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The term 'Ordnance Factories' was not officially used until 1890, after 
the publication of the official Morley Report (C 5116) 1887. Prior to 
this the official term used was 'Government Manufacturing Depart-
ments', sometimes abbreviated by the contemporary media to the 
'Woolwich Departments'. 
As not all the Ordnance Factories were located at Woolwich, and to 
produce a standardised description throughout this thesis, the term 
'Ordnance Factories' has been used. 
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Back&round 
This thesis is an examination of the reforms of the Ordnance Factories from 
1855 due to the development of a professional management ethos. In this context the 
thesis has three broad objectives: 
1. To assess the development of professional management in the Ordnance 
Factories based on double-entry book-keeping (DEB), costing and scientific 
management. 
2. To assess the origins of professional management with particular reference to 
the concept of the soldier technologist. 
3. To challenge the myth which has grown up identifying the Ministry of Muni-
tions as being the catalyst for management change, particularly in relation to 
costing. DEB and scientific management. 
In the light of these objectives, it is interesting that in 1993 the British Conser-
vative Chancellor of the Exchequer, during his Budget Address to the House of 
Commons, used the opportunity to say that "the present cash accounting system has 
served the government well over many years" (Cm 2929, July 1995: 1). However, 
this cash system had limitations as to the information which it provided, notably on 
capital, resource and budget accounting. The then Chancellor of the Exchequer in 
his 1995 Budget Address considered that the' proposed new government accounting 
system would probably prove to be the most important reform of the civil service 
accounting system during the past century. 
In this context the proposed new initiatives of Resource Accounting and 
Budgeting (RAB) (or Project CAPITAL as it is known in the Ministry of Defence 
(MoD)) into central government accounting are not new. Similar reforms were 
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introduced into the War Office controlled Ordnance Factories from 1862, a fact not 
known by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, nor did the Chancellor refer to the cost 
accounting experiment within the British Army from 1917 to 1925. This experiment 
had directly influenced the later Crick Report findings of 1950 into Forms of Govern-
ment Accounts (Cmnd 7929). Crick was averse to any form of commercial accounting 
principles being introduced into government accounts and cited the assumed failure 
of the earlier cost accounting experiment in the Army as a reason. 
This study has been conducted by first-hand research among archive files and 
documentary records located in the National Army Museum, the Indian and Oriental 
Museum of the British Library, the London School of Economics (LSE) and the Public 
Record Office. This first-hand research also included a scrutiny of published papers 
in contemporary institutional journals including The Accountant, Cost Accountant and 
The Incorporated Accountant, as well as the proceedings of the Institution of Civil 
Engineers. 
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Abstract 
This thesis is an exploration into the development and professionalism of 
management in the Ordnance Factories from 1855 to 1925. Writing in 1969, Ash-
worth commented that: 
"Naval historians have usually been concerned much more with war-
fare, politics, the careers of great leaders than with the business side 
of the service. The technical characteristics of warships and their 
annament have received much attention, but the economic question 
(apart from the simple demand for money), which have been insepar-
ably linked with technical advance, has attracted less study. Yet there 
are several ways in which the provision and running of a large and 
growing navy must have a peculiar significance and interest for the 
economic historian." (Ashworth, 1969: 491) 
This is also similar to the development of the Anny from 1855. 
Recent historians have focused on the Ministry of Munitions as the catalyst for 
management change within government departments. In particular Loft (1986, 1988, 
1994) and Marriner (1980) have explored the change in government accounting 
procedures within the Ministry of Munitions due to the proliferation of professional 
accountants into the wartime government as temporary civil servants. There is a 
notion in history that the pre-I915 War Office was regarded as an inefficient 
organisation whereas the temporary and monolithic Ministry of Munitions is heralded 
as the organisation of change, having the services of "the men of push and go" (Lloyd-
George, 1938; Adams, 1978). 
The refonns of the Ordnance Factories from 1862 were mainly accounting 
driven and the catalyst for these changes were probably due to the logistical failures 
of the British Anny in the Crimean War. The refonns themselves were undertaken 
by civil servants although there was a nucleus of military talent, the concept of the 
soldier technologist was never as influential as the American experience. However, 
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the Ordnance Factories did evolve into a factory system in the post-Crimean era, 
whereas the contemporary engineering industry was still dominated by the myth of 
the craft skill, subcontracting and a workshop ethos. 
By 1915 the Ordnance Factories reflected a high degree of professionalism 
within its management ethos which probably was better than that experienced by the 
contemporary private sector. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Setting the Scene: 
Purpose, Scope, Methodology 
and Underlying Factors 
Introduction 
Hypothesis 
The objective of this thesis is to examine the development of professional 
management in the public sector of the United Kingdom from 1855 to 1925. In 
particular, this thesis focuses on the War Office administered Ordnance Factories and 
especially the accounting dimensions which in tum initiated other managerial refonns. 
At the time of writing this thesis (1999), the Royal Ordnance Factories (ROF) have 
been privatised as Royal Ordnance and are part of British Aerospace munitions group. 
What was so special about the Ordnance Factories in the period under review? 
This thesis will demonstrate that in the period from 1855 to 1925 the Ordnance 
Factories were the largest engineering and technological factories in Britain, where 
integrated management techniques were developed from the emergence of three inter-
related concepts which were accounting-driven. These were: 
• Costing and accounting systems, including the double entry method of book-
keeping from 1864. 
• The production process and interchangeable parts of rifle manufacture, intro-
duced into the Royal Small Anns Factory, Enfield in 1857, and into the 
Woolwich-based Royal Gun Factory five years later in 1862. The process of 
interchangeability was based on "the American system of manufactures" 
(Hounshell, 1984, Appendix 1). 
• Scientific management, labour relations and flexibility, including pieceworking, 
first introduced into the Royal Carriage Department, Woolwich in 1855 (WO 
47/2755, p.1535). 
The main hypothesis being put forward is that a professional management ethos 
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was emerging within the Ordnance Factories from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, 
which was in many respects more sophisticated than in the contemporary private 
sector. One major intention of this thesis is to show how the varying areas of reform, 
accounting, production process control and industrial relations interacted. 
Another, although secondary dimension developed in this thesis relates to the 
concept of the soldier-technologist. Systems of military organisation and procedures 
provided a framework which was most closely allied to management systems because 
it involved planning and command systems. This framework was a better basis for 
the emergence of coherent systems of control than the uncertainties of the private 
sector. In America much credit has been given to the soldier-technologist (Chandler, 
1977; Hoskin and Macve, 1986, 1988, 1994, 1997). If the individuals are not as 
recognisable in Britain, the underlying systems are. The soldier-technologist compo-
nent within the British and Indian Ordnance Factory model tended to imply a more 
efficient management structure. It must also be appreciated that these reforms, along 
with contemporary naval administrative reforms, were conducted within a political 
climate of Victorian economic liberalism {Ashworth, 1969: 495-521} which acted as 
a catalyst for internal reform and efficiencies. This point is further discussed later. 
Another secondary argument put forward in this thesis is that the initiatives 
established in the First World War, primarily in the Ministry of Munitions, were 
inherited from the pre-1914 Ordnance Factories. Recent research concerning ordnance 
and munitions supply and the Ministry of Munitions has tended to ignore the pre-1914 
reforms, as did the official though unpublished History of the Ministry of Munitions 
(Adams, 1978; Hinton, 1973; Loft, 1988, 1994; Marriner, 1994). 
The aim of this thesis is to explain how the separate areas of reform were 
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synthesised and interfaced with each other. Such reforms include accounting, produc-
tion process reforms and industrial relations. 
• Accounting reforms were the driving force leading to the other reforms. 
Chapter 4 will explain how new accounting systems were introduced, first into 
the Royal Arsenal, Woolwich. The accounting reforms were set against the 
backdrop of the immediate Crimean War era and the advent of the multi-
calibred Armstrong Gun and the development of the 'American system of 
manufacture' at the Enfield Rifle Factory. The accounting reforms were 
emerging contemporaneously with the rapid development of a factory produc-
tion system within the Ordnance Factories, particularly the Royal Small Arms 
Factory and the Royal Gun Factory. 
• The development of the factory system in the Ordnance Factories had a major 
impact on the production process and its control. Engineers such as Arm-
strong, Anderson and Fraser reorganised the culture of workshop production 
to one of conveyor belt production where the concept of accounting, 
accountability and control was accepted very quickly. 
• This was achieved through an industrial relations process of the paternalistic 
employer concept, pieceworking, job rotation, scientific management and 
better-than-average wages compared to the private engineering / metal industry. 
There was also scope for promotion of shop floor workers to clerical and 
supervisory grades. Throughout most of the period from 1855 to 1925, the 
workforce experienced a long-term career due to long production runs. 
All three components were closely linked and interfaced with each other. The 
major driving force was, however, the accounting reforms. Urwick and Brech, almost 
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fifty years ago, recognised that "the history of control in management is the story of 
evolution of accounting and cost accounting" (t 953, vol.2: 15). 
The complementary relationship between accounting, production process control 
and industrial relations established principles within the Victorian Ordnance Factories 
or conveyor-belt production and interchangeability, scientific management and labour 
flexibility. Such techniques produced cheap and efficient munitions on long production 
runs, compared with those produced under contract. The catalyst for these reforms 
lay in the political climate of the post-Crimean War Victorian society. This was the 
heyday of Victorian liberalism as manifest in laissez-faire doctrine. Victorian liberal-
ism was driven by an ever parsimonious Treasury and the Victorian taxpayer who was 
after "more bang for his buck". 
Finally, an exploration of the reforms of the Ordnance Factories prior to 1915 
is also important because it can expose some of the myths of history relating to the 
Ministry of Munitions which have become part of the legend and incorporated into 
the historiography of welfarism and the First World War. This is particularly so with 
the work of Hinton and the first Shop Stewards' Movement (1973). 
Questions to be addressed 
The fundamental questions to be addressed in this thesis are as follows: 
• Were the management reforms of the Ordnance Factories a result of the 
transition from workshop to factory production from 1855 onwards? The 
reforms from 1855 onwards were similar to those of the American Federal 
Armories and the private American armories and other enterprises from the 
mid-nineteenth century onwards, on which Chandler commented: "These 
- 4 -
processes differed from earlier ones in their potential for exploiting the unprec-
edented cost advantages of the economies of scale and scope II (Chandler, 1994: 
21). 
• Was the fact that the Ordnance Factories in Britain were public sector institu-
tions a major factor in the developing management reforms which occurred 
from 1855 onwards? In this context, consideration will be given to the failure 
of these reforms to develop in the private sector in Britain due to the con-
straints of family capitalism (Payne, 1967; Chandler, 1994). Also Cooper 
(1984) relates that British entrepreneurs and craftsmen failed to appreciate or 
to humanise new technology. She cites the failure of the Portsmouth system 
of manufacture pioneered at the Naval Dockyard, Portsmouth as an example 
of this. 
• Was the prevailing political economic system of laissez-faire a contributory 
factor in the development reforms of the Ordnance Factories? 
• Who were the internal and external innovators of the reforms? 
• How far did the role of the soldier-technologist have a major bearing on the 
reforms of the Ordnance Factories? 
• What were the major differences between the management of the Ordnance 
Factories and the engineering I metal industry in the private sector? 
• Were the alleged reforms as introduced in the Ministry of Munitions after 1915 
already well established in the Ordnance Factories prior to 19141 
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ManaKement history and its relationship with economic history and other related 
areas of history 
Management history cannot be explored in isolation and must be seen as part 
of business history. However, the purpose of management history is to explore how 
historical players, such as entrepreneurs, managers, supervisors and indeed military 
officers and civil servants utilised the factors of production to the best advantage of 
the enterprise or, in the context of a public institution, the taxpayer. Nor did these 
personnel exist in a vacuum. Both historically and in a contemporary setting, busi-
nesses and public sector institutions are required to conform to the rules established 
by legal processes. The demand for their goods and services may be influenced 
through domestic and international consumer demand, the shape of the economy and 
the standard of living. Political ideology can also influence the decisions and success 
or survival of businesses and their managers. 
In this respect the nineteenth-century Ordnance Factories existed in a climate 
of political and economic liberalism where the prevailing philosophy was to minimise 
the role of the state. This philosophy re-emerged in the late twentieth century under 
the premiership of Mrs. Thatcher, 1979-90, with monetarism, privatisation, a reduc-
tion of the state role and the support of the enterprise society (Jeremy, 1998: 9). The 
fundamental difference between the laissez-faire philosophy and Thatcherism in terms 
of the Ordnance Factories was that they not only survived from 1855 but actually 
increased in size and technological support, whereas under Mrs. Thatcher's administra-
tion they were privatised. 
War itself is a major factor in the influence of business development and 
activity as the previous factors do change, Le. trade embargoes, increased state 
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intervention and the decisions to manufacture munitions rather than domestic goods 
and services. Total war as experienced during the First and Second World Wars 
created opportunities and encouraged business managers in the private sector to move 
into government. The influence of major entrepreneurs and industrial managers who 
worked for the government in both wars (i.e. the Ministry of Munitions 1915-19, the 
Anny and Navy Contracts Departments, the Ministry of Supply and Ministry of 
Aircraft Production 1939-45) was enonnous. 
But in the acclaim of the private sector influence in the realm of government 
in both World Wars, the role and success of the Ordnance Factories from 1855 
onwards has been neglected. Indeed, a supposition has grown to suggest that they 
were inefficient. It is the aim of this thesis to address this neglect. 
Generally, managers act and react to certain internal and external situations. 
Management history complements business history in this by attempting to analyse 
and explain how and why managers adopted certain procedures, including tool such 
as accounting, production process control and labour relations protocol. In tenns of 
the Ordnance Factories, certain management practices developed with the transition 
of the production process of munitions into a factory-orientated system in the immedi-
ate post-Crimean War era. For example, the theories of F. W. Taylor in America 
during the latter part of the nineteenth century and the development of scientific 
management, only synthesised existing piecemeal practices into a written and recorded 
body of knowledge. 
Indeed, Bravennan refers to the fact that: 
"the use of experimental methods in the study of work did not begin 
with Taylor; in fact, the self-use of such methods by the craftsman is 
part of the very practice of a craft." (Braverman, 1998: 61) 
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Braverman considered that: 
"the publication of management manuals, the discussions of the prob-
lems of management and the increasingly sophisticated approach taken 
in practice in the second half of the nineteenth century lend support to 
the conclusions of the historians of the scientific management movement 
that Taylor was the culmination of a pre-existing trend." (Braverman, 
1998: 61-62) 
To support his argument, Braverman quoted Urwick and Brech as follows: 
"What Taylor did was not to invent something quite new, but to 
synthesise and present as a reasonable coherent whole ideas which had 
been germinating and gathering force in Great Britain and the United 
States throughout the nineteenth century. He gave to a disconnected 
series of initiatives and experiments a philosophy and a title." (Urwick 
and Brech, quoted by Braverman, 1998: 62) 
Traditionally, economic history as a discipline has explored international, 
national and regional development in a historical fonn. Economic history attempts 
to analyse why certain nations or regions develop faster than others, or the causes of 
swings of the business cycle. For example, economic historians have attempted to 
explain whether there was a depression in the British economy from 1871 to 1895 
(known controversially as the Great Depression) (Saul, 1985). Factors in this debate 
include the increase in industrialisation of France, Gennany and America, which 
experienced a second industrial revolution. For the first time the British economy was 
suffering from intense competition, particularly in its staple industries. 
Labour history has traditionally been recognised as a subdivision of economic 
history. Indeed, labour history has had a long relationship with orthodox economic 
history. However, labour history tends to represent the history of class conflict and 
systems of individual control. In relation to this thesis, which argues that the post-
Crimean refonns of the Ordnance Factories and the onset of interchangeability, the 
work of Bravennan proves useful. Bravennan's Labor and Monopoly Capital, The 
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Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century, first published in 1974, has by 1998 
entered its twenty-fifty anniversary edition. 
Bravennan's thesis challenged the orthodox interpretation of work as it evolved 
into the technological age with the notion of 'deskilling', by the challenge that reskill-
ing actually meant deskilling. Bravennan is influenced by Marx and his critique 
encouraged: 
" ... a generation of historians stimulated by E.P. Thompson's The 
Making of the English Working Class (1964) to explore labor history 
from radically new perspectives drew heavily on Bravennan in the 
1970s. In sociology, an entire body of literature inspired by Bravennan 
arose, now known familiarly as the labour process debate." (Braver-
man, 1998; new introduction by J.B. Foster, xiii) 
Much research relating to labour history reflects the conflict of a growing urban 
industrialised working class together with a growing middle class of entrepreneurs and 
managers of the working environment. This is evident from the research of other 
distinguished labour historians, notably Hinton, Hobsbawm and Pollard. 
Accounting history has been recognised for about a hundred years. Its impact 
in Britain is still somewhat marginal although its influence is growing. Orthodox 
economic historians have not fully considered the role of accounting as a tool of 
analysis within the broader field of economic history. Indeed, Pollard considered that 
the IIpractice of using accounts as direct aids to management was not one of the 
achievements of the British industrial revolution" (Pollard, 1965: 288). This was 
despite the earlier pioneering work of Roll (1930) into cost accounting systems 
employed at the Boulton and Watt Soho Factory at the tum of the nineteenth century. 
Later research has tended to negate Pollard's viewpoint. The work of McKend-
rick (1970) again suggests that Wedgwood extensively used cost accounting techniques 
at his Pottery during the late eighteenth century. This later research has pointed to 
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the fact that accounts and accounting were management tools used in the British 
industrial revolution; for example, Stone (1973) explored an early English cost 
accounting system that existed at the Charlton Cotton Mills, Manchester in 1810. 
Boynes and Edwards (1995) again researched into the existence of the costing systems 
in the coal, iron and steel industries to 1900. In 1989, Edwards published an up to 
date review of recent knowledge and understanding of industrial cost accounting 
developments in Britain to 1830. 
Business history in Britain has evolved since the early 1950s from company 
histories written by the companies themselves, via retired directors or senior managers 
who could be trusted with the Whig interpretation of their respective company 
histories. Most of these histories tended to be unsatisfactory relating no more than 
perhaps short biographies of important members within the evolution of the company. 
Such histories lacked appraisal or any analytical approach. 
The development of business history in the USA over the last thirty years has 
tended to shift the emphasis away from company histories towards generic themes, 
notably through Chandler (1962, 1977, 1990). Chandler moved the focus of business 
history towards organisations, particularly through the corporate management revol-
ution rather than through the traditional approach of appraising the historical signifi-
cance of entrepreneurs. The perception of Chandler's research was through the 
emergence of a bureaucratic firm together with its managerial hierarchies. This is 
evident with factory production, particularly of the Federal Armories and the American 
railroad system. Both were influenced by contemporary reforms of the American 
military, particularly the Ordnance Department and the Corps of Engineers. The focus 
of Chandler's interpretation of business history was through technical change in the 
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nineteenth century, widening markets, mass consumer demand, which thrust the shift 
of production from craft to mass production. The growth of the demand for high 
volume production and distribution resulted in the growth of corporate managerial 
hierarchies to explore strategies lowering their transaction costs through absorbing 
more and more transactions into their own entrepreneurial organisations. Thus 
bureaucratic activity replaced market activity. 
Management history is a relatively new concept within the wider field of 
economic and social history. Although the history of management exists within 
business history, there tends to be a lack of analysis between the business and the 
manager in the role and activity of management, for example the socio-economic 
origins, education and training of the manager. Recent research by Gourvish has 
begun to make an inroad into this void, particularly with his account of Mark Huish 
and the London and North Western Railway (Gourvish, 1972). A later paper by 
Gourvish examined the background of senior railway executive managers from 1850 
to 1922 (Gourvish, 1973). Again, Gourvish has linked business and management 
history through his research into British railway history and its development from 1850 
into a structure where there was a divorce of ownership from control. Gourvish 
commented that: 
"By the 1850s. however, a measure of progress was clear. While 
British industry in general was centred on the family firm or partner-
ship, companies such as the London and North Eastern Railway and, 
later, the North Eastern led the way in developing line and staff pro-
cedures, a delegation of authority to salaried managers, and a more 
comprehensive understanding of the complexities of accounting and 
costing in the modem business sense (Gourvish, 1972; Irving, 1976)." 
(Gourvish, 1980: 10) 
However, more recent research by Brech (yet to be published), who has begun a study 
concerning the development of management in its historical context, has continued the 
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earlier remedy by Gourvish of linking business and management history into a more 
cohesive relationship. 
The link between management history and accounting, business and labour 
history is more fully appreciated in the area of scientific management. Braverman 
argues that: 
"The classical economists were the first to approach the problems of 
the organisation of labour within capitalist relations of production from 
a theoretical point of view. They may thus be called the first manage-
ment experts, and their work was continued in the latter part of the 
Industrial Revolution by such men as Andrew Ure and Charles Babb-
age." (Braverman, 1998: 59) 
Braverman suggested that: 
"Between these men and the next step, the comprehensive formulation 
of management theory in the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies, there lies a gap of more than half a century during which there 
was an enormous growth in the size of enterprises, the beginnings of 
the monopolistic organisation of industry, and the purposive and sys-
tematic application of science to production." (Braverman, 1998: 59) 
In relation to the Ordnance Factories which it is argued in this thesis restructured into 
factory-orientated production centres within a decade after the termination of the 
Crimean War, the analogy between factory structure, hierarchical line and staff 
function, the establishment of work measurement and design is very apparent. 
Braverman, in his original first edition, suggested that: 
"The technical subordination of the worker to the uniform motion of 
the instruments of labour, and the peculiar composition of the working 
group, consists as it does of individuals of both sexes and all ages, 
gives rise to a barrack-like discipline, which is elaborated into a com-
plete system in the factory and brings the previously mentioned labour 
of superintendence into its fullest development, thereby dividing 
workers into manual labourers and overseers, into the private soldiers 
and the NCOs of an industrial army." (Braverman, 1974: 549) 
The new names associated with management history and who, perhaps, viewed 
the notion of management with a less jaundiced viewpoint as portrayed by Braverman, 
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are Pollard and Chandler. Pollard's research, as published in The Genesis of Manage-
ment, explored the rise of the 'professional' manager as the individual entrepreneur 
in the early part of the British industrial revolution. Chandler's research explored a 
different phenomenon in the rise of the salaried professional manager in the context 
of an occupational grouping in America during the second industrial revolution. 
Pollard, with his Genesis of Modem Management, written and published in the 
mid 1960s, "is still judged by many to be the most stimulating single text on the 
subject, and its analysis ranges much wider than is suggested by its title" (The Guard-
ian, 24 November 1998). As part of his analysis, Pollard assessed the development 
of management in the Admiralty dockyards during the eighteenth century in an attempt 
to identify the emergence of a managerial class. The Genesis of Modem Management 
made an impressive sally into this unknown area over thirty years ago but this 
pioneering work has not been further developed. 
However, the work of Chandler (1977, 1990) has pioneered the historical 
interest in the origins and development of the management revolution mainly as it 
evolved in America. The Visible Hand (1977) was a study of the development of the 
management revolution in America during the nineteenth century. Chandler's research 
focuses on the development of the professional manager as the corporate development 
moved towards the separation of ownership from control. This put the role of the 
professional salaried manager in a new focus. Before World War II, Britain's mana-
gers had much less professional status when compared to the American experience. 
Chandler's Visible Hand highlights the importance of the American military (the 
Ordnance Department and Corps of Engineers) and the role of the Federal Armories 
at Springfield and Harper's Ferry in this development as previously mentioned. 
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Chandler's later work, Scale and Scope (1990), was based on a historical comparison 
of the new forms of capitalism as manifest in the United States and Europe during the 
second half of the nineteenth century. Chandler refers to the advanced development 
of American and German entrepreneurship and management structures in the second 
half of the nineteenth century, compared to the backwardness of British 
entrepreneurship and management. According to Chandler, British entrepreneurs 
failed to make the three-pronged investment into marketing, manufacturing and 
management, whereas both American and German entrepreneurs had exploited this 
much earlier (Chandler, 1994: 235). 
Chandler (1977) and his contemporaries (Payne, 1967; Coleman, 1973) have 
commented on the failure of British capitalism and entrepreneurship during the 
nineteenth century and these will be touched on in this thesis. However, the emerg-
ence of the Ordnance Factories from 1856 onwards lay outside the parameters of the 
failure of British private capitalism as they were state-owned institutions. This may 
indeed have played a major part in their industrial and managerial success to 1925. 
The emphasis of management of the Ordnance Factories is also important 
because the contemporary engineering I metal industry in Britain reflected small-scale 
production capabilities and apparent entrepreneurial failure (Chandler, 1996: 275-83). 
Chandler states that: 
"Although there were few entrepreneurial opportunities within Britain 
in the oil and meat processing industries, there were many in mass-
produced standardised light machinery, electrical equipment, chemicals 
and metals. In these industries British entrepreneurs failed to grasp the 
opportunities in the new technologies that had opened up precisely 
because they failed to make the necessary inter-related, three-pronged 
investment in production, marketing and management. These opportun-
ities within Britain were seized instead by Germans and Americans." 
(Chandler, 1996: 27) 
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It is part of the argument of this thesis that the rapid development of the 
original government workshops (under the control of the Board of Ordnance prior to 
1854) into a comprehensive factory system from 1858 is in marked contrast to the 
engineering / metal industry in the private sector and an instance where Britain did 
grasp the new systems noted by Chandler. However, despite the success of the 
Ordnance Factories from 1858, this success has not attracted the research interest from 
historians that it deserves. 
Previous research in the history of the public sector 
Before proceeding to the research methods to be used in this thesis, it is 
perhaps pertinent to illuminate the concept of history, particularly in terms of account-
ing and business history, and criticisms of the existing state of play. 
Other areas of the public sector, particularly central government departments, 
have similarly not attracted the attention of historians. In particular, and contemporary 
with the Ordnance Factories, are the naval dockyards. Indeed. the reforms of the 
naval dockyards from 1834 by Sir James Graham, First Lord of the Admiralty, 
became the model for the reforms of the Ordnance Factories from the mid-nineteenth 
century. Ashworth's paper of 1969 is an example of how economic history can relate 
to a public sector organisation. Ashworth in particular wrote on the economic impact 
of the naval dockyards in the late nineteenth century (1969: 491-525). 
Hobsbawm briefly mentioned the role of the ordnance factories, suggesting that 
"the pioneering role of the government's own establishments must not be forgotten. 
During the Napoleonic Wars they anticipated. amongst other things. conveyor belts 
and the canning industry" (Hobsbawm. 1974: 50). 
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Again, Hobsbawm refers to some of the leading players in the industrial 
revolution who gained their experiences in the government's naval and ordnance 
establishments. For example, men like: 
"Henry Cort, who revolutionised iron manufacture, began in the 1760s 
as a Navy agent, anxious to improve the quality of the British product 
in connection with the supply of iron to the Navy. Henry Maudsley, 
the pioneer of machine-tools, began his career in the Woolwich Arsenal 
and his fortunes (like those of the great engineer, Marc Isambard 
BruneI, formerly of the French navy) remained closely bound up with 
naval contracts." (Hobsbawm, 1974: 50) 
Marc Brunei, together with Henry Maudsley and Samuel Bentham, also 
pioneered what Cooper has called "the Portsmouth System of Manufacture", in the 
production of pulley blocks for the Royal Navy at Portsmouth Dockyard from 1805 
(Cooper, 1984). 
One history of the Royal Arsenal at Woolwich has been written, in 1963, 
compiled by a senior military officer and former deputy Master General of the 
Ordnance (MGO) Brigadier O.F.S. Hogg. Regimental and military histories are often 
written in the same style as traditional business histories as defined previously by 
Ferguson, and Hogg's history of the Royal Arsenal exemplifies this. Also the multi-
volume, unpublished History of the Ministry of Munitions is written in a similar vein. 
Ashworth (1969) wrote a paper on the late Victorian naval administration. Here, 
Ashworth was very careful to write his paper as an economic history rather than as 
a naval or technological paper. 
Another criticism of accounting, business and labour historians is their lack 
of interest in the public sector generally, and in the civil service and government 
departments in particular. With particular regard to accounting history, Anderson 
reinforces this criticism suggesting that "few scholars have dedicated themselves to 
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management accounting and even fewer have looked into government accounting, 
central or local" (1994: 67). 
Both Loft (1986, 1988, 1994) and Marriner (1994) have explored the area of 
accountancy and the First World War. Yet they leave gaps in their research as to the 
origins of the reforms of the Ministry of Munitions. Loft in particular tends to 
overplay the role of professional accountant in these reforms. Again, some of these 
gaps exposed by the research undertaken by Marriner and Loft are explored in this 
thesis, which hopes to give an adequate explanation to the origins of the reforms of 
the Ministry of Munitions. 
A back.:round to the Ordnance Factories 
A more comprehensive history of the British Ordnance Factories is given in 
Chapter 3. Suffice to state by way of introduction that the Ordnance Factories, or 
Government Manufacturing Departments as they were known until 1887, had existed 
since the late eighteenth century, the Royal Laboratory being formed in 1696 although 
the origins of the Arsenal at Woolwich Warren can be traced back to the reign of 
Elizabeth I (1558-1603). From 1560 the Board of Ordnance had storehouses located 
on Woolwich Warren and in 1588 guns were erected on Woolwich Warren as a 
temporary measure for defence of the Thames (SUPP 5/1 037). According to Hogg: 
"The Royal Arsenal can be considered to have begun on the 13th June 1667 when 
Prince Rupert was commissioned by Charles II to fortify Woolwich Warren as a 
defence against the Dutch fleet" (SUPP 5/1037). The origins of the Royal Gunpowder 
Factory at Waltham Abbey can also trace its origins to Tudor times. 
The role of the Ordnance Factories was to manufacture and supply munitions 
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and procurement for the regular Army and Royal Navy. Although the Royal Navy 
had its own ordnance factories, cannon, gun carriages, guns and ammunition were 
supplied to the Admiralty by the Royal Brass Foundry and then from 1860 by the Gun 
Factory at Woolwich. 
An examination of the accounting-driven management reforms of the Ordnance 
Factories is the key to understanding the development of public sector management 
generally in his historical context. Also, in particular such a study answers questions 
originally set through the previous research conducted by Marriner and Loft. 
A number of major reforms within the War Office and the British Army from 
1855 onwards were as a result of the experiences of the Crimean War and the close 
relationship formed between the (unusually) allied British and French armies reflected 
in contracts and tenders for the procurement of military supplies and in French rifled 
artillery which proved so successful in the breaching of the Redan at the seige of 
Sevastopol. 
The superiority of the French equipment had a considerable history and must 
be seen in terms of the French enlightenment in the eighteenth century and as it was 
manifested in the American War of Independence. This included the standardisation 
of artillery and arms uniformity in general. Also the French (as were the Prussians) 
were superior in relation to military education in the nineteenth century, as illustrated 
in the Ecole Poly technique. 
Smith argues that: 
"Since the Revolutionary War, French artillerists and engineers had 
exercised a pervasive influence on the United States Army. Through 
them, engineering treatises, testing procedures, arms designs and 
educational techniques had made their way to the American shores and 
were assimilated by native officers. Indeed, whenever the United States 
needed to revise and improve its military program, it looked primarily 
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to the 'French system' for its appropriate models. This practice con-
tinued until well into the 1840s." (Smith, 1987: 44-5) 
The transition of the Ordnance Factories after 1856 into factory orientated 
production centres, together with the development of line and staff functions, occurred 
within a decade. The reasons for this transition are complex, but the failure of the 
British land army in the Crimean War is a major cause of reform, as has been stated. 
However, the reason for reform can go back earlier to the Great Exhibition at Crystal 
Palace in 1851. Here, American gunsmiths displayed their small arms constructed 
by the process of interchangeability. 
The resulting Board of Ordnance Commission visitation to the American 
armories (including the Federal Armories of Springfield and Harper's Ferry) resulted 
in the construction of the Royal Small Arms Factory in 1858, followed by the Shell 
and Paper Factory at the Royal Laboratory and by the Royal Gun Factory, both on 
the Royal Arsenal site at Woolwich. 
A contemporary writer, the locomotive engineer John Fernie, praised the 
manufacture of duplicate machines in wood and iron at the new Enfield Rifle Factory 
in a paper written for the Institution of Civil Engineers in 1863 (Institution 0/ Civil 
Engineers Minutes o/Proceedings, vo1.22, 1862-63: 604). Fernie's application of this 
observation was to introduce interchangeability into railway locomotive construction. 
This was not unusual: the manufacture of cannon included the casting in a mould of 
two halves of a cannon, then boring the barrel. This process or skill was equally 
adaptable to the casting and boring of cylinders for both static steam pumps and 
locomotives. 
The design and construction of the post-1856 Ordnance Factories was carried 
out by James Alexander Cameron Hay, who spent all his career from apprentice 
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draughtsman to civil engineer in the employment of the War Office. These themes 
and the personalities behind the reforms are further explored in Chapter 5. 
Research approaches 
Anderson has identified three research methodologies appropriate to accounting, 
business and financial history: (i) traditional, (ii) critical and (iii) positive (1994: 70-1): 
i) The traditional school relates towards describing and interpreting the past. It 
comprises of research "which has generated data regarding different forms of 
accounting and accounting practice over time" (Anderson, 1994: 68). 
ii) The critical perspective, according to Anderson, is a major recent development 
in the study of accounting history and attempts "to place the subject more 
firmly in its historical context" (Anderson, 1994: 72). The main thrust of the 
critical perspective approach is that accounting (nor management) should not 
be seen as a neutral or technical process but it should be perceived in a wider, 
more complex process within social, political, economic, technological and 
organisational factors, which can be in direct conflict with one another 
(Anderson, 1994: 72). 
iii) The positive approach views "the objective of theory as explaining and predict-
ing accounting practice" (Anderson, 1994: 75). Anderson suggests that much 
reliance for this approach is placed on economic theories "which are largely 
drawn from the neo-classical perspective" (Anderson, 1994: 75). Anderson 
also suggests that "the importance of this is clear, given the (sometimes harsh) 
criticism of some traditional research as fact-finding antiquarianism. In 
addition, the problems addressed are likely to be of contemporary relevance" 
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(Anderson, 1994: 75). 
To test the hypothesis of this research, the methodology used will be a critical 
perspective of the British ordnance establishments from 1855 to 1925. The critical 
perspective of this research is to place the reforms of the Ordnance Factories more 
firmly in their "historical context" (Anderson, 1994: 72). Although Anderson was 
writing about research methods in accounting history, these adapt well to management 
history for, as Anderson suggests: 
"The critical perspective is a major recent development in the study of 
accounting [and management] history which attempts to place the 
subject more firmly in its historical context." (Anderson, 1994: 72-3) 
This is an important issue for a study of the management structures of the British 
ordnance establishments. Advocates of critical perspectives of history have attempted 
to use theories of a power-knowledge relationship, notably by Michael Foucault (1970, 
1972, 1977, 1980). According to Anderson, Foucault: 
" . .. introduces a notion of a discourse of accounting which is 'a lan-
guage expressed in terms of accounting that, as it changes through 
time, enables us to see, within accounting, different phenomena, and 
by seeing them, controlling them'." (Anderson, 1994: 73; quoting 
Napier, 1989: 245) 
The research of Hoskin and Macve (1986, 1988, 1994, 1997) on the American 
development of accounting through the reforms of the Springfield Armory is important 
in the context of this thesis. The origins of interchangeability at the Royal Small Arms 
Factory, Enfield was influenced by the Springfield Federal Armory, as will be stated 
later. In addition. although there was no exact equivalent military academy in Britain 
parallel to West Point, the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich was nearest to a 
West Point model. The graduates from Woolwich became the soldier-technologists 
in the British Army. but their influence was not so great in Britain as was the counter-
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part soldier-technologist in America, particularly the relationship between the US 
Corps of Engineers and the American railroad system (O'Connell, 1987; Hoskin and 
Maeve, 1997). 
During the period of the British industrial revolution, the application of 
accounting both as a commercial and management tool, was limited. Its use lay in 
very rudimentary forms of cost control and in financial stewardship. Accounting was 
used as a tool which "... aimed to conserve loss rather than maximise gain. It did 
not operate as part of something one might call 'management'" (Hoskin and Macve, 
1994: 7). Chandler emphasises this and argues that a trend in British entrepreneurship 
was "accounting for failure" (1996: 248). There are numerous reasons why British 
capitalism did not develop as in contemporary America and Europe. The" answer to 
this historical question is enormously complex" (Chandler, 1996: 284), but it is worth 
noting at this stage that the structure of British capitalism during the nineteenth century 
reflected family capitalism and that entrepreneurs were producing successfully to a 
localised market which demanded craft orientated goods rather than national markets 
which required economies of scale and production (Payne, 1967; see also Chandler, 
1996: 234, 294). 
The transition to modem corporate structures occurred first of all in America. 
Chandler defines this through specific characteristics: "It contains many distinct units 
and is managed by a hierarchy of salaried executives" (1977: 1). Chandler identifies 
these beginnings of modem business thus: "Single-unit management had its genesis 
in the United States at the Springfield Armory" (1977: 75; see also Hoskin and 
Macve, 1994: 80). 
Although the soldier-technologist concept as it emerged in America was very 
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influential in the development of modem corporate structures, the soldier-technologist 
concept as it developed in Britain was less significant in the private sector. Never-
theless, the scientific corps of the British Army (the Royal Artillery and Royal Engin-
eers) were influential in both the British and Indian Ordnance Factories and indeed 
more generally in the Indian Public Works Department. The influence of the Royal 
Engineers permeates into the railways both in Britain and in India. 
The managerial reforms of the British Ordnance Factories occurred in the 
immediate post-Crimean War era from 1856. The outcome of the Crimean War itself 
was the fulcrum of reform, as was previously noted. But of equal importance was 
the prevailing doctrine of Victorian liberalism (Ashworth, 1969). This point is further 
explored later in this chapter. 
Historioaraphy and research sources 
The initial enquiry into this research included a historiographical search. It 
has been suggested that the historiography of the Ordnance Factories generally is poor 
and reference has already been made to Hogg (1963). Trebilcock wrote on war and 
industrial mobilisation two decades ago (1975) and his earlier papers (1966, 1969) 
corresponded to rearmament and the government relationship to the cordite firms 
(1968). However, the emphasis of Trebilcock's research was more with the private 
sector rather than the Ordnance Factories. Along with Adams (1978) and Loft (1994), 
Trebilcock's writings suggest that the Ordnance Factories were less efficient than the 
corresponding private sector apparently because they were public sector organisations. 
Trebilcock describes the second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) as the last of 
the laissez-faire wars. He stated that: 
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"The restrictive factor was the state of the [Royal] Arsenal's equipment; 
it was not fully up to standard and its forging capacity was markedly 
deficient. The fact that the Royal Gun Factory did not have a drasti-
cally busy war and made few heavy guns - while orders were heaped 
on the trade and the anny in the field cried out for heavy guns - is 
explained by bottlenecks within the state factories." (Trebilcock, 1975: 
147) 
The traditional role and purpose of the public sector ordnance factories was: 
to carry the burden of munitions demand only at the commencement 
of a war and until such time as the private sector shifted into higher 
gear." (Trebilcock, 1975: 147) 
The ratcheting-up policy of the private sector failed partly because of the 
concept of laissez-faire of the private sector. Unlike the state Ordnance Factories, 
the private sector rarely maintained idle though expensive reserve production lines 
(mothballed until a demand by war made them operational). Trebilcock argues that 
the military authorities who, reporting to the post-1902 'post mortem' enquiries of the 
second Anglo-Boer War "were loath to admit that their factories - seen as anny 
'commands' - had shared in the production problems of the private trade." Both 
Annstrong's Elswick factory and at Vickers, government inspectors found these 
private munitions factories in disarray, "clogged with work, expanding haphazardly 
in a desperate attempt to provide manufacturing space" (Trebilcock, 1975: 146). 
Despite the universal munitions production problems of 1900 (to be repeated again 
in 1914), the state-owned Ordnance Factories did fare better in 1900 than. did their 
private sector counterparts. Although not totally efficient, the ratchet effect was better 
met at the Ordnance Factories than at either Armstrong's or Vickers. Trebilcock did 
not mention that the post mortem report of 1906, the Murray Committee Report (Cd 
3626) recommended the removal of the reserve production facilities of the Ordnance 
Factories. This recommendation was initiated by the Master General of Ordnance 
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(MGO), Sir Frederick Hadden, between 1910 and 1914 and was a major contributory 
factor towards the far larger shell scandal of 1914-15. 
It must also be remembered that the large private munitions factories, notably 
Armstrong Whitworth and Vickers, produced for the international arms market, a 
market more lucrative perhaps than short-term War Office and Admiralty contracts. 
Indeed, Warren has suggested that the privatised "armament firms were pioneer 
multinationals" (Warren, 1989: xiii). The Ordnance Factories only produced muni-
tions for the Regular and Reserve Army, the Admiralty, the Indian Army, the Egyp-
tian Army and British Colonial Armies. There was no requisitioning of munitions 
destined for the international arms market during the second Anglo-Boer War - this 
did happen however in 1914, under emergency legislation (Defence of the Realm Act). 
In relation to accounting history many of the published works tend to be at a 
micro-level only and relate to the major institutions. Indeed, appreciation of the 
historiography of accounting history is critical of these house histories but Anderson 
is more complimentary of Edgar Jones and his evolutionary history of Ernst and 
Whinney (Jones, 1981). Ashworth achieved a similar result with his paper on the 
economic impact of the naval dockyards in the late nineteenth century (1969). 
A useful exercise is to pursue primary source data previously explored by 
earlier researchers. It is here that there may be a conflict between different studies 
of researchers in the same broad discipline. Carnegie and Napier suggest that: 
"The important function of documenting accounting's past was carried 
out not just by self-identified accounting historians. Economic and 
social historians frequently document and use accounting materials, 
though their interest in these is often motivated by questions from their 
own discipline rather than specifically accounting-related issues. This 
has often allowed subsequent accounting historians to revisit and rein-
terpret archives that had been fully exploited by earlier generations. 
For example, both Fleischman and his colleagues (Fleischman and 
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Parker, 1991; Fleischman and Tyson, 1993) and Edwards and his 
collaborators (Edwards, 1989b; Edwards and Newall, 1991) have 
reviewed much of the archival evidence from which the economic 
historian Sydney Pollard (1965: 248) concluded that 'The practice of 
using accounts as direct aids to management was not one of the ach-
ievements of the British industrial revolution'. The more recent 
research draws different conclusions: 'Cost accounting practices during 
the industrial revolution were far more developed and widely utilised 
than many renowned scholars have believed'." (Fleischman and Tyson, 
1993: 515; Carnegie and Napier, 1996: 14) 
Anderson (1994: 81-2) refers to difficulties in relation to accounting history, 
which include: 
"a) The physical location of source material, involving time and 
cost; 
b) The assessment as to how typical the sample chosen is of the 
total population; 
c) The way in which to avoid unnecessary bias, to produce an 
impartial view; 
d) To recall that documentation of past events will, in all probabil-
ity, be incomplete." (1994: 81-2) 
Although Anderson was referring more to accounting history, these practical diffi-
culties are also relevant to management history and were experienced in the compila-
tion of this thesis. 
Records exist of the Ordnance Factories since the mid nineteenth century. The 
accounting records and other documents are preserved and centralised in the Public 
Record Office at Kew. In relation to the public sector, the records of the Ordnance 
Factories are perhaps more complete and numerous than the corresponding private 
sector business organisations, thus their accessibility and centralised physical location 
are more efficiently retrievable in time and cost and perhaps more complete than a 
contemporary private sector organisation. However, there are gaps in the primary 
source data and this is due to war damage both in the First and Second World Wars. 
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For example, the Royal Arsenal, Woolwich and the Royal Gunpowder Factory, 
Waltham Abbey were targeted by zeppelins in 1915, gotha bombers in 1917, the 
Lufftwaffe in 1940-2 and by VI and V2 rockets in 1944 and 1945. 
Bearing this in mind. this thesis has followed the consideration of Carnegie and 
Napier. who suggest that any research into the accounting and management history 
of the public sector should consider the following areas as being relevant for study 
in as far as they relate to the central arguments of this thesis: 
"a) a description and analysis of surviving accounting records [This 
also includes the management records of the Ordnance Fac-
tories. including Parliamentary Papers. official reports and the 
original internal papers of the Ordnance Factories]; 
b) the examination of the literature surrounding public accounts; 
c) a search for the various motivations. political and otherwise. 
which shaped the public accountability systems; 
d) a review of the history of ideas concerning public accounta-
bility." (1996: 26) 
As this thesis is concerned with management. which includes the public accountability 
of the Ordnance Factories. these areas identified by Carnegie and Napier have been 
extended to reflect this. Other supporting primary source data has been interpreted 
along with the accounts of the Ordnance Factories. which include: 
• British Parliamentary papers in relation to this study. 
• Various committees of inquiry and Public Accounts Committee (PAC) records. 
• War Office papers relating directly or indirectly to the Ordnance Factories and. 
from 1915. Ministry of Munitions papers. 
• Various War Office directories. the Army and Navy lists. the official though 
unpublished and undated twelve-volume History of the Ministry of Munitions. 
• Various contemporary newspapers. 
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• A reassessment of the literature. Most concerns the First World War era, 
notably Hinton (1973) and the first Shop Stewards' Movement (Loft, 1994; 
Marriner, 1994). 
However, Ashton, in an earlier work, published a volume in the official series, 
The History of the Second World War (1953). His volume was on contracts and 
finance. Ashton, however, concentrated on the decade after the First World War up 
to 1945. He made little mention of the Ministry of Munitions and no mention was 
made of the pre-1915 Ordnance Factories. Where Ashton does mention the Ministry 
of Munitions, in relation to similarities in the legal niceties of anns contracts, that is 
the clause to tenninate by giving three months' notice, after the contract had run for 
one year (p60); the costing method used to price contracts, i.e. the post-costing, plus 
a rate of profit prescribed by the government, subject to Excess Profit Tax (EPT) 
(p67), and the origins of the Technical Costs Section (p70 - footnote). This section 
"was originally developed in the Gun Ammunition Department of the Ministry of 
Munitions in 1915 ... It was later used for many other classes of stores purchased by 
the Ministry ... and was transferred to the Admiralty in 1920 when the purchasing 
function of the Ministry of Munitions ceased" (Ashton, 1953: 70 - footnote). 
When assessing what occurred in the contemporary British public sector, one 
should be aware that complete contemporary records are rare, which contrasts with 
the archive material that exists for the American War Department. 
Compared to the private sector. little has been written or researched on 
Victorian management in the public sector. 
There is a need for research to be conducted to explain how the components 
of business history interface with each other. The current philosophy of both account-
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ing and labour historians is to research in components without understanding the other 
areas of business reform. 
Limitations of earlier research, especially in relation to costinl and accountinl 
In comparing the American development of cost accounting with the British 
experience, Hoskin and Macve consider that, where there is evidence of the use of 
costing in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Britain, its development was not 
utilised "to co-ordinate production, control costs and maximise productivity on a 
regular basis" (1994: 80). Their thesis depends on the American development within 
the US Army. Previous research reveals an apparent lack of interface of management 
issues of accounting, production process control and industrial relations reforms. 
Until recently the history of cost accounting before the mid 1880s was not 
based on any published contemporary texts, which may indeed have existed, nor have 
sufficient primary source costing records survived. However, cost accounting histories 
over the last fifty years tend to rely on published works of British theorists at the time, 
notably Fells (1887), Garcke (1887), Lisle (1899) and Pixley (1897). These theorists 
suggest that the practical application for decision-making through costing developed 
from America through the scientific management movement under the innovation of 
Frederick Taylor. Richard Brown, a chartered accountant from Edinburgh, made an 
attempt in 1905 at publishing a general history of the accounting profession, however 
the completed monograph of some 300 pages failed to identify industrial cost account-
ing in its entirety (Brown, 1905; Jones, 1981: 80). Brown related the history of 
accountants as they contemporarily existed. His monograph is very much a personal 
narrative of contemporary accountants and traditional accounting procedures which 
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is no more than was produced by Pixley (1897) and Lisle (1899). As traditional 
accountants did not concern themselves with cost accounting, traditional accounting 
commentators, including Brown, did not broach the subject. 
The accounting and production reforms within the post-18SS Ordnance Fac-
tories led to other complementary reforms including scientific management. Similar 
but rather limited reforms in the contemporary private sector originated more from 
the practical man approach. Such reforms were not transferable to other organisations. 
Individual organisations used their own systems. These were created on a rule of 
thumb basis, particularly in the private engineering sector, which was predominantly 
craft-orientated, reflecting demarcation and controlled rigidly by powerful trade union 
interest, notably the Amalgamated Society of Engineers (ASE). 
Urwick and Brech (19S3, vol. 2: 72-87) gave an example ofthe non-transferable 
skills in their assessment of J. Slater Lewis (1852-1901). Quoting from Slater Lewis, 
Urwick and Brech stated: 
"For the mere purposes of commercial book-keeping, it matters, 
indeed, little in the way the general and shop establishment charges are 
dealt with, so long as they are eventually paid out of the profits made 
in the work ... it matters little whether they appear in the books as 
chargeable to general revenue, or are allocated to several items of work 
in progress in the shops ... " (1953: 78) 
This localisation of systems had been inherited from the experience of cost 
accounting in the eighteenth century where it existed. Much has been written on the 
influence of J.M. Fells and E. Garcke in their Factory Accounts, their Principles and 
Practices, first published in 1887. The date of this first edition may have influenced 
Solomons (1957) to date "the costing renaissance" from the mid-1880s. However, 
Factory Accounts from its first edition in 1887 to its sixth edition in 1910, gave "only 
the briefest reference to cost accounting". a point made by Jones (1981: 114). 
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Indeed, Factory Accounts followed other trends in the published text from the 
later nineteenth century in its legalistic approach to the practicalities of accounting. 
Only the seventh edition published in 1922 gave a wider experience to cost accounting, 
due no doubt to the experiences of accounting and the First World War and in 
particular to the cost accounting experiment in the Anny from 1917. 
However, despite the lack of texts on the subject of cost accountancy, there 
is evidence to suggest that it was practised in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
Reference has already been made to the costing systems of Boulton and Watt (Roll, 
1930) and to Wedgwood (McKendrick, 1970). Cost accountancy may not have been 
the prerogative of accountants but rather engineers or entrepreneurs, "men closest to 
the problems and particularly anxious to improve their organisation and output" (Jones, 
1981: 115). 
An example of this can be seen from the contemporary railway industry, 
although it came rather later and can be assumed to be a twentieth-century develop-
ment. The North Eastern Railway (NER) managers had until the tum of the twentieth 
century relied on competition for its freight traffic on roads and coastal shipping, "to 
govern the level of their freight rates, with marginal and essentially intuitive adjust-
ments for specific commodities and distances" (Irving, 1976: 123; Jones, 1981: 115). 
The main user of the NER freight trains, the fanners within that region, 
complained in the 1880s that imported foodstuffs were conveyed more cheaply by the 
NER than their home-grown produce. In its initial defence, the NER replied to the 
fanners' complaints that imported foodstuffs were collected from the ports of disem-
barkation in bulk and that as a consequence they were easier to handle. The NER 
management possessed little statistical evidence either to confirm their defence, or to 
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prove the farmers right. By the tum of the twentieth century, however, the NER 
pioneered the systematic use of ton-per-mile statistics for the first time in Britain, but 
it was only in 1914 that the system, developed in order to analyse the whole question 
of undue preference which had caused friction between the NER, the port authorities 
and the farmers, began to be resolved. The system eventually allowed for average 
rail freight for specific lines to be calculated, the figures then used to determine 
appropriate rates. The system eventually led to greater flexibility in charges, including 
the establishment of special rates which superseded a strict price charge which varied 
directly with distance (Irving, 1976: 123-5; Jones, 1981: 115-6). 
It must be remembered that this system, adopted by the NER, only occurred 
in 1900 and was not fully operational until 1914 when other railway companies 
eventually followed suit. In 1849 the Great Western Railway (GWR) invited a public 
accountant William Deloitte to inspect the company's books, a prospect not well 
received by the board of the GWR. The purpose of Deloitte's inspection was to 
comply with the legal requirements of the 1845 Companies Clauses Consolidation Act 
and not for the efficiency of costing and comparing or laying down tariffs and fares 
(Jones, 1981: 52). 
The third substantial component of this chapter deals with the economic, social 
and industrial contexts of the period from 1855 to 1925. 
Structure of British capitalism. 1855 to 1914 
Before concluding this first chapter it is important at this stage to give an 
overview of the structures of British capitalism from 1855 to 1914, as compared to 
America. Having said this, by the late nineteenth century competition from Germany 
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and France also overtook Britain in industrial supremacy. Much of the German co-
operative management capitalism, as did the United States, employed: 
" ... salaried managers with little or no equity in the enterprises for they 
worked. . . German entrepreneurs were often the first in Europe to 
make the three-pronged investment in manufacturing, marketing and 
management." (Chandler, 1996: 393) 
This goes some way to explain why British industrialists failed to make any signifi-
cant advances through costing techniques up to 1914. Neither did British industrial-
ists, entrepreneurs, senior managers or indeed the emerging professional accountants 
enquire about the major impact of management reforms taking place in America, in 
particular du Pont's asset accounting principles, cost accounting or scientific manage-
ment. 
Payne has elaborated on the major differences between American and British 
corporate growth from 1870 to 1914. Even the larger companies in Britain were still 
ossified in family capitalism. Payne suggests that: 
"Among such enterprises some, like Huntley and Palmer, Crosse and 
Blackwell, J. and J. Colman, Pilkington Brothers and Harland and 
Wolff, were extremely efficient and became very large, despite the fact 
that they were entirely private on the very eve of the First World War." 
(Payne, 1967: 526) 
Although the success of Huntley and Palmer, Crosse and Blackwell and J. and J. 
Colman were "impressive in the British context, the scale of enterprises in the food 
sector in the United States was much bigger" (Payne, 1967: 526, footnote 3). 
The reasons for the lack of interest in cost accounting in Britain at the eve of 
the First World War has much to do with the differences in size and corporate 
structure in Britain as compared to America. The lack of interest in the post-1918 
era in Britain may be due to the retrenchment of British industrial structure and 
practice enforced through legislation (Restoration of Pre-War Practices Act 1919). 
- 33 -
Payne suggests that the growth of the American corporate structure as com-
pared to the British corporate structure was due to the following reasons: 
• The growth of urbanisation in America and the completion of a nationwide 
railroad network. 
• The acceptance by the American market of a mass-produced standard-sized 
product. 
• The American skill at product differentiation. 
• The use in America of tariff protection. 
By contrast, British corporate growth was marked quite differently by the following 
reasons: 
• The ossification of the family firm. Private companies were not legally 
recognised in Britain until 1907. 
• Most limited company ordinary shares were in the hands of the family. 
• The British consumer preference for craft manufactured and individual 
characterised goods. This tended to create a culture resistant to encompassing 
new technology and the mass production techniques. An example of this 
relates to Sir Marc Brunei and his machinery designed to manufacture in 1812 
Army footwear by mass production. The idea was never seriously considered 
by the British footwear industry for ninety years (Cooper, 1984: 255). 
• A local or regional market demand required specialised goods. This negated 
any attempt towards diversification and discouraged investment in new produc-
tion lines. 
• The British entrepreneurial characteristic of independence and self-sufficiency. 
• This was propagated by a belief in "the expediency of iaissez1aire" (Payne, 
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1967: 526). The writings of men such as Samuel Smiles reinforced this 
culture. 
The structure of British capitalism from 1855 to 1914 must be seen in the context of 
the political and economic doctrine of laissez-faire. It was in this period of economic 
liberalism that the Ordnance Factories flourished. The rationale of laissez-faire and 
its influence on the reform of the Ordnance Factories is given in more detail in 
Chapter 3. 
Overview of subsequent chapters 
In concluding this chapter an overview of subsequent chapters is now given. 
Chapter 2 will focus on the growth of professional status in relation to the 
professional manager generally. A more in-depth examination will explore the role 
and growth of the soldier-technologist as a manager from the experience of the US 
Army resulting from the reforms of West Point Military Academy from 1819. The 
results of these reforms permeated into the US Army Ordnance Department and the 
Corps of Engineers. This, according to Chandler's thesis, resulted in the growth of 
modem business organisations, particularly with the development of the Springfield 
Federal Armory and the Corps of Engineers' involvement with the American railroad 
companies. This influence was reflected in the reforms of the British Ordnance 
Factories from 1855 onwards. 
Chapter 3 explains the overall reforms of a reconstituted War Office from 
1855, including the creation of the Accountant General's Department in its relation 
with the government manufacturing departments. A brief description is given of their 
overall history, status and purpose. Their existence and role in the era of classical 
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Victorian liberalism and the parsimonious treatment from the Treasury created the 
impetus to be successful and competitive. A survey of Parliamentary accounting in 
relation to the Army will also be given. 
Chapter 4 introduces the first concept within the confines of this thesis, arguing 
that the cost and accounting systems and method in the nineteenth century may have 
been more advanced than the corresponding private sector. This development rein-
forced the concept of interchangeability and scientific management principles employed 
at the Ordnance Factories from 1862 onwards. In particular the case of the Elswick 
Ordnance Company and the production under contract of the Armstrong gun is 
considered. The personalities involved are also considered. Reforms undertaken at 
the Ordnance Factory in the 1860s only began to emerge in the Ministry of Munitions 
from 1917. By 1914 the Army and the Ordnance Factories were displaying to the 
public an aura of efficiency and economy. 
Chapter 5 continues the themes set by chapters 2, 3 and 4, by tracing the 
origins of production by interchangeability from America and its introduction into the 
Royal Small Arms Factory at Enfield. This system also permeated into the Royal 
Arsenal, Woolwich and spawned the complementary functions of scientific manage-
ment and labour relations in a relatively short space of time. This is despite the failure 
of the private engineering sector to be equally successful with similar production 
methods until the First World War. 
Chapter 6 further explores the growth of a 'professional' management system 
within the Ordnance Factories and the development of employee relations including 
evidence of the evolution of 'scientific management'. The origins of piecework 
systems and their management are explored. Evidence would suggest that a premium 
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bonus system. very similar but prior to the Hasley system. operated in the 1880s. 
It was confirmed by the Murray Report (Cd 3626. 1907) that the Rowan premium 
piece-rate system was in use at the Royal Gun Factory at Woolwich just prior to the 
First World War. 
The management structures of the nineteenth century Ordnance Factories are 
examined and critically assessed. Particular detail is given to the evidence of Lewis 
W. Engelbach. Principal Clerk to the Director of Artillery and Stores at the Royal 
Arsenal, Woolwich (the clearing house of management of the government factories) 
and of James McGee. manager of the Enfield Rifle Factory. Both gave evidence to 
the Morley Committee (C 5116: 1887). 
Chapter 7 considers the causes for the Morley Inquiry. its recommendations 
and how these were implemented. particularly with the centralisation of the executive 
management function and the line of management. Within this chapter. evidence is 
given regarding the model employer ethos of the Ordnance Factories and the introduc-
tion of a 48-hour week to all government employees in 1894. Evidence suggests that 
this relates to the growth of scientific management efficiency systems, due in part to 
the recognition of a rational labour utilisation process. That this occurred at the latter 
end of the debated. so-called Great Depression tends to support the evidence so given 
(Hobsbawm. 1979: 356). 
Chapter 8 assesses the evidence to suggest that the Ministry of Munitions 
appeared to rediscover the original pre-1914 reforms of the Ordnance Factories and 
to call them their own. This is despite the intrusion of professional accountants, 
entrepreneurs and industrialists from the private sector, who were appointed as 
temporary civil servants at the Ministry of Munitions. 
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There is a marked lineage from the nineteenth century Ordnance Factories 
through to the cost accounting experiment within the British Army from 1919 to 1925. 
The apparent reforms within the Ministry of Munitions were only temporary. 
Chapter 9 addresses the contribution of this thesis to the advancement of our 
understanding of public sector management generally from the mid-nineteenth century 
to the immediate post-1918 period. Areas are identified where future research may 
be directed in order to achieve a greater understanding of management in the nine-
teenth century generally. 
Summary 
The evidence produced in this thesis is to prosecute the argument that there 
was an emerging professional management ethos from the Ordnance Factories from 
the mid-nineteenth century which was more sophisticated than the contemporary 
private sector. 
In concluding this first chapter, the reforms of the Ordnance Factories from 
1855 to 1925 occurred when the boundaries of Victorian economic liberalism were 
being challenged and changed. As the nineteenth century progressed, the electorate 
grew. Both Army and Navy technology expanded although the prevailing rationale 
of democracy and liberalism prevailed. On the one hand Britain deployed a small 
regular army to police an Empire, which heavily relied on locally recruited dominion 
and colonial troops, as well as the Indian Army. Alternatively, there was the per-
ceived threat from the major central powers. To combat this threat, the Navy rapidly 
expanded in technological strength from the 1880s onwards. Much of the new 
weapons technology for a growing class of iron-clad warships were manufactured at 
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the Royal Gun Factory, Woolwich. 
From 1855 to 1914, the major expenditure of Victorian governments was on 
defence. Due to the political doctrine of democracy and liberalism and the mistrust 
of defence expenditure per se by the Victorian taxpayer and Member of Parliament, 
the audit and control of defence budgets was far tighter than other spending department 
budgets. It is in this context that the reforms of the Ordnance Factories must be 
examined. 
The appendix to this chapter is a time chart showing the reforms of the 
Ordnance Factories from 1855 to 1925 and names the personalities involved in these 
reforms. 
- 39 -
Flow chart of the reforms of the Ordnance Factories, 1855 to 1925 
1855: Crimean War Office created. Government manufacturing departments 
War came under the War Office Board of Ordnance visitation to 
US federal and private armories. 
1855 Royal Carriage Department introduces pieceworking. 
1855 Office of Master General of Ordnance abolished. 
1858 (Indian Royal Small Arms Factory Enfield, interchangeability (Ameri-
Mutiny) can system of manufacture). Machinery tools and expertise 
1857-58 loaned from the Springfield Federal Armory. 
1858 Internal War Office committee on the overspent budget on the 
rebuilding of the Royal Arsenal, Woolwich. 
1862 The recommendations of this committee influenced the pro-
cedure of charging depreciation on buildings and capital 
assets. 
1858-1862 Development of the Armstrong gun. One third of contract 
given to Elswick Ordnance Company, Molesworth Committee 
1862, Elswick overcharging for an inferior but higher priced 
gun than was manufactured at Woolwich. Whiffin, Assistant 
Accountant General, initiates a costing system under John 
Anderson, Inspector of Machinery, and J .C. Hurst, a civil 
servant. Elswick contract terminated. 
1858 Royal Gun Factories created from the original Royal Brass 
Foundries. Armstrong gun manufactured through 
interchangeability pioneered by the gun factory manager, 
Robert Fraser. 
1864 Hurst introduces DEB into Woolwich. 
1879 Reorganisation of clerical establishment mechanical writers 
identified as trained engineers. 
1887 Morley Report. Evidence of James McGee, manager at En-
field, Hurst, chief auditor and accountant, Engelbach, secre-
tary to the Director of Artillery crucial. 
Morley recom- Centralised structure of Ordnance Factories under a Director 
mendations General. Accounts, stores and audit procedures centralised. 
1889-1890 Army and Navy Audit Act. Parliamentary vote for Ordnance 
Factories separated from army vote. 
1889 First civilian Director General of Ordnance Factories. 
1893 Eight-hour day introduced into Ordnance Factories. 
1898 Office of Chief Mechanical Engineer initiated. 
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1899-1902 
1904 
1904 
1904 
1907 
1906 
1907 
1909 
1914 
1915 
1915-1918 
Key personnel in 
the nineteenth 
century refonns 
Second Anglo-Boer War. 
Master General of the Ordnance resurrected. 
Retrenchment. 
Esher 1904 ) 
Mowatt 1904 ) Reports 
Henderson 1907 ) 
Superintending managers doubled up 
Murray Report 1906, leading to the Hadden report 1909-1911, 
removal of surplus production capacity of Royal Arsenal. 
Army Pay Department - disbanded - 1904. 
Army Contracts Department - disbanded - 1904. 
Haldane - Secretary of State for War, creation of order of 
battle on BEF system. LSE Army class. Expansion of reg-
ular reserve and territorial force to meet growing German 
threat. 
Army Contracts Department resurrected. 
Army Pay Department resurrected. 
4th August: First World War begins. 
Ministry of Munitions established, takes over control of Ord-
nance Factories. 
Reinventing the wheel? Professional accountants as temporary 
civil servants. Costing. Recent evidence suggests Elboume's 
Factory Administration was responsible. The argument that 
these reforms were already in existence in Ordnance Factories 
have never been put forward. Official history states that DEB 
was introduced into the Ministry in March 1917. 
John Anderson - inspector of machinery and later 
superintendent, Gun Factory. 
Robert Fraser - Manager, Gun Factory. 
H. W.S. Whiffin - Assistant Accountant General. 
J.C. Hurst - described in 1864 as Accountant 3rd class, 
Accountant General's Department, later Chief Account-
ant and auditor of manufacturing department. 
L. Engelbach - principal clerk to Director of Artillery, 
later Assistant Accountant General. 
James McGee, Manager, Royal Small Arms Factory, 
Enfield. 
H. Campbell Bannerman, Secretary of State for War. 
J. Grimwood, Controller Cost Accounts at the War 
Office. 
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CHAPTER 2 
The Concept of the Soldier-Technologist 
and the Growth of the Professional Manager 
Introduction 
This chapter deals with the background of management in Britain in the first 
half of the nineteenth century. In particular it explores the concept of the soldier-
manager-technologist in the British Army, since they are the key to later innovation 
within the British and Indian Ordnance Factories, and also important more generally 
in the growth of management. Mass production, cost accounting and scientific 
management were areas that did not transpose into British industry in the private sector 
until well into the twentieth century, although it is argued in this thesis that these 
developments were experienced in the Ordnance Factories from the mid nineteenth 
century. 
However, there is evidence to suggest that a soldier-technologist concept did 
exist and, in some cases, the British Army and the Army of the Honourable East India 
Company were used as a training ground for management in the private sector, 
particularly in the Victorian railway industry. The Victorian railway companies were 
examples of large-scale enterprises. However, large enterprises existed before the 
railways, a point noted by Pollard: 
"new industries which began on a large scale without a craft or domes-
tic background, such as distilling, brewing, sugar-refining and soap 
boiling where men were employed direct from the beginning and 
supervised by the firms' foremen." (1966: 19) 
The demand for a "managerial or supervisory" class within the workforce 
increased as large-scale enterprises expanded. The division of labour widened into 
those who supervised and those who were supervised. In relation to the Army. during 
both the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries it was perhaps the largest public sector 
organisation in Britain and was structured on a hierarchical rank system. 
There were a number of routes which involved the training and education of 
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managers. Although there is evidence to suggest that 'managers' of the eighteenth 
century onwards were probably well versed in what may be termed management skills, 
many of these skills were learned on the job. But the term 'manager' was a term not 
understood in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Thus the practical man 
concept is an important consideration when assessing the concept of managerialism. 
Despite this, other skills which could be adopted for managerial expertise were 
sometimes gained from the varied sources of schooling that existed. However, there 
was no formal management education in Britain as such until well into the twentieth 
century. Perhaps the Royal Military Academy (RMA), Woolwich together with the 
Honourable East India Company's college at Haileybury were the closest to a formal 
management school which existed in Britain during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. Haileybury College also trained military and civil officers for service with 
the Honourable East India Company. In 1872, the Royal Indian Engineering College 
was founded at Cooper's Hill. Esher, Surrey and existed until its closure in 1906. 
Cooper's Hill College was a state-owned institution run by the India Office and its 
role was mainly to train engineers for the Indian PWD. From the late eighteenth 
century until the early 1870s, the role of the Military Board and its successor the PWD 
expanded from being the engineering wing of the Army in India. concerned only with 
military projects. to being responsible for a whole range of public works projects. 
Until the early 1870s the PWD was generally staffed by military engineers, though 
a few civilian engineers. called Stanley engineers, were being recruited from the 1860s 
onwards. The Accountant General and accounting staff for the PWD in each Indian 
province was a senior Royal Engineers officer and this continued until the First World 
War. 
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This transition from military to civil engineering projects needed civilian 
engineers rather than military and Cooper's Hill College was established to supply this 
need. The Royal Indian Engineering College from 1872 onwards expanded its 
curriculum to include civilian engineers not only for the Indian PWD but for the 
Colonial Service generally. The type of engineer ranged from railway engineer to 
forestry and telegraphic engineers (India Lists, 1872 to 1905). Military students from 
the Royal Engineers and Royal Artillery, who were destined for the Indian Ordnance 
Department, also attended Cooper's Hill College prior to taking up appointment. 
The RMA Woolwich trained gentlemen cadets for commissioned rank in both 
the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers (collectively known as the Scientific Corps 
of the Army). The Royal Engineers during the nineteenth century were instrumental 
in civil engineering projects in India. This included land drainage, canal and railway 
construction and road building, as well as military construction projects such as 
barracks and Ordnance Factory development. There is evidence to suggest that book-
keeping may have been taught at RMA Woolwich from the eighteenth century. 
However. General Sir George Chesney, Royal Engineers, who in 1860 became the 
Accountant General to the Indian PWD. lamented the lack of accountants within the 
PWD and the drudgery of book-keeping which befell engineering project officers 
(Chesney, 1859). Chesney was instrumental in forming the Royal Indian Engineering 
College in 1872.1 From 1879 onwards accounting was introduced into the curriculum. 
Chesney's brother, Colonel Charles Chesney, also of the Royal Engineers. was 
influential in establishing the first Army Staff College at Sandburst in 1856. Charles 
Chesney became Professor of Military History at the Staff College from 1858 to 1868 
and was a member of the Royal Commission on Military Education from 1868 to 
1870. He was sent by the government to report on the Franco-Prussian war in 1871. 
The Staff College was modelled on the RMA Woolwich and its curriculum included 
military engineering and fortification, military history and mathematics (The Royal 
Engineers Journal, 1 June 1895: 213-4). RMA Woolwich was also the model for the 
Royal Indian Engineering College at Cooper's Hill. 
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Officers of the Royal Artillery were employed in the Ordnance Factories both 
in England and in India from 1855 onwards. They were employed as junior staff 
officers. as instructors and examiners (quality control) and as superintendents of 
individual factories. having overall managerial command of a mainly civilian 
workforce. From 1855 onwards the Ordnance Factories both in England and India 
developed into large-scale enterprises. Evidence presented in this chapter identifies 
the managerial skills of the officers of the Scientific Corps as soldier-technologists. 
Since the early nineteenth century. all Army officers were subject to audit by 
a twice-yearly confidential reporting system. This was being practised at a time when 
most infantry and cavalry officers of the British Army bought their commissions under 
a complex system of patronage. Officers of the Royal Engineers and Royal Artillery 
were selected on merit for promotion - commission by purchase did not extend to the 
Scientific Corps. However. the concepts of manager and management were not 
understood in Victorian military society. 
The system of confidential appraisal of managerial grades in commerce and 
industry did not happen on a regular basis until well after the post-1945 era in Britain. 
The chapter also looks at the growth of contemporary management in the 
private sector. The growth of any formal management education in the private sector 
was marred by the difficulties in reconciling the liberal arts and the sciences. Thus 
the major development was apparent by the practical man concept (Barnett. 1985). 
The reconciliation of the 'arts' and sciences of management, it is argued, had been 
achieved at RMA Woolwich and is evident from its curriculum from the eighteenth 
century. 
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The concept of the soldier-technololist: the experience of the United States Army 
and the reforms at West Point Military Academy from 1819 
Much of the argument for the genesis of the modem business structure originat-
ing in the American Army can be traced back to the reforms of West Point Military 
Academy in 1819. The reason for these reforms were part of a wider restructuring 
of the American Army, particularly the US Ordnance Department and the Corps of 
Engineers from 1815 onwards. This was as a direct response to the misfortunes of 
the American Army in the war with Britain from 1812 to 1814. 
The West Point reforms were undertaken at the direction of the fourth superin-
tendent of the Academy, Sylvanus Thayer, who was appointed to the post in 1817. 
These reforms have been well researched in Britain by Hoskin and Macve (1988: 
1994). Thayer modelled West Point on the French Ecole Poly technique structure both 
in terms of the curriculum taught and the disciplinary pedagogy of "constant deploy-
ment of writing, examination and grading" (Hoskin and Macve, 1994: 81). The 
curriculum was scientifically based on the great French scientific texts. 
Thayer introduced management concepts within the organisation of West 
Point's hierarchy which apparently may have been the practical origins of the modem 
American business structure. Accordingly Thayer adopted a management role and 
style similar to a modem chief executive officer (CEO) by issuing orders in writing 
and establishing line and staff management structures. 
Students' performance was graded and recorded in an individual weekly 
account, together with a weekly class report. The results were factored together for 
the twice-yearly examinations, eventually being totalled up for a final Annual Merit 
Roll. 
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The refonns of West Point penneated into the Ordnance Department, thence 
into the Springfield Federal Annory during the 1830s. This concept is explored more 
fully later as it is crucial to the mid-nineteenth-century refonns of the British Ordnance 
Factories. 
In America, by the 1880s Captain Henry Metcalfe had developed the earlier 
accounting refonns of the Springfield Annory into the concepts of scientific manage-
ment. The Springfield Annory had evolved into a factory system during the American 
Civil War when Springfield was under the control of Colonel Alexander Dyer. The 
development of scientific management tends to equate to a factory system, however 
a similar system developed in the British Ordnance Factories which evolved into a 
factory system from the Crimean War. However, as was previously mentioned, 
factories existed prior to the development of scientific management (see Pollard, 1966: 
19). The system that evolved in the Ordnance Factories included changes in the 
production process, the extensive use of semi-skilled rather than skilled (craft) labour, 
the employment of labour on a master-and-servant contractual basis. This is in 
contrast to subcontracting in labour (as was evident in the Springfield Annory until 
the American Civil War) or craft labour, as was evident in the pre-18S8 workshop 
environment of the Royal Arsenal, Woolwich. Although the production process of 
interchangeability was imported from America, there is no relationship to suggest that 
Metcalfe's refonns actually influenced similar refonns of scientific management in 
the British Ordnance Factories. On the contrary, it is possible that scientific manage-
ment evolved in the British Ordnance Factories prior to the refonns as postulated by 
Metcalfe. However, the evolution of scientific management in the American federal 
annories and British Ordnance Factories was a development from the earlier account-
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ing reforms. The components of scientific management as they evolved within the 
Ordnance Factories are referred to later. 
The genesis of modem managerialism as experienced in America arguably 
came from the West Point reforms. Hoskin and Macve (1994: 82) challenge Chand-
ler's original contention when he played down the West Point connection, particularly 
in relation to railroad management. Chandler also contends that West Point acquainted 
US military engineers and Ordnance Department officers with bureaucratic "hierarchi-
cal organisation in antebellum America" (Chandler, 1977: 95). Hoskin and Macve 
argue that the origins of interchangeability at the Springfield Armory and the begin-
nings of the • American system of manufacture' was the direct result of the West Point 
connection, particularly with the US Ordnance Department. 
The growth of multi-unit enterprise business organisations with the American 
railroad systems were due to the secondment of officers of the Corps of Engineers to 
the civil railroad companies. Both the Ordnance Department and the Corps of 
Engineers took the cream of West Point graduates. Hoskin and Macve develop this 
particular argument to the West Point • second generation'. Their 1997 paper considers 
that there was a network of West Point graduates from the post-1S17 period. These 
graduates disseminated new practices, which broadly equate to those described in 
Benthamite terms through "grammatocentrism" and "calculability". "At everyday level 
what we are observing is a new way of constructing space I time relations" (1997: 
6). 
This is defined in the concept of writing and grading: 
"An orientation to time facing towards the future - but a future which 
is to be known by drawing on the medium of objectivity measured and 
graded past performance." (1997: 6) 
- 48 -
Hoskin and Macve attempted to clarify how time is rewritten, in a continuing process, 
as follows: 
"(For it is not just that clock-time replaced body-time, clock-time is 
then rewritten [e.g. as the 'machine hour'] to produce a new quality 
of time-control and time-knowledge)." (t 997: 6) 
Co-ordinating the concept of space was disseminated through a new sense of 
extensive and intensive co-ordination and control. This was through administrative 
co-ordination. Here, managerialism can know and control the extreme parameters 
of the organisational space. New structures and scales of organisational complexity 
and size could be devised through divisionalisation and matrix structures, which 
penetrated to every comer of the organisation. Foucault called this a kind of panopti-
cism (Foucault, 1975; Hoskin and Macve, 1997: 6). Hoskin and Macve suggested 
that "specifically it is a grammatocentric panopticon" (1997: 6). 
The nucleus of this transition into the Springfield Armory and other federal 
armories was through West Point graduate US Ordnance Department officers appointed 
by George Talcott (Head of Ordnance) as officer-inspectors in the Ordnance Depart-
ment. This cadre of officer-inspectors, together with their chief accounts clerk of the 
Ordnance Department and the Chief Inspector of Contract Arms "formed a bureau-
cratic team of middle managers whose separate but interrelated activities vastly 
improved the internal rhythm of ordnance enterprise" (Roe Smith, 1985: 69). 
Chandler (t 977) considers the evolution of a modem business enterprise in the 
USA as "a necessary and rational response to prior economic and technological 
change" (Hoskin and Macve, 1997: 6). Indeed, Chandler specifically considered that 
"modem business enterprise was thus the institutional response to rapid pace of 
technological innovation and increasing consumer demand in the United States during 
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the second half of the nineteenth century" (1977: 12). 
Chandler conceded that there was something strange here. He assumed that 
the military had only an indirect impact on the beginnings of modem business manage-
ment. His "pioneers of modem management" (Hoskin and Macve. 1997: 4) were: 
"a new type of businessman. It is worth emphasising again that they 
were salaried employees with little or no financial interest in the com-
panies they served. Moreover they had specialised training." (Chan-
dler. 1977: 95) 
Chandler has misjudged the importance of the US military. It is a theme developed 
by Hoskin and Macve and on closer examination of the key changes first identified 
by Chandler. some revelations are brought to light. The two pioneers at the Spring-
field Armory (single-unit factory management) and the Western Railroad (multi-unit 
enterprise) were Daniel Tyler and George W. Whistler. Both were military officers 
who had gone through the same specialised training. graduating together from the 
reformed West Point Military Academy in the class of 1819. Neither had ever run 
a business enterprise in their lives (Hoskin and Macve. 1997). 
Hoskin and Macve contend that: 
" ... we have argued that historians of modem business have generally 
been looking at the wrong technological stimulus. for they should have 
been looking at the development of the invisible technologies: writing. 
examination and grading. The reason why the USA (then only a 
marginal player on a world economic scene. dominated by Europe and. 
in particular. Britain) invented the 'modem business enterprise' around 
1840 is to be found at West Point before 1820." (1997: 5) 
Hoskin and Macve have moved forward Chandler's pioneering work to suggest 
that there is a close connection between the development of modem business culture 
and the earlier reforms of the US Army. 
From 1815 to the Mexican War of the 1840s, America was not involved in any 
major armed conflict. The American Army was deployed in protecting an ever-
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widening frontier, the Anny being engaged in only minor Indian wars. As with 
contemporary British society, the American taxpayer did not wish to expend vast sums 
of public money securing a large anny which could be a threat to the democratic 
image. Thus the production of ordnance at a federal workshop was positively encour-
aged to develop efficiencies. The American and British systems of anns procurement 
were also subject to competitive contract and War Department orders went to the most 
efficient producer, whether a Federal annory or private contractor. 
Both the US Ordnance Department and Corps of Engineers took the best 
graduates from West Point. Officers of the Corps of Engineers were seconded to the 
developing American railroad companies, which were ever-expanding westwards. 
O'Connell states that "the organisational and administrative experience these officers 
brought to the railroads had great influence on the early development of the art of 
management in the United States" (1985: 88). The US military obviously benefited 
from the development of the railroad system as it meant troops could be deployed 
more quickly to the frontier. 
The soldier-technoloaist experience from the permective of the British Army 
Recent research has tended to focus on the concept of the soldier-technologist 
of the American Anny in relation to the development of modem American business 
(Chandler, 1977; Hoskin and Macve, 1986, 1988, 1994, 1997). Little attempt has 
been made to suggest that a similar concept could be derived from the experiences of 
the British Anny. The contention of this thesis also suggests that a soldier-technologist 
also developed in the British Anny. 
The problem raised by recent research into the concept of the soldier-technol-
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ogist and the development of the corporate structure in American business during the 
nineteenth century, is whether any similar development was apparent in the British 
military administration. 
The first point to be raised here is that there was no parallel in Britain to West 
Point Military Academy but it is argued that RMA Woolwich was close to fulfilling 
a similar role. The Scientific Corps of the British Army (the Royal Engineers and 
Royal Artillery) trained their cadets at RMA Woolwich, whereas officers for the Army 
generally were trained at Royal Military College (RMC) Sandhurst. The Royal 
Military Academy (RMA) Woolwich was older than the Royal Military College, 
Sandhurst, having been founded in the first half of the eighteenth century. RMA 
Woolwich was always known in the contemporary Army as 'The Shop'. It was not 
obligatory for officers of the cavalry or infantry to attend any military academy, unlike 
the experiences of Prussia and France where there was a compulsory requirement for 
their potential military elite to have graduated from a military academy. This was also 
the experience in America after the West Point Academy reforms. West Point was 
modelled on the French Ecole Poly technique. As mentioned earlier, the first British 
Staff College was only established in 1856 to train middle-ranking officers to the 
higher echelons of command. 
Basically, the experiences as manifest in the American and British armies were 
different. The contemporary British military experience was broadly similar, although 
it is not suggested that from this experience developed any modem business 
organisation as such. What did develop was more of a modem business culture, which 
for the British Ordnance Factories from the mid nineteenth century, made them into 
single factory units of production which, it is argued, were more efficient than their 
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private sector counterparts. 
'The Shop' 
Woolwich during the second half of the nineteenth century until the First World 
War, reflected a 'Solomon's House'. Here there was a link between the liberal arts, 
science and technology, the practical and professional. Woolwich Garrison was the 
home of the Royal Artillery, one of the two scientific corps of the Army and the Royal 
Arsenal. Close by was Chatham Garrison, home of the Royal Engineers, the second 
scientific corps of the Army. 
Until the 1840s, the RMA was located within the estate of the Royal Arsenal. 
The RMA was always known as 'The Shop' but the origins of this nickname are not 
absolutely known for sure. A paper published in the Journal of the Society of Histori-
cal Research in 1925 stated that: 
"In a letter written by second captain RM Cairns Royal Artillery then 
in Portugal dated 4 April 1813 to a brother officer at Cadiz gave the 
following information: 'I can send you no news, and therefore 
crammed you well with the Shop'." 
A later history suggested that 
"It is possible that the Royal Military Academy Woolwich has acquired 
the sobriquet 'Shop' in this connection, as being the seat of learning, 
or institution where professional military subjects are taught. Major 
General Sir A.E.H. Anson Royal Artillery, who was at the Shop in 
1841, wrote in a letter of 1 December 1923, 'I believe the name Shop 
was given to the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich as a familiar 
name for the place where cadets were housed and did their business of 
instruction for the Army'." (Jones, 1954: 114) 
The general opinion amongst the staff of the Royal Artillery Institution, among 
them senior officers of the Royal Artillery, is that unlike the rest of the officer corps 
of the regular Army, the officers of the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers, who 
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entered the Army via RMA Woolwich and its preparatory school. Addiscombe. were 
the sons of small tradesmen. This may have some implication that the Woolwich 
cadets had some commercial awareness. The length and breadth of the curriculum 
at RMA Woolwich was far more advanced than at the Royal Military College. 
Sandhurst. formed some forty years after RMA Woolwich. 
The experience of RMA Woolwich during the eighteenth century reflected an 
advanced curriculum for the age. compared with other English institutions. From 
1773 to 1809 the mathematician. Charles Hutton LLD FRS. was Professor of Mathe-
matics at RMA Woolwich. Hutton (1737-1823) was born at Newcastle-upon-Tyne 
and followed his father as a colliery labourer. Hutton acquired a taste for books and 
at the age of 18 he became the village schoolmaster at Jesmond. Later. Hutton opened 
a mathematical school in Newcastle. In 1764 he wrote his first book The School-
master's Guide and later was appointed as Surveyor to Newcastle-on-Tyne. 
The experiences of Charles Hutton are important when assessing the genesis 
of modem managerialism. particularly in relation to RMA Woolwich. Hutton was 
appointed as Professor of Mathematics to the RMA in 1773 and one year later was 
elected as a fellow to the Royal Society. Between 1776 and 1778 Hutton researched 
and published papers on the Force of Exploded Gunpowder and the Velocities of &//s 
for which he gained the Copley Medal. 
Pollard related that the curriculum of RMA Woolwich during the period of 
Hutton's tenure: 
" ... included writing, arithmetic. merchants accounts (or the true Italian 
method of bookkeeping), algebra. geometry (elemental and practical), 
mensuration, trigonometry, projection of sphere, conic sections, mech-
anics, statics and hydrostatics. doctrine of fluxions, etc. together with 
their various applications in Navigation, Surveying, Altimetry and 
Longimetry. Gunnery. Dialling, Gauging, Geometry, Astronomy etc. II 
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(1966: 141; see also Records of the Royal Military Academy 1741-
1892) 
The internationally renowned pioneering English chemist, Joseph Priestly 
(1733-1804), was sometime Professor of Chemistry at RMA Woolwich. 
The student numbers at anyone time never exceeded 200. In 1855 there were 
180 cadets of whom 40 of the "first or practical classes under the able instructors in 
the art of fortification" were instructed on the Royal Foundry (The Army List, 1856). 
The number of students in 1904 was 169, who were divided into either the Artillery 
or Engineer Division. In 1881 arrangements were made for an "interchange" of text-
books between RMA Woolwich and the Military Academy at West Point, USA 
(Record of the Royal Military Academy 1741-1892: 165). 
Having described the reforms of RMA Woolwich since the eighteenth century, 
it is pertinent to point out that it was not as advanced as either a contemporary West 
Point Military Academy or the Ecole Poly technique , or even the Pruss ian military 
academies. However, in terms of scientific and management education in eighteenth 
and nineteenth-century Britain it was the best in the nation. The failure of British 
artillery and logistical detail in the Crimean War in the wake of superior French 
logistics and ballistics is an example of this. Neither did the concept of the soldier-
technologise manifest itself in Britain in the way it did in America after the West Point 
refonns of 1819. However, the British military experience of the emerging soldier-
technologist was much smaller than in contemporary America. The influence of the 
RMA Woolwich graduate and the soldier-technologists was seen more in India than 
in Britain. 
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The lelacy of RMA Woolwich: the example of the Indian Public Works Depart-
The legacy of the RMA Woolwich is evident from the refonns of the Indian 
PWD, particularly in the post-1858 era. A resume of the PWD was given earlier in 
this chapter, in relation to the Royal Indian Engineers College. The Accountant-
General of the PWD were senior officers of the Royal Engineers, the most influential 
being General Sir George Tomkyns Chesney KCB MP 0830-1895). Chesney was 
born in Devon and originally began to study medicine but was persuaded to take an 
Indian cadetship instead. He entered Addiscombe for a year, then entered RMA 
Woolwich, being gazetted as a second lieutenant in the Bengal Engineers on graduation 
in 1848. Chesney was a prolific writer whose numerous papers were published in the 
Calcutta Review. 
In his writings, Chesney described how the concept of the professional engineer 
evolved throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, particularly from the 
viewpoint of the military engineer in India. The evolutionary process grew from a 
previously haphazard system of tacit learning and the concept of the practical man, 
with the exception of a few distinguished engineers such as Smeaton. 
"But, at the end of the last century, there was no such recognised 
profession as the engineer's; engineering works were comparatively 
of a simple kind and were generally executed in an empirical haphazard 
fashion ... " (Calcutta Review, vol.64, 1859: 348) 
Chesney argued that the post-Mutiny era from 1858 was beneficial for the PWD as 
it would entail a more vigorous prosecution of public works. 
It is evident from Chesney's writings that a great deal of the PWD project 
engineer's time was spent on accounting and costing. The basis of this appears to be 
quite elaborate, given that there were no accounting bodies at this time. However, 
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it does reinforce the argument put forward in this thesis that the reforms of the 
Ordnance Factories came from gunner officers who were (as were sapper officers) 
trained at RMA Woolwich. Much of the system of accounting in the PWD was based 
on budget accounting rather than DEB. 
Chesney described the duties of a project officer (normally a subaltern of the 
Royal Engineers) as being engaged in bridge or railway construction and the accounts 
of work to be taken. 
"Accounts involving to a large extent dealings with day labourers and 
of materials which are constantly undergoing a change of value and 
form must always be of a complicated and intricate character. These 
accounts of work will indeed be usually more intricate than mercantile 
ones, for while the goods of a merchant remain invariable in form, a 
hogshead always a hogshead, a bale of cotton always a bale of cotton, 
the materials on an Engineer's books are constantly going through a 
process of change. The mud worked up into a sun-dried brick gradual-
ly becomes transferred, after a mixture with other materials, into the 
finished masonry wall. The tree purchased while growing in the forest 
is first enhanced in price by the cost of felling it, and further by the 
cost of transferring it to the place where it is required. When sawn up 
into logs or planks the fractional cost of the tree, which represents the 
value of each log or plank, is to be increased by a part of the sawyer's 
wages, of the wear and tear of his tools, and further by a share of the 
cost of the shed built to protect it from the weather, and of the watch-
man's pay who looks after it. 
After this, it will probably be worked-up for use with other materials, 
the prices of which have been determined in an equally complicated 
way, the price of the whole combined into a manufactured state being 
further increased by the cost of the labour to do so. 
So with lime, cements, paints and all other materials. To keep exact 
accounts of them through these transactions, and to be able to show 
what they are worth at every stage of the operation, involves account-
keeping of a very complicated and difficult character. 
Heavy cash accounts with contractors and day labourers, though 
simpler than stock accounts, require method and attention, and it will 
therefore be readily understood that with every Engineer his accounts 
come to be considered a very important, often the most important, part 
of his duty." (Calcutta Review, vol.64, 1859: 359) 
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This system was not standardised until Chesney's Public Works Department 
reforms were implemented as policy. 
"Each officer was therefore left to himself to establish his own system 
of book-keeping, and the result was what might have been expected. 
Some few went to principles and did well, some hit upon plans which 
gave them correct accounts exhibited, and all necessary details. but 
with vastly unnecessary complication of books. and requiring the 
constant attention of the officer himself ... and if ever accomplished 
involved an amount of mental labour that, properly applied. would have 
made the unhappy officer a finished accountant." (Calcutta Review. 
vol. 64. 1859: 362) 
Such systems lagged and the Public Works Department found itself greatly in arrears 
regarding the auditing of such accounts. Chesney's own recommendations for reform 
were ultimately accepted. 
"The Commission knew well that in India the man who spends the 
money must be the one to account for it, that the Engineer must also 
be the responsible accountant, however uneconomical the distribution 
of labour may apparently be; but assuming this to be fixed, they 
suggest several means of lightening his labour. The principal of these 
were: 
1st. a more rapid audit, which they proposed effecting by having a 
separate audit office for each province. and by permitting a greater 
latitude in the difference between the estimate and bill. thus rendering 
the preparation of the latter easier. 
2nd, that every executive (engineering) officer should be properly 
instructed in the principles of account keeping. 
3rd, that a responsible accountant should be attached to every office 
to relieve the Engineer from the main drudgery of the books and give 
him more time for his engineering duties." (Calcutta Review. vol.64, 
1859: 362) 
The recommendations of Chesney, which were eventually accepted by the India Office, 
are remarkably similar to the grammatocentric panoptican of the West Point educa-
tional revolution as described by Hoskin and Macve (1994: 81). 
Chesney also described the training of both the civil and military engineer for 
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service in India. He acknowledges the long relationship of the Executive Officers of 
the Indian provinces being appointed from the Royal Engineers and. as with the US 
Corps of Engineers, the Royal Engineer Officer, lithe greater part of which from its 
first establishment has always been employed in civil duties during peace time" 
(Calcutta Review, vol. 64, 1859: 369). This is very much true of Victorian social 
reform. Sapper officers were employed in penal administration, notably Major 
Generals Sir Joshua Jebb and Edmund du Cann. Their monuments of two London 
prisons. Brixton and Wormwood Scrubs, still stand as operational establishments. The 
creation of the Science and Art Department at South Kensington in 1857 was directed 
for much of its life until 1898 by Major General William Donnelly RE, epitomised 
by Gilbert and Sullivan as the livery model of a modem major general". 
Chesney also remarked that the engineer officer so employed on these duties 
received no special training, except perhaps on-the-job, or sit by Nellie. All Royal 
Engineer cadets were trained at RMA Woolwich and later a second college at Cooper's 
Hill, Esher was opened, particularly to train civil engineers for the Indian service. 
Chesney suggested that the best military college in mid-nineteenth century Europe was 
the Ecole Poly technique in Paris, stating that: 
II Admission to the Polytechnic is open to very severe competition 
among all the youth of France; the cadets who enter it are therefore 
all well educated. and their general qualifications much more equal than 
Addiscombe. where a considerable number never make an effort to 
compete for the Engineers. The newly modelled senior or scientific 
department at Addiscombe will probably not come far short of the 
Polytechnic. The system at [RMA] Woolwich resembles that at Addis-
combe but the advantages of entering the Royal Artillery or Engineers 
are so closely balanced that many of the cadets choose the former. The 
proportion of appointments given to the Engineer Corps is usually 
larger than Addiscombe, which tends to diminish competition and, 
probably from these causes, the standard of education at Woolwich has 
been for some years much lower than at Addiscombe." (Calcutta 
Review, vol. 64, 1859: 369 (footnote)) 
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From Addiscombe or Woolwich the cadets of the Royal Engineers then 
graduated to the Royal School of Military Engineering, Chatham. Part of the Chatham 
curriculum included civil engineering. On arrival in India, both civil and military 
engineering cadets entered the Public Works Department as assistants, spending a 
period of attachment with either the Bombay or Madras Sappers and Miners of the 
Indian Army. However, the papers written by Chesney and published in the Calcutta 
Review were influential enough to promote major reforms within the financial account-
ing and management system not only of the PWD from 1860 onwards but also with 
the Indian state railways. For his efforts, Chesney was appointed as Accountant-
General to the PWD. Much of the accounting and financial management of the PWD 
until 1914 was undertaken mainly by officers of the Royal Engineers (India Office 
Lists, 1860-1914). 
The Royal Indian Engineering College was also modelled on RMA Woolwich, 
the majority of its Army staff being officers of the Royal Engineers. During his ten-
year presidency of Cooper's Hill College (from 1870 to 1880), some 3,110 civilian 
engineers graduated from the College for service with the PWD (The Royal Engineers 
Journal, 1 June 1895: 213-4). In terms of this thesis, Cooper's Hill College is 
important as the first lecturer in accounts was J.C. Hurst, appointed in 1879, who was 
also the Chief Accountant and Auditor of Factory Accounts for the Ordnance Fac-
tories. The influence of Hurst is crucial to the development of this thesis and is a link 
between Chesney and the PWD reforms. Hurst was a major player in the nineteenth-
century managerial reforms of the Ordnance Factories. Cooper's Hill College may 
have been the first institution in Britain which exclusively had management and 
accounts in its curriculum and taught this for the public sector. 
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The identity of Hurst in the context of the syllabus of Cooper's Hill College 
is crucial as it points to evidence that cost accounting and scientific management were 
management practices being conducted in the Ordnance Factories from 1862 onwards. 
Accounting was first introduced into the Cooper's Hill calendar from 1879, the year 
Hurst was appointed as visiting lecturer in accounts. The accounts course was an 
obligatory course for all third-year students and included Mercantile, Banking and 
Government accounts, including the accounts of manufactories (Ordnance Factories) 
and of the Indian PWD (British Library, India and Oriental Collection ST 1378) (see 
appendix to this chapter for a detailed description of the accounting curriculum at 
Cooper's Hill College). 
Also, stores accounting was a prominent part of the syllabus, including 
charging stores against the works on which they had been used. Contract accounts 
were also taken into consideration, for example labour-only contracts, and where 
labour and materials were both contracted for; work undertaken by one contractor, 
or various contractors. The syllabus did not change from 1882 to 1903, when 
accounts as a subject was withdrawn from the curriculum two years before Cooper's 
Hill College was closed (British Library, India and Oriental Collection, Cooper's Hill 
Calendar, ST 1378). 
The reforms of the Ordnance Factories in Britain and India came directly from 
America after the visitation of the Board of Ordnance Commission to the US Federal 
Armories in 1855. However, the introduction of reformed accounting systems into 
the Indian Public Works Department and the British and Indian Ordnance Factories 
was simultaneous with the reforms in the American federal armories. 
Indeed, in January 1914 a paper appeared in the Army Review which became 
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the catalyst for the later cost accounting experiment in the British Army from 1917 
to 1925. Major H.A. Young wrote in the Anny Review of January 1914: 
"No matter how supplies of equipment, food, pay, clothing etc. reach 
a unit, the unit should be self-contained itself and be directly respon-
sible for all expenditure which is incurred in its upkeep, and that unless 
it is economical it cannot be efficient. Charge against such unit every 
item of expense incurred by it, discriminating, of course, between items 
which it can control and those which are fixed. I do not say that the 
data obtained can be taken by themselves, or that the early results will 
be accurate. Many factors must be considered, such as the date of 
issue of the equipment, service on which the unit has been employed, 
its station and other circumstances. As time goes on, however, the 
accumulated data will become more and more valuable and accurate, 
and an intelligent comparison of unit with unit will be a practical means 
of judging to what extent economy has been obtained, and will enable 
those responsible to the state, for the Army as a whole to reward the 
efficient and punish the wasteful." (Army Review, 1914: 225-230) 
Young was an officer in the Royal Artillery who spent all his service from 
1888 to 1921 with the Indian Ordnance Department, being superintendent of a number 
of Indian Ordnance Factories and later in 1917 becoming Inspector General. 
The point being made here is that Young's experience within the Indian 
Ordnance Department was very similar to that experienced by the gunner officers who 
were superintendents of the British Ordnance Factories. As with officers of the Royal 
Engineers, they were the soldier-technologists of the nineteenth century. Their 
knowledge of accounts and cost accounting was probably learned through on-the-job 
learning rather than through any specialised training, as was apparent from America 
and the West Point connection. 
Officers of both the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers also held junior 
positions within the British and Indian Ordnance Factories. From the mid nineteenth 
century, training for officers appointed to the staff of Ordnance Factories was 
formalised, which continued until the First World War. A number of Royal Artillery 
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officers spent large parts of their service with the British and Indian Ordnance Fac-
tories. as was evident from the career of Young. From 1860 until 1879 the Superin-
tendent at the Royal Laboratory. Royal Arsenal. Woolwich was Major General Edward 
Mourrier Boxer RA FRS. Boxer's career is further explored in Chapter 8. 
Patrona&e and professionalism: the audit of the Victorian Army officer 
Despite the concept of patronage within the purchases of Army commissions, 
there was a stringent audit of commissioned officers within the Army, through a 
system of twice yearly confidential reports. This, as Harries-Jenkins (1977) pointed 
out, was well over a hundred years before a similar model was used in the private 
sector. Thus the presumed inefficiency of commissioning through purchase begins 
to be challenged as the system itself was thoroughly audited. 
The confidential reports of the general officers commanding brigades were 
passed to superior officers along the chain of military hierarchy. For example the 
brigade general officer would pass his inspecting confidential report to the officer 
commanding a district. then command until they arrived at the Adjutant General at 
the War Office. Each receiving officer could add to the confidential report, perhaps 
in the same manner as a 'grandparent' in the modem sense of an appraisal system. 
The Adjutant General would then forward these reports together with any observations 
"which they may judge it expedient to add ... for the information of the Commander-
in-Chief" (Queen's Regulations [QRs] for the Army, 1859: 404, para.4). 
Harries-Jenkins (1977: 82) refers to the confidential report system for officers 
of the Army from 1850. The earliest King's Regulations (KRs) held in the National 
Army Museum at Chelsea, London are for the year 1837, the last year of the reign 
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of William IV. The 1837 KRs from pages 473 to 498 deal specifically with confiden-
tial report for officers, where it commences that: 
" ... every General Officer employed on the staff whether at home or 
abroad is required to make a confidential report in the early parts of 
the month of May and October in each year, or as soon afterwards as 
the circumstances of the Service will pennit of what has fallen within 
his observation on those important subjects since the previous inspec-
tion." (KRs, 1837: 473) 
"These Reports are, as far as practicable, to be the result of continued 
intercourse and observation and not to be confined to an inspection at 
any particular time." (KRs, 1837: 473) 
The nature of confidential reports for the British Army throughout the nine-
teenth century appears to be of an unscientific design. There was, for the most part, 
no prescribed printed sheet. The General Officer made his report in long-hand on a 
sheet of paper following the guide in King's (Queen's) Regulations. 
However, despite the supposedly unscientific nature of the system of confiden-
tial reporting, the system existed long before its development in the private sector. 
The audit of officers in the nineteenth century perhaps increased their efficiency and 
professionalism, through the entry of the majority of officers into commissioned ranks 
of the Army by purchase and patronage. 
This system of annual confidential reporting was also introduced into the 
reformed Purveying Department to the Army in 1857. The original Purveying 
Department had come under criticism during the Crimean War, and was one of the 
first departments to undergo transition in the immediate post-1856 period. Indeed, 
the Purveying Department was close to the Ordnance Factories. 
The qualification and conduct of Purveyors clerks were to be confidentially 
reported upon annually, by the Purveyors under whom they served. The report was 
based on the following points:-
- 64-
• The range of duties upon which they have been employed during the year 
• The manner in which these duties have been performed 
• Punctuality 
• Knowledge of current regulations and duties of the Department generally 
• Their knowledge of mathematics and of accounts 
• Their skill in composition, writing, calculations and the preparation of returns 
• Their skill of acquaintance with French, or any other foreign language 
• Their general conduct 
• Their conduct as officers and gentlemen, prudence, respectability. courteous-
ness, and whether it is known they have any pecuniary embarrassments. 
These Confidential Reports had to be forwarded to the Purveyor-in-Chief by the 1st 
of January each year. 
Also each Purveyor in charge of a station had to maintain a diary recording the daily 
hours of the clerks, any recorded absence and the tasks performed by each clerk on 
a daily basis. This diary had to be forwarded annually to the Purveyor-in-Chief 
(Regulations for the Guidance of Officers of the Purveying Department, first edition 
1857, WO 33/4 A and B). 
This example gives evidence of the confidential reporting procedures in detail 
with a small department of the Army. This illuminates previous arguments in this 
chapter concerning education for management, as well as the rationale behind the 
confidential reporting system. Equivalent managers in mid-Victorian commerce did 
not experience this type of regular audit. 
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Military officers as mangers 
Few commissioned officers of the British Anny attended dissenting academies 
although officers of the Indian Army were sometimes graduates from these academies. 
An example was Captain Mark Huish (1808-1867) who was commissioned into the 
67th Regiment. Bengal Native Infantry. Huish was a non-conformist. an unusual 
devotion at the time for a commissioned officer. His schooling was at a Dissenting 
Academy at Nottingham. identified by Wardle (1970) as a private writing school. 
Huish later became managing director of the London and North Western Railway. 
The career of Huish as General Manager was to unite and centralise three 
railway companies into the London and North Western Railway Company. The 
obituary of Captain Huish describes his rule as "based on sound commercial prin-
ciples. as well as upon an admirable system of centralisation" (Minutes of Proceedings 
of the Institution of Civil Engineers. vol. XXVII , Session 1867-68: 601). 
Huish resigned his commission in 1834 due to poor career and promotion 
prospects. At this time many officers. both in the British and Indian annies and the 
Royal Navy. left the service for similar reasons. Many former Anny officers became 
managers in the growing railway industry in Britain. Junior officers of the Anny and 
Navy "had experience of accounts and bookkeeping and were also familiar with the 
control of large staffs" (Gourvish, 1972: 27). In the case of Huish. active service 
always eluded him. His administrative talent, due to his education, led him to become 
quartermaster and interpreter to his Regiment. Other fonner Anny officers who 
became leading railway managers included: Captain William O'Brien, North Eastern 
Railway; Captain John Laws, Managing Director of the Manchester and Leeds; and 
Charles Saunders, Secretary and Superintendent of Traffic, Great Western Railway 
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(Gourvish, 1972: 27). 
The Army and Navy were used as a training ground by officers for future 
management roles in the private sector. This was an unconscious decision; many 
officers left the Army early due to uncertainty and the inactivity of the Army between 
1815 and 1854. The railway inspectorate of the Board of Trade was staffed 
exclusively by sapper officers since its formation in 1842. Indeed, the railway 
inspectorate became a sort of clearing house for officers of the Royal Engineers to 
be recruited into the railway companies. An example of this can be seen in the career 
of Captain Joshua William Coddington RE (1809-1855). Coddington was educated 
at the Royal Military Academy Woolwich and in 1840 resigned as a lecturer in 
military engineering. From 1844 to 1847 Coddington was on the staff of the Inspector 
of Railways at the Board of Trade. His obituary stated that "during that period he 
had been frequently solicited by railway companies to undertake the general manage-
ment of their lines and eventually he accepted the post of General Manager of the 
Caledonian Railway" (Minutes of the Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers , 
vol. XIV , 1854-55: 166). 
The London and North Western Railway was also associated with the Moorsom 
family. Captain William Moorsom, on leaving the Army (7th Fusiliers), joined the 
staff of the London and North Western where his elder brother, Rear Admiral 
Moorsom RN was one of the directors of the company. Captain Moorsom's survey 
of the proposed railway link between Birmingham and Gloucester in 1836 was the 
accepted tender. He beat off competition from George and Robert Stephenson and 
I.K. Brunei (Minutes of the Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers, 
voI.XXIII, Session 1863-4: 500). 
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The Irowth of professional manyement in the public sector in the ei&hteenth 
century: examples from the Naval Dockyards 
The reforms within the Ordnance Factories in the nineteenth century did not 
occur in isolation. There is evidence to suggest that there was a growth of pro-
fessional management in the public sector during the eighteenth century. Pollard has 
identified these reforms within the Admiralty dockyards. Indeed. Pollard notes and 
nearest parallels between the public and private sectors in terms of an identifiable 
management remuneration grades as manifest in the Admiralty dockyards and Office 
of Works (1966: 166). 
The remuneration of the Comptroller of the Office of Works during the first 
quarter of the eighteenth century was £158 p.a. As this was the era of patronage. 
there were "several additions for perquisites and sinecures [which] raised to well over 
£700 by 1726" (Pollard. 1966: 167). 
The master craftsmen at the Office of Works and clerks who were in charge 
of "the work had salaries of £25-£50 p.a., though some of them added to their 
incomes substantially by 'outside' contracting" (Pollard, 1966: 167). 
The Admiralty dockyards, Pollard notes, had no such overheads. The Naval 
Dockyard at Chatham in 1700 paid its six chief officers £200 each, and £100 for three 
other officers "and the Bos'n [Boatswain] of the Yard" £80. The Purveyor, and all 
other master craftsmen and foremen, were paid around £50 (Pollard, 1966: 167). 
Again, Pollard notes that "these salaries remained unchanged in 1790, except that the 
Purveyor's salary had been raised to £100" (1966: 167). 
However, Pollard in the examination of the pay lists of Chatham Dockyards 
for the years 1700 and 1790 has overlooked another point regarding the 'Bos'n' of 
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the Yard, who in 1700 was salaried at £90 per annum, paid in the first quarter 1 
January to 31 March 1700, £20, whereas his successor ninety years later, the then 
Bos'n of the Yard, one Thomas Mann, was now paid £80 per annum and for the first 
quarter 1 January to 31 March 1790 £20 (ADM 42/8; 42/81), a reduction of £10 per 
annum. 
The implication of this would appear to be that there was some prejudice 
between a manager such as a purveyor who was in charge of indenting for all the 
stores and supplies needed for a thriving naval dockyard, which by 1790 was on 
'active service', and the Bos'n of the yard, who had to have the managerial skills of 
logistically deploying the stores and labour to the correct objective and to control 
discipline and pay the dock labour. The position may roughly equate to a personnel 
manager. The tasks performed by Thomas Mann as Bos' n of the Yard at Chatham 
Dockyard in 1790 were perhaps more complex and sophisticated than those carried 
out by his distant predecessor some ninety years previously. 
Contemporary civil British mangement in the late eiahteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries 
In terms of the soldier-technologist experience and from the perspective of the 
British Army and the underlying training at RMA Woolwich. although it was not as 
advanced as in the contemporary United States of America. it was far more advanced 
than what was offered in the British private sector. There were strands within the 
British educational system of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries where a frag-
mented curriculum could provide subjects relevant to commerce and industry, such 
institutions ranging from dissenting academies to certain public schools. Indeed, there 
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was a rich diversity of schools and places of learning but they were not synthesised 
and were based upon a fragmented and varying localised system. 
Pollard has identified the rich variety of these schools and sources of learning, 
noting that men such as George Stephenson, William Edwards, the Welsh bridge-
builder Joseph Bramah, and Richard Trevithick amongst others "who had the village 
school as the main, or sole, basis of their formal education" (1966: 129). From this 
often followed some form of apprenticeship to a local craftsman. 
The public schools also provided an education which proved useful for potential 
managers. In particular were the smaller public schools endowed as charities. These 
are known as the Taunton schools after a Royal Commission investigation into their 
endowments, chaired by Lord Taunton. The sons of local merchants, craftsmen and 
entrepreneurs were often sent to this type of school where arithmetic and the art of 
bookkeeping were taught. The dissenting academies excelled in the teaching of 
science. 
The major public schools and the ancient English universities tended to 
permeate the concept of a humanist curriculum. This was particularly so at Eton, 
Harrow and Rugby, the great Clarendon schools. These schools and the ancient 
universities were "in many respects a club for young men of the nobility and gentry, 
or at least wealth" (Taine, in Coleman, 1973: 100). The new wealth of the rising 
entrepreneur class did not permeate the great public schools or universities in any great 
number until later in the nineteenth century. However, there was a different ethos 
in the north due to the Scottish enlightenment. Neither did the Clarendon schools nor 
the ancient universities offer any curriculum which would have direct transferable 
skills to business and enterprise. This is despite their earlier pioneering innovation 
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of DEB some centuries earlier. They reflected a gentlemen's club which. Coleman 
suggested. was as follows: 
" ... be it the right school for the young. the right university for the 
adolescent, the right club for the adult, was an integral part of the 
gentlemanly ethos in practice, just as was the unwritten code of behav-
iour. Both as a concept and as a practice, it has shown a powerful 
talent for survival." (Coleman, 1973: 100) 
The major debates on English education. both in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. were mainly concerned with scientific and technological education or the 
deficiencies thereof. In the nineteenth century there was the Devonshire Commission 
(1867) and the two Samuelson Commissions (1881 and 1884). Such debates hardly 
touched the "world of business at all" (Coleman. 1973: 101) and also hardly touched 
the Clarendon Schools nor the ancient universities, long attached to a classical curricu-
lum, which suited a gentlemanly class who "were to live idly and without manual 
labour" (Coleman, 1973: 101). 
However, there was the alternative point of view which could defend the 
existence of the English public school system. for example the emphasis of team 
working which developed due to the cult of sportsmanship in the public school 
curriculum (Jeremy, 1998: 390). Jeremy also highlighted other factors, for example 
"authority and hierarchy, team spirit, of respect for past experience... Christian-
informed compassion and empathy likewise resonate with modem notions of HRM 
[human resource management]" (Jeremy. 1998: 391). 
Much of the problem was due to the reliance of British entrepreneurs on the 
concept of the practical man, which is further explored in the next section. Coleman 
(1973) also relates to the theory of the concept of 'Gentleman versus Player', where 
the divide was quite rigid. although the divide could be crossed. For example, in 
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some industries this gentlemanly concept prevailed and was promoted. Coleman refers 
to Dr. Reader and his history of ICI (Imperia/ Chemica/Industries: A History. 1. The 
Forerunners 1870-1926). Reader refers to the "Winnington Hall Club", begun at 
Brunner Mond's Cheshire establishment during the latter part of the nineteenth 
century. The Club continued into the twentieth century and was a management club. 
Its membership was reserved for gentlemen. 
"Election to the club was narrowly restricted. Technical men of grad-
uate standing - meaning for practical purposes chemists - could perhaps 
take it for granted: no-one else could, least of all engineers and com-
mercial men ... " (Reader, 1970: 218) 
"The whole structure rested on class distinction. University men 
(amongst whom engineers were by no means automatically included) 
were gentlemen: the rest were not, unless they achieved the status by 
consent of those already holding it." (Reader, 1970: 219) 
Coleman comments that even in a highly successful technologically and 
scientifically based organisation, the social strata of English society prevailed. This 
was not only unique to the 'new' industries: the concept of a gentleman's club was 
still the model for Courtaulds in 1952. 
"For a long time there has been no fundamental change in the Board ... 
The Executive Directors have directed and managed, and on the whole 
they have been successful. There has been a Gentleman's Club atmos-
phere in the Board Room and I believe it's true to say that over the 
year this has been spread to all departments of our business. It is, in 
fact, part of the goodwill of the company, which we must safe-guard. 
On the other hand great care must be taken to avoid inefficiency." 
(Quoted by Coleman [1973: 101] from Courtaulds' Archives, private 
memorandum by Sir John Hanbury-Williams, Chainnan of Courtaulds, 
sent to four of his senior directors) 
During the nineteenth century, two parallel distinctions emerged. Science 
failed to establish itself in the concept of liberal education. This led to the notion of 
science divided into pure and applied science: pure science including natural philos-
ophy, could be pursued within the realm of the liberal arts by the cultivated amateur. 
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Rothblatt (I 968: 268) points out that: 
"The overwhelming majority of trained science and engineering grad-
uates from all universities. chemists as well as physicists. were 
employed in teaching rather than industry. Manufacturers continued 
to favour industrial chemists or engineers who had received their 
training essentially in the works itself. The attitude that college life 
ruins a man for a business career was still prevalent." 
The natural sciences taught at Oxford and Cambridge Universities did not 
encompass applied sciences and were part of the overall liberal arts curriculum as 
practised by both the ancient universities. This attitude may have been promoted by 
the English concept of a liberal education as practised in the ancient universities and 
Clarendon public schools where the notion of a practical man was regarded as being 
of lower status than that of a gentleman. Applied science was regarded as manual 
labour only. to be pursued by the practical man. The two cults were contemporary 
although divorced from one another. Rothblatt (1968: 268) argues that the: 
" . .. leaders of commerce ... were reluctant to employ arts graduates. 
For at least sixty years (during the nineteenth century) prominent 
intellectuals. parliamentary spokesmen, heads of scientific associations 
and institutes. government committees and royal commissions had 
urged the schools to produce scientists and technologists to staff indus-
try and increase the importance of British manufacturing. " 
The sources of the concept of the gentleman and the practical man were vested 
in the "embodiment of English education and the idea of a gentleman. and to the social 
nature of the English industrial revolution" (Coleman, 1973: 102). 
Oxford University only established an engineering department in 1907, as a 
response to pressure from certain leading public schools who had introduced mechanics 
into their curriculum for boys who wished to pursue an engineering career. The 
creation of an engineering department at Oxford "became an 'urgent necessity' as 
parents now expected their sons to be able to continue these studies at Oxford" (Honey 
- 73 -
and Carthays, 2000: 563-4}. However, Oxford was thirty years behind Cambridge 
where a Chair in engineering had been founded in 1875. Despite this, few undergrad-
uates read engineering at either univesrity until after the First World War. 
However, the engineering department, as well as the applied sciences, expanded 
at Oxford University in 1907 due to the closure of the Royal Indian Engineering 
College at Cooper's Hill the year previously. Prior to 1907 efforts had been made 
unsuccessfully to establish a Forestry degree at Oxford. This was achieved in 1907 
but it was financed by the India Office and the students were potential PWD engineers. 
William Schlich became the first government professor also sponsored by the India 
Office. Previously, Schlich had been Professor of Forestry at Cooper's Hill College. 
By 1911, applied sciences departments had been established at Cambridge and 
Edinburgh (Howarth, 2000: 475). 
As neither the ancient universities nor the public schools played a major role 
within the development of the British industrial revolution, the vacuum was filled by 
the practical man ethos, both socially, economically and politically. 
The progress of the industrial revolution saw the rise of the practical man 
socially, economically and politically. The status of 'Player' according to Coleman 
was the ultimate goal of the 'Practical Man'. Coleman (1973: 103) argued that: "As 
industry consolidated its success and emerged as a recognisable possible route to this 
ancient goal [of gentlemen], so did further social development follow". Coleman 
refers to the new occupational patterns which emerged in which were to be found the 
industrial 'practical man', for example in the managers of factories and mills. 
Partners and directors who aspired to the requisite wealth could become gentlemen, 
whereas the practical man continued to exercise the technological criteria of industry. 
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The division in education, according to Coleman, split into what was conceived to be 
education required for gentlemen, and training for the players (Coleman, 1973: 103). 
However, the primary ambition of a player was to become a gentleman (Chandler, 
1996: 292). Indeed, Wiener's thesis of the decline of the industrial spirit in England 
was due to a gentrification process (Wiener, 1981). Wiener's argument is not 
supported by all historians, however. 
During the latter part of the nineteenth century, as the education and science 
debate intensified, the Gentleman versus Player argument became more evident. 
Criticisms were made of the public school and ancient universities by eminent scien-
tists of the day, notably Playfair and Huxley. Both stressed the importance of science 
to business, indeed a dichotomy of interest was displayed by Huxley who, in evidence 
to the Samuelson Committee of 1867, stated: "If I intended my own son for any 
branch of manufacture, I should not dream of sending him to the university" (quoted 
in Coleman, 1973: 106). 
Instead, Reader suggests that despite the attractions of the profession: 
"An increasing percentage of school leavers went direct into business: 
6 per cent from Marlborough in 1846 but 23 per cent in 1906; 6 per 
cent from Merchant Taylors in 1851 but 42 per cent in 1891; 9 per cent 
from Clifton in 1867 but 25 per cent in 1907; even Winchester sent 12 
per cent of its leavers straight into business in 1893." (Reader, 1966: 
212-214) 
This suggests there was a middle-class basis for business education. Much of 
the innovation of the British industrial revolution was based on the concept of the 
practical man or gifted amateur (Barnett, 1990). Most inventors and entrepreneurs 
in the British industrial revolution were not educated to match their skills with an 
emerging economy. Unlike their American, German and French counterparts, British 
entrepreneurs in the nineteenth century were trained to manage small units based in 
- 75 -
family capitalism. 
A major reason for the failure of British capitalism in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century was its failure at business and management education. whereas 
American. French and German economies had developed processes for management 
education. This was a contributory factor in their industrial supremacy from 1870 
onwards (Chandler. 1990: 291-2). During the period of the Great Depression. a 
number of Commissions of Inquiry were established to investigate the reasons for 
economic stagnation in Britain. and education featured in these. One such study was 
a comparative educational survey, undertaken by Matthew Arnold junior. As with 
other investigations, the deficiencies of British business, management and scientific 
education were noted but in reality little was successfully achieved to improve the 
deficit. Neither were business or commercial faculties so successful in Britain until 
the post-1945 period. 
It was this factor and the reliance on the practical man ethos that resulted in 
the negative response to various commissions. For example, the net result of the 
findings of the two Samuelson Commissions (1881 and 1885) into scientific, techno-
logical and managerial education in Britain compared to Europe and America was a 
very weak and enabling (as opposed to mandatory) Technical Instruction Act of 1889. 
This Act only entered the statute book on its sixth attempt. The five previous attempts 
were undermined by entrepreneurs and trade unionists alike, particularly the ASE. 
Fears included the release of trade secrets and the demise of patent rights, whereas 
the ASE feared the loss of the craft spirit which, as will be demonstrated later in this 
thesis, was already a myth. The Act itself allowed local rateable authorities to levy 
a penny rate if they so wished, to finance science education. The government also 
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redistributed central funds originally earmarked for compensation for redundant 
publicans. Thus the finance behind the 1889 Technical Instruction Act was known 
as 'whisky money'. 
The major controversy surrounding English education until 1914 was the dogma 
of religious controversy, better remembered through the stormy passage of the 1870 
and 1902 Education Acts which consumed a great deal of Parliamentary time. Few 
British universities successfully offered any commercial or management courses until 
well into the twentieth century. Where some universities did attempt to introduce 
commercially orientated courses, these proved to be unsuccessful. For example. the 
London School of Economics (LSE) had been founded in 1895 and, in 1901, was one 
of the first higher education institutions in England to offer a business degree. 
However, an attempt to establish a Faculty of Commerce failed "because the Univer-
sity of London commissioners would not agree to it but they did allow a Faculty of 
Economics and Political Science (including Commerce and Industry) and the School 
set up its BSc(Econ)" (Keeble, 1992: 99). In 1932 the LSE began a "graduate 
programme in commercial education ... but there was no graduate work in Britain in 
commerce or business" (Chandler, 1996: 293). 
Joseph Chamberlain's attempt to establish a Faculty of Commerce and a 
Bachelor of Commerce degree at Birmingham was rejected by Midlands industrialists. 
They were not 
" ... persuaded sufficiently to give the idea their financial backing, but 
Chamberlain was able to tum to a non-industrial source for the necess-
ary initial funds. He persuaded Lord Strathcona (the Canadian High 
Commissioner and some time lecturer at Mason College) to allow his 
donation of £50,000 intended for the proposed University of Birming-
ham to be invested separately and the income used to support the new 
Faculty of Commerce. It began in 1902 in two rooms over a shop." 
(Keeble, 1992: 100) 
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W.J. Ashley became the first Professor of Commerce but "the level of industry's 
interest in the new Faculty of Commerce was disappointing. However much thought 
and effort had gone into the business degree, Birmingham businessmen were never 
attracted to the idea" (Keeble, 1992: 101). In his first annual report. Ashley reported 
that "the friends of the University must constantly bear in mind that the high-sounding 
designation 'Faculty of Commerce' is a prophecy and an ideal, rather than an accom-
plished fact" (quoted by Keeble, 1992: lOt). Oxford and Cambridge, along with the 
civic universities, had a divorced relationship with the business and industrial world. 
treating each other with "indifference if not distrust and hostility" (Locke, 1986: 96, 
quoted by Chandler, 1996: 293). 
Chandler also refers to the paucity of engineering courses at English univer-
sities. There were Chairs in engineering at Oxford, Cambridge and the civic univer-
sities, although "the professors who occupied them had few students. In 1913 the 
number of engineering students graduating from the universities of England and Wales 
was 1,129" (Chandler, 1996: 293). In assessing this, the concept of engineering and 
entrepreneurship (including management) in Britain was very much in the model of 
the "practical man" (Barnett, 1990). This practice was quite acceptable in contempor-
ary society at the time. William Armstrong, known as an eminent nineteenth-century 
engineer and a pioneer in the reforms of the post-1855 Ordnance Factories, only took 
up full-time engineering at the age of 37. having a natural talent in mechanical 
engineering. Previously, Armstrong had practised as a solicitor in Newcastle upon 
Tyne (Warren, 1989: 13-18; Wilcox. 1999: 57). 
The fact that Britain had experienced the first industrial revolution may have 
had an adverse effect later. particularly on the older British industries. This is 
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particularly so in relation to management and technology. Chandler again points to 
this in assessing the British steel industry, where "... entrepreneurs may have been 
paying the price of having been pioneers before the opportunities to fully exploit the 
new technology appeared" (1996: 285). 
Having said this, the outcomes of the Devonshire Commission and the two later 
Samuelson Commissions, damning as they were regarding scientific and technological 
education and its apparent importance to national economic performance, were met 
with apathy from parliamentarians and entrepreneurs alike. Only a core of backbench 
Liberal MPs and other interested parties were concerned about Britain's loss of 
industrial supremacy. The apathetic stance was supported due perhaps to the reliance 
on imperial preference in British foreign trade and the belief in the assumed sustainab-
ility of the Empire and the protected market as well as the complacent belief in the 
concept of the 'practical man'. This prevailing culture resulted in a resistance to the 
adoption of new technology, a point made previously (Cooper, 1984). 
The absence of any graduate or post-graduate educational facilities in Britain 
to promote business, engineering and management training blunted the competitiveness 
of British industry. Chandler comments that: "As a result, the educational infrastruc-
ture so essential to sustaining modem industry appeared much later in Britain than in 
the United States or Germany" (1996: 293). 
Where there were apparent successes in British industrial competition, particu-
larly in chemicals (including explosives), electrical equipment and copper. British 
entrepreneurship still failed to sustain this initial competitiveness. British scientists 
were as good as those of Germany and America. but what was absent was the entre-
preneurial and managerial spirit. Chandler commented that: 
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that: 
"Whatever the exact reason for such entrepreneurial failure were, two 
points are clear. First entrepreneurial failure in the new industries can 
be precisely defined. It was the failure to make a three-pronged invest-
ment in production, distribution and management essential to exploit 
economies of scale and scope. Second, the time-period in which that 
investment could have been made was short. Once the first movers 
from other nations had entered the British market often supplementing 
their marketing organisations by direct investment in production. the 
window of opportunity was closed." (Chandler. 1996: 286) 
Singleton, in his paper on tank production during the First World War, stated 
"Railway locomotives, rolling stock, steam engines, agricultural mach-
inery, armaments, textile machinery and heavy machine tools were the 
core products of the British engineering industry. On the eve of the 
First World War, Britain possessed significant productive capacity of 
the newer branches of engineering such as the manufacture of motor 
vehicles, bicycles and electrical machinery." (1998: 91-2) 
In his assessment, Singleton notes that: 
"The attempts of economic historians to assess the health of the engin-
eering industry, in the early twentieth century, have been hampered by 
the sector's diversity. Ground was certainly being lost in established 
export lines, to American and German competitors before 1914." 
(Singleton, 1998: 92) 
The context of British cultural attitudes towards corporatism and entrepreneurship was 
the reason for almost a non-committal to efficiency tools such as cost accounting. As 
cost accounting is closely correlated to departmental accounting, its development in 
American corporate enterprise is clearly evident. The failure of British industry to 
adopt cost accounting techniques on a large scale is the result of these structural 
differences. Thus the growth of the contemporary accountancy profession in Britain 
from 1850 onwards did nothing to enhance the expansion of cost accountancy or other 
management accounting tools in Britain (Jones, 1981: 115), but a different story 
emerged from the Ordnance Factories from 1855 onwards. 
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From practical man to the professional ideal 
The process of industrialisation in some way had an influence on the transition 
of the gentleman and gifted amateur during the eighteenth century. to service and 
profession during the nineteenth century. Perhaps the industrialisation concept also 
put a vulgarity on the notion of professionalism. identifying it as a form of labour. 
albeit labour of a superior kind. In some respects the rising professions during the 
nineteenth century were similar to the notion of tradesmen of the preceding centuries 
who had risen through an equally mystifying process from apprentice to master. 
The consequences of industrialisation made its mark on the professional 
relationship. Indeed. the traditional bonds between the professions and landed classes 
began to be loosened during the nineteenth century. The traditional patron I pro-
fessional relationship of eighteenth century English social culture tended to be depend-
ent upon aristocratic custom and patronage and was now being replaced by a client 
I professional relationship. 
As the nineteenth century progressed. the demand for professional services 
increased. due to the following reasons: 
• The shift towards a servile state. particularly from 1900. 
• The shift towards meritocracy. This is evident from the reforms of both the 
university examination system and the Civil Service. from the 1834 Graham 
Naval Reforms. 
• The legal acceptance of the divorce of capital ownership from control and the 
concept of limited liability from 1855. This caused a demand for professional 
business managers and independent consultants. Although this was more 
evident in America from the 1830s with the development of the 'modem 
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business enterprise', the demand for professional business managers began to 
emerge in Britain from the 1840s but for other reasons. Most in the form of 
public accountants were exclusively engaged in floatation. winding up. bank-
ruptcy and, later, auditing. 
• This gave rise to a number of new quasi-professionals. for example land agents 
and public accountants, which occurred prior to the establishment of any 
professional accounting body. In a number of cases the public accountant also 
fulfilled other roles including that of land agent and country banker (Jones. 
1981: 29). 
Lloyd (t 924), writing on the nineteenth century reforms in Army administra-
tion, suggests that public and private moral standards increased throughout the century . 
Lloyd concludes that the stabilising of the English banking system and the influences 
of interested groups within society, particularly quasi-religious groups, was the catalyst 
behind the improvement of moral standards in nineteenth century society (1924: 16). 
The influence of quasi-religious groups did affect the commercial and banking com-
munities. The concept of the web of credit within the private sector generally and 
high trust culture (Wilson, 1995: 25). 
Within the public sector the Crimean War was perhaps influential in the 
contemporary administrative reforms within the British Army. The work of William 
Russell as War Correspondent to the Times (the first in the field) reported and 
published the inefficiencies of the British Anny in the field. The media began to play 
an important part in infonning a better educated British public which in itself began 
the process of influencing the professional conduct of public officials. 
By the mid-nineteenth century the Victorian public wanted 'value for money', 
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especially in respect of the Anny and Navy. which reflected an anathema to Victorian 
democratic society. The Victorian taxpayer was now a stakeholder in the public life 
of Britain. which is evident from the pressure to set up the Northcote-Trevelyan 
Inquiry. despite the earlier reforms in the civil service. 
The establishment of this inquiry into the Home Civil Service and its report 
to the Organisation of the Civil Service in 1853 was influenced by public opinion. 
despite the previous refonns. who were alarmed at the rise in public expenditure and 
the conduct of certain public officials. 
The major objective of the Northcote-Trevelyan Report was to distinguish 
between the division of labour within the Civil Service. between the political and 
administrative civil service work and establish a distinction between 'intellectual' and 
'mechanical' tasks. Certain government departments deployed double-entry accounting 
systems before 1853. notably the Admiralty. Ordnance Department and the Office of 
Woods and Estates. There was no overall uniformity. however; most departments 
practised single-entry cash-based accounting systems only. 
The administrative class was established through the Civil Service Commission 
in 1855. During the 1860s some development regarding open competition was 
introduced. The post-1855 Civil Service accepted the concepts of "expertise. ability. 
economy. efficiency and effectiveness" and that recruits. or those aspiring to promo-
tion. now had to rely on examination or open competition rather than through patron-
age (Ryan. 1972). The reforms did not amount to open competition until the 
Gladstone Refonns of 1870 however. Although the reformed Civil Service. like the 
previous 'unreformed' model. had its own internal professional route which was closed 
around a well constructed expertise of administration or knowledge. which was self 
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regulating and was vested within the objects of government on which liberal rule 
depended (Osborne, 1994: 289-313). 
These refonns penneated into Victorian public life due to the increase within 
the democratic process throughout the century. Although universal suffrage was not 
attained in Britain until the twentieth century, many nineteenth century public sector 
institutions were established under the control of locally elected bodies with authority 
to spend public funds, for example the Municipal Corporations Act 1835, Poor Law 
Amendment Act 1834, and the School Boards under the Elementary Education Act 
1870 with the authority to raise penny rates in order to fund local school boards. The 
creation of these local, if somewhat piecemeal bodies throughout the nineteenth century 
also increased the desire for professional rules set by professional bodies. For 
example, the public audit provisions of the 1835 Municipal Corporation Act statutorily 
provided the requirement to keep and fonnalise accounts. The onset of the 1834 and 
1844 Poor Law Amendments Acts provided similar requirements. In order to protect 
the municipal and poor law ratepayer, district auditors were appointed with full powers 
to examine, audit, allow or disallow of accounts. 
No powers or duties were attached to either municipal or poor law district 
auditors except that accounts were to be submitted to them and the auditor was to sign 
them if found correct. This concept was little different from the audit requirements 
of limited liability companies after the 1856 and 1862 Joint Stock Companies Act. 
Indeed the procedure of audit of municipal accounts remained thus in some boroughs 
until 1972. The lack of statutory regulation assigning the correct duties of a district 
auditor meant that there was a freedom to audit a diverse fonn of accounts. For 
example in most cases, borough treasurers were also not guided by detailed statutory 
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provision. This gap gave rise to district auditors and borough treasurers developing 
heir own expertise in local government financing and to fonn a professional body in 
order to standardise procedures. Hence the Institute of Municipal Treasurers and 
Accountants was fonned which later became the CIPF A in 1959. Other local account-
ants and treasurers joined the Society of Incorporated Accountants and Auditors on 
its fonnation in 1885. The establishment of the Society was not regarded with any 
equanimity by the Institute. On the contrary. the Institute of Chartered Accountants 
regarded its rivals as an outcast. full of school board clerks. overseers and others 
(Stacey. 1954: 28). 
Local government professional bodies were fonned at the tum of the century 
and include the Institute of Municipal Treasurer and Accountants (IMT A) which 
boasted of 154 members in 1900. Previously it was known as the Corporate Treas-
urers and Accountants Institute (CTAI). also founded in 1885. The CTAI was fonned 
as "there being no Society or Union in existence for the furtherance of objects 
common to all municipal and other similar local financial officers" (quoted in Jones. 
1997). The CT AI followed the professional route by establishing its own journal. the 
Financial Circular. in 1896 and drew up its own procedures for membership and 
expulsion. In 1900 the CTAI unsuccessfully applied for a Royal Charter and was not 
to be granted this until 1959. In 1901 the CT AI was incorporated under the Com-
panies Act and began to set its own examinations by 1903 (Sowerby. 1985). How-
ever. the CT AI was unable to secure a monopoly. its main rival being the Society of 
Incorporated Accountants and Auditors. The competition between the two bodies was 
partially resolved when the Society members were allowed to sit the IMT A final 
examination without being required to sit either the preliminary or intennediate 
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examinations (Garrett. 1961). However. very few public accountants were actually 
employed either in the Civil Service or the local authorities until relatively recently. 
It is only since the Government White Paper Better Use of Taxpayers' Money 
(Cm 2929) of July 1995 that elements of commercial accounting are being introduced 
into central government (RAB). Resource accounting and budgeting is only parat of 
a wider reform of the civil service under the Next Steps Initiative which includes the 
Private Finance Initiative (PFI). RAB and PFI reforms within the civil service now 
mean that government accounting has to comply with accepted accounting conventions 
common to the professional accounting bodies. This may open the way for more 
professional accountants to enter the civil service as a career option. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on the soldier-technologist manager and this develop-
ment as it evolved from America and. to a lesser extent, the British Army. This 
concept has been placed within a prevailing historical background of a growing 
professional elite. The experiences of Britain were quite small compared to develop-
ments in America. France and Germany. However. there were reforms which became 
more apparent after the Crimean War (1854-56). 
The concept of British management still reflected the Practical Man approach 
although certain developments in the Ordnance Factories and possibly naval dockyards 
were reflecting a professionalisation of management, possibly from the eighteenth 
century. Pollard' s intrusion into this over thirty years ago now needs to be reassessed 
in order to substantiate this. 
The War Office generally from 1855 to 1914 had at its head some remarkably 
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good political secretaries of state. including Lord Panmure. Hugh Childers. H. 
Campbell-Bannerman and Haldane. and equally good civil servants including H. W.S. 
Whiffin. J.C. Hurst. L. Engelbach and C. Harris. However. the quality of the 
soldier-technologists. the superintendents and the civilian managers of the Ordnance 
Factories displayed a style of management which allowed production. technological 
development. efficiency and excellent labour relations to be undertaken at maximum 
efficiency with minimum disruption. This was at a time when Victorian liberal 
orthodoxy prevailed, with its suspicion of advances in the public sector or military 
expenditure. This allowed for the nucleus of professional management to develop. 
In terms of this research, the next chapter examines the civil administration 
of the War Office, particularly in relation to Army accounts, and also gives an 
overview of the Ordnance Factories. This is important as most of the post-1855 
accounting reforms of the Ordnance Factories were implemented by civil servants 
rather than by soldier-technologists. 
The accounting reforms of the Ordnance. particularly of the Royal Arsenal. 
Woolwich (the Woolwich Departments) is explored in depth in Chapter 4. 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2 
Cooper's Hill Calendar 1884-85 
from India and Oriental Collection, British Library ST 1378 
Obligatory course 
Accounts 
Third year 
1. First Principles of Accounts 
Single and double entry: 
limits of application of single entry accounts 
double entry 
nature of record 
meaning of terms Dr and Cr 
continued adjustment by means of 
limits of error possible in 
books of record needed for double entry accounts 
primary record ledger 
journal 
cash book. its relation to ledger and other accounts 
vouchers. different kinds of 
subsidiary ledgers. nature of 
balance sheets 
Estimates and accounts 
2. Mercantile Accounts 
books for bills payable and receivable 
invoices 
bills of lading 
warehouse and store accounts 
3. Banking Accounts 
special features of. as compared with mercantile accounts 
4. Government Accounts 
radical difference between government and mercantile accounts. the one based 
entirely on cash transactions occurring within fixed definite periods. the other 
upon liabilities and claims outstanding 
relations of government accounts to parliamentary appropriations 
exchequer credits and appropriation audit 
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5. Accounts of Indian Public Works Department 
form of these accounts determined by two conditions: that expenditure is 
limited by annual grants, and that the department is a manufacturing agency 
system of annual appropriations 
comparison of Indian as compared with English system of annual grants: 
degree of latitude allowed to the engineers in the application of the funds at 
their disposal 
public works accounts: divisible into three main parts - original accounts of 
disburser, abstracted accounts of the responsible engineer, and final record in 
audit office 
accounts of disburser 
forms of cash account 
imprest and current accounts 
nature of voucher required as evidence of payment 
work accounts 
various modes of economising labour and space in recording results 
contractors' accounts 
different cases of contract work 
labour only by contract 
labour and materials both contracted for 
work done by various contractors 
work done by one contractor only 
simplest mode of recording these transactions 
store and manufacture accounts 
mode of charging stores consumed against the works on which they have been 
used 
compendious modes for abbreviating labour in striking balances 
mode of checking balances 
store-taking 
accounts of the engineer 
mode of abstracting transactions of his subordinate disbursers 
mode of dealing with stores 
transfer accounts with other officers and departments 
divisional abstract of expenditure and receipts, the record on which the audit 
is based 
ledger and journal 
store ledger 
monthly balance sheet 
distinction between 'personal' and 'service' accounts 
accounts of audit office 
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two main records 
journal and ledger 
difference between journal of executive engineer and that of audit office 
journal used in Public Works Department: its special features 
principle which underlies all good accounting. that the process of abstraction 
and condensation should be continuous throughout the books 
accounts of an Indian province 
annual appropriation account 
accounts of the Indian Empire 
mode of compiling them 
6. Accounts of railway and irrigation works 
twofold conditions involved. since these partake of the character of both 
government and mercantile account: first. accounts of year must be based 
upon cash transactions occurring within it: second. profits must be recorded 
7. Accounts of manufactories (the Indian Ordnance Factories) 
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CHAPTER 3 
The War Office Army Accounts 
and an Overview of the Ordnance Factories 
Introduction 
Sir Charles Harris, the Assistant Financial Secretary to the War Office, stated, 
in a paper delivered to the Staff College in 1908, that "the administration of the British 
Army is probably more complicated than any other business in the world" (quoted by 
Hinchliffe, 1983: 68). The aim of this chapter is primarily to examine the creation 
and growth of the War Office from 1855 onwards. The financial function of the War 
Office was undertaken by the Accountant General's Department, also created in 1855. 
The Accountant General's Department survived until 1904 when it was superseded 
by the Army Accounts Department. This chapter also examines the Accountant 
General's Department and its relationship with the Ordnance Factories from 1855 
onwards. Initially the finance and management control of the Ordnance Factories 
came under Section E (later Section 5) of the Accountant General's Department of the 
War Office. 
This chapter also explores the complexities of Army accounting and audit, first 
from a macro-accounting level, which was probably the source of the comment made 
by Harris in 1908. At a micro-accounting level, the costing and accounting systems 
at the Ordnance Factories is first introduced in this chapter and continues into Chapter 
4. 
The research profile into business and management history has tended to 
neglect the overall contribution of the government manufacturing departments 
generally, a point made in Chapter 1. Hobsbawm (1974) outlined the importance of 
war in economic, technological and social innovation, both in the public and private 
sectors. He relates the expansion of the Royal Navy including the Admiralty dockyards 
and the Arsenal at Woolwich with the growth of the iron founders such as the 
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Wilkinsons, the Walkers and the Carron Works and the innovations of Henry Ford. 
This is similar to the importance of the space/defence industry for the American 
economy. 
Both Henry Maudsley, the pioneer of machine tools, and Marc Isambard 
Brunei, as has previously been mentioned, "remained closely bound up with naval 
contracts" (Hobsbawm, 1974: 50). Sir Marc Brunei was instrumental in installing a 
steam sawmill at the Royal Carriage Department which became operational in 1812. 
The first steam engine to be used at the Royal Laboratory was installed in 1805 
by Joseph Bramah. Hobsbawm also reminds the student of the period that the 
pioneering role of the government's own establishments must not be forgotten. The 
statement made by Harris highlights the size of the War Office, including the 
Ordnance Factories and British Army in comparison to the contemporary private sector 
in Britain. 
The War Office underwent numerous reforms in the nineteenth century, which 
included reforms of the government manufacturing departments and administrative and 
financial reforms within the Army generally. 
From 1855, the government manufacturing departments were taken over by 
the War Office. Each government factory was placed under the superintendence of 
a senior military officer, which supports the notion of the soldier-technologist in 
Britain. But this development was by no means as advanced as the soldier-technologist 
concept in contemporary America. There was no overall military or civilian 
overseeing director general or chief superintendent until 1887. This system caused 
inefficiencies, particularly relating to breakdown in communications between one 
factory and another, even though they were on the same site. For example. the Royal 
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Gun Factory failed to effectively communicate with the Royal Carriage Department 
over changes in the patterns of gun mountings. 
From 1887 onwards, attempts were made to civilianise the superintendencies 
of each Ordnance Factory and in 1890 the first civilian Director General of Ordnance 
Factories (DGOF) was appointed. (The title was changed to Chief Superintendent of 
Ordnance Factories [CSOF] in 1900.) However, there was a mixture of both civilian 
and military superintendents until the end of the First World War. 
The purpose of this chapter is to act as a prelude to subsequent chapters which 
examine the financial structures, management of production and industrial relations 
of the Ordnance Factories. In relation to the concept of Victorian liberalism, the idea 
of ordnance manufacture through a public sector manufactory is somewhat enigmatic, 
yet it was because of this anathema shown by Victorian liberalism towards military 
expenditure that the Ordnance Factories evolved very quickly during the nineteenth 
century into modem units of manufacture, using the factory system, costing and DEB, 
scientific management principles and flexible labour processes. 
The reforms of the War Office in 1855 
The War Office was reconstituted in 1855 as the War Department. The official 
title of War Office was introduced three years later. The War Office existed as a 
separate government spending department until the creation of a tri-service (MoD) in 
1964. 
The initial reforms of the War Office in 1855 may have been influenced by 
the earlier Graham Navy Reforms of 1834 although the 1855 War Office reforms went 
much further than the original Graham naval reforms. For example, the Army 
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Contracts Department was established in 1855 as part of the War Office reforms. The 
Admiralty had to wait until 1869 for a similar Navy Contracts Department to be 
incorporated within its bureaucracy. However, the Accountant General's Department 
at the War Office was modelled on the Accountant General's Department for the Navy 
formed twenty years earlier in 1835 as part of the Graham Naval reforms. 
Prior to 1855 some fifteen separate departments were in some way concerned 
with the administration of the British Army. This included two major offices of state: 
the Commissariat Office, which was under the direct control of the Treasury (Funnell, 
1990) and the Home Office which, until 1859, administered the part-time volunteers 
from the militia and yeomanry. 
The new War Office also incorporated the duties of the original Board of 
Ordnance, the Board of General Offices and the Army Medical Department including 
the men of the Medical Staff Corps. 
Before 1855 the original Secretary at War had an office of Army Accounts. 
Despite this title, the Army Accounts Office was not wholly responsible for the 
administration of Army finance and indeed the Ordnance Office maintained its own 
separate financial system. This culture tended to prevail after the formation of the 
War Office. Sykes (1864), in a paper to the Royal Statistical Society, commented that 
the "great functionaries of the Army" held their own budgets quite separate from those 
of the War Office. These were: 
• The Inspector General of Engineers 
• The Director of Works 
• The Director of Ordnance 
• The Commissary-General in Chief 
• The Purveyor-in-Chief 
This structure was the main reason why the system of Army Accounts which evolved 
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throughout the nineteenth century reflected the separation with the administration of 
votes within the War Office. This caused an array of administrative departments and 
a bureaucracy mirror-imaging the organisation of votes. This system may have been 
adopted for control and audit purposes. Funnell describes this system as a: 
" ... fragmentation of the administration with numerous departments for 
all practical purposes autonomous of each other and not tied together 
by a central co-ordinating committee, issuing their own plethora of 
regulations and operating their own systems of administration." 
(Funnell, 1997: 20) 
The principal officials of the War Department in 1858 were: 
• The Secretary of State of War 
• Two Under-secretaries of State 
• The Assistant Under-secretary 
• The Secretary for Military Correspondence 
Personnel records for civil servants employed by the War Office during the nineteenth 
century now no longer exist. However, a valuable source of primary evidence in 
relation to this research has been the annual War Office staff directories. An almost 
complete set exists at the library of the PRO, Kew, London (reference books 355: 340 
216 WOR). There are some missing volumes including the years 1870, 1886 to 1889 
and, more notably, for the years 1915, 1916 and 1919. The War Office Staff Lists 
tend to be unique as they contain biographies of all the principal civil servants in the 
War Office and of those who have been superannuated. There does not appear to be 
a corresponding Admiralty Directory for the same period. The reasons why the War 
Office should produce an annual Directory and not the Admiralty are not known. 
Part of the War Office reforms included the establishment of the Accountant 
General's Department and the Army Contracts Department. Much of the work of the 
former involved accounting and audit of the War Office departments, mainly on a cash 
basis. But the accounting systems of the Ordnance Factories from 1862 represented 
- 95 -
accounting concepts such as resource, capital and accrual accounting. This is further 
explored in Chapter 4. 
The Cardwell Army reforms 1868·1872 
Edward Cardwell was appointed by Gladstone as Secretary of State for War 
in 1868. Cardwell had to juggle with Army reform without excessively increasing 
the annual Army estimate. This would have been unpopular with the Victorian 
taxpayer, who was mindful of excesses in maintaining a regular standing army and 
contrary to Gladstone's Liberal manifesto. 
Cardwell instigated a number of measures which began to transform the system 
of the Army into an organisational structure that was to last well into the twentieth 
century. He attempted to curtail the powers of the Commander in Chief and, by the 
War Office Act of 1870, the two offices of Secretary of State and Commander in 
Chief were amalgamated into a single department under the control of the Secretary 
of State. Power was shared and the new structure created a dual system as follows: 
• The Secretary of State for War remained solely in charge of supply and 
finance. 
• However, the Commander in Chief controlled the internal administration of 
the Army and its efficiency in pursuance of military duties. (Harris, 1911: 69) 
Cardwell also reorganised the system of Army administration including the 
method of management of financial procedures and procurement of the military 
through a Control Department. This department became the nucleus of the Army Pay 
Department (APD) , formed eight years later in 1878. The APD undertook the 
paymaster function of the Army and for the first time Army paymasters became part 
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of a professionally orientated organisation which enhanced their military career 
prospects, role and efficiency (Hinchliffe, 1983; Black, 1995). 
The macro-accountinl level - Parliamentary accountinl in relation to Army 
accounts and expenditure 
Until 1688, the established revenues of the Crown were the absolute 
prerogative of the sovereign, as was the disposal of such revenues. After the 
'Glorious Revolution' of 1688, Parliament began to appropriate grants for specific 
objects and passed annual votes for the Army, Navy and Ordnance. However, the 
charges of civil government were generally defrayed from the sovereign's fixed civil 
list and were not totally divorced from civil list expenditure until the reign of William 
IV (1830-37). 
The monies voted on warlike expenditure were audited by the Commissioners 
for auditing the public accounts who: 
" ... were required not only to identify defects in existing arrangements 
but also to consider in what more expeditions and effectual and less 
expensive manner the services can in future be regulated and carried 
on for the benefit of the public." (Adams, 1986: 189) 
Despite this system of auditing, it was not transparent as the Commissioners for Audit 
were "practically under the control of the Treasury, the Accounts being declared 
before and passed by that Department" (MUN 5/106/400/12: xviii). 
Before the Crimean War (1854-56) the Army to a large extent was self-
administering in times of peace. Arms and ammunition were provided in kind by the 
Ordnance office for both the Army and Navy alike, the necessary funding for this 
being voted outside the Army and Navy estimates. The colonel of each regiment 
clothed his men on an allowance per man. Food, forage and horses were supplied 
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through the internal economy of each regiment. The Commissaries of the Treasury 
only took responsibility for the Army in times of war. 
An examination of the contributions of Army accounting reforms during the 
nineteenth century, together with the personalities behind them, is important when 
considering the origins and concepts which were to become the precursors of modem 
management accounting. The system of Army reform and professional public sector 
management may appear to be completely unrelated, but Victorian liberal society had 
developed historically to be suspicious of large standing armies filled with conscripts 
designed for aggressive policies with contemporary neighbours. The viewpoint of the 
Victorian liberal conscience was interpreted by Parliament to effectively control the 
Executive. Therefore the control of the Army by a democratic Parliament was linked 
through these financial controls. This unfortunately was accomplished at the expense 
of any military preparedness and efficiency. Parliamentary financial safeguards were 
obsessive by the mid-nineteenth century to ensure its constitutional supremacy. This 
precluded "concern for the needs of a well-prepared army. The consequences of this 
alienation were tragically demonstrated in the Crimean War of 1854-1856" (Funnell, 
1990: 321). 
There were external reforms of naval accounting from 1834 and these did 
influence later Army reforms, but the major emphasis for reform was the effects of 
the Crimean War. The reforms in the management of Army accounts from 1855 were 
attempts to reconcile military finances and constitutional fears. By the eve of the First 
World War this had evolved into a system of efficiency and economy, and a 
description of the influence of these reforms is now given. 
Prior to the 1866 Exchequer and Audit Departments Act, the form of 
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appropriation audit for 1862 slightly changed existing procedures in relation to both 
the Army and the Navy. The 1862 audit provided that if a necessity arose for 
incurring expenditure not provided for under the normal vote appropriate, then under 
certain approved uses the Treasury could allow certain sums to be made from any 
surplus from the same department. Technically, this was contrary to the normal rules 
of virement which generally did not allow the transfer of credit between one civil vote 
and another. 
The preparation of the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act was undertaken 
by Mr. H. Childers and Mr. W. Anderson of the Treasury. Childers, in 1869, 
became First Civil Lord of the Admiralty and later in 1880 was appointed as Secretary 
of State for War. He influenced part of the War Office reforms in the latter half of 
the nineteenth century. Anderson was a civil servant and instrumental earlier. in 1832 
whilst at the Admiralty, in implementing the Graham naval reforms. 
The major clause of the 1866 Act was to "inquire into the receipt, issue and 
audit of public monies in the Exchequer. the Pay Office and the Audit Department" 
(MUN 5/106140011246476: xviii). Section 22 directed that a department charged with 
expenditure of a vote should prepare an appropriation account showing how the monies 
were spent. 
Under the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act of 1866 the audit of civil 
accounts was required through the following heads: 
a) correct appropriation in relation to proper classification both as to vote and 
sub-head. as well as to year of charge; 
b) proof of payment; 
c) application to the purposes for which the grant was intended to provide; 
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d) a test of arithmetical accuracy; 
e) an inquiry as to authority of expenditure (MUN 5/106/400/12 46476: xx). 
During the post-Crimean period, the whole sphere of Army administration was 
reorganised and departmentalised. This included the reconstitution of the War Office 
in 1855. Money was provided by the public in separate votes for clothing, 
commissariat transport, weapons etc. Each vote covered the activities of a department, 
which was responsible for the Army both in times of peace and war. The major 
accounting department, the Accountant General's Department of the War Office 
supplied the financial specialisms of the Army for Parliament. All these departments 
came under the authority of the Secretary of State for War (Report of the Committee 
for Army Expenditure, Cmd 2073, 1924). 
The Army accounts submitted to Parliament were technically a cash statement 
only. The Army accounts showed monies received by the Parliamentary vote and how 
it was expended on Army balances. Harris did however refer to one criticism of the 
system of appropriation accounts by suggesting that "you can arrange or classify 
expenditure in two ways - according to its nature or according to its purpose II (Harris, 
1911: 63). He commented that the Army estimates: 
" are arranged according to the nature of expenditure without 
reference to its purpose, so that our accounts, which follow the 
arrangement of the Estimates, do not show the cost of any service, 
department or branch of the army, or any other result of which the 
mind can lay hold as throwing light upon the economic merits of army 
administration." (Harris, 1911: 64) 
The influence of Harris on the later cost accounting experiments in the British Army 
is crucial. The experiment itself reconciled the purpose and· nature of Army 
expenditure. 
The system of Army accounts along with other government accounts only 
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accounted for subjects rather than objects. The cash statement of Army accounts only 
showed monies received by the Parliamentary vote, and how it was expended by its 
proper vote head. Any surplus was returned to the Treasury, a point made by 
numerous witnesses to the Morley Committee of Inquiry in 1887 (C 5116). 
The system of Army accounting was criticised as being unimaginative, "as to 
render criticism almost impracticable" (The Balance, 1924, vol.3, no.3: 100-1). The 
total once sanctioned by Parliament became almost a fixed annual figure which could 
only be varied under the Monk resolution in times of emergency. This resolution was 
passed by the Commons on 4 March 1879 on a motion put forward by Mr. Monk MP 
(MUN 51106/400/12; Higgs, 1914: 73). The 1924 Report on Army Expenditure (the 
Lawrence Report) noted that: 
"It is to this conception of the 'nursing' of the fighting army by the 
departments that the pre-war [1914] arrangements of Army estimates 
in fifteen separate votes corresponded. The different votes defined the 
provinces of different departmental directors in the War Office [formed 
in 1904 under the recommendation of the Esher Report] grouped under 
the several members of the [Army] Council who, through the Directors 
[of the varying departments], administered the respective votes, i.e. 
drafted the estimates for them and when the expenditure should proceed 
and initiated the necessary action. The priority of rival schemes of 
expenditure with reference to the total fixed for the Army Estimates as 
a whole was decided by the military members of the Council in 
Estimate Committee; but that once done, and the Estimates approved, 
the administration of the vote for a particular 'subject' (clothing, stores, 
works etc.) lay with the member of Council concerned as a 
departmental head, and with his directors." (Cmd 2073, 1924: 6) 
The fragmented and departmentalised establishments within the War Office, 
as previously described, caused the system to fail when the Army was deployed in 
the field in an operational role. This had been one of the J:Tlajor difficulties 
experienced in the Crimean War. Although there were initial improvements during 
the post-Crimean War period, the system showed signs of failure again during the first 
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and second Anglo-Boer wars, in 1881 and 1899-1902. 
Army accounts came under the provisions of the 1866 Exchequer and Audit 
Act 1876 but the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) audit of Army accounts was 
not by an item-by-item audit "but rather continued the policy of a test audit followed 
previously by the Board of Audit" (Funnell. 1997: 19). The CAG could select any 
item, votes or sub-votes to audit but had to cover all votes over a six-year period 
(Funnell, 1997: 19). During the financial year 1877-8 the system of test audit in the 
Army was extended to the Navy (MUN 5/106/400/12). 
Other detailed test examinations were made on a selected proportion of both 
the Navy and Army revenue accounts. The CAG audit of the receipts of revenue on 
the following accounts was governed by s.33 of the 1866 Act, the 1889 Army and 
Navy Audit Act and delegated Treasury powers. 
• The test and audit of stores accounts by Treasury minute of 15 November 1886 
(Public Accounts Committee Report, 1887: 206). 
• The test and audit of manufacturing and expenses account of the Army and 
Navy under the 1889 Act. 
The 1866 Act required accounting officers approved by the Treasury to be on the 
establishment of each government department, to audit and approve the expenditure 
of each department and to superintend the compilation of the annual balance sheet for 
Parliament. Indeed, it would appear that the imposition of a Treasury-appointed 
accounting officer may have sought to impose a "regime of truth on ministries" 
(Foucault. 1980: 133). 
The Accounting Officer at the War Office from 1855 to 1903 was the 
Accountant General and from 1904 to 1908 the Director-General of Army Finance. 
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retitled from 1908 as the Assistant Financial Secretary, a post held from 1908 to 1924 
by Sir Charles Harris. 
It was the business of the Accounting Officer to superintend. scrutinise and 
sign the annual appropriation account, the same Treasury minute stating that: 
but 
"technical knowledge of accounts is not necessary to enable the 
representative of the department ... to discharge himself of the 
responsibility which his signature implies" 
"My Lords expect that accounting officers will take precautions to 
secure the recovery and bringing to account at proper times of all extra 
and other receipts connected with the votes under their control." 
(MUN 5/1041400/24) 
The challenge to the subject-based system of Army accounts came from Harris, who 
argued for the accounting of objects rather than subjects in order to enhance the 
efficiency and economy of Army expenditure and audit. In evidence before the Select 
Committee on National Expenditure 1908 (the Dawkins Committee), Harris criticised 
the existing system, arguing that it was: 
" . .. so rudimentary that no even moderately complicated modem 
commercial business . . . could be conducted successfully without 
something further, something that would classify and exhibit the 
expenditure according to the purposes for which it is incurred, 
distinguished between 'capital' and 'maintenance' , between the working 
expenses of the different branches of the organisation and so on, 
something that would supply at least some general test of the economic 
efficiency of the concern such (e.g.) as the train-mile unit in railway 
management." (Quoted by Hinchliffe, 1983: 68) 
The system of 'object' accounting, as defined in the Seventh Report of National 
Expenditure of 1918, became part of the nucleus of the short-lived cost accounting 
experiment of the British Army. This point was not mentioned by Funnell in his paper 
of 1997. However, Funnell is correct in suggesting that the outright reforms of the 
system of Army accounting and audit did not occur permanently, at least in part, until 
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the last two decades of the twentieth century (Funnell, 1997: 21). 
The concept of object accounting may have been part of the experience of 
Harris when he was Auditor of Factory Accounts (Ordnance Factories) from 1894 to 
1904 within the Accountant-General's Department when he was the Head of Section 
5. This is a theme which is referred to later in this thesis. 
The micro-accountinl level: a resume of accountinl and cost accountinl in the 
Ordnance Factories 
The accounting and management reforms of the Ordnance Factories during the 
1860s were modelled on similar reforms within the Admiralty dockyards and shipyards 
some thirty years earlier. It is perhaps pertinent at this point to introduce the 
accounting, costing and audit system of the Ordnance Factories in the nineteenth 
century in order to appreciate the emergence of a professional management ethos. 
This must be assessed against the problems and failings of the overall structure of 
Army accounts, as previously described. The internal reforms of the accounting 
systems of the Ordnance Factories are important, as it was only in 1995 that the then 
Conservative Government reintroduced these measures to encompass all government 
departments (Cm 2929, July 1995). This included RAB, which in essence includes 
resource budgeting, capital accounting and DEB. 
Harris commented that: 
"Only in one army department are there anything that a businessman 
would call accounts kept, and the difference between such accounts and 
Parliamentary Appropriation Accounts is well shown. 11 (Hams. 1911: 
64) 
Here, Harris was referring to the accounts of the Ordnance Factories which, since the 
earlier reforms of 1862. had included: 
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• The Number 2 Balance Sheet which displayed depreciation of assets and 
buildings. 
• The introduction of Capital Accounts in 1862. 
• The introduction of DEB in 1864. 
The system was working very satisfactorily and a favourable report was given by Lord 
Randolph Churchill's Select Committee Report on the Army estimates for the year 
1887-8. 
Harris commented in 1907 that: 
"the Appropriation Account for the factories merely tells you that a 
million odd was spent on wages and a million odd on materials ... The 
manufacturing or business account tells you in detail all the stores 
produced, with the cost price of each; so that you can see that your 
new field gun costs so much and its carriage so much, and can judge 
on the one hand whether your contractors are charging you a fair price 
for the same thing, and on the other whether your gun factory is being 
economically run." (Harris, 1911: 64-5) 
The Army and Navy Act of 1889 had statutorily introduced another class of 
accounts under the review and scrutiny of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC). 
These included the manufacturing (or business) accounts of the Army, these being for 
the Ordnance Factories, and for the Navy, which were the Admiralty-owned naval 
shipbuilding yards. Also, the expense accounts were presented to the PAC. These 
included wages, purchases of materials and contract accounts. 
The scrutiny of Navy expense accounts was to show how the costs of labour, 
materials and contract work had been converted into ships. The technology of 
warships was increasing and a particular design could be outdated in fifteen years. 
Costings at the Royal Dockyards were very successful. Ashworth stated that: 
"The steel plates used in building warships at the end of the nineteenth 
century cost only a quarter as much as the iron plates used twenty years 
earlier. . . The reduction was from £20 per ton to £5 per ton and 
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cheaper steel plates were 20 per cent to 30 per cent stronger than the 
best iron plates fonnerly used." (Ashworth, 1969: 495 and footnote 
3) 
Ashworth suggested that "technological influences were not wholly biased towards 
costliness" (Ashworth, 1969: 495). 
A similar system developed within the Ordnance Factories. The accounts could 
show conversion of expenses into field guns and the increase in ordnance technology 
was compatible with cost effectiveness. The accounts themselves showed the progress 
made with say each ship or field gun under construction, compared with a programme 
of estimated progress appended to the estimates set before the PAC. Again, the 
accounts also showed the cost of completed ships or field guns, constructed at 
government shipyards or at the Royal Gun Factory, as compared with those completed 
under contract at private yards or ordnance companies. Ashworth comments that a 
fair proportion of the warship repair and construction work in the UK until the end 
of the nineteenth century was completed in the Royal Dockyards. It was only in the 
years of sudden expansion, "e.g. 1877-78, 1878-79, 1885-86, 1886-87, did 
expenditure on contract-built ships exceed that on dockyard-built ships" (Ashworth, 
1969: 492). There is also evidence to suggest that here may have been the beginnings 
of scientific management as a voucher system was recorded for all expenditure on each 
order and the employment of what Loft tenned cost clerks to implement the voucher 
system (1994: 118). This voucher system began in the Ordnance Factories after 1862. 
The voucher scheme and the increased use of clerical staff to administer the system 
may be evidence that a system of scientific management was' developing (see 
Braverman, 1998, chapter 15: 203-47). This point is further explored later. In the 
Ordnance Factories and Admiralty dockyards these cost clerks were called mechanical 
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writers. 
A similar system also evolved in America, where Metcalfe employed what he 
called a "shop-order system of accounts" which made it possible to control the flow 
and improve basic cost accounting (Chandler, 1977: 273). The development of 
scientific management principles is an important concept which links the accounting 
refonns to other refonns within the Ordnance Factories, including production 
techniques and labour flexibility. The method of voucher recording in the Ordnance 
Factories is explained in more detail later. 
The manufacturing accounts of the Ordnance Factories and the Royal 
Dockyards were subject to a test audit by the CAG from 1888. This was conducted 
with the same objective of accuracy of the accounts and in a proper fonnat in order 
that, from the completed accounts, actual expenditure is exposed in "the confonnity 
with the programme for which Parliament had provided the funds". This policy was 
incorporated into the 1889 Anny and Navy Audit Act (Ashworth, 1969: 500, footnote 
5). The success of the 1889 Act allowed for its influence to increase over other areas 
of government manufacture, including prison manufacture (MUN/5/1 06/400/12 46476: 
xxi). The major statutes of the 1889 Anny and Navy Audit Act were incorporated 
into the 1921 Exchequer and Audit (Amendment) Act. 
Macro-accountina reforms versus micro-accountina reforms 
In 1890 the appropriation account of Ordnance Factories was altered under the 
auspices of the 1889 Anny and Navy Audit Act. The vote for Ordnance Factories 
was presented to the Public Accounts Committee for the first time, on the 
recommendations of the Morley Report 1889 (C 5116). The vote of the Ordnance 
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Factories was separated from the Army vote generally and became Vote 9. 
Until 1886-7 the Army votes had provided for the pay of the establishment of 
the Ordnance Factories and for the full cost of land and sea armaments. From 1890 
the votes for sea armaments were transferred to the Navy. The costs of the Ordnance 
Factories were met by the advancement of monies from the War Office, the Admiralty 
and other customers, for example the Indian Government, against orders. Any final 
adjustments were made on completion of the work. 
Reforms as recommended by the Morley Committee of 1887 (C 5116) were 
mainly concerned with micro-accounting within the Ordnance Factories. These 
reforms included improvements on existing cost accounting in relation to labour costs. 
Prior to Morley, these costs were based on the records maintained by a staff of "work-
takers". Each Ordnance Factory had its own variation and structure, with 
remuneration varying between each department in respect of the same class of labour. 
One department levelled charges against another to account for its own mistakes and 
so on. 
The post-Morley reforms centralised the work-takers and their records. Stores 
accounts too were centralised. By this system a reliable account was secured on work 
completed and wages paid. Depreciation on machinery, cost of repairs, engine power 
and other current expenditure on plant was charged to indirect expenditure and 
ultimately distributed as a percentage on wages debited to orders in the cost ledgers. 
After the second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902), there were increased costs due 
to the expenditure of the war. These costs were borne by the public and were still 
rebounding within the Anny vote in 1914. The Ordnance Factories had always 
maintained a reserve production capacity in order to meet the unexpected needs of 
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maintaining the Army in the field in an operational capacity. After 1903 there were 
growing criticisms about the expenditure made in maintaining this idle but necessary 
reserve production capacity at all. In any comparison between the Ordnance Factories 
and the private sector, this reserve production capacity always reflected a form of 
negative equity to the apparent detriment of the government factories. The 
government from 1904 began to favour procurement from the private sector for the 
Army. Companies such as Armstrong-Whitworth began to expand through this 
encouragement, opening the Coventry Ordnance Works in 1906 (Warren, 1998: 140). 
A committee chaired by the Chief Superintendent of the Ordnance Factories 
(CSOF), H.F. Donaldson, deliberated between 1901 and 1902 in order to consider 
the costing system of the Ordnance Factories. The Donaldson Committee employed 
the expertise of a professional accountant (Morland) to assess the existing system. 1 
Although Morland was generally happy with the existing costing system of the 
Ordnance Factories, he was less than happy with the costs required to maintain an 
almost idle reserve production capacity, i.e. fixed and variable costs. The calculation 
of the costs needed to maintain the reserve production capacity, proved to be 
Harold F. Morland 0869-1939) was a brilliant Cambridge mathematician and a devout 
non-conformist of Quaker persuasion. Morland became a partner in Price 
Waterhouse. Morland's eventual career was marred due to his involvement in the 
Royal Mail Steamship case (R v Kylsant and others). Lord Kylsant was chairman of 
the Royal Mail Steamship Company and Morland was the appointed company auditor. 
Both were charged under the 1861 Larceny Act with misleading shareholders as to 
the true state of the company's financial position. Both Kylsant and Morland knew 
that the Royal Mail line's trading position had been performing badly since 1921. 
Kylsant had been transferring large sums from undisclosed internal reserves in order 
to pay acceptable dividends. This was done with the conniv8J.lce of the auditor 
Morland. Although both were acquitted, Kylsant was further charged with issuing 
a false prospectus, for which he received twelve months' imprisonment (Jones, 1981: 
151). (See also Jones, 1995: 153, 157 for a more detailed description of Morland's 
role in the case. Jones correctly refers to the inadequacies of the company legislation 
of 1907 and 1929 which was the major culprit of the R v Kylsant case, rather than 
any criminal intent by Kylsant or Morland. These defects in company audit were not 
remedied in part until the 1948 Companies Act.) 
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speculative rather than scientific. 
The unique feature of maintaining the reserve production capacity was an 
expense borne by the Ordnance Factories and the Anny estimates. No such reserve 
was maintained by the private ordnance factories. Indeed, this actually meant that no 
fixed percentage of difference of trade prices could be laid down between the 
Ordnance Factories and the private sector. The maintenance of the reserve production 
capacity in an idle state was unbusinesslike. However, Harris qualified his previous 
statement of the businesslike state of affairs of Anny accounting by stressing that "the 
expenditure is a fact, while the efficiency (at any rate in peace time) must remain in 
large degree a matter of opinion, whereas war itself is unbusinesslike" (Harris, 1911: 
60). 
The anny Ordnance Factories only supplied an internal market, supplying the 
Army, Navy, the India Office and the Government of Egypt, and the prices of the 
Army factories were published in the official publication, Priced Vocabulary a/Stores. 
These prices were based and quoted mainly on the cost price of the Ordnance 
Factories. 
The private munitions factories traded in a highly competitive, international 
and open market. The Priced Vocabulary of Stores was interpreted by the private 
armaments sector as representing the full and fair selling prices. This interpretation 
caused problems with certain annaments companies involved in the export of their 
products. The Priced Vocabulary 0/ Stores did not stipulate that the prices reflected 
were cost prices, nor did the official literature explain that incorporated into the cost 
price was the cost of maintaining the reserve production capacity. 
In assessing this problem, the Donaldson Committee agreed that the best 
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solution was to add a rider to the Priced Vocabulary of Stores, which was as follows: 
"Prices shown in these accounts do not include rent on land, interest 
on capital or other trade charges." (History of the Ministry of 
Munitions (nd), vol. VIII, Part 1, Ch.l, p.19) 
However, the PAC added to Donaldson's rather one-sided rider and included: 
" . .. but on the other hand, include charges for depreciation and the 
upkeep of unused buildings and machinery maintained with a view to 
expansion, and cost of care and custody of stock stores." (History of 
the Ministry of Munitions (nd), voI.VIII, Part 1, Ch.l, p.19) 
The official History of the Ministry of Munitions, written some twenty years later, fails 
to mention that the trade was prepared to use the Priced Vocabulary of Stores as a 
benchmark. In consideration of the eventual balanced-out rider incorporated into the 
Priced Vocabulary of Stores. the realities of the costing system of the Ordnance 
Factories became much clearer. 
It would appear from the first part of the rider that the Ordnance Factories 
were at an unfair advantage compared to the private sector. Nevertheless. the second 
part of the rider. incorporated at the insistence of the PAC. reflects the original costing 
reforms from 1862. The Ordnance Factories had charged depreciation annually on 
their accounts since 1864, as will be shown in the next chapter. Many contemporary 
private sector organisations did not write off depreciation annually but only in times 
when trade was good. The PAC at least recognised the difference in the regular 
treatment of depreciation by the Ordnance Factories compared to the private sector. 
The contemporary American attitude towards depreciation was equally as 
vague. Chandler referred to Oberlin Smith, the Chief Engineer of a New Jersey 
machine-tool company, and commented that "neither Smith nor his contemporaries 
made any attempt to account systematically for depreciation" (Chandler, 1977: 274). 
Indeed, the majority of American metal-working companies continued to adopt the 
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railroad method of renewal accounting and charged repairs and renewals to operating 
costs. Their assets were recorded either at original (historic) cost or as replacement 
cost (Chandler, 1977: 274). A similar method was adopted by railway companies in 
Britain, who used an accounting method known as the double account system of the 
capital account. 
The inclusion of these riders into the Priced Vocabulary of Stores suggests that 
the previous inequalities were rather levelled out and, from 1903, the Priced 
Vocabulary offered similar comparisons with trade prices, but the reserve production 
capacity was removed from the Ordnance Factories between 1904 and 1914. This 
ultimately compounded the initial problems of munitions supply between 1914 and 
1915 causing the alleged conspiracy of the 'shell scandal'. The shell scandal was the 
inability of both the Ordnance Factories and the private sector to supply adequate 
munitions during the first year of the First World War. The official History of the 
Ministry of Munitions does not mention the reduction of the reserve production 
capacity between 1904 and 1914. 
Laissez-faire and its effect on the British social system 
The concept of laissez-faire was a dominant social and political influence within 
nineteenth-century Britain. Taylor stated that: 
"Nineteenth-century England may be said to have come closer to 
experiencing an age of laissez-faire than any other society in the last 
five hundred years... It was, until at least 1870, and arguably for a 
further twenty-five years beyond that, the strongest impulse influencing 
the shape and character of government policy." (Taylor. 1972: 64) 
The basic tenet of laissez-faire was for the minimum state interference in the 
private affairs of the individual or private commercial concern. An early manifestation 
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of laissez-faire in British government was evident from the reforms of the Admiralty 
from 1834 onwards under Sir James Graham, as previously mentioned. Graham was 
a disciple of Benthamite philosophy. However, other reforms also occurring during 
the 1830s appeared to contradict the concept of laissez-faire. These included the 
government reforms of the Poor Law system under the influence of the civil servant 
Edwin Chadwick, and the giving of government grants to church elementary schools 
from 1833 onwards. Such reforms and later reforms throughout the nineteenth century 
created a government bureaucracy to administer the new systems. 
Again, the state also interfered in the affairs of private industry and the 
apparent dilemma was more manifest, particularly in the state regulation of the railway 
companies and of banks. This was perhaps as a consequence of the crashes following 
'Railway Mania' and the banking crises of the 1830s and 1840s. By the 1840s both 
industries were heavily regulated under statutory legislation. The increase in public 
companies during the first half of the nineteenth century resulted from 1855 onwards 
in step-by-step legislation which regulated the affairs to some degree of limited liability 
companies. 2 
The state in Victorian England and Wales did not provide resources for 
management education or training in the private sector, but a form of management 
education appeared in the curriculum of RMA Woolwich. It must be borne in mind, 
however, that neither the curriculum designers at RMA Woolwich nor the Victorian 
Army Officer, nor indeed the Victorian entrepreneur would understand the meaning 
of management. Braverman refers to Lockwood who, when writing on British clerical 
2 For a discussion on Victorian company legislation and its support or otherwise of the 
principles of laissez-faire, see Jones and Aiken [1995: 61-82], Walker [1996: 305-324] 
and Jones and Aiken [1999: 85-96]. 
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labour, commented that: "Many of the clerks mentioned at the earlier period were 
probably performing duties which would nowadays be classified as managerial" 
(quoted by Braverman, 1998: 203). Lockwood also referred to the terms 'clerk' or 
'chief clerk' in the contemporary sense of the eighteenth to mid-nineteenth centuries, 
which in many cases related to a managerial title in some "British industries, railways 
and public services" (quoted by Braverman, 1998: 203). The relationship of clerk 
or chief clerk to a management function in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
reflected perhaps management in a functional rather than a strategic sense. As was 
explained in the previous chapter, the establishment of the Royal Indian Engineering 
College at Cooper's Hill in 1872 further expanded the provision of management 
leadership including accounting education in England. 
Education in Victorian England was a "central arena for debate about the 
cultural values which shaped society" (Garnett, 2000: 210). Most state funding of 
education was bound up in religious issues and was targeted at elementary education. 
The state funding of elementary education had first begun in 1833 when grants were 
given to church schools of Anglican and nonconformist persuasions. Nevertheless, 
the protagonists of laissez-faire supported this system as it 'instructed' the working 
classes to accept their place in society, so fulfilling the original tenet of Benthamite 
utilitarianism, that being the greatest happiness of the greatest number. 
The reforms of the British Ordnance Factories were influenced by economic 
liberalism, as had the previous Admiralty reforms, and also by the failure of logistical 
support for the Army during the Crimean War. The Victorian voter by the mid-
nineteenth century was becoming more of a stakeholder in his society. Although the 
maintenance of a standing Regular Army and Royal Navy remained the total responsi-
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bility of the state, the Treasury was far from generous in maintaining the armed 
services in times of relative peace. However, the Ordnance Factories were required 
to compete with the private sector from 1855 onwards for procurement for the Army 
and Navy. 
Chandler (1990) identified the backwardness of British entrepreneurs as having 
much to do with the failure of the underlying social structures in Victorian society, 
particularly in education and management training. Unlike the contemporary military 
officers, British entrepreneurs lacked any formal management training, as was seen 
in Chapter 2. The effects of this backwardness were most felt from 1870 onwards. 
From 1871 to the end of the nineteenth century the British economy underwent 
a downturn in the business cycle which has become known as the Great Depression. 
Traditional British industry was being overtaken by Europe (mainly France and 
Germany) and by America. This caused considerable alarm at the time. However, 
despite this concern, which led to a number of official enquiries into British industrial 
competitiveness, or the lack of it, little was actually achieved. The reason for this 
was possibly due to the belief in economic liberalism in its purist interpretation, and 
the belief in the notion of imperial preference with the British Empire and Colonies. 
In respect of the Ordnance Factories, however, they flourished during the era 
of laissez-Iaire, particularly after 1855. The Army and Navy were not popular with 
contemporary Victorian society. The Ordnance Factories as public sector institutions 
were an anathema to the prevailing Victorian philosophy of economic liberalism. The 
Victorian taxpayer was not keen on financing a standing Army and Navy, nor the 
attendant Ordnance Factories or HM Dockyards, nor was the Treasury generous in 
financing the Army and Navy budget. Thus the Ordnance Factories, along with the 
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Admiralty dockyards, had to survive by their own merits and this they did very 
successfully. 
Efficiency and economy. the Kovernment departments from 1855 and the increase 
in military technoloKY 
The emphasis of the paper delivered by Harris to the Staff College in 
November 1907 emphasised the efficiency concept of Army accounting generally 
(Harris, 1911). According to Harris, efficiency and economy of Army financial 
management compensated for the non-commercial concept associated with Army 
accounting generally (including the accounting and financial management of the 
Ordnance Factories). This concept was elaborated further by Captain Mark Synge 
of the Indian Army's Supply and Transport Corps. Synge identified efficiency and 
economy as reflecting the equivalent of profit in the private sector. He argued that: 
"In a great many ways, the work of the Supply and Transport Corps 
is the work of a large business. We have to buy as cheaply as possible, 
and we have to store goods with care and economy, and we have to 
supply the good articles; we do not work for a profit, but we work for 
efficiency and economy. Efficiency and economy are to a government 
concern as profit is to a private concern. Hence we are businessmen 
working for what is analogous to a profit, and as such we are largely 
governed by the same rules of financial policy as are commercial firms. 
By learning how they finance their businesses we may learn to finance 
our own the better." (Synge, 1908: 1) 
In relation to the hypothesis of this study and taking the efficiency and economy 
concept described by Synge, it is argued that it was the Ordnance Factories which 
were pioneering business management in the nineteenth century rather than the private 
sector. The concept of efficiency and economy was taken up again in 1914 by Young, 
previously referred to in Chapter 2, and in 1919 by Grimwood when arguing for 
costing for control in government departments. To elaborate further, a more detailed 
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analysis of accounting in relation to the Ordnance Factories will be given in the next 
chapter. 
There were five major government manufacturing departments and two smaller 
satellite factories in 1855. Three government factories were situated at Woolwich and 
together were known as the Royal Arsenal. These were as follows: 
• The Royal Laboratory founded in 1696. 
• The Royal Brass Foundries, founded in 1716. 
• The Royal Carriage Department, founded in 1803. 
The Arsenal at Woolwich had been granted its Royal status in 1805 by George III 
(SUPP 511056). The origins of the Arsenal at Woolwich probably began during the 
time of Elizabeth I and were constructed on unoccupied land known as the 'Warren'. 
There is evidence from the Morley Inquiry of 1887 that the government were actually 
squatters on the site as the War Office never paid rent for the site of the Royal 
Arsenal. This point is explained more fully in chapter 4. 
To the north of London, at Enfield Lock, was the Royal Small Arms Factory 
with two satellite factories in Birmingham, at Bagot Street, and Sparkbrook. The 
Royal Gunpowder Factory at Waltham Abbey also had its origins in Tudor times. 
There was also a government manufacturing department at Portsmouth until the late 
1860s. The Royal Army Clothing Department was located at Pimlico, London. There 
were also the naval Ordnance Factories which were concerned with shipbuilding, 
ships' accessories, the production of victuals and equipment for sea supply. These 
came under the auspices of the Admiralty and, although more numerous than the Army 
Ordnance Factories, were smaller in size. A naval Ordnance Factory also existed at 
Woolwich until the First World War. 
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The War Office, on its formation in 1855, took over control of the government 
manufacturing departments from the original Board of Ordnance. However, during 
the preceding decade the government factories, particularly at the Royal Arsenal, 
Woolwich. had been updated and improved. notably under the supervision of a 
Scottish engineer. John Anderson (1814-1886). Anderson became a principal figure 
in the reforms of the government manufacturing departments during the nineteenth 
century. After a period as a boy clerk, Anderson was apprenticed to the same cotton 
mill in Aberdeen and attended classes at the local Mechanics Institute. This experience 
stimulated his interest in machinery. After seven years, Anderson moved first to 
Manchester with Messrs. Fairburn and eventually arrived in London working for Mr. 
Napier. Whilst in Napier's employ, Anderson assisted in the design and construction 
of a steam hammer at the Royal Brass Foundries within the Royal Arsenal. Woolwich. 
However, the civilian clerical establishment of the government manufacturing 
departments appeared to be second-class in status compared with the staff at the War 
Office headquarters in London, and other Army and Admiralty establishments. There 
was no interchange between the staff of various War Office and Admiralty 
establishments until 1879. 
From 1855, military superintendents were appointed to each government 
factory and this continued until the last decade of the nineteenth century. The military 
superintendents were mainly senior officers of the Royal Artillery, though officers 
from the Royal Engineers were sometimes appointed as were, occasionally. naval 
officers. 
The exception to this was the appointment of William Armstrong to the post 
of Superintendent of the Royal Gun Factory in 1859. Armstrong had been 
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instrumental in inventing a rifled barred field gun and assigned the patent to the War 
Office, according to Wilcox (1999) out of patriotism. In return he was appointed at 
a salary of £2,000 per annum plus £800 in travelling expenses, "his contract was made 
retrospective to 1856 as compensation for his past labours" (Wilcox, 1999: 58). 
Armstrong's appointment in 1859 was for a further seven years. Along with his 
civilian factory manager, Armstrong was instrumental in transforming the production 
of field artillery from a workshop orientated Royal Brass Foundry to a factory system 
within a relatively short period, building on the earlier successes of Anderson. 
From 1855 onwards the reorganisation of the Ordnance Factories involved the 
creation of a formal structure with line and staff management functions. The model 
established fitted well into the bureaucratic formal organisation run on the Weberian 
model, which is based on six principles of which three relate to the emerging structure 
of the Ordnance Factories from 1855. These were: 
"1. Fixed and official jurisdictional areas governed by rules. 
2. Hierarchical office authority with higher ranks of officials 
supervising lower ranks. 
3. Management based on written documents 'the files'. One unit 
of files and their officials comprise a 'bureau', known as an 
'office' in the private sector." (Jeremy, 1998: 501, quoted from 
H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds). From Max Weber, 
Essays in Sociology, 1948; reprint 1995; London, p.214) 
However, the bureaucratisation of the Ordnance Factories continued after 1889 
when, on the recommendation of the Morley Report, the command structure of the 
Ordnance Factories was centralised under a supreme Director General of Ordnance 
Factories (DGOF). 
Other line management and staff posts were also reserved for military officers. 
The employment of military superintendents of the government manufacturing 
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departments reflects somewhat the concept of soldier-technologist as was apparent 
from America, particularly the US Ordnance Corps and the Corps of Engineers 
(Smith, 1987: 40; O'Connell, 1987). 
Before 1865 the superintendents were employed for an indefinite period. 
However, from 1865 onwards the superintendents' tour of duty was restricted to five 
years, according to "the ordinary rules of Staff Service" (WO 33/34 - the 
Manufacturing Departments of the Army - Reorganisation of Clerical Establishment, 
1879). 
The cycle of transition of the military superintending staff of the government 
manufacturing departments placed the civilian principal clerks in a very important 
logistical position. Their role was similar to that of a company secretary in a limited 
company and they were required to assist the superintendent (equivalent to the 
Managing Director) "in all matters relating to the internal and financial economies of 
the factories" (WO 33/34: 6). They were responsible for all matters in relation to: 
"the internal and financial economy of the factories ... and for the 
custody of stores and the correctness of the store accounts, and 
countersign all certificates for cash payments connected with the 
respective factories." (WO 33/34: 6) 
The principal clerk for each factory was the custodian of the records of their respective 
establishment. Their permanence of position, together with their knowledge and 
experience of the organisation structure and both official and unofficial procedures 
of the government manufacturing departments, made their position especially valuable, 
particularly on a changeover of military establishments. The principal clerk appeared 
to be the influence behind the internal generated management systems in the Ordnance 
Factories rather than the military superintendent. 
Until 1879 the principal clerks of the government manufacturing departments 
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were only equated to clerks on the War Office headquarters establishment. The 
Committee of 1879 recommended that their pay and conditions of service be improved 
commensurate with their duties, experience and knowledge, to be at least in parity 
with senior clerks on the War Office headquarters establishment. The 1879 Committee 
also recommended that clerks and writers at the government manufacturing 
departments should be able to interchange with other War Office and Admiralty 
departments, and the salaries of these clerks be the same as other London-based War 
Office clerks. 
Despite this, the five-year cycle tended to cause some long-term management 
difficulties which were exposed during the Morley Inquiry of 1887-8. Morley 
recommended that these posts should be civilianised to ensure continuity of 
management. The evidence behind this recommendation came primarily from Lewis 
W. Engelbach, who was Principal Clerk to the Director of Artillery at Woolwich. 
Engelbach was a member of the 1879 Committee investigating the reorganisation of 
the clerical establishment of Army factories. Engelbach later became Assistant 
Accountant-General at the War Office in 1888. 
The Crimean War (1854-6) had witnessed the failure of British smooth-bore 
artillery made of traditional brass at the seige of Sebastopol in the wake of the superior 
allied French rifled artillery. The British guns were heavy, difficult to position and 
prone to damaged vents after modest firing. The War Office sought advice on artillery 
improvement which arrived in the form of the Armstrong gun in 1860. The 
Armstrong gun was lighter, had more manoeuvrability than the previous heavy guns 
though having the same firepower. The Armstrong gun proved its worth in its first 
baptism of fire during the second China War of 1860. 
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The Annstrong gun was made of iron coils joined together through forging. 
Initially, the process meant that the partly constructed gun had to pass through 
differing phases in various workshops until completed, which was a waste of both 
resources and manpower. 
This problem was resolved by the manager of the Royal Gun Factory, Robert 
Frazer (later Fraser) who: 
"soon after ... [his] appointment to the machinery department, the 
Government adapted the gun and its manufacture introduced by Sir 
William Annstrong, which led to the transition of the Royal Gun 
Factories, from the comparatively small foundry and machine shop in 
Dial Square into the magnificent works of which the department now 
exists." (Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers, vol. 78, Part 
4, 1883-4: 427) 
Fraser adapted Annstrong's original gun where it could be constructed of a lighter 
steel rather than wrought iron, and comprise only of a few large component parts 
rather than several shorter parts. By this method Fraser reorganised the labour 
involved in the production of the Annstrong gun, where fewer component parts had 
to be transported between workshops (see Chapter 4). The modified gun bore Fraser's 
name and: 
"combined with the employment of cheaper iron, a Fraser gun can be 
made more cheaply than [the Annstrong gun]... The 'Fraser' [gun] 
manufacture and construction has since pervaded the entire service and 
though steel is now superseding iron, the system of building the gun 
has not been materially changed." (Proceedings of the Institution of 
Civil Engineers, vol. 78, Part 4, 1883-4: 429) 
Fraser's refonns of the Annstrong gun meant that it could be produced through a 
process of interchangeability (see Chapter 4 in relation to the lower production costs 
of the Fraser gun). 
The role of the government manufacturing departments was to supply munitions 
of war in the short tenn, whilst the private sector prepared to ratchet up its production 
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in order to fulfil any long-tenn demands made upon it in time of war. The period 
from 1856 to 1899, according to Trebilcock, involved a laissez-faire concept of wars. 
Trebilcock, quoting from the Esher Report on War Office reconstitution (Cd 1932, 
1904), stated that: 
"one immunity from stress when the provision of relatively small 
expeditionary forces to operate against unorganised and ill-anned 
peoples had been the principal occupation of the War Office." (quoted 
by Trebilcock, 1975: 141) 
Further, Trebilcock suggests that: 
"In such a context, a small coterie of professional annourers, working 
alongside the royal Ordnance Factories, could supply the nation's 
needs, and industrial mobilisation remained many battles distant" (1975: 
141) 
Both statements must be treated with caution. Esher had obviously not included the 
results of the two Anglo-Boer wars (1880-1 and 1899-02) in the statement made in 
his report of 1904. The Boers were hardly unorganised nor ill-anned. Indeed, the 
Natal Field Anny under General Colley had been defeated in three engagements during 
the first Anglo-Boer War, resulting in the death of Colley, who was killed in action 
at Majuba Hill in February 1881. The result of this war led to the independence of 
two Boer republics, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. 
Despite the apparent 'gunboat' diplomacy and order of battle policy of the 
Victorian military high command from the cessation of the Crimean War in 1856, to 
the commencement of the second Anglo-Boer War in 1899, the ensuing decades saw 
an increase in both the technological sophistication and volume of military and naval 
weaponry. 
The transfonnation of naval technology was influenced by events both in 
Europe and in America. In 1859, the French launched the first iron-clad battleship 
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with a 4th" thick iron-plated hull (Wilcox, 1999: 59), La Gloria, to be followed a year 
later by the British contribution in the form of HMS Wamor. The first naval battle 
in history between two iron-clad battleships occurred during the American Civil War 
(1861-64). The Union navy built USS Monitor, constructed of rigid flat iron plate, 
and her guns were mounted in an armoured revolving gun turret. The Monitor could 
engage fire without changing direction. 
The Confederate Army controlled the Naval Yard, Norfolk, Virginia and 
rebuilt a former traditional battleship as an iron-clad ship. The CSS Virginian's guns 
were traditionally placed in the hull of the ship so that she would have to alter course 
in order to engage fire. The Virginian broke the Union blockade, sinking two 
traditional wooden battleships. The Monitor and Virginian met in battle in the Hamden 
Roads off Norfolk. After four hours of battle, although inconclusive, the Virginian 
was forced back to Norfolk. She was scuttled by the Confederates prior to the taking 
of Norfolk by the Union Army. 
The influence of this battle altered the course of naval warfare and, with the 
development of breech-loading rifled cannon and the metal-penetrating exploding shell, 
the European naval powers were transformed. For example, from 1860 to 1913 total 
gross expenditure of the UK government on Army and Navy ordnance increased 
enormously. Ashworth points to the fact that: 
"Throughout the nineteenth century defence was one of the two largest 
items in government expenditure and, apart from transfer payments (of 
which debt charges were the main constituent), it was the largest item. 
Indeed, at least from 1885 it was the largest item on any sectioning. 
Expenditure on the Army and Ordnance regularly exceeded that on the 
Navy, but in the late nineteenth century it was the Navy that was 
causing much of the largest increases, and from 1896 onwards 
expenditure on the Navy (except during the [second Anglo] Boer War 
and its immediate aftermath) was always more than half the total 
defence expenditure." (Ashworth, 1969: 49) 
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1860 1885 1895 1896 1913 
(£m) (£m) (£m) (£m) (£m) 
Total gross expenditure 69.6 88.5 100.9 105.1 
of UK government 
Army and ordnance 14.1 18.6 17.9 18.5 
Navy 10.8 11.4 17.5 19.7 
Total defence expenditure 24.9 30.0 35.4 37.2 
Debt charges 28.7 29.0 23.3 22.8 
(B.R. Mitchell and Phyllis Deane, Abstract of British Historical Statistics. 
Cambridge, 1962, pp.397-8, quoted by Ashworth, 1969: 491) 
184.0 
28.1 
44.4 
72.5 
19.9 
In relation to refonns to British developments in respect of naval ordnance, 
G.W. Rendel presented a paper to the Institution of Civil Engineers in 1874 of such 
undertakings at the Elswick Ordnance Factory. This paper was published by the 
Institution in their minutes and describes the progress of mechanically adjustable gun 
carriages in order to elevate the gun, and of the development of mechanical loading 
naval ordnance. Rendel suggested that: 
"A few years ago gun carriages were of the simplest character and, 
though well adapted to their purpose, were scarcely worthy of the 
attention of the Civil Engineer. But of late, owing to the increase in 
the size and power of ordnance since the introduction of annour, gun 
carriages have gradually become elaborate machines and the appliances 
for working the monster ordnance now in contemplation will tax all the 
resources of mechanical sciences." (Institution of Civil Engineers, 
Minutes of Proceedings, vol. 38, 1873-74: 85-103 with plates 'Gun 
Carriages for Heavy Ordnance', G.W. Rendel) 
The growth in the proportion of Navy to Anny expenditure was slightly affected by 
the transfer of the cost of naval annament from the Army to the Navy vote from 1888, 
as recommended by the Morley Report of 1887 (C 5116). Prior to this, naval 
ordnance manufactured in the Anny Ordnance Factories was borne by the Anny vote. 
Much of this military and naval technology encompassed numerous Victorian 
engineers. For example, George Wightwick Rendel (1832-1902) had been an engineer 
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in India constructing bridges for the East India Railway across the Ganges and Jumna 
rivers at Allahabad. In 1858 Rendel became a partner in the finn Sir William 
Annstrong & Co., later known as the Elswick Ordnance Company. Rendel was later 
appointed by the Admiralty in the design of iron-clad warships and in devising systems 
of hydraulic machinery for mounted guns for both the British and Italian navies 
(proceedings of minutes, Institution of Civil Engineers, vol. 1 5 I, 1902-3).3 
The emerlence of a factory system 
The development of the new military technology was both researched and 
manufactured at the government manufacturing departments. Indeed, Enock suggested 
that annament production began "to take on its modem aspect of complexity and 
specialisation" from this period (1923: 70, quoted by Trebilcock, 1975: 141). Despite 
the relatively low-key laissez-faire wars from 1856 to 1914, the government 
manufacturing departments emerged during the same period from a craft-orientated 
workshop environment representing inflexibility both in tenns of production, craft skill 
demarcation and ritual, to one of interchangeability, factory production methods and 
flexible labour practices through piece-working on the basis of scientific management 
principles. The Ordnance Factories had a major advantage over the contemporary gun 
trade as they had a market which favoured long-run production processes coupled with 
efficiency and cost effectiveness. Also, the government manufacturing departments 
along with the Royal Dockyards became part of the 'Solomon's House' of innovation, 
science and technology. 
3 For an appreciation of G. W. Rendel and the Rendel family in the history of 
Armstrongs of Elswick, see Warren, 1989, chapter 3: 18-20. 
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By comparison, the civil engineering industry appeared to be a long way behind 
the government manufacturing departments. Hinton refers to the attempts of 
nineteenth century engineers to: 
"exercise control over various aspects of managerial prerogative - the 
types of machine used, the manning of machines in the context of their 
concern with the material rewards of work: 'control as a bulwark of 
wages'." (Hinton, 1973: 93) 
Craft control was not only perceived in terms of monetary goals but also spiritual 
rewards. Hinton explains that: 
"Craft controls had been built and tenaciously maintained not only in 
defence of material interest, but also as a means of resistance to the 
reduction of craft labour to commodity status. The craft worker always 
retained something of the creative psychology of the producer." 
(Hinton, 1973: 93-94) 
There was a great division between the engineering craftsman and his labourer, despite 
the strength of: 
"the craftsman's apparent acceptance of a bourgeois ideology of /aissez-
faire , self-help, his aspirations remained an implicit fundamental 
challenge to capitalist rationality. This is how the Engineers' Executive 
in the peaceful mid-1850s protested their innocence of any antagonism 
to the employers: 'It is not intended ... to damage their interests. but 
rather to advance them, by elevating the character of their workmen, 
and proportionately lessening their own responsibilities'." (Hinton, 
1973: 94; Webb, 1920: 208) 
An assessment of each of the great engineering lock-outs of 1851, 1897-98 and 1922 
"was fought explicitly in defence of managerial prerogatives, seen by the employers 
as the front line of bourgeois hegemony" (Hinton, 1973: 94). 
The increase in engineering technology was a potential to desk ill craft work 
into "almost foolproof machine minding" (Hinton, 1973: 98). The increase in 
technology included new jigs and gauges, high speed steels from the 1890s made for 
more accurate cutting tools, "and speed and feed tables replaced the experienced 
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judgement of craftsmen" (Hinton. 1973: 98). 
The craft engineering workshop in the private sector reflected the industrial 
economy of the nineteenth century generally. which "was highly fragmented. 
dominated by small units ... with a low level of integration between different stages 
of production... Most industrial firms had weak internal commercial hierarchies" 
(Daunton. 2000: 75-6). The major transition of the factory system and an integration 
of managerial hierarchies in the nineteenth century. particularly within engineering 
and manufacturing. can be seen with the post-1855 reforms of the Ordnance Factories. 
particularly with the Royal Small Arms Factory. Enfield from 1858. Prior to 1858 
there had been a government workshop at Enfield with two satellite factories at Bagot 
Street. Birmingham and at Sparkbrook. which manufactured muskets and bayonets. 
The pattern of organisation and method of production changed after the Board of 
Ordnance Commission visit to the American Federal and private armories. 
The Commission. with the approval of the Master General of Ordnance. Lord 
Raglan. purchased 57 milling machines at £60 each and 8 universal millers at £160 
each. from Morris Robbins and Lawrence of Windsor, Vermont. Other machinery 
to the value of £7,500 was bought from the Arms Manufacturing Company of 
Chicopee, Massachusetts. 
The Commission also engaged the services of J.H. Burton. Master Armourer. 
the Federal Armory. Harper's Ferry for the new Enfield factory. Burton' s role would 
be to design the fixings and the tools required for the new system of production. 
Molesworth recommended the building of a large new factory on the existing 
Enfield Lock site, previously used as a government factory for repairing muskets and 
manufacturing bayonets. The new Royal Small Arms Factory at Enfield would be 
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dedicated to small anns manufacture on the interchangeability production method. 
In February 1855 Colonel (later Major General) Manley Dixon RA was 
gazetted Superintendent Royal Small Anns Factory at Enfield. Dixon was the first 
military officer so appointed to command a government manufacturing department. 
Dixon's appointment has some similarities to Roswell Lee's appointment as 
Superintendent of the Springfield Annory in Massachusetts some twenty years 
previously (Roe Smith, 1987: 48). Dixon was the officer of the Royal Artillery who 
had accompanied Gunner and Anderson to Manchester and Leeds the previous year. 
The manufacture of bayonets by a process of interchangeability at the Enfield 
workshop prior to 1855 was probable though this has not been confinned or 
substantiated. The work of reconstruction of the Enfield site commenced during the 
latter part of 1854 and was completed in late 1857. The original outlay for the 
reconstruction of the Rifle Factory site was £202,880: this figure excluded the value 
of the original site adapted for manufacturing rather than, as previously, assembly. 
The sum expended on land, buildings, machinery and gas works amounted to 
£315,000. By 1862 this amount, together with £48,000 depreciation, had repaid itself 
by the reduced cost of production (Monsell, 1862: 576). 
The rebuilding programme was under the management of Major General 
Collinson RE. The maximum output from the completed project was estimated to be 
130,000 muskets and bayonets per annum. The Royal Small Anns Factory at Enfield 
Lock became both a laboratory and a factory, very similar to the Springfield Annory 
in Massachusetts. 
In March 1893, in answer to a Parliamentary question, the Financial Secretary 
to the War Office stated that the expenditure of the Enfield factory, commencing from 
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1854, included £2,670 for land, £7,000 for a rifle range and, since 1854, £195,328 
had been spent on buildings. Mr. Woodall, the Financial Secretary, clarified the 
situation by suggesting that during the period from 1854 until the present (1893), 
depreciation had "reduced the imputed value of the buildings". This was represented 
by a smaller figure representing the value of the buildings which was evident from 
the current annual balance sheet (The Times, 25 March 1893). 
The introduction of interchangeability within the government manufacturing 
departments from 1855 altered the ethos of ordnance production. From 1855 onwards, 
production was now based on a factory system rather than a workshop system. There 
was a 'de-crafting' of labour and the method of payment was based on piece-rate 
working. This suggests that elements of cost accounting and scientific management 
principles were now being used within the government manufacturing departments: 
this is examined in more detail in later chapters. 
There was also the incentive of competition to encourage cost accounting as 
the majority of Army procurement was tendered to the private sector. In particular, 
the private armaments manufacturers and cordite firms were very keen to procure 
Army contracts. Piece-rate working was an essential consideration in assessing the 
changes that took place after 1855. It points directly to elements of costing within 
the government manufacturing departments. 
The American influence on small arms manufacture at the government factories 
did not stop in 1855. James McGee in 1886 was Manager at the Enfield Rifle 
Factory, a post he had held for seven months. Prior to this. McGee had been 
Assistant Manager for twelve years and had been with the Enfield factory for a total 
of twenty years. McGee gave evidence to the Morley Inquiry in 1886 (C 5116: 50-
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51). 
In evidence to Morley. McGee stated that he went to the gun factories of 
America in 1868-9 on his own account and was employed as a workman at the 
Springfield Armory. McGee commented that the machinery employed at Enfield and 
at Springfield were almost of the same pattern. In his opinion. the average American 
workman in the Federal armories are given more encouragement to invent than they 
was the case in England. The American workman can obtain a patent quite cheaply 
"and is always rewarded by the management for any useful suggestion they make" (C 
5116: 50). 
McGee also commented that the II American workmen are steadier and more 
self-reliant than the English workmen". However. many of the workers at the 
Springfield Armory were Englishmen. especially the blacksmiths. McGee explained 
how a system of subcontracting operated in the Federal armories. The subcontractors 
employed about fifty men. A similar system at Enfield had failed although. in private 
gun manufacturing. a gunsmith at Bow and at Birmingham successfully used a 
subcontracting system. McGee stressed that the subcontracting system encourages 
talent in lithe workmen and saves a number of foremen II (C 5116: 51. Summary of 
Evidence). 
Subcontracting-in of labour was a common feature at the American Springfield 
Armory prior to 1861. However. the control management and production of the 
Springfield Armory perhaps did not reflect a factory system until the onset of the 
American Civil War. Under the superintendency of Colonel Alexander Dyer. the 
manufacturing systems were radically altered. in order to mass-produce in high volume 
the Springfield rifle-musket Mkl. By the time of the American Civil War, the labour 
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utilisation at the American Federal Armories had been 
" ... mechanised and divided ... individual work assignments became 
more simplified whilst the overall production process became more 
complex ... Under these conditions the engineering of people assumed 
an importance equal to the engineering of materials." (Smith, 1987: 
79) 
Production methods at the Small Arms Factory, Enfield did not include the 
practice of subcontracting-in labour. nor of subcontracting-out work. Indeed. 
subcontracting was not a regular practice deployed by the Ordnance Factories until 
the First World War. This was a major reason for its development into a factory 
system after the introduction of interchangeability whereas. due to subcontracting. the 
Birmingham gunsmiths retained a workshop culture almost until the end of the 
nineteenth century. The factory system at Woolwich and Enfield may be reflected 
in the lack of militancy shown by the ASE membership at the Royal Arsenal during 
the First World War and could be a reason for the unique relationship between the 
trade unions and the War Office generally. 
Writing in the immediate post-1918 era. Wolfe commented on the pre-1914 
relationship as follows: 
"But on the whole the Admiralty and the War Office. as the great 
employing Departments. were under little control except the general 
control of the Treasury and the Cabinet ... The War Office again dealt 
separately with the problems at Woolwich Arsenal and Enfield Small 
Arms Factory. In matters of general labour policy. questions were 
decided not by reference to the Board of Trade or the Home Office. 
but by the decision of the Army Council. For example. in the vexed 
question like that of the recognition of a shop stewards' committee. 
which was destined to playa considerable part in the War ... so far as 
Woolwich Arsenal was concerned. by negotiating with a committee of 
that character in the Arsenal." (Wolfe. 1923: 11-12) 
McGee also stated that. in his opinion. skilled labour prefers to inhabit towns 
rather than the country. At Enfield the labour was very unskilled. Most labour at 
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Enfield rented rather than bought their own homes. The labour force was migrant. 
McGee stated to the Morley Inquiry that: "When trade is slack at Sheffield and 
Birmingham skilled men come to the factory [Enfield] and leave it when trade revives" 
(C 5116: 51). 
In 1907 Murray noted that the Government Rifle Factory at Sparkbrook, 
Birmingham had been recognised as surplus to requirements. A previous committee 
in 1905, chaired by Mr. Bromley Davenport, later Financial Secretary to the War 
Office, placed the Birmingham factory on reserve. By 1907 the Birmingham site was 
sold to the Birmingham Small Arms Factory (BSA). As a condition of the contract, 
BSA was guaranteed to receive an order to produce part of the overall order for the 
short-muzzle Lee Enfield (SMLE) rifle. In return, BSA gave preference of 
employment to the original employees at the government factory at Sparkbrook, 
Birmingham. 
Murray considered that the dual manufacture at Enfield and Sparkbrook, as 
hitherto carried on, had not been an economic advantage for the following reasons: 
"There are obvious advantages, e.g. in the reduction of indirect charges 
to be obtained by concentrating the manufacture of similar articles in 
one factory provided, as in the present case, the resulting establishment 
does not become unwieldy; and we are confident that if Government 
were now beginning such manufacture de novo two separate factories 
would not be created." (Murray, Cd 3626, para.16, 1907) 
The Birmingham factory only produced rifles, whereas at Enfield both rifle, sword 
and bayonet manufacture and rifle repairs were conducted. Enfield also produced 
machinery and machine tools as well as participation in research and development 
projects. The Birmingham Bagot Street factory also housed the Inspection 
Department. The Bagot Street factory was closed down in 1894 and production of 
the innovative new magazine-loading Lee Metford rifle was transferred to the 
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Sparkbrook factory along with the labour force (The Times. 20 February 1894). 
Despite the government Small Arms Factory at Birmingham. with its close 
proximity to coal and iron supplies and a skilled labour force. Murray noted that the 
Enfield factory produced at less cost than the Sparkbrook factory in Birmingham. This 
difference had been observed in previous committees. notably the Molesworth 
Committee some sixty years previously. 
Evidence given to the Murray Inquiry noted that: 
"Taking the period of the fifteen years from 1889-90 to 1903-04. 
inclusive. we find that the average cost of rifle production at the two 
factories has been as follows. viz: 
Enfield 
Birmingham 
Showing a difference of 
£ 
3 
3 
s 
3 
7 
4 
d 
2 
7-8 
5 
During the same period the average number of rifles manufactured 
annually at Enfield was 44.274 and at Sparkbrook 16.181." (Murray. 
Cd 3626. para.16. 1907) 
Murray suggested that the disproportion in the volume of output explains the higher 
cost of production at Birmingham. The Committee also states that the Sparkbrook 
factory could not be enlarged whereas at Enfield enlargement was possible. However. 
Murray failed to explain more fully the higher costs of production at Birmingham. 
Despite the apparent advantages of economies of scale at the Sparkbrook factory in 
relation to its factors of production. notably coal and iron, its labour may have been 
the cause of the higher cost element compared with Enfield. Yet Murray had 
considered relocating the Royal Arsenal to a provincial town in order to avoid London 
prices. However. most of the Birmingham gun trade was still craft- and workshop-
orientated. rather than flexible- or factory-orientated. This encouraged higher labour 
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costs. By 1904 most of the government Rifle Factory at Binningham were recruiting 
labour from the local gun trade with its prevailing demarcation craft culture and 
subcontracting ethos. 
There is evidence, given by McGee to the Morley Committee in 1887, to 
support this argument. McGee confinned that wages at Enfield were slightly higher 
than at Sparkbrook "for the same class of man". However, McGee imagined that at 
Binningham: 
"You would more readily obtain men for a limited time than would be 
the case at Enfield. We could get men at Enfield for working the 
machines, unskilled labour - I have no doubt cheaper, or as cheap as 
you could at Binningham - but not skilled labour." (Morley, C 5116, 
1887: 379, question 7801) 
In 1907 it was considered that the maximum number of men who could be employed 
at the Enfield Rifle Factory was about 3,500 and the minimum number 2,000 (Murray, 
Cd 3626, para. 19 , 1907). 
Conclusion 
This chapter has described the development of the War Office, the Accountant-
General's Department and government manufacturing departments from 1855 to 1914 
and the bureaucracy of the system of Anny accounting and audit. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the government manufacturing 
departments had emerged from being workshop-structured manufacturing units to 
factory-producing manufactories. Much of this transition and reform resulted from 
internal rather than external influences, through engineers and civil servants employed 
by the War Office rather than through entrepreneurs or accountants. The nature of 
the Victorian Army, with its attendant Ordnance Factories within contemporary 
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society, was a major influence for its efficiency. In the main, the Ordnance Factories 
had to be efficient and to stand and fall by their own merits. They were successful 
in cultivating an efficient managerial ethos until the end of the second Anglo-Boer War 
in 1902. From 1904 to 1914, numerous Treasury dominated committees reduced the 
total efficiency of the Ordnance Factories in relation to finance and morale to a 
fraction of what it had been. Commentators writing on the inadequacies of industrial 
mobilisation in 1914 have always been ready to blame the Ordnance Factories for this 
(Lloyd George, 1938; Adams, 1978; Trebilcock, 1975; Loft, 1994) but the real 
culprit was the Treasury and the preference for naval shipbuilding at the Royal 
Dockyards. Elements included in this chapter will be further explored and elaborated 
upon in subsequent chapters, notably three concepts: 
i) Cost and financial management accounting (Chapter 4). 
ii) The production process through interchangeability (Chapter 5). 
iii) Scientific management. including labour relations (Chapters 6 and 7). 
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CHAPTER 4 
Efficiency and Economy 
and the Woolwich Department Accounts: 
The Management, Accounting and Costing System 
of the Government Manufacturing Departments 
From 1862 to 1915 
Introduction 
The accounting refonns of the Ordnance Factories began some eight years after 
the conclusion of the Crimean War. Although there had been earlier and similar 
refonns within the Admiralty dockyards during the Graham naval refonns, some thirty 
years earlier, the architects of the Ordnance Factory accounting refonns had experi-
enced the inadequacies of Anny administration generally during the era of the Crimean 
War (1854-6). One of the principal architects of the accounting refonns, H. W.S. 
Whiffin, the Assistant Accountant General, served as a civilian paymaster on active 
service in the Crimean theatre of operations. 
In this respect, accounting refonns of the Ordnance Factories tended to 
originate internally. There appeared to be no external pressure for these refonns, 
which is why the accounting reforms of the War Office at a macro-accounting level 
were different from the more superior micro-accounting refonns of the Ordnance 
Factories. There is a tendency to assume that the Ordnance Factory refonns occurred 
in the way that they did in order to relate to the best practices in the contemporary 
private sector generally. However, on further reflection this proved not to be the case. 
Indeed, the accounting refonns of the Ordnance Factories from 1862 tended to be 
superior to the prevailing business culture in the Victorian liberal economy. 
Prior to 1862 the state of the accounting function at the Ordnance Factories 
could not show any comparison between the cost of production and the equivalent cost 
under contract. There was no double-entry book-keeping. According to one of the 
architects of the refonns, J.C. Hurst, there was no system at all. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine these reforms as they were manifest 
from 1862 onwards. There is also a clear lineage from 1862 through to the cost 
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accounting experiment in the British Army from 1917 to 1925. These nineteenth-
century reforms were a microcosm of the recent reforms introduced in 1995 by the 
then Conservative Government under the 'Better Use of Taxpayer's Money' concept 
(em 2929, 1995) and the introduction of RAB into government departments. 
Again, the earlier nineteenth-century reforms of the Ordnance Factories put 
in place an accounting system which seemed to have been forgotten between 1915 and 
1919 when the Ordnance Factories came under the control of the Ministry of Muni-
tions. In fact the official, though unpublished History of the Ministry of Munitions 
fails to acknowledge these earlier reforms and, on their reintroduction in 1917, 
claimed that these were being used for the first time by the government in the Ministry 
of Munitions. 
Equally, it must also be remembered that the experiences of cost and financial 
management procedures of the First World War, particularly as manifest in the 
Ministry of Munitions, were short-lived in the post-1918 period. For example, the 
cost accounting experiment in the British Army was terminated after six years. Cost 
accounting in the private sector in Britain did not really come to fruition until the 
Second World War; nor did it become a permanent feature of British industrial life 
until well after the post-war period. This theme is further explored in Chapter 8. 
The major reforms in the United States during the 1920s and 1930s made little 
influence in the private sector of Britain during the inter-war period. Although 
Marriner suggests that there was no universal standardized system of accounting within 
the various government departments, certain reforms did emerge in the Ordnance 
Factories, which Marriner only touches on in her paper on Government Accounting 
and the First World War (1994: 452). 
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In assessing the development of professional management in the public sector 
in the UK from 1855, the overall aim of this chapter is to underpin the argument that 
the management reforms in the Ordnance Factories produced efficiencies which were 
probably superior to those in the contemporary private sector. The development of 
costing and financial management in the Ordnance Factories from the mid-nineteenth 
century also influenced other reforms including scientific management, labour flexibil-
ity and of pieceworking. Overall, these reforms were far more advanced than in the 
contemporary private sector. 
In order to appreciate these management reforms more fully. the evidence given 
to two Parliamentary Select Committees on Ordnance (both chaired by William 
Monsell) of 1862 and 1863 and the later Morley Report of 1887 (C 5116) is particu-
larly relevant to this thesis. Indeed, the later Morley Report into the workings of the 
government manufacturing departments actually clarifies more fully the two earlier 
Monsell Committee reports of 1862 and 1863. In particular the evidence of the chief 
accountant and auditor of Ordnance Factory accounts, James Charles Hurst, is crucial. 
Like other reformers in the development of professional management in the Ordnance 
Factories, Hurst was a civil servant rather than a soldier-technologist. Hurst was very 
influential in the quality of evidence given to all three reports. As a junior civil 
servant, Hurst conducted most of the background research and reforms which formed 
the basis of Whiffin's evidence given to the two Monsell committees in 1862 and 
1863. 
There is evidence to suggest that DEB existed in certain government depart-
ments prior to the Northcote Trevelyan reforms of the civil service. Despite this, even 
by the mid twentieth century the findings of the Crick Report of 1950 (Cmnd 7976) 
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were still averse to the introduction of any commercial principles in government 
accounting, including DEB. 
The relationship between costin.: and DEB 
The initial management refonns at the Ordnance Factories involved accounting 
and DEB. These refonns themselves may already have been practised in the Naval 
dockyards. As a major area of this thesis will be involved in assessing the accounting 
refonns within the Ordnance Factories, it is worth at this point defining the relation-
ship between costing and DEB. 
Edwards (1994: 272) argues that interest in costing developed during the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century as profit margins declined. Therefore. industry 
became more competitive and capital-intensive and overheads were perceived to be 
more important to entrepreneurs than had otherwise been the case, but the development 
appears to have been led by engineers rather than accountants (Parker. 1986: 41; 
Loft. 1994: 118). 
Financial managers could only carry out the management of the enterprises 
under their control effectively if they have full infonnation of all the factors relevant 
to their area of control. Important factors included: 
i) market potential, consumer requirement; 
ii) competitive position - prices, quality and plans of competitors; 
iii) economic environment - trends, credit availability; 
iv) personnel - skills, morale, objectives; 
v) production - processes, capacity, quality levels; 
vi) engineering - plant life, power requirements, enhancement of new technology; 
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vii) purchasing - material prices. quality. reliability of suppliers; 
viii) costs. 
Costing is the information that indicates the economic implications and consequences 
of management decisions. The values of resources used are found and the techniques 
employed are all aimed at arranging money information in such a way that manage-
ment is given as clear an indication as possible of their performance and the direction 
in which they must move in order to improve their economic efficiency. 
Cost can be defined as the value of the economic resources used. As part of 
the development of a form of cost control it will be appropriate to establish • cost 
centres'. These are parts of a financial enterprise to which costs may be charged. e.g. 
a) geographical - department or sales area; 
b) an item of equipment - lathes. delivery vehicles; 
c) a person - salesperson. production worker. 
Double entry book-keeping is a form of record keeping which is applied to 
financial transactions. As its name suggests. it is based on the principle that each 
financial transaction has a two-pronged effect on the business. e.g. cash spent may 
indicate the reduction of total cash held and the acquisition of an item of equipment. 
This technique is used to enable the entrepreneur or business manager to be provided 
with the information which will afford. at any chosen moment: 
i) the production of a trial balance. which will prove the arithmetical accuracy 
of the recorded work; 
ii) each entry is so recorded as to give the business a complete history of all that 
has taken place; 
iii) the detailing of amounts owing to and owed by the business; 
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iv) whether the business is trading at a profit or a loss and details as to how the 
result arose; 
v) the constituent assets and liabilities which the business has created - is the 
business succeeding or failing. 
The system of DEB represents a comprehensive orderly and methodological approach 
to the maintenance of a financial structure. 
It is argued that by 1914 the financial and cost accounting within the ordnance 
factories was completely integrated. For some reason this was not recognised, or 
continued from 1915 when the ordnance factories were transferred to the Ministry of 
Munitions. However, the origins of the short-lived cost accounting experiment in the 
Army from 1917 to 1925 came from the pre-1914 ordnance factory reforms, rather 
than from the wartime Ministry of Munitions. 
Cost accounting emphasises the control and decision making of an organisation 
more so than the stewardship of the book-keeping function, though both are inter-
related. The basis of any cost accounting system is only as good as a basic DEB 
system. Moreover, cost accounting is that part of accounting definition which is 
concerned with the internal reporting function to the management or decision-making 
element of the organisation or enterprise (Parker, 1984: 115). Parker also suggests 
that cost accounting: 
" ... in its original meaning [involves] the accumulation and assignments 
of historical costs to units of production and departments primarily for 
the purpose of stock valuation and profit measurement." (Parker, 1984: 
47) 
The terms 'cost accounting', 'cost management' and indeed 'costing' often tend to be 
used interchangeably. These terms represent the use by management of cost-based 
information (Fleischman and Tyson, 1993: 503). 
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In its twentieth century definition, cost accounting is difficult to distinguish 
from management accounting, however management accounting is the term developed 
during the post-1945 era to describe the provision "for management, of statistical 
information for the purpose of planning, decision making and control" (Edwards and 
Newell, 1991: 35). 
Cost accounting must be distinguished from the practice of financial reporting. 
This particular discipline was developed in the sixteenth century as an aid to merchants 
(Gamer, 1954: 1-26; Wilson, 1995: 29). Wilson suggests that it is important to 
recognise that because fixed investments were usually small in mercantile business, 
traditional financial accounting which in the main meant double-entry book-keeping, 
did not accommodate overheads when calculating the cost of a product (Wilson, 1995: 
29; Chatfield, 1977: 99-101). 
In terms of relationship between costing and DEB, the Acting Controller of 
Army Cost Accounts in 1918 Lt. Col. J. Grimwood defined this by classifying 
accounts into: 
" ... two great headings. The first heading is what one would call the 
ordinary commercial accounting or counting-house accounts... These 
accounts are purely the book-keeper's accounts and record transactions 
with outside people or departments, which are translated into money 
or money's worth. 
The second heading is a system of accounts which can be best described 
as the departmentalisation of the counting-house accounts, and deals 
especially with recording the separate cost of the various processes in 
the production of an article. In other words, it deals with the depart-
mental costs which go to make up the total cost of the finished prod-
uct." (Grimwood, 1919: 114) 
Grimwood made the crucial distinction between costing and DEB on the need for a 
system whereby a comparative analysis could be made. On its own, DEB cannot 
achieve this. 
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Ashworth (1953) gave an example from the 1930s of the use of costings as a 
decision-making tool used by the Director of Contracts, in deciding the best option 
to order artillery shells either from the Royal Ordnance Factories (ROF) or from trade. 
The example used by Ashworth, although from the 1930s, was as relevant in the pre-
1920 Army Contracts Department: "Contracts with regular shell makers were at fixed 
prices but in 1934-35, owing to the wide difference between trade and ROF prices, 
they were checked by costing, which showed that commercial prices were much higher 
than those of ROF" (Ashworth, 1953: 128). A similar scenario prevailed in 1862-63 
over the trade price of the Armstrong gun made at Elswick compared to prices at the 
Royal Gun Factory and is described later in this chapter. 
Evidence of double entry accountina in the pre-Northcote-Trevelyan Board of 
Admiralty and Board of Ordnance 
There is evidence to show traces of change in the financial management and 
reporting within governments before 1850. The case of the Admiralty under Sir James 
Graham's naval reforms have already been stated. Certain government departments 
were using double entry accounting systems before 1830. This appeared to be 
confirmed in the evidence of the Public Accounts Committee which convened on 7 
June 1837. The Committee's chairman, F.T. Baring, questionsJ.T. Briggs (Account-
ant General of the Navy) who explained that double entry had been introduced into 
the Navy by a Mr. Thompson in about 1828. Briggs, in his deliberations to Baring, 
confirmed that "the whole of the accounts of the Navy Department were kept by 
double entry" (BPP, 1837, vii: 381). Other government departments using DEB 
included the Paymaster General's Department and the Colonial Office. 
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Corey, writing in 1840, argued that the Admiralty was advanced in the 
technique of double entry accounting due to its complex financial structures and links 
with contractors. The system of overall control contained the complexities of Admiral-
ty business included: 
II the system adopted in the Admiralty is the Italian method of double 
entry with the common mercantile ledger and journal and proper 
subsidiary books. II (1840: 101) 
Parker (1907: 166) quotes Lord Welby who, in 1856, became a clerk in the 
Treasury. Welby described Anderson as being head of the Finance Department at the 
Treasury in 1856, stating that: 
II Sir William Anderson, when quite a young man outside the service 
had been picked up by Graham to aid him in devising the new scheme 
of accounts in the Admiralty ... and Anderson was transferred after-
wards to institute accounts and reform financial procedure in other 
Departments. In fact, he is the author of our present system of account 
throughout the service... One of the first acts of Mr. Gladstone, on 
becoming Chancellor (December 1852) was to bring him to the Treas-
ury and make him head of the Finance Department. II (Parker, 1907: 
166) 
There is also evidence to suggest that the Ordnance Department, then under 
the remit of the Board of Ordnance, had developed a system of double entry account-
ing from 1840. A Treasury minute dated 3 December 1841 commented: 
II • •• that the system of account by double entry has been in use in the 
Ordnance Department for upward of 10 years ... but however useful 
this improved method of keeping the accounts may be in the internal 
administration of this department, it cannot furnish that information, 
out of the department, which is indispensable to the exercise of a 
proper control over its proceedings, until the accounts are embodied 
in the abstracts of the nature of those which it is proposed should be 
annually prepared." (BPP, 1844, xxxii: 744) 
Here, the Treasury have identified the sporadic use of double entry accounting at a 
micro level in certain departments. 
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Forms of accounts 
Part of the problem when assessing the development of financial management 
through double entry accounting systems into public departments, is the elusiveness 
of the evidence. If Hurst did introduce double entry accounting systems into the 
government manufacturing departments in 1864, this does not adequately explain what 
happened since the introduction of double entry book-keeping into the Ordnance 
Department over twenty years earlier. It may well be that the double entry accounting 
system as introduced into the Ordnance Department did not extend to the subordinate 
government manufacturing departments. Such inconsistency and sporadic reforms of 
one department but not the other were common at the time. 
The Morley Committee (C 5116, 1887), in assessing the workings and 
organisation of the government manufacturing departments in 1886, commented that 
the system of double entry accounting at the Ordnance Factories was operating very 
satisfactorily. This was confirmed by Hurst and by the superintendents and managers 
of each factory. There is no evidence to suggest that the double entry accounting 
system at the Ordnance Factories was terminated between 1887 and 1915. Thus when 
the Ministry of Munitions took over control of the Ordnance Factories in November 
1915 it is likely that the double entry accounting system of the War Office controlled 
Ordnance Factories was also transferred to the new monolithic Ministry of Munitions. 
However this is not acknowledged in the official history of the Ministry of Munitions. 
Volume 3 of the history makes great play of the introduction of a double entry system 
introduced into the Ministry in March 1917 (JIistory of the Ministry of Munitions, 
vol. 3, ChIlI, Part 1: 80). Although Harris, in evidence to the Committee on the Royal 
Ordnance Factories in January 1919, criticised the accounting systems of the Ordnance 
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Factories during the era of the Ministry of Munitions control. he suggested that the 
pre-1915 system was superior (MUN. 4/63751). This is explored later in this chapter 
and in more depth in Chapter 8. 
The problem of interpretation is made complicated by the virtual semi-indepen-
dence of each government department and indeed sub-departments within the pre-1914 
civil service. This perhaps reflects the role culture model of the pre-1914 civil service 
(Handy. 1993: 185). Although the role culture model is often stereotyped as bureau-
cracy. it is the role concept that is more pronounced. 
The civil service is often cited as an example of a role culture model. Indeed. 
the role organisation will only succeed when it operates in a stable environment. As 
with the War Office. during the nineteenth century until 1914. hostilities often 
disturbed the role foundation. Also. the attitude towards specialists of a role 
organisation may explain why there were sporadic reforms in financial management 
within public departments until 1925. 
Any double entry accounting system could not be superimposed into the final 
departmental accounts as submitted to Parliament. Indeed. in its pursuit of uniformity 
the Treasury strove to maintain the cash-related accounting system for Parliamentary 
accounts. In the deliberations around the fourth report of the Committee of Inquiry 
into the system of account and audit in the Ordnance Department. the Treasury. in 
a written opinion of 7 March 1844, declared that: 
"The accounts of the annual income of the kingdom are founded on the 
actual receipts in the year; the account of the actual expenditure for 
the public debt is an account of actual payments in the year... The 
mode of accounting for the whole should, in our opinion, be uniform. " 
The committee itself emphasised that: 
"It is in accordance with the principle adopted by the Committee of the 
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House of Commons in 1822 to consider the best mode of simplifying 
the accounts annually laid before Parliament. The balance sheet recom-
mended by that Committee. and which has been ever since annually laid 
before Parliament. is simply a classified account current of the actual 
receipt and expenditure into and from the Exchequer within a definite 
period of time." (BPP. 1844. xxxii: 745) 
Thus the cash-based system of accounting culture prevailed well into the late twentieth 
century. The changes at a micro level, particularly within the government manufactur-
ing departments from 1862. did expose contract suppliers, particularly in relation to 
the Annstrong gun, but parliamentary accounting made no provision for accrual 
accounting. A transaction was only recorded in parliamentary accounts when a cash 
exchange took place. Indeed, the recommendations of the 1950 Crick Committee on 
the fonn of government accounts (1950. Cmnd 7976) tended to be adverse to both 
accrual accounting and cost accounting. as well as DEB. a point made earlier. 
Apparently the Crick Committee was influenced in its decision by the apparent failure 
of the cost accounting experiment in the British Army some twenty-five years previ-
ously (Wright, 1956: 463). 
Crick recommended that "the main Exchequer Accounts and the framework 
of both Estimates and Appropriation Accounts should be on a cash basis" (Point 1 in 
summary, p.57) and "the subjective basis of the Estimates should be retained" (Point 
19 in summary of main conclusions, p.58). Indeed, Crick had recommended the 
continuance of a cash-based charge and discharge system of Exchequer Accounts that 
had existed from the nineteenth century, apart from the six years of the Army's cost 
accounting experiment (Cmnd 7969. 1950. Appendix C. p.69). 
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The link between the earlier reforms of the Navy and the Ordnance Factories: 
the Whimn family and James Charles Hurst 
The earlier Graham reforms of the Navy between 1832 and 1837. which 
included the establishment of the Accountant General's Department of the Navy. also 
introduced DEB into Admiralty accounting. 
By 1862 DEB was not a system used in the Ordnance Factories and this was 
established by the Assistant Accountant General to the Army H.W.S. Whiffin. 
However. Whiffin admitted that DEB was used in the Admiralty dockyards and supply 
departments. In evidence to the 1862 Monsell Committee. Whiffin responded nega-
tively when asked whether the accounts at the Royal Gun Factory were kept by double-
entry. Whiffin did not know why the accounts were not kept by double-entry and 
suggested that they did not employ a professional accountant there. The examiner. 
Sir Frederick Smith. a member of the Monsell Committee. stated that: 
II In the Admiralty and in the dockyards are not the accounts all kept 
by double-entry? II 
Whiffin replied: 
II An establishment has recently been formed in the Admiralty for that 
purpose; a very large addition to the establishment was made. but the 
accounts of our manufacturing departments have been rendered to the 
public without any additional cost. but if a system of book-keeping by 
double-entry were adopted at the gun factories. it would lead to a very 
considerable expense and I do not think that it would lead to any 
improved results in the accounts. II 
When pressed by Sir Frederick Smith whether the manufacturing departments of the 
Navy and the War Office should be structured on the same system. Whiffin suggested 
that whilst he could form no opinion lIupon the subject of Navy accounts •... I am 
satisfied that the accounts rendered by the Woolwich Departments answer to the 
purpose in every respectll (Monsell. 1862; evidence given by H.W.S. Whiffin. 
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questions 128-130, pp.6-7}. At the time of giving this evidence Whiffin was exploring 
the possibilities of introducing DEB into the Royal Gun Factory. 
The name Whiffin was contemporarily synonymous within the Royal Navy, 
the Accountant General's Departments of both the Navy and Army. Here, it is 
argued, is the crux of the accounting reforms of the Ordnance Factories. 
Henry William Sharp Whiffin (1824-1904) was born at Deptford (the home 
of the Naval dockyard, victualling yard and naval ordnance factories). His father was 
a wheelwright. At the age of 14, H. W. S. Whiffin became a clerk in the original 
Board of Ordnance. During the Crimean War he served as a civilian paymaster to 
the Ordnance Department, serving in the field at Gallipoli, Scutari, Varna and in the 
Crimea itself. H.W.S. Whiffin received the Crimean War Medal with three clasps 
(Alma, Inkerman and Sevastopol) and the Turkish Crimea War Medal. For the period 
1857-58 Whiffin was specifically employed by the Indian Government to "report upon 
the accounts and bring up the Indian store accounts" (War Office Staff List, 1872: 
248). In 1863 Whiffin reported to the Monsell Committee that "an application has 
been made by the Indian Government for a short period in connexion with Public 
Works in India" (Monsell, 1863; evidence given by H. W.S. Whiffin, p.278). The 
War Office Staff List qualified Whiffin's modest statement by stating that he "pro-
ceeded to India under a Special Commission to inquire into the Public Accounts" (War 
Office Staff List, 1872: 248). 
In 1860 Whiffin had been appointed as one of two Assistant Accountants 
General at the War Office. His remit was overall responsibility for the financial 
management of the Ordnance Factories. In February 1865 Whiffin also became Chief 
Auditor of Army Accounts and a Commissioner of Income Duty in April 1866. 
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Finally, in April 1870, H.W.S. Whiffin was appointed Accountant General to the 
Anny. The following year, however, Whiffin resigned on a pension of £650 a year. 
He became a chartered accountant and practised in the finn of Lovelock, Whiffin and 
Co., Coleman Street, London. 
H.W.S. Whiffin's two younger brothers, John George Whiffin 0826-1892) 
and Alfred Whiffin (1837-1910) both became Paymasters-in-Chief of the Royal Navy 
respectively. J.G. Whiffin entered the Royal Navy as a clerk in 1843 when he was 
17 years old. He was employed in the surveying ship HMS Tartarus when she was 
deployed in the River Shannon on anti-riot duties (the O'Connell riots). J.G. Whiffin 
was appointed as clerk on HMS Herald, serving in this ship for over six years, in 
which time he made three voyages in the Arctic through the Baring Strait in search 
of the previous Franklin expedition. Whiffin received the Polar Medal. In 1851 J.G. 
Whiffin was appointed as Assistant Paymaster, then Paymaster in 1851. He was on 
active service during the Crimean War, serving in the Baltic and at the Siege of 
Sevastopol in HMS Gladiator. Whiffin received the Baltic Medal and Crimean Medal 
with clasp Sevastopol. J.G. Whiffin was appointed Paymaster-in-Chief in 1873 and 
retired from the Royal Navy the same year at the age of 47 years, on retired pay of 
£305 per annum (The Times obituary notice, 11 January 1892: Navy record PRO 
ADM 19611). The relationship between the three brothers was substantiated through 
baptismal records for the Parish of St. Pauls, Deptford - entry no.1125 for H. W.S. 
Whiffin's date of baptism on 5th January 1825 and for J.G. Whiffin no.1924, date 
of baptism 11th September 1826. 
A second naval connection contemporaneous with the Whiffin brothers was 
their uncle, John Whiffin (1804-1871), a civil servant in the Accountant General's 
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Department of the Navy. The 1851 Navy List records, under the Civil Section, 
Department of the Accountant General, John Whiffin, clerk of the second class 
employed in the Invoice and Claims Branch. Ten years later, in 1861, the Navy List 
under the Department of Accountant General records John Whiffin Esq. as Chief Clerk 
(Cash and Accounts Section). By 1868 John Whiffin was Assistant Accountant 
General for Pay in the Accountant General's Department for the Navy (Comptroller 
of Seamen's Pay). 
John Whiffin retired to Tunbridge Wells in 1869 and died there two years later. 
He may have been the influencing factor behind the public careers of the Whiffin 
brothers in Army and Naval administration. 
The major architect of financial and accounting reform within the post-1855 
Ordnance Factories was James Charles Hurst. From the 1881 census, Hurst was 
described as having been born at Wareham, Dorset. He was a career civil servant 
who joined the newly reconstituted War Office as a temporary clerk in 1855. He was 
then about 25 years old but nothing is known about Hurst's career prior to 1855. 
However, his marriage certificate of 18th June 1859 describes his occupation 
as a clerk in the War Office and his father's occupation (Limpus Hurst) is described 
as a clerk in the Audit Office. 
The War Office Staff List for 1864 describes Hurst as an Accountant Third 
Class in Subsection E of the Accountant General's Department. This particular 
subsection was responsible for the compilation, preparation, audit and presentation 
of the Ordnance Factory accounts to Parliament. By 1881, the official census records 
Hurst as "an Accountant at the War Office". At this time Hurst was residing at 
Broxboume, Herts. This was close to both the Royal Gunpowder Factory at Waltham 
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Abbey and to the Enfield Rifle Factory (Enumerator's List for Broxbourne, Herts., 
1881 Census, PRO/ll11399). 
Hurst's evidence to the Morley Committee of 1886 gives an in-depth appreci-
ation of the financial refonns of the Ordnance Factories from 1862 to 1864. Also 
Hurst describes the prevailing system which existed prior to 1862, which he described 
as non-existent. Hurst's evidence to the Morley Committee clarifies the earlier 
Monsell Select Committee reports some twenty-five years prior to Morley. 
The first Monsell Committee was "intimately connected" with both the Arm-
strong and Whitworth principles of artillery manufacture. Hurst remembers the 
witnesses from both companies appearing before Monsell. 
In his evidence to Morley, Hurst recounts the prevailing system of accounting 
at the Royal Arsenal before 1862. All the various items of expenditure in the records 
of the (Woolwich) Department were adopted as debits. Credits per contra for the 
approximate cost of production were calculated during the year. Whatever the 
difference shown between the estimated cost and actual cost, was adjusted by a 
percentage being added or deducted from the approximate cost of production all round 
to make both sides of the account equal in amount. Hurst further explained as 
follows: 
"Supposing that the total charges, we will say, on the debit side of their 
balance sheet amounted to £500,000; and then supposing on the other 
side by the estimate which they had prepared of their total production, 
it had turned out that the estimated cost was £600,000, without knowing 
what their debit was going to be, they first of all considered that the 
estimate of £600,000 would correctly represent what they produced at 
cost price; but as they could only charge themselves with £500,000, 
they could not take credit for the £600,000. for the simple reason that 
£100,000 of the credit side would represent an over-estimate of the 
cost; and, therefore. to reduce that £600.000 to £500,000 they took 
off every item of manufacture the percentage that would make both 
sides fit." 
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The Chairman, William Woodall MP, enquired of Hurst: "Was there any attempt at 
that time to assess the value of the plant and the capital employed?" Hurst replied 
that there had been an attempt but that it was never taken into consideration "in any 
shape or form in their cost" (C 5116, 1887: question 3378, p.192). 
Woodall pressed his question further, enquiring whether the accounts kept at 
the time at the Arsenal enabled a comparison between the cost of production and the 
cost at which "similar things could be purchased by contract". Hurst recollected that 
an account was kept which, although it was accepted as useful to the purposes at the 
time, was considered by Hurst as being no system at all. This opinion was presented 
to the Monsell Committee in 1862. 
Mr. Ruston, a member of the Morley Committee (question 3381) enquired 
when this system happened. Hurst replied that improvements occurred in 1864 when 
he received a final decision. He recalled that "Lord de Grey was in power at the time, 
Lord Ripon as he became afterwards". Hurst pointed out to Monsell at the time that 
the only way to get a satisfactory system was to introduce pure and simple double 
entry (C 5116, 1887: 192-3). 
In clarifying a point from the Chairman, Hurst confirmed that in 1860 there 
was no double-entry system at all at the Arsenal or at other government manufacturing 
departments. Lord de Grey, at the recommendation submitted by Hurst, through the 
Accountant-General instigated the double-entry system. Lord de Grey had granted 
Hurst permission to visit a large number of manufacturing establishments, particularly 
in the north. This was perhaps five or six years after the Molesworth Committee sent 
a delegation to the northern manufactories. The results of Hurst's visit are not known 
as the internal reports and other papers apparently no longer exist. 
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The name of Hurst is a common feature in this thesis. By 1887, at the time 
of the Morley Inquiry, Hurst was the War Office Chief Accountant and Auditor of 
the Ordnance Factories. 
The role of H.W.S. Whiffin and J.C. Hurst is apparent within the reforms of 
the Ordnance Factories during the latter part of the nineteenth century. However, the 
link between the Whiffin family and Hurst is also associated with General Sir George 
Chesney - the reformer of the Indian PWD - and the Royal Indian Engineering 
College, Cooper's Hill, Surrey. J.G. Whiffin retired as Paymaster-in-Chief, Royal 
Navy and in 1878 he was appointed Secretary to Cooper's Hill College, a post he held 
until his death in 1891. Hurst was appointed at the first lecturer in accounts at the 
College in 1879, a post he held in conjunction with his War Office post as Chief 
Accountant and Auditor of the Ordnance Factory accounts (see chapter 2). 
It is possible that Hurst also knew J.G. Whiffin well and that H.W.S. Whiffin 
may have had some influence in suggesting that Hurst was the person who would be 
the most suitable choice. Again, the Accounts syllabus at Cooper's Hill College may 
have been drafted by Hurst, J.G. and H.W.S. Whiffin, who was by now a chartered 
accountant. Hurst continued to lecture at Cooper's Hill College until 1900 and marked 
accounting papers until 1904, three years prior to his death. As previously stated in 
chapter 2, accounts as a subject was withdrawn from the syllabus in 1904 due in part 
to there being found no suitable candidate to teach accounts. There is evidence to 
suggest that the Royal Indian Engineering College, Cooper's Hill may have been the 
first institution to train managers for the public sector, mainly for the Indian PWD. 
though graduates of Cooper's Hill also entered the Colonial Service and served from 
Africa to the Far East. The Whiffin brothers. and their uncle John Whiffin. as weill 
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knowledge of costings and accounting procedures. Concepts such as accrual account-
ing and depreciation were rarely practised with any amount of consistency in the 
private sector until well into the twentieth century. This point is explored more fully 
later in this thesis. 
Evidence of costin IS and depreciation with the development of the Armstron& lun 
at the Royal Gun factories and at the Elswick Ordnance Company 
The excess in expenditure during the building of the extension at the Royal 
Arsenal Woolwich came about just after the Crimean War. During the Crimean War. 
particularly at the Battle of Inkerman on 5th November 1855, the heavy guns of the 
Royal Artillery avoided a British defeat, despite the difficulties in positioning the guns, 
the rate of fire and reloading time, and the immense manpower required to make the 
guns fire efficiently. Armstrong had developed relationships with the Board of 
Ordnance in 1854 when he designed submarine mines to protect the harbour facilities 
at Balaclava and Sevastopol, though the outcome of this project came to nothing 
(Warren, 1989: 12). 
However, Armstrong began to design a lighter. more efficient gun with a rifled 
barrel. Warren (1989: 12) suggests that Armstrong became preoccupied with develop-
ing such a weapon more as a leisure activity than for any other reason. Two British 
inventors began to develop rifled ordnance in the aftermath of the Crimean War, Sir 
Joseph Whitworth, and Sir William Armstrong. Also the French and Germans were 
conducting research and development in rifled breach loading ordnance and their 
research was at a more advanced stage. In terms of testing patents and inventions, 
the War Office during the mid nineteenth century had quite flexible plans for the 
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testing and costing of these. The system had become more flexible since the demise 
in 1855 of the office of Master General of Ordnance and the Board of Ordnance. (For 
a comparison in the ballistics performance and costing of the Whitworth gun compared 
to the Armstrong gun, see Warren, 1989: 12-13; Wilcox, 1999: 57-61.) 
The development of the Armstrong gun was achieved at a crucial point in the 
immediate post-Crimean War period. The Indian Mutiny was far from resolved, a 
new Indian Army with British Army elements had to be re-equipped, and in foreign 
policy Anglo-French relationships were deteriorating whilst at the same time both 
countries were rearming. 
As previously stated, Armstrong refused the financial reward offered by the 
government, and gave his patent to the War Office. In return Armstrong who was 
a director of the Elswick Company, accepted the post of superintendent to the new 
Royal Gun Factory and, whilst remaining a director of Elswick, also refused any 
financial remuneration for his directorship there. 
However the government placed orders for the new Armstrong artillery piece 
with the Royal Gun Factory and under contract with the now restyled Elswick Ord-
nance Company. But the Elswick Company (as did the Ordnance Factories) could 
only sell its output to the War Office. In return, the War Office gave machinery to 
the Elswick Ordnance Company as well as up front payments to assist the development 
of their Armstrong production line. 
The development of the Armstrong gun at Woolwich. transformed the original 
Royal Brass Foundries into a much larger Gun Factory. The impetus of the Arm-
strong gun revolutionised the original craft workshop system of manufacturing brass 
smooth bore cannon at the Brass Foundry. into a major factory system. 
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as J.C. Hurst must therefore be seen as pioneers in this development. 
The introduction of capital accounts into the Ordnance Factories 
Capital Accounts for the government manufacturing departments were intro-
duced in 1862. The origins of the Capital Accounts and of depreciation within the 
government factories occurred a few years earlier between 1855 and 1857, when after; 
"Referring to the several letters from the Heads of Departments at 
Woolwich ... stating the large excesses which have been discovered 
upon the grants for various works which have been executed in the 
Arsenal" (WO 33/4 A and B, Report of the Committee into the Excess 
of Expenditure in Woolwich Arsenal) 
Lord Panmure, Secretary of State for War, instituted "a searching inquiry into the 
causes which led to these excesses, and the best mode of preventing them in future" 
(WO 33/4 A and B). 
The Report recognised that part of the problem was caused by the heavy 
demands being made at the time to re-equip and replenish munitions for the British 
Army in the field. As Chesney had pointed out concerning junior military engineer 
officers in India, the keeping of accurate accounts formed a most crucial part of his 
duty. In fact this could actually cause a conflict of interest between maintaining the 
accounts, and conducting and managing the project at hand (The Calcutta Review, vol 
64, 1859: 359, see also Chapter 2). 
The crisis over the excess of expenditure at Woolwich Arsenal may have 
resulted in a change of accounting procedures which were highlighted a few years later 
with the development and manufacture of the Armstrong gun both at Woolwich and 
under contract from the Elswick Ordnance Company. Suffice to say at this point that 
along with civilian engineers, there is evidence that military engineers had a practical 
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The Armstrong gun was initially made of wrought iron, through coils being 
forged together into a barrel. Later production from 1862 was through 
interchangeability, due to modifications made by Fraser (see Chapter 3). The payment 
system was transferred from day payment to one of piece-work. Production of the 
Armstrong gun commenced in 1858, the same year as interchangeability began at the 
transformed Royal Small Arms Factory, Woolwich. J 
The earlier Armstrong guns were muzzle loading. Though Armstrong 
attempted to develop a fail-safe breech loading artillery piece, he was not altogether 
successful in this venture. However, there is some disagreement concerning the 
success, or otherwise of Armstrong and the development of breech-loading ordnance. 
Scott, in his history of Vickers (t 962) argues that it was the conservative attitude of 
both the Admiralty and the War Office which scuppered Armstrong's plan for breech-
loading artillery (1962: 30). However, this contradicts Armstrong's own testimony. 
For example, in 1881 when Armstrong was elected as President to the Institution of 
Civil Engineers, he made reference to muzzle-loading artillery, in his inaugural 
address, and favoured this method, particularly for shore defences where, "muzzle-
loading guns can be mounted in such a manner so as to be loaded under the shelter 
of an earthen parapet, by hand worked machinery of the very simplest description" 
(Armstrong's Inaugural Address. Proceedings of the Institution Of Civil Engineers, 
vol. 68: 37, 1881-82). 
Scott assumed that the War Office wanted an excuse to terminate the Elswick 
contract, and used the argument for muzzle-loading ordnance as a preference to 
----------------------
For a detailed description of the production process and coiling in the manufacture of the 
Armstrong gun, see notes made by Captain Francis S. Storey, Assistant Superintendent Royal 
Gun Factories 1870-71, quoted by Hogg, 1963: 904; see also Wilcox, 1999: 57-61 and 
Warren, 1989: 12-13. 
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breach-loading (1962: 30). This is not a correct analysis of the situation, as will be 
shown shortly. Scott suggests that "According to an official enquiry after the event 
it was reckoned that half a million pounds had been spent at Elswick and that half this 
sum might have been saved if the government had drawn all its material from the 
Royal Ordnance Factory" (1962: 30). 
In his history of Annstrong's of Elswick, Warren only briefly refers to the War 
Office contract with Elswick to produce Annstrong guns. Warren states that: 
"The circumstances of the case were complicated as is shown especially 
in the conflicting statements about the money spent at Elswick in the 
period of the contract... An assistant Accountant General at the War 
Office reckoned that if goods purchased from Elswick over a three-year 
period at a cost of £593,000 had been bought from Woolwich, 
£242,000 might have been saved. The evidence for his statement was, 
however, disputed." (Warren, 1989: 16) 
The Assistant Accountant General in question was H. W.S. Whiffin, as previously 
mentioned, but Whiffin's assessment may have been more accurate as the accounts 
produced by the Royal Gun Factory and compiled by Whiffin were more advanced 
than those produced by Elswick. 
The two Parliamentary Select Committees on Ordnance (Monsell, 1862: 63) 
investigated this episode. The results of both Committees found that case proved that 
the Elswick guns were of inferior quality and cost more to produce than the correspon-
ding Woolwich guns, as well as accepting the Annstrong gun in preference to the 
Whitworth gun. It was Robert Fraser who modified the production process of the 
Annstrong gun into a successful breach loader, though the heavier guns remained as 
muzzle loaders. 
The first Monsell Inquiry of 1862 reflected a change in procedures in the 
fonnat of Parliamentary accounts submitted to Parliament. The changes were made 
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due in part to the Elswick contract, and also due to the previous excess in expenditure 
at Woolwich Arsenal, as already described. The 1862 Monsell Committee on Ord-
nance in particular investigated the manufacture and supply of the multi-calibred 
Armstrong gun both at the Gun Factory, Woolwich and those manufactured under 
contract from the Elswick Ordnance Company. 
However, there is evidence to suggest that the method of accounting at the 
government manufacturing departments was being altered just prior to the Monsell 
Committee convening in 1862. The Assistant Accountant-General, H. W.S. Whiffin 
had begun a costings exercise at the Royal Gun Factory in January 1862, three months 
before the Monsell Committee began its deliberations. He had sent his subordinate. 
J.C. Hurst, together with J. Anderson, the deputy superintendent of the Royal Gun 
Factory, to assess and analyse the costing surrounding the manufacture of the Arm-
strong Gun. 
Whiffin acknowledged to the Accountant General the zealous work of Hurst. 
Whiffin' s memorandum was appended to the 1862 Monsell Report. 
liThe manner in which Mr. Hurst has conducted the inquiry fully 
confirms the opinion that I have already expressed in regard to his 
capabilities as an accountant, and of his qualities as auditor of our 
manufacturing accounts. II (Monsell, 1862, Appendix 182, copy of 
memorandum dated 10 June 1862; manuscript of the original memor-
andum, SUPP 5/297/34931) 
Also, Whiffin, in direct evidence to the 1862 Monsell Committee, related how: 
"Mr. Hurst, the accountant who had gone into the detail of those 
accounts at Woolwich and had eliminated from the general charges in 
the Royal Gun Factory and all those general charges which he con-
sidered belonged to the other work than guns which is produced at 
Woolwich ... 11 (Monsell, 1862: 119, question 2389) 
The balance sheet as drawn up by Whiffin and Hurst was secondary to a first balance 
sheet already in existence which was designed for public knowledge being the balance 
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sheet presented to Parliament. The second balance sheet (the Number 2 balance sheet) 
was intended for internal Parliamentary scrutiny only and omission from the public 
may have been due to reasons of commercial confidentiality. The Number 2 balance 
sheet showed overheads including depreciation of buildings and machinery. The 
indirect overheads were charged pro rata to labour and materials. It would appear 
that this second balance sheet was a document which would be useful in any costings 
exercise. 
The indirect expenditure data was obtained from the cost and principal ledgers 
and represented those charges which could not be debited against any particular order. 
Such charges included salaries, superannuations of civilian staff of managerial, 
administrative class grade of the civil service, repairs to machinery, engine power, 
sweeping of roadways, rates and divine service. 
Within each government manufacturing department was an Estimates Branch, 
which was immediately subordinate to the factory manager. It was staffed by a class 
of clerks called mechanical writers, mainly recruited from selected industrial class of 
workers (this is further examined in Chapter 6). 
The Estimates Branch was staffed by: 
• One senior mechanical writer, who worked alongside the factory manager, and 
• seven mechanical writers. 
The role of the Estimates Branch was as follows: 
• Preparation of all estimates of cost. 
• Preparation and revision of all piecework prices. 
• Investigations of queries arising in the works accounts branch. 
• Maintain records of weights and tonnage of articles manufactured. 
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• Preparation of lists of the component article of each service. for the guidance 
of the works accounts branch (C 5116. Morley. 1887. Appendix XVIII: 557). 
In relation to costings reflecting tenders for contract to the private sector. the depart-
mental costs were used as a yard-stick to consider what was fair and reasonable prices 
for competing private armaments companies. 
Indeed, the origins of the costing and accounts system at the government 
manufacturing departments from 1862 was to have, "a thoroughly accurate and reliable 
statement of the actual cost of the guns and other things produced in the Government 
factories for the purpose of comparison with the prices at which they could be obtained 
by contract" (Morley, 1887. C 5116: 198, question 3504). It was by this method that 
the 'inflated' prices of the Elswick Company were revealed in 1862 leading to the 
premature termination of their contract with the War Office. 
Hurst, in giving evidence to the Morley Inquiry in November 1886, stated that 
Balance Sheet No 2 "was instituted to show the cost of articles to compare with 
contract prices" (Morley, 1887, C 5116: 22 - Digest of Evidence taken). Hurst 
explained the objective of the No 2 Balance Sheet in 1862 was to satisfy complaints 
from Parliament and from representatives of the Chamber of Commerce: 
"who came to see Lord Hartington and Lord de Grey" stating. "that 
it was unfair for us to publish this No 1 Balance Sheet to the World, 
showing merely the cost of what we produce based upon the expendi-
ture voted by Parliament without taking into consideration those items 
which they were obliged to bear". (Morley. 1887. C 5116: 195. 
question 3435) 
Hurst clarified that "depreciation and interest rates is confined to No 2 Balance Sheet. 
it does not affect No 1" (Morley 1887, question 3435). The Number 1 Balance Sheet 
was merely a document showing charge and discharge effects of the annual vote by 
Parliament, and how it was spent. Any surplus balance was returned to the Treasury 
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2 
(MUN/5/106/400/2, June 1916; Higgs, 1914: 79). 
By November 1886, the capital account of the Arsenal was valued at £927,588, 
and made up of a valuation of 1859, "to which all the money since spent in plant and 
buildings had been added: this is subject to 10 per cent depreciation on machinery 
and 5 per cent on buildings" (Morley, 1887, C 5116: 22. Digest of Evidence). The 
No 2 Balance Sheet introduced in 1862 covered the estimated depreciation of buildings 
and machinery per annum. interest on investment and working capital as follows. 
• depreciation on buildings 5 per cent2 
• depreciation on machinery 10 per cent 
• interest on invested capital 3th per cent 
• interest on working capital 3th per cent 
(which was taken at one fifth of annual aggregate expenditure of the govern-
ment manufacturing departments) 
There is no evidence to suggest that the 1862 refonns of the Ordnance Factory 
accounting systems were influenced by the contemporary refonns of company account-
ing as enacted by the 1862 Companies Act. The 1862 Act, along with the earlier 1856 
Limited Liability Act, made limitation of liability of registered public companies 
"universally available in law" (Jones, 1981: 29). The Victorian companies legislation 
tended to be anns-Iength interference rather than rigid control. The exception to this 
was railway and banking accounts, which were more vigorously controlled by manda-
tory railway and banking legislation, for example the Bank Charter Act 1844. 
Later under the recommendation of the Internal Committee chaired by the MOO Major 
General Sir Frederick Hadden, (1909-11) depreciation of buildings was reduced from 5% to 
3%. Hadden wished it to be reduced to 21h% but this did not meet with Treasury approval 
and the accepted 3 per cent was a compromise however. But to offset Treasury objections 
a review was planned for October 1914. This, of course, never happened due to the interven-
tion of the First World War (WO 32/11212). 
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The Ordnance Factory refonns occurred in the post-Crimean War era which 
was influenced by refonns in the Anny generally and by the need to enhance maxi-
mum efficiency within parsimonious budget parameters set by the Treasury. However, 
the refonns of both the Ordnance Factories on the one hand and companies legislation 
on the other were influenced by a society which began to call for better scrutiny of 
public monies and of shares. By 1866 public accounts in respect of government 
departments were standardised through refonns of the Exchequer and Audit Depart-
ments Act. The major differences between the refonns of the accounts of the Ord-
nance Factories and that of the 1862 Companies Act can be seen from the treatment 
of depreciation of capital assets. 
The concept of depreciation in the private sector durinl the nineteenth century 
This section concentrates on the concept of depreciation in the nineteenth 
century from the perspective of the private sector and the public sector Ordnance 
Factories. This is justified as the introduction of depreciation into the Ordnance 
Factories is crucial to the appreciation of other subsequent refonns. 
The treatment of depreciation in the private sector during the nineteenth century 
posed major dilemmas for the Victorian entrepreneur. The philosophy of depreciation 
was well understood but the actual treatment of accounting for depreciation was 
something rather less scientific. Even in the early part of the twentieth century, Jones 
refers to Edward Holden, Managing Director of the Midland Bank, who in 1903 
recorded in his diary that he had seen: 
"Mr. Whinney Senior who came in to discuss with me the question of 
depreciation and investments. He said he thought the proper course 
would be for the Bank to take a sum off their reserve fund. correspon-
ding to the depreciation, but I [Holden] pointed out that there was no 
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necessity for us to do that." (quoted by Jones. 1981: 117) 
Hurst considered that depreciation was more a matter of speculation. and 
suggested that depreciation was "an estimated charge, adopted in order to produce a 
result which might be considered to harmonise with trade prices" (C 5116, 1887, 
question 3464). Hurst clarified contemporary trade practices as follows: 
"I know that the trade talk a great deal about depreciation and interest, 
but I found when my inquiries have been in this direction, that it is a 
mere matter of expedience what they write off for depreciation, that 
in a good year they will write off, we will say, 10 per cent or 7th per 
cent, and in a bad year they will write off nothing." (C 5116; ques-
tion 3641) 
Again, Hurst clarified this statement concerning depreciation and bad years, 
suggesting trade would not average depreciation say at 5 per cent, but would write 
nothing for that year (C 5116: question 3465). 
Depreciation had been introduced into the accounts (no.2 balance sheet) of the 
Ordnance Factories in 1862. This permeated into a consistent system of depreciation 
treatment until the First World War. It possibly did represent speculation in its 
calculation, but the evidence portrays a more standard and regularly used system than 
was apparent within the contemporary private sector, including the Victorian railways. 
The 1911 Company Secretary's Directory defined depreciation as: 
" ... the diminution in value of an asset due to: 
1. Wear and tear, or exhaustion of subject matter: 
2. Natural causes, occasioned by the effluxion of time: 
3. Obsolescence owing to inventions and general progress of 
mankind." 
Despite the prevailing lack of consistent treatment with the write-off of depreciation 
charges, the Directory considered that "depreciation must always be regarded as a cost 
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of manufacture" (1911: 177). 
However, the same Directory did note the point of existing practice where the 
directors of organisations contend that if their plant and machinery and other fixed 
assets are regularly maintained in a proper working order funded from revenue, then 
this would negate the reason for depreciation write-off in the first place (t 911: 177). 
The treatment of depreciation within the Victorian railway industry was also 
inconsistent and little guidance was given in earlier Victorian railway legislation. 
Chandler argued that the American metal-working industries in the 1880s "continued 
to use the railroad method of renewal accounting. They charged repairs and renewals 
to operating costs, and listed their assets either at original (historical) costs or at 
replacement costs" (Chandler, 1977: 274). In relation to depreciation and company 
accounts, it was only by the enactment of the 1948 Companies Act that depreciation 
charges and provisions had to be legally published in these accounts. 
Thus there was no standardized format for the treatment of depreciation at this 
time. Since the early days of the railways, various railway companies either ignored 
depreciation, particularly of the permanent way, or charged depreciation to the capital 
account, rather than to the revenue account. Indeed numerous railway companies 
assumed that the permanent way would last 20 years or more without repair. Esti-
mates of life spans particularly with British railway companies were always guess-
work, a problem also noted by Hurst. 
There are a number of reasons as to why the Victorian entrepreneur did not 
make any provision within the accounts of the business to annually charge for depreci-
ation. Indeed, there was little incentive to change attitudes in this respect. Victorian 
corporate legislation was rather benign on this issue altogether. Other reasons 
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prevailed including the following points:-
• The main business structure with Victorian society was outside of limited 
liability status. That being so, even within limited liability status, the 1862 
Companies Act made no reference to depreciation. Daunton states that: "Only 
in 1856 was it possible for firms to become joint stock companies with limited 
liability - even then few industrial concerns took advantage of the legislation" 
(Daunton, 2000: 74). 
• The Victorian entrepreneur was continuously involved in his own business 
operations. The concept of family capitalism prevailed including in relatively 
large Victorian companies in the UK (Payne, 1967; Daunton, 2000: 74). 
Thus there was little interest shown in regular calculations of profits and 
statements including the value of capital assets. 
• Also the nineteenth century entrepreneur was mainly not accountable for the 
profit of others. 
The manufacture of the Armstronl Gun. Elswick Ordnance Factory and Royal 
Gun Factory 
Evidence suggests that the new form of balance sheet, supplemented with 
Elswick's equivalent documents, exposed their prices as being too high. Anderson's 
evidence to Monsell both in 1862 and again in 1863. suggests a higher failure rate of 
Elswick manufactured Armstrong guns in testing at the Royal Arsenal. This is 
supported through evidence given to the 1862 Monsell Committee. by Captain Henry 
Gordon RN, principal storekeeper at the Royal Arsenal (who was responsible for the 
proofing and testing of passed ordnance). and Lt Col M Boxer RA. superintendent 
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of the Royal Laboratory. The Royal Laboratory tested ammunition of all calibres 
produced for the Annstrong gun both at Woolwich and at Elswick. 
Because of these allegations, Monsell reconvened in 1863 in order to invest i-
gate the contract of the Annstrong gun further, which resulted in a second Parliamen-
tary Select Committee on Ordnance (Monsell, 1863). Mr. George Rendel replied by 
letter defending the costings of the Elswick Ordnance Factory, and criticising Hurst 
and Anderson's figures and findings. He also criticised the balance sheet of the Royal 
Gun Factory. From Rendel's criticism it is obvious that the Elswick Ordnance 
Company did not itself use a contemporary balance sheet. Nor was the company 
enthusiastic about the Ordnance Factory No 2 balance sheet. 
Anderson furnished a Paper in reply to this where he acknowledges that, 
"The balance-sheet in question is the first submitted under the recent 
orders from the War Department on this subject, and from its novelty, 
together with the haste waged for its completion, is not so perfect nor 
distinct as it ought to have been, and which will be improved in the 
future." (WO 33/012, letter of 30 June 1863) 
In Anderson's reply there is evidence to suggest that piece-working as used in the 
Royal Gun Factory was not a practice deployed at Elswick. This may also suggest 
that the Elswick Ordnance Factory may not have been manufacturing their guns using 
interchangeability techniques at this time. 
Anderson described part of the costing process as follows; 
"Another example ... is the item for tongs, for lifting 12 pounder 
Annstrong shells off the limber boxes. On this item, Mr. Rendel says, 
'At page 28, making iron tongs for lifting 12 pounder shells for Ord-
nance Select Committee is charged at £505-13s-4<l. The material used 
in the manufacture of these tongs is stated to have been of the value of 
only £24-12s-7d. So that in the manufacture of a common article of 
hardware, the cost of the article is stated at twenty times the value of 
the material used'." 
In response to this Anderson states that 
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"This tong is a well finished article, with the part that grips having 
teeth cut perfectly concentric with the shell. The joint also is a well-
constructed piece of workmanship and the gripping part is made to 
embrace two-thirds of the shell. As there was a considerable number 
to make, it was deemed advisable to prepare tools so as to produce 
them by machinery as much as possible. The expense thus incurred 
was considerable; 420 pairs were completed during the year. and a 
considerable more were in hand. All expenses incurred is included in 
the above total. The workmanship was done by piece-work at lIs 3d 
per tongs; the material cost about 9d. If more are required we now 
see a way of reducing the cost a little, and considering the foregoing 
circumstances the above price is not unreasonable. Mr. Rendel calls 
this a common hardware article. There may be some difference of 
opinion regarding the word "common" but these tongs are as good and 
sound as can be made, and will be much cheaper in the end than what 
I would call a common article." (WO 33/12: 5-6) 
Anderson also commented that, 
"In a large Government manufactory such as the Royal Gun Factory. 
there is a continual performance of trifling jobs. altercations. and other 
work that must be done to carry on the service smoothly. which. if 
performed by a contractor must be paid for. but in the Department this 
is not the case, such temporary help or assistance being usually done 
by those whose time is booked to orders properly authorized. it being 
understood that nothing is lost if done for the furtherance of the ser-
vice." (WO 33112: 6) 
Regarding the preparation of the second Number 2 Balance Sheet. Anderson was 
confident it would be much improved. "and the accounts of the current year are kept 
in such a manner that in all probability the following balance-sheet may be nearly 
perfect. as so much fresh light is brought to bear on the whole subject" (WO 33112: 
6). 
Again Anderson in attempting to redress Rendel' s claims, that the prices from 
the Royal Gun Factory was not unreasonable. yet required further explanation on other 
grounds, including four items overlooked by Rendel. These were: 
1. Artificers sent out to stations. 
2. Taking the annual valuation of stock. 
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3. International Exhibition. 
4. Pay and instruction of naval and military artificers (WO 33/12: 6). 
However, Anderson did concede "where is the line to be drawn?" These items: 
"involve general expenses, and where a principle of division is laid 
down, it must be carried out systematically, unless the item itself is 
introduced into the general charges, every order, large or small, must 
be treated alike; were it otherwise, it would open a door to all sorts 
of meddling with the accounts, and might lead to one being favoured 
at the expense of another." (WO 33112: 6) 
Accordingly, Anderson conceded if the current system was wrong, or until a better 
plan was devised then "we can only act according to the rule laid down, whatever it 
may be, leaving nothing to selection on the part of those who compile the accounts, 
but it seems to me more a question for the Accountant-General to decide" (WO 33112: 
6). 
The proofing and sights for the Annstrong guns manufactured both under 
contract at Elswick, and at the Royal Gun Factory was tested and fitted at the Royal 
Arsenal Woolwich. Indeed the Royal Gun Factory was the finishers of all the guns 
whether manufactured at Elswick or Woolwich. Anderson defends the costings at the 
Royal Gun Factory to include: 
" . .. the grinding of the interior of the guns to precise dimensions, 
generally to the thousandth part of an inch, finishing the outside pre-
paratory ... beyond what is specified... As the guns were generally 
heavy ... it was necessary to provide ... lifting and handling and 
removing them from place to place, -- to insure absolute correctness 
... and their sights ... to be perfect in the strictest sense of that word. 
The sights themselves .. which were worked upon during the year 
amounted to 37.529 and. considering the accuracy and finish. is of 
itself a fonnidable item." (WO/33112: 6) 
It would appear from this evidence that the Royal Gun Factory as a public department. 
was more advanced in its production, costing and accounting techniques as compared 
to the Elswick Ordnance Company. On the recommendation of the Monsell Report 
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of 1862, the War Office terminated their contract with the Elswick Ordnance Com-
pany, compensating them with £85,000 for loss of profit. This figure had been 
reduced from a recommended higher figure, for the non-return of certain machinery 
loaned to Elswick. The Times reported that a test of an 80 ton made at Woolwich and 
a 100 ton gun made at Elswick were "subjected to a comparative trial by the commit-
tee on ordnance at the proof butts in the marshes adjoining the Royal Arsenal, 
Woolwich" (The Times, 5 February 1862). The trials also tested gunpowder made 
at the Royal Gunpowder Factory and imported gunpowder from Westphalia. The 
Ordnance Committee favoured the performance of the Woolwich gun and the Waltham 
Abbey gunpowder (The Times, 5 February 1862). 
The idea that all the Armstrong guns were required by the Army and Navy, 
was also reflected in evidence given to the 1863 Select Committee on Ordnance. 
Whiffin, in evidence to the 1863 Committee, suggested that a very large saving could 
be made to the country if this happened. However, Whiffin apparently gave this as 
an opinion and did not back it up with any data or other evidence. The Committee 
appeared to take some exception to this opinion, for example this point was made by 
Colonel Dunne in evidence to the Committee who, although he had the highest regard 
for Whiffin as an accountant, commented that, despite exchanges in correspondence, 
"I do not see very well how he could have given in the form of the return which he 
was asked to fill up. any report very different from this ... " (Monsell. 1863. question 
5315: 2641, index 591). 
Scott briefly records this episode, and states that: 
"There were allegations that costs at Elswick were unduly high. and 
that money was being thrown away which could be saved if manufac-
ture were kept in the hands of the Royal Arsenal at Woolwich." 
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Scott contends that "Armstrong was sacrificed, and in October 1862 the Elswick 
contracts were terminated" (1962: 30). 
The reason for the failure of Elswick to retain its contract was due to the better 
performance of the Woolwich guns, and not, as Scott contends, because they "aban-
doned breech-loading" (1962: 30). Neither does primary source evidence support 
Scott's premise that Armstrong was sacrificed (Proceedings of the Institution of Civil 
Engineers, vol. 68, 1881-82; vol. 147, 1901-2). 
Evidence given to the second Monsell Inquiry of 1863 referred to accidents 
with the Armstrong guns manufactured at Elswick and in service with the Royal Navy, 
whereas the Admiralty reported favourably with regard to the Woolwich manufactured 
Armstrong guns (Monsell Report, 1863: index, p.S91). 
However, Scott does suggest that the loss of the War Office contract for the 
Armstrong gun, encouraged the Elswick Ordnance Company to compete in the 
international armament industry. Quoting Armstrong, Scott records that: "From that 
time ... the firm had no alternative but to commence a new career based on foreign 
support, and it was by that support - and not by government patronage - that the 
Elswick Ordnance Works was established" (quoted by Scott, 1962: 31). Unfortunate-
ly, Scott did not give the source of this reference. However as Elswick previously 
had been a success as a civil engineering company under the directorship of Arm-
strong, and it was possible for the Company to revert to civil engineering. In fact 
the Elswick Company, as Armstrong of Elswick. entered the growing international 
arms market, which included both home and foreign naval orders for warships 
(Warren, 1989). Orders from the War Office were not forthcoming and thus between 
1863 and 1878 Elswick, under Armstrong's directorship. produced and sold Armstrong 
- 176 -
breach-loading rifled ordnance to America (including the Union and Confederate 
Armies in the Civil War), Peru, Chile, Egypt, Turkey, Italy, Denmark and New 
Zealand. In fact Armstrong's of Elswick came a close second in the international arms 
market to Krupp and by 1900 was perhaps the largest company in the United Kingdom 
(Warren, 1989: xiii; Wilcox, 1999: 60). 
By the late nineteenth century, along with BSA, the Elswick Company were 
manufacturing bicycles through interchangeability processes. Scott's History of Vickers 
reflects a certain bias towards the Elswick Ordnance Company. This is a criticism 
of house histories generally, a point referred to in the first chapter. 
Anderson succeeded Armstrong as Superintendent to the Royal Gun Factory. 
He gave the bulk of evidence to the 1863 Monsell Committee and successfully rebutted 
the Elswick defence. Anderson and his manager, Robert Fraser, were engineers. But 
it is apparent from their testimonies that they were expert with costing techniques, and, 
indeed could be associated as costing or efficiency engineers, as argued by Loft (t 994: 
118). Jones succinctly argued that it was those at the 'cutting face' who acquired the 
necessary skills to perform effectively (t 981: 72). Both Anderson and Fraser are 
examples of this, Fraser was first appointed to the machinery department of the Royal 
Arsenal, then as manager of the Royal Gun Factory. His improvements to the 
Armstrong gun in terms of production quality, increased its cost efficiency. whilst 
lowering production costs where. "Time and labour are ... sacred in having fewer 
pieces to move from workshop to workshop ... combined with the employment of 
cheap labour. a Fraser gun can be made more cheaply than an Armstrong gun as 
originally manufactured" (Institution of Civil Engineers Proceedings. vol. 78. part 4. 
1883-4: 428). By 1868 the modified Fraser gun was being produced in steel. Fraser 
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also resolved most of the difficulties with Armstrong's original prototype breech-
loading mechanism. This achievement was not mentioned by Scott (1962) nor by 
Warren (1989). 
Fraser had adapted the production process of the Armstrong gun where with 
the rescheduling of labour, and the introduction of the conveyor belt assembly system. 
he could produce the gun faster, more efficiently and cheaper. The re-named Fraser 
gun cost £70 per ton to produce compared to the £ 100 manufacturing cost of the 
Armstrong gun. The Fraser guns were easier to produce and assemble. They 
withstood the severest of tests by the Woolwich inspectors. For example, two Fraser 
guns endured continuous test firing of 2000 rounds each before succumbing to stress 
(Hogg, 1963: 904). 
The recommendation of the 1863 Monsell Report and the departmentalisation of 
accounts 
The Select Committee on Ordnance of 1863 in part of its terms of reference, 
further examined the accounts of the Woolwich Departments which in the main 
included the Gun Factory and Laboratory and reported on the workings of the new 
systems generally. In particular the Chair of the Committee, William Monsell, asked 
whether "Mr. Anderson of the Treasury, who is the highest authority on this subject, 
has considered the question of different accounts at Woolwich and whether he has 
approved of them" (Monsell. 1863. question 5578: 279). 
Whiffin replied that he "did not think that his attention has ever been drawn 
to the detail of the Army manufacturing accounts; he gave a general approval of the 
books in existence two or three years since. but I do not think his attention was ever 
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drawn to the principle of the accounts as now rendered" (Monsell, 1863, question 
5578: 279). 
Later in the proceedings Whiffin's opinion was sought as to whether the No.2 
Balance Sheet could be called a commercial account (Monsell. 1863. question 5628: 
280). Whiffin replied that it was "very difficult to make government accounts on 
commercial principles", which was then suggested by Colonel Dunne (a member of 
the Committee) that it would be difficult to compare commercial prices with govern-
ment prices (Monsell, 1863, question 5623: 280). However, Whiffin gave the opinion 
that he did not "think there is very much difficulty in making a comparison of the 
prices charged by a private establishment as those of the government; that is to say, 
making a comparison for government purposes" (Monsell, 1863, question 5623: 281). 
The index to the Monsell Report of 1863 summarised the accounts (Woolwich 
Departments) which included: 
1. The Gun Factory; 
2. Laboratory; and 
3. As to the systems generally. 
There was a problem in the recording of the accounts in the Gun Factory, particularly 
with reference to the cost of the 100-pounder gun and the distribution of the various 
labour and material costs under the various heads. Monsell recognised this difficulty 
in the Gun Factory "of clearly showing the precise cost, an account of the variation 
in the value of stock in hand (Mansell, 1863. questions 5337-5340: 59t). 
The Mansell Report of 1863 approved of "the adoption at Woolwich of the 
system of accounts recommended by the War Office" (questions 4085-6) but suggested 
that "the accounts at each department be kept separate and that the capital necessary 
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be borrowed from the Treasury at interest" (Monsell, 1863, index: 591). 
The introduction of the balance sheet into the Woolwich Departments was 
praised by Monsell, who suggested that they "should be so distributed as to show the 
actual cost of each article to the country" (Monsell, 1863, index: 591), The report 
highlighted the success of the balance sheet in explaining that its objective was to 
"comply with certain representation that the expenditure should be distributed as to 
show the actual cost of each article to the country", but Baring reminded the Commit-
tee that "the attempt, though a great step in advance, is far from complete" (Baring, 
5334 et seq). Different results produced by allotting the indirect expenses on labour 
only, and upon labour and material combined (in questions 5326-33, 5340) with 
expediency in the formation of a balance sheet, of its being definitely settled how the 
general expenses are levied in 5342-6 (Monsell, 1863, index: 593). 
The 'gun problem' had been difficult to resolve. Before 1862 the accounts and 
finances of the newly reconstituted Gun Factory had been "in a very unsatisfactory 
state" (Monsell, 1863, questions 5342-8: 266-9). Baring had highlighted the problem 
of costing for the multi-calibred Armstrong gun, noting the difficulties in charging 
overheads to the differing artillery produced at the Gun Factory. Whiffin admitted 
that there was a gun problem, particularly with reference to the cost of the Armstrong 
1 OO-pounder gun, and to the distribution of the various labour and material costs under 
the various heads. This was recognised in the 1863 Select Committee Report on 
Ordnance. The summary of the report into the accounts of the Gun Factory 
emphasised the problem of "clearly showing the precise cost, on account of the 
variation in the value of stock in hand" (Monsell. 1863. index: 591; see also questions 
5337-40). 
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The solution to the gun problem was provided by Hurst. who divided the cost 
accounts in the Gun Factory into three classes according to the calibre of the ordnance 
being manufactured. these being (i) heavy, (ii) medium and (iii) light. Each class of 
ordnance bore an appropriate percentage on materials for labour and machinery 
charges (Hogg. 1963: 874). Hurst's methods redressed the previous and simplistic 
system which was unworkable due to the increasing technology in artillery and 
ballistics science as reflected in the Armstrong gun. in factory production and in the 
changing systems of the division of labour. The transition of the manufacture of 
artillery at Woolwich from a workshop-based brass foundry to a factory production 
method. had not brought the support systems together. for example the accounts 
costings and other voucher systems. 
The rationale behind the organisation and line structure of the Ordnance 
Factories still favoured a decentralised system. This too was reflected in British 
capitalism. particularly in the structure of family capitalism and partnership. Over 
the next two decades the systems evolved through a learning curve and. with the 
increased technology in artillery and ballistic science and the increased size in the 
Ordnance Factories. the idea of centralisation became more apparent. 
The centralization of the accountina function at the Ordnance Factories 
Loft stated that: 
"To establish a comprehensive system [of costing] required a standard-
ization and organisation of production which was found only excep-
tionally. .. To find out what it cost to make something required in 
many cases, combining factory records of production. and records from 
the accounts office which were kept independently." (1994: 118) 
However. Loft does not give an example of a British company or organisation which 
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did this. But the example of the nineteenth century refonns of the Ordnance Factories 
is such an example, particularly after the centralisation of the ordnance establishments 
in 1887. 
The basis of the Morley Report into the Workings of the Government Manufac-
turing Departments, of 1887, had its origins in an earlier inter-departmental committee 
report of 1879. This committee was appointed on 26 July 1879 "to enquire into the 
Clerical Establishment of the Manufacturing Departments (WO 33/34: The Manufac-
turing Departments Of The Anny Reorganisation Of The Clerical Establishment.) 
The recommendations of this committee were based around the improvement in the 
pay and conditions of the clerical establishment, and advised the use of interchange 
between the Ordnance Factories clerical staff with that of the Naval dockyards and 
arsenals. 
There was a marked difference between the Admiralty system of accounting 
and auditing compared with that of the War Office Manufacturing Departments. 
Within the Royal Dockyards the dockyard accountant was appointed from one of the 
principal officers. The dockyard accountant also fulfilled the role of local auditor. 
He was subordinate to the Dockyard superintendent, but reported directly in his role 
as auditor to the Board of Admiralty. His audit was accepted as final. 
By contrast, the Accountant and Auditor of the government manufacturing 
departments was bound on the strength of the War Office directly, though located at 
the Royal Arsenal, Woolwich. The Accountant and Auditor was responsible for all 
the manufacturing departmental accounts, and he reported directly to the Assistant 
Accountant General. The Committee Report of 1879 concluded that the audit of the 
accounts, and balance sheets of the government manufacturing departments was more 
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thorough than the contemporary dockyard accountants. The Report continued "that, 
whereas there is a separate accountant for each Yard, there is only one Auditing 
Officer for the whole of our Arsenal Factories (Vote 12 - Woolwich, Enfield and 
Waltham Abbey), and formerly his sphere of duty extended to the Clothing Factory" 
(WO 33/34: 6). 
The 1879 Committee Report complimented the professionalism of Hurst and 
stated that they "wish to record their opinion that his duties are of a very important 
and responsible character, and it is regretted that he has no assistant of adequate rank 
and position who is learning his duties and qualifying to take his place in the event 
of absence or retirement" (WO 33/34: 6). 
Hurst's salary in 1879 was £500 pa, and had not altered for ten years since 
being fixed in 1869, when graded at the then 2nd Class of the War Office. His staff 
at Woolwich consisted of: 
"One Second-Class Assistant at £250 pa 
Two Lower Division Clerks at £90 to £250 pa 
One Writer at 34s a week." (WO 33/34: 6) 
Costin,s and the evidence or Hurst to the Morley Committee. November 1886 
The 1887 Morley Committee (C 5116) investigated the workings of the 
government manufacturing departments in three broad areas:-
• the lack of coordination and communication between the individual government 
factories 
• the quinquennial changes of superintendents 
• inspection. 
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The lack of co-ordination and communication between the individual govern-
ment Ordnance Factories had been allowed to develop due to the independent historical 
origins of each factory, which had been established quite separately. In terms of the 
1863 Monsell Report, the decentralised administrative and financial structure was 
favoured because it fitted an already decentralised factory organisation which. in terms 
of the defence procurement needs of 1863, proved to be effective. By the mid-1880s, 
however, it was now evident that considerable diseconomies were apparent due to this 
decentralised structure. These were reiterated to the Morley Inquiry by each of the 
military superintendents of the Ordnance Factories. The interior economy of each 
government manufactory, particularly in relation to the conditions of employment and 
the payment of overtime, varied considerably between each department. Apparently 
there was some dissatisfaction among the employees from each manufacturing depart-
ment who were graded differently for similar work. Some workers were in receipt 
of non-monetary benefit in some factories, for example free breakfasts at Woolwich, 
whereas in other departments, workers received no such benefit at all. 
Again, Hurst also gave examples of a divergence between government manufac-
turing departments concerning the administration of accounts. The Accounts Branch 
at the Gunpowder Factory at Waltham Abbey would consolidate the financial structure 
of its separate operations, whereas at Woolwich separate accounts for each operation 
were maintained. Hurst argued for the centralisation of all accounting and financial 
functions of the manufacturing departments. 
Other overlapping issues prevailed such as the cost of maintaining the upkeep 
of the infrastructure of each factory, particularly road cleaning, gardens, security and 
divine service. Problems also arose in respect of experimental artillery produced at 
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the Gun Factory for use by the Royal Laboratory and later modifications. This 
produced elements of double-accounting and duplication. 
All these issues had developed since the earlier Monsell Report of 1863, 
particularly in respect of the evolution of ordnance and ballistic science. Since the 
1880s the type of warship developing in the Royal Navy required a defence system 
which had never been contemplated by Monsell. The first iron-clads were born, 
together with the attendant weapons systems. 3 
Much of the evidence given by Hurst to the Morley Committee centred around 
his role as Chief Accountant and Auditor. His evidence gives a clear picture of the 
costing system within the Ordnance Factories through apportioning indirect expenditure 
to cost centres. In terms of contemporary accounting practice, the system in the 
Ordnance Factories appeared to be more advanced than in the contemporary private 
sector. 
Mr. Carbutt, a member of the Morley Committee, questioned Hurst regarding 
his role as an auditor and whether the auditor was responsible for costing. Hurst 
stated that it was the individual factory manager who was responsible for costings (C 
1887: 194, questions 3402, 3403). 
The managers of the individual manufacturing departments were civilians and 
were responsible for the costing within their factory. Hurst stated that it was not his 
role to challenge any costings. But Hurst did remind the Morley Committee that the 
superintendent had authority over the manager, and therefore could intervene in any 
of the manager's decisions, if it was thought necessary: 
3 HMS Warrior, the first steam-driven iron-clad battleship in the Royal Navy. was first 
commissioned in 1860. J.O. Whiffin served as paymaster on HMS Warrior from 
1867 to 1870 (ADM 19611). 
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"of saying ... 'you charge too much for this gun and too little for that. 
Why have you charged certain items of expenditure within your work-
shop, to any general items, instead of to this special item?' I think the 
power remains with him [the superintendent]. I do not see how the 
auditor is to control anything of that kind." (C 5116, 1887: 194, 
question 3407) 
Carbutt, further questioned Hurst in relation to the system placed on managers in the 
government manufacturing departments, and whether the same reliance would be 
placed on a manager of a private engineering company. Carbutt in particular ident-
ified both Armstrong and Whitworth as comparisons. His line of argument was 
whether the assessed costing decision by the manager was internally checked, or 
externally audited in any way. Hurst reiterated his previous comment that the manager 
of a government manufacturing department had sole responsibility for this. Hurst did 
remind the Committee that the manager was subordinate to the superintendent for any 
discrepancy in the first instance, and not to the auditor. However, Hurst in his 
position as chief auditor had no power whatsoever to check the costing decisions made 
by managers of government factories. 
Nevertheless, Hurst did clarify his role as auditor that he did have the authority 
to check and compare the costings of each gun in the current year, with the costings 
of previous years. In Hurst's opinion, the same system and reliance of the manager 
was similar in the private sector, including at Armstrong and Whitworth. Both 
companies also left such decisions to the integrity of professional managers (C 5116, 
1887: 194, question 3405). 
Hurst confirmed that indirect charges were accounted for annually per gun and 
not monthly, as were materials and labour. Carbutt again in his questioning of Hurst. 
attempted to draw comparisons between government factories and the private sector. 
He questioned whether indirect charges at the Ordnance Factories were not charged 
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with the outlay for any particular month: 
" ... to which extent the government is in a better position than the 
private manufacturer would be, because he would charge his indirect 
expenses every month against the article." (C 5116, 1887: 194. ques-
tion 3410) 
Again Hurst replied that this in practice would not be the case. Hurst explained that. 
taking as an example the month of April, the government factory makes up the cost 
which has accrued during the month for materials and wages: 
" ... which are charged in the cost ledger, to the guns which were being 
produced, but the month's work would go a very little way towards completing 
the order. Therefore, month by month, there would be no difference I appre-
hend between the private manufacturer and the government factory, so far as 
direct charges are concerned." 
Hurst suggested that to undergo a scheme as suggested by Carbutt would: 
" . .. have 12 operations to go through in the year without any great public 
advantage, so far as I can see, besides which many 'of our indirect charges 
could not be ascertained monthly." (C 5116, 1887: 194, question 3410) 
In fact Hurst suggested that to account for indirect costs on an annual basis was more 
cost effective in clerical work and time. 
Hurst clarified the status of military officers attached to the government 
manufacturing departments, including the military superintendents at the various 
departments who, although receiving two salaries, one military and one civil, were 
only superannuated on their military salary. This was obviously not budgeted into 
the estimates for the Parliamentary vote for government factories. Neither did the War 
Office have to pay rent for the land on the site of the Royal Arsenal, a point made 
earlier. In fact, in the strict legal sense the War Office were squatters on Warren 
Marsh. Obviously both categories relating to military salaries and rent-free land were 
schemes not enjoyed by competing private sector contractors. 
At the end of the financial year the total amount of overheads was made up 
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and allocated pro rata as a percentage on the direct wages of all the articles produced 
(C 5116, 1887: 567, Appendix XVI). 
The method adopted at the government factories was described in Appendix 
XVI of the Morley Report. Each job was identified by a 'work mark' to which the 
charges for wages and material required in their production were booked. Material 
for the various trades were drawn from the store upon demands showing 'work marks' 
for which the articles were required. These charges were then prepared in monthly 
abstracts and then posted to the cost ledger. All the principal accounts were kept on 
double entry system (Morley, C 5116, 1887: 566-7). 
This system is very similar to the "shop-order system of accounts" which 
improved the control and flow of basic cost accounting devised in America by Met-
calfe (Chandler, 1977: 273). Metcalfe argued that the basic managerial problems in 
America during the 1880s "were co-ordination and control" where in many cases the 
process of manufacturing resulted from records "too often kept by memory" (Chan-
dler, 1977: 273). It would appear that the British Ordnance Factories had resolved 
this problem. 
Hurst in evidence to the Morley Committee described how the cost of an article 
was arrived at. This was through the material expended and the work input performed 
as ascertained daily, recorded by timekeepers. The derived cost was debited monthly 
together with indirect labour against the article. According to Hurst, the indirect 
percentages were about 50 per cent on the direct labour and were charged on the 
labour "as the result of careful deliberation" (C 5116, 1887: 295. questions 3414 to 
3428. See also summary of evidence given by Hurst, p.22). 
Hurst, in defence of the system at the government manufacturing departments. 
- 188 -
stated that: 
"The prices of articles made at the Arsenal, though often under those 
of similar contract articles, are accurate. It would require a conspiracy 
of several responsible men to put part of the cost of one article on to 
another, and there is too much risk and not sufficient motive for anyone 
to do this, as the chief officials' pay is the same whatever the price of 
the article ... The best method of testing the accuracy of the accounts 
is by local inquiry. The local accountants' would draw the attention 
of the superintendents to any inaccuracy in charges against articles. 
To prevent fraud, I [Hurst] compare the prices of articles in the year 
just ended with the prices in former years, and any discrepancy must 
be explained by superintendents. It would be almost impossible to cook 
the accounts for two or three years running." (C 5116, 1887, sum-
mary, p.23) 
He further explained that: 
"To find out what the cost of a gun this year comes out, I bring it into 
three items, labour, materials, indirect expenditure; if I find any 
serious difference between these items, I draw the attention of the 
Director of Artillery to it, and we get an explanation from the superin-
tendents." (question 3529, p.199) 
The Ordnance Factory cost clerks 
The factory managers at the government factories and the superintendents were 
not accountants. However, there is evidence that costings were being conducted quite 
accurately and effectively at the government manufacturing departments. The actual 
'costers' may have been the mechanical writers who were closest to the problem. The 
term writer was a grade of clerical worker in the civil service or a naval cleric These 
mechanical writers equated to the contemporary cost clerks as described by Loft (1994: 
118). 
The Committee of 1879 on inspection found the quality and performance of 
writers very impressive. The Committee recommended that certain writers should 
be allowed to be given superannuation along with assistant foremen and foremen, and 
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the latter should interchange with the role of writer, so long as they satisfied the 
appointments board by holding the requisite Civil Service Certificates (WO 33/34: 5). 
It is possible that by 1887, many mechanical writers had been recruited from 
the assistant foreman and foreman grades of the Ordnance Factories. Therefore they 
could have an in depth knowledge of engineering principles and costings. 
It is interesting to relate this development in the British Ordnance Factories 
with contemporary development of large American business, notably engaged in metal-
working. Metcalfe had advocated at the Springfield Federal Annory his voucher plan 
to be administered by the foremen and senior supervisors. This was criticised by 
Metcalfe's contemporaries. Taylor (of the Midvale Steel) and Anderson, who argued 
that foremen had neither the time nor interest to fill out the vouchers correctly. The 
view of Metcalfe may be too simplistic. Bravennan argues that the increase in the 
need for clerical workers was a symptom of scientific management. He refers to the 
early industrial enterprise which employed few clerks, "generally fewer than half-
dozen in even the largest finns" (Bravennan, 1998: 203). However, unlike the 
British Ordnance Factories. who recruited their mechanical writers from the supervis-
ory and foreman grade. the American metal-working industries had externally 
employed specialised clerks and timekeepers to "collect, record and disseminate the 
infonnation needed for costing and co-ordination" (Chandler, 1977: 274). Chandler 
commented that by the 1890s these clerks "had become the first 'staff' employees in 
a number of metal-working factories" (Chandler. 1977: 274). It is argued that a 
similar system had occurred earlier in the British Ordnance Factories. where line 
senior employees had been internally selected and promoted as 'staff' employees. 
There is no evidence in the PRO SUPP series to demonstrate how a paper trail 
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from production to the payment of wages was attained. But by a scrutiny of the 
existing committee reports such as Morley, in the description of the division of labour 
on the shop floor of the Gun or Rifle Factories, and utilising what is known about 
contemporary pieceworking payment systems generally, the following description may 
be made. 
The daily output of each worker was inspected by a viewer and each component 
passed was entered on a voucher. The number of passes on a worker's voucher was 
conveyed into current terms by a writer and then issued to the pay office. The system 
was audited by the supervisor of a section who would randomly and frequently inspect 
the viewer's passes and possibly conduct checks of a workman at his bench. Any 
errors or differences would be corrected. The foreman could also double-audit the 
supervisor, viewer, worker output process, as could the factory assistant manager or 
manager. A worker had the right of appeal against any decision, to the superintendent 
of the factory. 
Sir Charles Harris, in evidence to the Sub-Committee of Inquiry on the 
Ordnance Factories in January 1919, praised the Woolwich system of accounts as laid 
down before 1914 of the independent record of the work-taker and of the stocktaking 
of semi-manufactures (work in progress). There is some suggestion in the evidence 
given by Harris that these systems had deteriorated during the period when the 
Ordnance Factories came under the governance of the Ministry of Munitions (1915-
19). This is pursued further in Chapter 8. 
However. Harris pointed out that "prior to 1915 the system was under the 
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CSOF. A civil assistant (Mr. La Brooy4) was responsible for the whole business of 
the factories. Under him was another civil servant in charge of cost accounts who 
had been trained in the particular form of accounts used by the factories. The officer 
who actually kept the books was thus one of the assistants to the Chief Assistant to 
the CSOF (MUN 4/6375). 
According to Harris: 
"The main object of cost accounting was to save the country's money 
so far as possible. Accounts ought to be so kept and the results ought 
to be so analysed and brought before the Controlling Authority that that 
Authority knew quite definitely what was happening." (MUN 
14/63751) 
In relation to the pre-1915 Woolwich system of accounting, Harris said that: 
"there should be no difficulty in giving from the work-taker's books, 
in which the labour was now recorded. an analysis of the time spent 
or the wages earned or anything of that sort. so long as the managers 
at Woolwich could use it when they had got it." (MUN. 4/63751) 
However. Harris considered that the extraction of the costs from the books could be 
simplified "by appropriate arrangement of the work in the shops. e.g. by finishing a 
run of one kind of work right out and then changing over to another. so that no 
question of semi-manufacture would arise" (MUN 4/6375). 
The lovernment manufacturinl departments and double-entry bookkeepinl 
As previously mentioned. Whiffin confirmed that DEB was not used in the 
government manufacturing departments in July 1862. but DEB was used as an 
4 Justin Theodore La Brooy CB: civil assistant to the CSOF. Educated Corpus Christi 
College, Cambridge: Honours Classical Tripos 1880. Appointed Higher Division 
Clerk. Royal Gun Factory. August 1881. Appointed a staff officer 1891, civil 
assistant July 1900. Appointed a representative of the War Office on the governing 
body of Woolwich Polytechnic. September 1904. Appointed CB 1916 (War Office 
Staff List. 1919: 389). 
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accounting system in the Navy manufacturing departments (Monsell, 1862: 6, ques-
tions 127 to 130). 
Hurst described how the then Secretary of State for War, Lord de Grey, sent 
him to the Royal Arsenal at Woolwich. Here Hurst implemented the necessary 
documentation and canvassed it with the various Superintendents' and with the 
respective clerks, in order to make the system work successfully. 
"I had to draw up a statement to show how all the details could be 
worked in week by week and month by month and to show them how 
the double-entry books they might make monthly entries, and by these 
means... There is a check within itself in this double-entry system; 
and instead of leaving it to an indefinite period to work out the value 
of the material, for instance, especially at the end of the year, or at any 
time they liked, or that they had time to do it - month by month every 
item of material issued is valued and charged to the proper orders to 
which it is appropriated. and month-by-month the wages expended in 
the Department are also charged to the work upon which those wages 
have been expended; so that month-by-month the amount for any 
expenditure of that nature is debited to the work performed in the 
month; thus the expenditure month-by-month will be equal to the debit 
to the Cost Ledger month-by-month. and where production is going on 
for 12 months. the 12 months themselves will agree also." (C 5116: 
193. question 3383) 
Hurst confirmed to the Morley Committee that. the original double-entry system at 
the government departments was still operating very successfully after over twenty 
years. and was still totally accepted by the various superintendents. Their only 
concern was that to operate the system was very labour orientated, in terms of clerical 
labour. Hurst remarked that he believed "that the present system is as good as any 
systems that can be applied or that is applied in any of the large establishments in the 
kingdom" (C 5116. 1887: 193. question 3383). 
Regarding double-entry book-keeping. the system was not universal in the 
private sector. and many commercial institutions were using single entry methods of 
financial recording as this reduced labour costs. Also there was no corporate legisla-
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tion to enforce DEB (Corey, 1840, ch.IV: 46-9; Jones, 1981). This situation may 
have prevailed until the First World War. Single-entry book-keeping, or journal entry 
appeared in numerous texts in the nineteenth century from Corey 1840 to Lisle 1899. 
Many private engineering industries engaged in munitions production sub-contracted 
much of their work to smaller independent engineering workshops where single-entry 
book-keeping was common (see Warren, 1998: 182 for an example of a lack of an 
accounting system at the Cyclops Steel Works - also see Chapter 8). The accounting 
syllabus taught at the Army Class, London School of Economics (LSE) from January 
1907, included single-entry book-keeping (LSE, 20.3.30). 
Hurst had advised the Morley Inquiry that the system of accounting within the 
various government manufacturing departments could be improved, however. The 
prevailing system in 1886 did cause inconsistencies due to the existing decentralisation 
of the Ordnance Factories. Evidence of this had also been given to Morley by the 
separate superintendents of each Ordnance Factory. 
However, Hurst, although recommending the centralisation of the accounting 
function, recognised that it would also involve wider structural issues. Hurst also 
identified the need for a supreme Director General of Ordnance Factories (DGOS) to 
have overall charge of all the Ordnance Factories. He recommended a consolidation 
of the Stores Department. In his evidence to Morley, Hurst referred to the last 
accounts presented to Parliament which showed that stores to the value of £300,000 
were maintained in each of the three stores at Woolwich. Hurst considered that the 
stores structure at Woolwich was similar to "a Joint Stock Company depending on 
dividends, I am confident that the Directors would never consent, for economical 
reasons to having a Stores department kept up for each" (Morley, C 5116,1887: 202, 
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question 3586). 
Hurst and the recommendation for a centralised structure of the Ordnance 
Factories 
Until 1887 there were four quasi-autonomous stores branches which supplied 
the government manufacturing departments. 
• A military stores department under the Commissary-General of Ordnance 
• Three separate Stores Departments for each of the Manufacturing Departments 
at Woolwich. 
However Hurst realised that any change could increase his responsibilities. Even at 
the time of giving evidence to the Morley Inquiry. in November 1886. Hurst stated 
that he was entrusted with an annual amount "not far short of ten million sterling" 
(Morley, C 5116, 1887: 202, question 3587). 
When assessing Hurst's evidence referring to stores accounting. it must be 
borne in mind that his recommendation was far more advanced than the contemporary 
private sector. Until well after the First World War. both chartered and incorporated 
accountants, including those specialising in audit. showed little interest in stores 
accounting. The point was referred to by Webster-Jenkinson in a lecture to a Bristol 
audience of accountants in December 1918 when he stated, "As a general rule the 
auditor bothered himself very little about the stores accounts. regarding it as a works 
matter" (The Accountant, 18 January 1919; 45). Sir Mark Webster-Jenkinson had 
been Director of Cost Accounts in the Ministry of Munitions during the First World 
War. 
Contemporary with the Morley Inquiry. was Lord Randolph Churchill's Select 
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Committee on Anny Estimates in 1887-88. The final report itself recommended no 
change in the existing system other than: 
"It is desirable that the House should authorise steps to be taken to 
secure an independent professional examination and audit of the 
Expense accounts of the Anny Manufacturing Departments, and of the 
books on which those accounts have been based." (BPP 216, 223, 232 
and 259, 1887, Fourth Report: Hogg, 1963: 873) 
Generally however Lord Randolph Churchill's Report was satisfied with the existing 
system of accounts as it was simple to operate and sufficiently accurate in respect of 
financial reporting of the Ordnance Factories to the society which they operated in 
during the later nineteenth century (Hogg, 1963: 873). On acceptance of this recom-
mendation, Messrs Whinney and Waterhouse were duly appointed as auditors. 
Whinney and Waterhouse recommended a special fonnat for the final accounts of 
Ordnance Factories. However the 1889 Anny and Navy Audit Act, altered the method 
of Parliamentary provision of the Ordnance Factories Vote (originally Vote 12 but, 
after 1889, Vote 9) to be consolidated into one balance sheet and account, rather than 
the presentation of individual anny and navy Ordnance Factory accounts. 
Morley tackled the problem of the decentralised structure of the Ordnance 
Factories and in 1890 the complete system was reorganised on a centralised system. 
Four years later the Secretary of State for War, Campbell-Bannerman. introduced an 
eight-hour day for all government workers. including those at the Ordnance Factories 
(the exception being the Royal Gunpowder Factory). The success of an eight-hour 
day at most of the Ordnance Factories could only be achieved satisfactorily with a 
centralised system. The question of the eight-hour day is covered in Chapter 7. A 
unifonn system allowed for economies to be made in the deployment of staff and the 
actual control of expenditure to be obtained. The new office of DOOS (later to be 
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restyled the Chief Superintendent of Ordnance Factories [CSOF)) now had total control 
of factory production. The superintendents of each factory were allowed access to 
the records however. 
Cost accounting on a centralised system in respect of labour was based on the 
records maintained by a team of work-takers, immediately subordinate to the Principal 
Clerk in charge of the centralised Works Account Branch. Previously this had been 
compiled at each individual factory. 
An Inter-departmental Committee of enquiry of 1903 presided over by a 
Treasury official, Mr. F.W. Webb, investigated the whole system of cost accounting 
in the Ordnance Factories. There was a clash of opinion between the Chief Mechan-
ical Engineer of the Ordnance Factories, Mr. (later Sir) H.F. Donaldson and an 
independent accountant Mr. H.J. Morland (see Chapter 3), later a partner at Price 
Waterhouse. Donaldson "attached much weight to the system of cost accounting which 
would be of assistance for administrative purposes" (Hogg, 1963: 920-1). In order 
to achieve this Donaldson suggested that the weekly expenditure should be processed 
when it occurred, and the necessary returns made simultaneously in order that any 
investigation or diagnostic decision be made quickly. Also Donaldson wanted work-in-
progress valuations made weekly, and not monthly, as was the current practice. 
But the Committee was swayed by the argument of Morland, who had made 
an independent assessment of the system used in the Ordnance Factories, compared 
to the system practised in the private armaments industry. Morland was generally 
satisfied with the cost accounting systems at Woolwich in 1907 and appreciated the 
absence of profit considerations due to the different requirements needed in the 
preparation of Parliamentary sections rather than for a company trading, profit and 
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loss account together with a balance sheet (History of the Ministry of Munitions (nd) , 
vol. VIII , ch.l: 17). 
Morland's findings were raised again in January 1919 at the Costs Sub-Com-
mittee of the Committee of Inquiry into Royal Ordnance Factories. Sir Charles 
Harris, in defending the Woolwich system of cost accounts, suggested that the system 
had deteriorated during the First World War when the Ordnance Factories came under 
the overall administrative control of the Ministry of Munitions and not the War Office 
(MUN 4/6375, a point noted earlier in this chapter and which will be more fully 
explored in Chapter 8. 
The official history explaining the Webb Committee's findings some twenty 
years later described the recommended system put forward by Morland: 
" ... with recommending the adoptions of more accurate systems of allo-
cating machinery charges, in common commercial use, by which the 
work done at each machine bears an appropriate charge estimated to 
cover depreciation on that machine, cost of its maintenance and the 
power it consumes." 
But in coming to this recommendation, the Committee appreciated the difficulty of: 
"the omission of charges for interest in obtaining comparisons between 
Ordnance Factory and contract prices, but came to the conclusion that 
such comparisons would not be facilitated, but rather the reverse, 
unless the sums included in factory accounts for interest were calculated 
at a commercial rate of interest on a figure representing the commercial 
value of the factories." (History of the Ministry of Munitions (nd) 
vol. VIII, ch.l: 17) 
The evidence by Morland may have over-emphasised the allocation of charges 
for machinery use, described as in common commercial use. This system was by no 
means universal in 1903. But the problems of commercial valuations of factories had 
been a problem stated previously in the Morley Committee of Inquiry. Donaldson's 
scheme worked well for the Ordnance Factories, and was a scheme widely used in 
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engineering construction. 
However. by the tum of the century. the Ordnance Factories represented 
efficient organisations. which had evolved over the previous fifty years from workshop 
based units to one of factory production. This included reforms. cost and financial 
systems of control, the production process (interchangeability). the introduction of 
forms of scientific management. These reforms surpassed any other system in the 
contemporary private sector. in the United Kingdom. The Ordnance Factories 
provided at least one example in Britain where records of production and records from 
the accounts office were consolidated and costs could be found. Indeed. the Ordnance 
Factories were examples of centralized organizations. and where a comprehensive 
system of standardization and organization of production was in existence. This 
appears to have been unique in Britain at the time. 
Much of this transition and reform had resulted from internal rather than 
external influences, through engineers and civil servants employed by the War Office, 
rather than through entrepreneurs or accountants. This success continued until the 
end of the Second Anglo-Boer War in 1902. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the reasons and origins of costing and DEB within 
the management structure of the government manufacturing departments from 1862. 
In essence this has been an attempt to reinforce the overall argument that the develop-
ment of public sector management, as was apparent from the Ordnance Factories, may 
have reflected a more professional management structure than the contemporary private 
sector. 
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There is no evidence to suggest that these reforms of the nineteenth century 
were removed. These reforms included three interlinking concepts: 
• Costings and DEB. 
• Production process and control (interchangeability) 
• Labour relations and scientific management 
The Ordnance Factories were the catalyst of reforms within the British engineering 
industry generally because of the introduction and acceptance of interchangeability. 
the growing use of scientific management. Also the fact that the Ordnance Factories 
themselves were not ossified in family culture and capitalism. nor were they subject 
to a restrictive craft union dominance must be major considerations why such reforms 
did not penetrate the private sector in the nineteenth century (Payne. 1967; Loft. 
1994: 118; Chandler. 1996). Also. the Ordnance Factories. along with the Admiralty 
shipyards and dockyards. were flexible enough to adapt to changes in technology, both 
with the means of production and with the end product itself. 
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CHAPTERS 
'Uniformity, Simplicity and Solidarity': 
The Origins of interchangeability in the US Armories 
and its relationship with the British 
government manufacturing departments 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to explore the develoment of interchangeability from 
the American federal and private armories and the influence this had with the estab-
lishment of the Royal Small Arms Factory at Enfield from 1858 onwards. 
This chapter leads on from Chapter 2, which assessed the concept of the 
'soldier-technologist', from both the American and British perspectives. Some 
clarification is given to the term' American system of manufacture' which Hounshell 
states was not a phrase used either by the American or British participants of the time 
(Hounshell, 1984, Appendix 1: 333). However, the process of manufacture by 
interchangeability may have had its origins in earlier French enlightened thought. as 
there is evidence to suggest a French system in the late eighteenth century. Again it 
is known that Henry Maudsley. Samuel Bentham and Marc Brunei produced ship 
pulley blocks through an interchangeable production process from 1805. the 'Ports-
mouth system of manufacture' and Brunei senior produced Army footwear by the same 
process from 1812 (Cooper. 1984). These earlier sources are discussed further in this 
chapter. 
The terms • interchangeability' , the American or Portsmouth system of manufac-
ture relate to a mass production process and it is often thought that such systems can 
only exist in a factory-orientated production system. However, there is evidence to 
suggest that mass production can also exist in small-scale units. Examples of this are 
seen in the nineteenth century in the sweated industries of the Victorian economy. 
These trades included many domestic orientated businesses employing mainly women 
and children, and homeworking which was described in Mayhew's mid-nineteenth 
century contemporary research into London life. Indeed. the Royal Labontory. until 
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the mid-nineteenth century, used women outworkers on a large scale in the production 
of cloth cartridges. Again the practice of women outworkers was evident as a major 
means of mass production in the manufacture of military, naval and Post Office 
uniforms in the nineteenth century at the Pimlico-based Royal Army Clothing Depart-
ment Factory. 
Much of the Birmingham gun trade produced small arms in local craft units 
and Behagg referred to mass production in small arms manufacture outside of a factory 
system in England from 1790 to 1815 (1998: 1-15). This system was the major source 
of supply for the British Army and Navy engaged in the French wars during this 
period. However, a process of interchangeability producing repeat, long-run produc-
tion cycles requires more of a factory-orientated production system and semi-skilled 
I unskilled labour as opposed to craft labour. 
The emergence of interchangeability within the American Federal Armories 
from 1830 onwards does not mean that they produced on a factory system. There is 
evidence to suggest that this did not occur until the American Civil War 0861-64). 
Both the Springfield and Harper's Ferry Federal Armories still employed a craft-
orientated workshop culture. though there was a transition of change from the 1830s 
until the American Civil War. Both interchangeability. together with its technology 
as introduced into the Federal Armories. interacted with the craft culture that already 
existed until 1861. This was more prominent at the Harper's Ferry Federal Armory 
than at the Springfield Armory. 
However, the process of interchangeability in the production of small arms 
manufacture requires large-scale. repetitive and continuous production. The compo-
nent parts of an American Mk 1 Springfield rifle-musket and a contemporary Enfield 
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Mkl rifle musket of 1858 interchanged with other rifles of the same pattern. This point 
in relation to the Enfield rifle musket was noted by a railway engineer in 1862. who 
suggested that such a process of manufacture made the craft armourer redundant. 1 
The system of small arms manufacture to equip standing armies is more 
efficient and reaps the benefits of economies of scale. This was an attractive proposi-
tion for both the American and British governments. It was supportive of the prevail-
ing philosophy of economic liberalism. In terms of government armories and factories 
deployed in munitions production. the introduction led to other internal reforms which 
further increased the efficiency of the state-owned factories without any extra expendi-
lure from public funding. 
The method of interchangeable production revisited Britain at the 1851 Great 
Exhibition when American armorers displayed a range of small arms produced by this 
method. This caused some embarrassment to the British establishment as it revealed 
the backward-looking military small arms manufacture. which was represented by an 
anachronistic small-scale craft gun trade. Yet the road to reform still moved slowly. 
Three years after the Great Exhibition. the government of the day established a 
Parliamentary Select Committee in 1855. authorising a Board of Ordnance delegation 
to visit the American federal armories. In the meantime the Crimean War had begun. 
which revealed the inadequacies of British military small arms and artillery in the 
field. compared to the advanced standard of the French armaments. 
The lessons were quickly learnt and. on the recommendations of the Moles-
worth Report together with the failure of British small arms in the Crimea. the Royal 
See J Fernie. 'On the manufacture of duplicate machines and engines'. Minutes of the 
Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers. XXII (session 1862-3): 604-5. See 
also Rosenberg (t 969: 63). 
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Small Anns Factory at Enfield was built, becoming operational in 1858. 
This chapter first explores the origins of interchangeability within the American 
armories. Despite the early influence of interchangeability at the Springfield Armory 
under the superintendency of Roswell Lee, Springfield remained essentially a work-
shop rather than a factory until the American Civil War, a point made previously. 
For example, the use of Blanchard's lathes and interchangeability production methods 
did not totally eliminate craft workers (Cooper, 1991: 116). The workshop definition 
required a craft orientated process whereby the master craftsman controlled the place 
of work. Braverman elaborated this definition by suggesting that: 
"In view of the knowledge to be assimilated, the dexterities to be 
gained and the fact that the craftsman, like the professional. was 
required to master a speciality and become the best judge of the manner 
of its application to specific production problems, the years of appren-
ticeship were generally needed and were employed in a learning process 
that extended well into the journeyman decades." (Braverman, 1998: 
76) 
The transition of a workshop-cum-master-craftsman-controlled environment into a 
factory system arguably reskilled or deskilled the craft orientated labour. More 
significantly, this reduced the craft labour control over specific production processes 
and problem-solving ownership. The deskilling of the traditional journeyman to that 
of machinist was, according to Braverman, "in Taylor's day among the most recent 
and certainly the most important to modem industry" (Braverman, 1998: 76). 
Yet the introduction of the 'American system' into the British government 
manufacturing departments established Enfield and the Royal Gun Factory at Wool-
wich into a factory system in a relatively short period of time. The reason for this 
is that the Crimean War (1854-56) was the first 'industrial war' fought by Britain 
which involved the use of railways, of factory ships and civilians within the sphere 
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of the war. The Springfield Armory only adopted a factory system during the 
American Civil War under the superintendency of Colonel Alexander Dyer. The 
American Civil War was perhaps more devastating than the Crimean War in terms 
of casualties and collateral damage and reflected similarities which were to re-emerge, 
though on a much larger scale, during the First World War. 
The onset of interchangeability in the government manufacturing departments 
established changes within the bureaucracy and management of each factory, which 
included: 
• the change to a factory system almost immediately; 
• the onset of pieceworking; and 
• the establishment of scientific management. 
This transition also altered the way in which the government manufacturing depart-
ments presented their accounts to Parliament. As military and naval procurement was 
supplied in a ratio of 2: 1 by contract, the government manufacturing departments were 
under competitive pressure to be efficient. Changes in management accounting 
systems appeared to establish costings which could be analysed with contract prices. 
The role of the parliamentary accounts and the No.2 balance sheet was crucial to this 
development. 
The focus on the American experience of the Springfield Armory and other 
reforms is important when assessing the managerial reforms of the British Ordnance 
Factories. Thus the first part of this chapter centres on the American system and then 
links in to the transition to the British Ordnance Factories from 1855. 
- 205 -
InterchanKeability • its French oriKins and development in America 
In Chapter 1 it was suggested that the reforms of the Ordnance Factories were 
possibly influenced by the Franco-American reforms from the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries. Indeed, it is very likely that the original concept of 
interchangeability entered a young America during the War of Independence through 
a French influence. However this was not fully utilised until the post-1814 era after 
the disastrous war with Britain (1812-14). From 1815 until the late 1840s the Ameri-
can military always relied on the 'French system' in revising and improving its 
military strategy and technology (Smith, 1987: 44). 
The French influence is prominent in the two possible routes of interchange-
ability into Britain, the major influence being the American system of manufacture, 
though this itself most likely originated from the French. The second is the earlier 
influence of the "Portsmouth system of manufacture" (Cooper. 1984). The manufac-
ture of naval ship pulley blocks by a process of interchangeability at Portsmouth 
Dockyard was undertaken by Samuel Bentham. Henry Maudsley and the French 
emigre Marc Isambard BruneI. However, Bentham may have been influenced in the 
process of mass-produced wooden ship pulley blocks due to his earlier experiences 
in Russia (Cooper, 1984: 193). 
It is worth exploring the origins and operational procedures of the American 
Federal Armory at Springfield. Massachusetts. This is justified as important concepts 
developed from 1830 with the maturing of the US Ordnance Department. which was 
crucial to the development of interchangeability in the British government manufactur-
ing departments. This transition gave the government manufacturing departments a 
major lead for forty years, compared to engineering in the private sector. an issue 
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explored more fully later. 
The development of the US Army Ordnance Department from 1815 and the 
influence within the Springfield Armory was perhaps the genesis of the . American 
system of manufacture' as it evolved in the United States during the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. The US Army Ordnance Department was the nucleus for the 
eventual rise of modem management in America from the years 1827 to 1856. 
Other reforms in the American Army could have influenced later reforms 
within Britain. In particular the reorganisation of the US War Department during the 
1820s may have influenced the post-1855 reforms of the War Department in Britain 
(later to become the War Office). But the direct contact was the Board of Ordnance 
visitation to the American Federal and Private Armories in 1855, given that the 
Portsmouth system of manufacture appeared to exist in isolation. With experiences 
both in America and Britain of a reformed War Department and the Army, it reflected 
that the public sector was perhaps the origins for future business and management 
reforms in the private sector. 
The American experience developed from the effects of war with Britain 
between 1812 and 1814, which reflected previous peacetime inadequate funding, 
neglect and mismanagement. Military administration, including logistical support, was 
fragmented and decentralised. By 1814 the American field army suffered from poor 
logistical support and the inability of field commanders to unite in order to agree a 
general order of battle. The ultimate result was defeat. The American Army high 
command in the field had done nothing to impress the American taxpayer. Later, in 
the nineteenth century the British military system reflected a similar state of affairs, 
particularly during the Crimean War. 
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From 1815, attempts were made to reorganise and restructure the American 
Army. However, many American citizens were opposed to having a standing army, 
arguing that such an army could be a lethal weapon in a tyrant's hands, contrary to 
the rights of free Americans. The wider view perhaps is that the American taxpayer 
was not prepared to finance an army which proved to be so inefficient in the wake 
of the disastrous war with Britain between 1812 and 1814. 
Indeed, the standing British Army survives, even in contemporary society, only 
by an annual Act of Parliament. However, the nineteenth century British taxpayer, 
like his American counterpart, was suspicious about financing a standing army which. 
from 1815 to 1854, was hardly ever engaged in the field for a major expedition, apart 
from the Sikh War in India and a number of colonial skinnishes. By comparison, the 
role of the American Anny was vaguely similar. Until the American Civil War 0861-
64), the role of the American Anny was to garrison an ever-expanding frontier within 
a developing nation and actively engage in a number of minor Indian wars. The only 
war outside the American boundaries was the war with Mexico in the 1840s. 
The US Ordnance Department 
The beginnings of the American military culture began in the late eighteenth 
century when the new nation was nearly drawn into the war with France. This threat 
also awakened the idea of isolationism in America. The American War Department 
wanted to be independent of a reliance on imported annaments and ordnance. however 
the War Department needed a system whereby annaments. ordnance and munitions 
could be internally supplied at short notice. Also. the American military strategy 
required a system whereby ordnance equipment. including artillery and small anns. 
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could be repaired on the battlefield by military annourers, instead of the equipment 
having either to be discarded and replaced, or to be evacuated outside the battlefield 
zone for repair. The United States War Department was "willing to pay the very high 
costs involved because it wanted the upper hand on the battlefield" (Cowan, 1997: 80). 
In 1815 the US Ordnance Department was reconstituted and given powers to 
make contracts and exercise jurisdiction over the production and procurement of all 
anns contracts passed from the Commissary General of Purchases to the Ordnance 
Department. Federal annories were established at Springfield in Massachusetts and 
at Harpers Ferry, Virginia. The Federal Armory at Springfield became: 
" ... the largest and among the most important prototypes of the modem 
factory establishment and its accounting procedures and controls were 
the most sophisticated in use before the early 184Os." (Chandler, 1977: 
Tyson, 1990) 
The aim of the refonned Ordnance Department was to standardise and regulate 
ann aments manufacture. The French influence is perceived through its attachment 
to the idea in part of the 'enlightenment' thought. The idea was to produce more anns 
across Europe so that your weapons systems were standardised. This was deemed to 
be rational because you could allocate budgets more efficiently and repair weapons 
more effectively. 
During the war of 1812, American artillery and small arms had reflected a 
chronic disarray of calibres. The first Chief of Ordnance. Colonel Decius Wadsworth. 
complained in 1813 that "every superintendent selected whatever pattern and intro-
duced whatever alteration his fancy suggested" (quoted in Roe Smith. 1987: 49). 
Wadsworth had worked with French military engineers and artillerists. as well as 
Frenchmen in American service. notably Tousarde and Rochefontaine. Through this 
French influence. Wadsworth became acquainted with French military practice. 
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particularly Gribeauval's uniform system of artillery. On assuming command of the 
Ordnance Department in 1812, Wadsworth's philosophy was "Uniformity. Simplicity 
and Solidarity" (Roe Smith, 1987: 49). Wadsworth's influence was stamped on the 
US Ordnance Department until the American Civil War. As Chief Ordnance Officer. 
Wadsworth was strict. Ordnance officers were required to maintain accurate accounts 
and to enforce meticulous quality control through experiment, testing and inspection. 
Contemporary with the war of 1812-14 and the reforms of the Ordnance 
Department in America was the pioneering work of John H. Hall. Hall was a New 
Englander who began his career as a cabinet maker and shipbuilder in Portland, 
Maine. He became a subcontractor to the Harper's Ferry Armory. Hall considered 
that it was possible to produce a new rifle with interchangeable parts, thus fulfilling 
the War Department's desire. Hall argued that his rifle could be manufactured under 
two complementary methods: the first through specially designed specific-purpose 
machines, and secondly by a series of gauges that could be used to test each part for 
uniformity. There were sixty-three inspection gauges "and an impressive stable of 
machinery" (Smith, 1987: 62-3). Here, "Hall conclusively demonstrated in 1826 that 
his rifles could be made with interchangeable parts, the first of their kind in America" 
(Smith, 1987: 63). 
Hall received a contract from the War Department in 1820 which allowed him 
to establish a separate factory adjacent to the Harper's Ferry Federal Armory. 
Together with Simon North, who was an equally talented anns subcontractor from 
Middletown, Connecticut, another dimension was added to Hall's success. The 
process of interchangeability was proved when North adopted Hall's gauges and 
succeeded in making rifles whose parts exchanged with those produced at Hall's 
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factory at Harper's Ferry. Smith contended that "Hall and North provided tangible 
evidence of what could be accomplished by adopting unifonn practices at two widely 
separated factories" (Smith, 1987: 62-3). 
By 1822 Hall: 
" ... was able to report with considerable glee that he had reached the 
goal that Whitney and others had sought: 'I have succeeded in estab-
lishing methods of fabricating anns exactly alike, and with perfect 
economy, by the hands of common workmen'." (Schwartz Cowan, 
1997: 81, quoting in Roe Smith, 1980: 51) 
The success of Hall's method of manufacturing small anns by a system of 
interchangeability must not be seen in isolation. Contemporary with the success of 
Hall's system was the equal success of Thomas Blanchard's lathe design of 1819. 
Blanchard's lathe design solved two previous problems which otherwise prevented any 
process of interchangeability. particularly related to small anns production. The first 
problem resolved in this way was the development of a lathe to cut the material. and 
secondly to vary the relative position of the workpiece in order to cut away enough 
material in the right places to make the irregular object. Blanchard's invention created 
"an altogether new capability for the lathe, the ability to make a highly irregular three-
dimensional object such as a gun stock ... " (Cooper, 1991: 81). 
The development of the US Ordnance Department after the failure of the 
American field anny in the 1812-14 war with Britain. together with the developments 
by Hall. were undertaken in a reactionary period of American history. as previously 
stated. The period in question during the 1820s is known as the antebellum period. 
"as the political programme put forward by Henry Clay in his 1824 tariff speech 
before the United States House of Representatives. Clay sought political measures 
to maintain and promote American industry and to eliminate foreign competition" 
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(Hounshell, 1984: 15). 
The antebellum period was contemporary with the developments in American 
technology, when the American system denoted: 
"an entirely different phenomenon ... the American system ... as 
defined by Eugene S. Ferguson, means manufacturing involving 'the 
sequential series of operations carried out on successive special-purpose 
machines that produce interchangeable parts' ." (Hounshell, 1984: 15) 
As observed by Hall, the labour process in production through interchangeability does 
not need a craft orientated skill, indeed it could be argued that interchangeability could 
have resulted in the 'deskilling' of labour. This was an argument with the develop-
ment later in the nineteenth century of scientific management, in what Bravennan 
called lithe dissociation of the labor process from the skills of workers" (1998: 78). 
However, a similar phenomenon occurred earlier in Britain with the experience 
of the Portsmouth production line. Part of Samuel Bentham's plans to enact the 
system of interchangeable production lines of ship blocks necessitated restructuring 
the working patterns and designs, whereby machine operating tasks could "cut across 
old craft boundaries instead of falling in with them" (Cooper, 1984: 222). Cooper 
argued that the "machine operation was likely to escape organised worker resistance", 
even if it did not thereby escape a generalised negative worker attitude. For example, 
Bentham deliberately reorganised the work in the metal mill and wood mill at Ports-
mouth Dockyard and did away with the traditional apprenticeships, not only in order 
to hire boys more cheaply to do the work of men, but also to diminish worker 
resistance to future innovations and rationalisation of a procedure (Cooper, 1984: 222). 
The antebellum period in American history witnessed the reforms of the US 
War Department under Secretary John C. Calhoun and the reconstitution of the West 
Point Military Academy in 1819 under the superintendency of Sylvanus Thayer. 
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In 1817 John C. Calhoun became Secretary of War, a post he held until 1825. 
Like the British taxpayer, the American citizen wanted "more bang for his buck". 
With this in mind, and perhaps using the model of the Ordnance Department, Calhoun 
reformed and restructured the American War Department so that it extended and 
strengthened the military staff system. Previously, seven separate departments had 
administered the American Army on a role culture model (Handy, 1993: 185) with 
no overall objectives other than departmental objectives. A similar structure prevailed 
in Britain prior to the reconstitution of the War Office in 1855. The restructured 
American War Department included seven functional divisions which were in constant 
communication with each other. 
A Corps of Engineers was also formed. Its role was to provide technical, 
administrative and logistical support to the US Army and to society generally. The 
Corps of Engineers was instrumental in constructing the ever-expanding American 
civilian railroad system. 
The model of reform adopted by the US Army Ordnance Department, especial-
ly concerning the federal armories at Springfield and Harpers Ferry may have trans-
ferred to the private arms manufacturers, particularly Colt and Remington. Both 
companies competed with the federal armories for procurement of small arms to the 
American military. 
Calhoun's managerial philosophy stressed the need for a centralised authority. 
strict personal and financial accountability and a functional yet elaborate administrative 
hierarchy. This type of bureaucracy would enable control and standardisation to be 
met where operational divisions and units were scattered along a vast geographical 
frontier. It would not allow local variation but would admit Congress to be provided 
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regularly with detailed costs and financial estimates and give the American taxpayer 
"bang for his buck". So Calhoun instructed Brigadier General Winfield Scott to draft 
a set of regulations which appeared as a first form in July 1821. The General Regula-
tions for the Army became the 'arch stone' of Calhoun's military bureaucracy. This 
also became the model for the American private sector management. 
Much of these reforms, though contributing to a more efficient Army and War 
Department, were also an instrument of social control. The Corps of Engineer 
Regulations became the model for the Baltimore and Ohio Railway rule book in 1828 
(O'Connell, 1987: 100) although this has been challenged by Hoskin and Macve 
(1997). 
The American system of manufacture· the West Point and the Sprin&field 
Armory connection 
The revolution at the Springfield Federal Armory occurred under the 
superintendency of Roswell Lee from 1815 to 1833. Lee, a military officer, made 
Springfield "a credit to the government and an ornament to the nation" (Roe Smith, 
1987: 54). Lee's major objective was uniformity. 
However, unlike Springfield, Harper's Ferry Armory was under a civilian 
superintendent, James Stubblefield. Lee organised the Springfield Armory under two 
criteria, summed up by Chandler as follows: 
• careful identification and inspection of each piece made via a worker's mark, 
approved by an inspector's counter mark placed on every piece approved; 
• the meticulous double entry book-keeping for every transaction in the enter-
prise (Chandler, 1977: 73-74). 
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Lee also introduced innovations for worker control and discipline. These were not 
unique to Lee or the Springfield Armory but were similar to those innovations used 
in textile industries. in schools and in the penitentiaries. 
However. unlike the latter institutions. the accounting method incorporated into 
the whole of the management structure of the Springfield Armory. including produc-
tion. stock and labour control. In essence the structure was the incarnation of the 
power-knowledge concept and "the new power of writing" (Foucault. 1977: 185). 
This structure as manifest in the Springfield Armory under the superintendency of 
Roswell Lee. had been inherited from the earlier West Point Thayer reforms of 1819. 
Ordnance Department officers and former West Point graduates such as Daniel Tyler 
being the vehicle of the Thayer reforms into the Springfield Armory. 
The Springfield Armory reforms were probably more advanced than other 
American public sector institutions. including board schools and penitentiaries because 
of the suspicion of the standing United States Army during the post-1814 era. Smith 
suggested that: 
"Because every government agency stood accountable to Congress for 
funds received and expended. the department introduced sophisticated 
book-keeping methods at a very early date ... all officers in charge of 
federal arsenals and armories were required by regulations to submit 
quarterly returns detailing the work performed at their respective posts. 
Based on standard double-entry book-keeping these returns included 
abstracts and receipts of expenditures for buildings. raw materials and 
plant equipment. as well as detailed inventories of work performed and 
property on hand at the end of each period. The inventories identified 
and tabulated the types of arms manufactured or repaired and listed 
components still in progress and the amount of stock - coal. iron. oil 
and the like - remaining. In addition. the reporting officer transmitted 
monthly payroll accounts that recorded the name of each armorer. the 
type of work he performed. and the piece rate for each task. and his 
total wages. At the end of the fiscal year. the superintendent submitted 
an annual report that summarised the quarterly returns. tallied produc-
tion and previewed plans for the coming year. After review by the 
chief of ordnance and his staff. these records were sent to the Treasury 
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Department for final auditing and approval." (1987: 57-58) 
Unlike Springfield, Harper's Ferry Armory suffered "anti-disciplinary forces 
of the pre-modem culture". Here the master armourers ran their own shop. There 
were no work rules, absenteeism was rife and drink was available on the premises. 
For example, between 1816 and 1819: 
"attempts to introduce work rules during the 1820s generally went 
unheeded. 'Workmen came and went at any hour they pleased', one 
officer recalled, 'the machinery being in operation whether there were 
50 or 10 at work'. Along with these practices, armorers claimed the 
privileges of keeping frequent holidays, transferring jobs at will, 
drinking whiskey on the premises and selling their tools 'as a sort of 
a fee simple inheritance'." (Smith, 1987: 81) 
The efforts of the US Ordnance Department to impress the need for uniformity 
on the superintendents of the Springfield and Harper's Ferry armories was not well 
received at Harper's Ferry. The craft-orientated armorers of Harper's Ferry "resented 
the intrusion of ordnance officers and often balked at their insistent demands for 
innovation and change" (Smith, 1987: 56). By the early 1840s the situation at 
Harper's Ferry had not improved. 
In some way, this description of the Harper's Ferry Armory was similar to the 
workshop culture in the private sector British engineering industry during most of the 
nineteenth century. There is no evidence to suggest that either absenteeism or drinking 
on the premises was a problem within the British Ordnance Factories. However, part 
of the reason for the introduction of the eight-hour day in government departments 
in 1893 was to reschedule the day shift structure in order to eradicate the breakfast 
hour at the Royal Arsenal Woolwich. Some workers would frequent public houses 
during the breakfast hour, between 8.00 and 9.00 a.m. As a short-term measure Lee 
was seconded to Harper's Ferry. By 1841, however, the War Department decided 
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that the superintendents of all federal annories would come from the military. This 
is examined later. 
Despite Lee's reforms, Hoskin and Maeve (1988) argued that it still reflected 
a pre-modem system of production and control. The reforming zeal came later, which 
pushed Springfield into industrial capitalism. The man who influenced this was one 
of Theyer's West Point graduates, Daniel Tyler. 
Tyler had come first in his class at West Point. Fluent in French, he was sent 
to the French Artillery School at Metz in 1828 and translated the French Artillery 
Manual for use in the US Army. Returning to America, Tyler was appointed to the 
Ordnance Corps in 1830 and given the newly created position of Chief Inspector of 
Contract Arms. From Tyler's influence, the Chief Ordnance Officer, Colonel 
Bamford (also a West Point graduate) could report to Congress in 1845 that the type 
1841 model percussion rifle and the model 1842 percussion musket were interchange-
able and could be made in large numbers anywhere. whether at the national armories 
or with private contractors. 
Original French military textbooks were used at West Point (Hoskin and 
Maeve, 1988). The US Ordnance Department and Corps of Engineers were closely 
modelled on the French Corps of Artillerists and Engineers. Many West Point 
graduates under Theyer's reforms were commissioned into the Ordnance Department 
or the Corps of Engineers. These Corps appeared to be the elite of the American 
military system and took the best of the cadets graduating from West Point. Thus 
many West Point graduates in the Ordnance Department or the Corps of Engineers 
eventually found positions in the federal armories or were seconded to the railroad 
companies. 
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The development of the Sprinafield Rlne-musket Mark 1 by mass production 
In 1846, America was involved in a war with Mexico. This may have been 
the last major war which was fought with smoothbore muskets. From 1846 onwards, 
experiments were conducted to produce a standardised musket-rifle which had been 
developed into a Mark 1 production model by 1861. This was the Springfield rifle-
musket, .58 calibre. The Mark 1 Springfield was designed to be produced by inter-
changeability and comprised of three component parts: (a) lock with percussion cap 
and hammer; (b) stock; and (c) barrel, which was rifled. The Springfield rifle-
musket was a well-balanced weapon with a rifled barrel which fired a small conical-
shaped bullet (the French modelled Minie bullet) smaller than the barrel. The bullet 
was hollow at the rear with two grooves. This fitted into the rifling of the barrel so 
that it spun on discharge from the breech. This extended the range and accuracy of 
the Springfield. The rifle-musket also had sights, a component absent from the 
smoothbore musket. One aimed a Springfield rifle but only pointed a smoothbore 
musket. 
The development of the Mark 1 Springfield rifle coincided with the American 
Civil War of 1861-64. Until then, the Springfield Armory, despite its reforms, was 
a pre-industrial workshop. So too were the government manufacturing department 
workshops until the Crimean War of 1854-56. Both wars were fought on a 'modem' 
scale, where victory depended on high industrial logistical support. A railway network 
was established between Balaclava and Sevastapol. In both wars, but particularly the 
American Civil War, civilian targets were considered legitimate, causing many 
unnecessary casualties amongst non-combatants, a point previously mentioned in the 
introduction to this chapter. 
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The Springfield Federal Armory became the arsenal for the Union Army. 
Colonel Alexander Dyer was appointed as superintendent of the Springfield Armory. 
On appointment, Dyer industrialised the shift system by introducing two lQl,'2-hour 
shifts instead of one. Production rates increased enormously as quantity exceeded 
quality. 
The Federal Armory at Harper's Ferry Armory fell into confederate hands 
early on in the American Civil War, which resulted in the expansion of the workforce 
at the Springfield Armory. Cooper argues that "for the first time there was a scale 
of operation commensurate with Fitche's [earlier] assumption, that is [production] of 
over 100 gunstocks a day" (Cooper, 1991: 116). Prior to the Civil War the number 
of workers 
" ... engaged in gunstocking had shrunk from its pre-Blanchard tally of 
35 to only 15 by July 1853, but had ballooned to 180 in 1864, a more 
than tenfold increase. But the Armory was producing sixteen times as 
many guns as in 1853, so the pre-worker productivity had gone up at 
a rough estimate from almost four a day in 1853 to over five gunstocks 
a day in 1864." (Cooper, 1991: 116) 
However, despite the introduction of the • American system of manufacture' 
in the Federal Armories, a craft-orientated mentality existed at Harper's Ferry well 
into the 1840s. Also. although both Armories employed interchangeability production 
methods. this did not eliminate all the craft-orientated tasks. Cooper suggests that: 
"Over half of the gunstockers in 1853, and at least three-fifths of them 
in 1864 were doing handwork. so the machines, even in the second 
generation. had clearly not eliminated handworkers. But over the 
decades since 1820 the two generations of gunstocking machines, 
together with the division of labor and other kinds of production 
rationalisation has made possible this immense expansion of scale in 
a wartime emergency. " (Cooper, 1991: 116) 
Indeed, during the Civil War under the influence of Dyer, the Springfield 
Armory quickly adapted to reaching production demands needed in a modem war of 
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attrition. Prior to 1861, the Springfield Annory produced some 20,000 muskets a 
year, about 1,500 a month. During the peak of production at Springfield between 
1863 and 1864 some 25,000 rifles were being produced per month. The supply of 
the Springfield rifle-musket to the Union Anny was almost limitless. The range of 
the Springfield rifle-musket was longer and its accuracy and volley firepower over a 
longer range was more precise than the smoothbore muskets deployed by the Confed-
erate Anny. This deadly mismatch was seen at its most effective at the Battle of 
Gettysberg. In fact, the Springfield rifle-musket was a major factor in detennining 
the outcome of the American Civil War. 
The experiences of the Springfield Federal Annory under Colonel Dyer's 
command during the American Civil War transfonned anns manufacture in America 
into a factory system. This was perhaps the nucleus for the notion of the Arsenal of 
Democracy which became apparent nearly a century later at Detroit during the Second 
World War. 
However, mention has been made earlier in this thesis of the Ponsmouth 
system of manufacture. This was pioneered by Samuel Bentham, Henry Maudsley 
and Marc Isambard Brunei who, in 1805, began the manufacture of ship pulleys and 
blocks through interchangeable production methods at Ponsmouth Naval Dockyard. 
Samuel Bentham (1757-1831) was the brother of the utilitarian philosopher Jeremy 
Bentham (1748-1832), indeed Jeremy Bentham may have been influenced by the 
concept of panoptican philosophy from his brother Samuel. This concept became the 
cornerstone within the philosophy of the laissez-faire economic liberalism of the 
nineteenth century. In its practical application, the panoptican concept related to penal 
and workhouse architecture and to factory design. In terms of interchangeability and 
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production, the panoptiean ideology related well to the deskilling of labour (Braver-
man, 1998: 110). Even the transformation of the accounting systems, including those 
at the Ordnance Factories, may have been influenced by the panoptican ideology. 
According to Hoskin and Macve, this was also apparent in Thayer's reforms of West 
Point Military Academy from 1819 where "it was specifically a grammatocentric form 
of panopticism, whose modus operandi was constant writing, grading and examination" 
(1994: 82). Again in terms of accounting functions and systems, Hoskin and Maeve 
suggest that accounting: 
" ... has become one particularly privileged way of measuring and 
restructuring man as the 'calculable person' ... it has also come to play 
a strategic role in the development of a new, grammatocentric kind of 
'managing by the numbers', exemplified in the emergence of what 
Alfred Chandler (1977) has called the 'modem business enterprise' . " 
From 1780 to 1791 visited Russia where he was employed on Prince 
Potemkin's vast estates near Smolensk. Here, Bentham devised woodworking machin-
ery including a planing machine which was sufficiently easy to operate that it could 
be used by unskilled peasants. In 1787, Bentham designed circular buildings in which 
to install and operate his woodcutting and planing machinery. These buildings were 
designed as a panoptical model with the supervisor's office located at the core of the 
building, directly overlooking the work in progress (Cooper, 1984: 193). This design 
is very similar to Jeremy Bentham's design for a panoptican penitentiary in London, 
which became manifest at Pentonville Prison as the new model penitentiary from 1835 
(Pentonville Prison is still an operational establishment). The establishment of a 
panoptican concept as it permeated into the emerging factory system, including the 
Ordnance Factories, with overseers, inspection. time measurement and payment by 
results. ultimately led to a management system which could be measured with 
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notionally similar applications to science. Thus emerged the creation of what became 
known as scientific management (Bravennan, 1998: 59). 
The influence of Samuel Bentham's experiences in Russia was noticeable in 
the Portsmouth production line which, when installed: 
"was capable of producing about 700 small blocks, 570 medium blocks 
or about 240 large blocks, or a total of about 1,420 daily. Taken 
together the three sets of machines were versatile enough to make thick-
sheaved blocks of about seventy-two standard sizes ... thin sheaved 
blocks in forty-eight sizes plus ... up to more than 200 'sorts and sizes' 
in all." (Cooper, 1984: 206) 
The Portsmouth system of manufacture, however, from its inception in 1805, remained 
for the most part an intellectual curiosity until the arrival of the Greal Exhibition. 
The Molesworth Committee and the Board of Ordnance Commission's visitation 
to the US federal and private armories 
The Great Exhibition of 1851 revealed exhibits of American produced small 
anns with interchangeable parts. The Board of Ordnance was faced with the poor 
technological state of British anns manufacture and the chaotic state of the Binning-
ham gun trade, which supplied much of the Anny's requirements in small anns. Thus 
a Pari iamentary Commission headed by Joseph Whitworth went to America to examine 
the federal and private annories which manufactured these high technological small 
anns. 
This was the nucleus of the Parliamentary Select Committee on the manufacture 
of small anns established in 1854. The Committee. according to Behagg. "focused 
upon the archaic nature of the Binningham gun trade. By comparison with its 
American cousin it was apparently hidebound by craft practices and under-capitalised 
as a result" (1998: 3). 
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The Select Committee chaired by Sir William Molesworth initially authorised 
officials of the Board of Ordnance to inspect private sector institutions. For example, 
the War Office Register of Letters no.1568 of Saturday 26 February 1853 records that: 
"The Inspector of Artillery authorised to direct Mr. Anderson and 
Lieutenant Warlow (RA) to visit certain manufactories in the North of 
England, for the attention of Mr. Payne". (WO 47/2746) 
Later, on 7 October 1853, the Inspector of Machinery at the Royal Arsenal, 
Mr. John Anderson, was sent to the original Royal Small Anns establishment at 
Enfield, in order to inspect the manufacture of bayonets by machinery. Anderson duly 
reported to the Board of Ordnance and recommended the erection of a further govern-
ment factory on the same site as the existing Royal Arsenal which, once 
production was commenced, would deliver 500 muskets a day. Anderson recom-
mended the Woolwich site as there was already a reserve of skilled labour within the 
surrounding area. 
However, there was considerable opposition to Anderson's recommendation 
of a proposed new small anns factory within the Arsenal site at Woolwich. The 
government of the day set up a parliamentary select committee under the chair of Sir 
William Molesworth to examine Anderson's report and recommendations, the tenns 
of reference being to enquire of "the cheapest, most expeditious and most efficient 
manner of providing small anns for Her Majesty's Government" (Hogg, 1963, vol. II. 
Appendix IV, p.l 073). 
There were fourteen members on the Molesworth Committee including James 
Monsell, clerk to the Board of Ordnance, who acted as secretary to the Committee. 
Monsell himself chaired two later select committees into the government manufacturing 
departments during the early 1860s. 
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Witnesses giving evidence to the Molesworth Committee included private arms 
manufacturers, in particular Naysmith and Whitworth, and Colonel Samuel Colt of 
the American Pistol Factory. Anderson, who was at this time chief inspector of 
machinery at the Royal Arsenal, also gave evidence to the Molesworth Committee. 
Molesworth's eventual report consisted of some 570 pages, in two volumes. 
The normal method of small arms manufacture for muskets in bulk for use by 
the Army, the Admiralty and the Honourable East India Company, was to purchase 
by open contract all the separate components of the weapon. After passing a quality 
examination, the component parts were then placed into store. Issues were then made 
both to the factory at Enfield Lock and, to a greater degree, to private contractors. 
Both the government factory at Enfield Lock and the private contractors were no more 
than assembly lines of component parts. The assembled and finished weapon was 
finally inspected by a government inspector and either accepted or rejected. The 
rejection rate was high, due to the varying methods of production processes from the 
contracting firms. There were also differing practices of assembly and working 
arrangements at the government factories at Enfield and Birmingham. Thus the high 
rejection rate was due to inefficient production and assembly processes. By 1855 this 
was causing a major concern to both the Army and to Parliament. Britain was 
engaged in the Crimean War, which reflected the inefficiencies of small arms perform-
ance under field conditions. The government of the day was also under considerable 
pressure to economise on the expenditure of public monies from a vexed Victorian 
taxpayer. Evidence from a senior inspector's report on the increasing rejection rate 
of musket barrels was presented to the 1854 Select Committee on Small Anns: 
" Another and very potent element of difference arises out of the system 
under which the manufacture is carried out at two places (i.e. Enfield 
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and Binningham). At Enfield no workman is admitted unless he be of 
first class in his trade, and of sober, moral and regular habits. He has 
the assistance of the best machinery and works under the immediate eye 
of the viewer, who corrects any error of work as they arise. He has 
a comfortable home and receives his wages in full at a certain hour 
every week. 
Whereas at Birmingham the first and ruling question is price; the man 
who will work at the lowest rate is entrusted with it, without much care 
as to capability or character, there is little or no tie between him and 
his master; he is mulcted for the millpower that he uses and for tools, 
and he receives his wages often very irregularly. The consequence is, 
that his workmanship is inferior, and the men resort to all sorts of 
shifts and tricks to evade the viewer's eye. The master complains of 
the injustice of the inspection, when it is his own fault for employing 
inferior workmen and screwing them down in price." (quoted by 
Hogg, vol. II, Appendix IV, p.1074) 
The government factory at Binningham reflected the contemporary small craft 
Binningham gun trade generally. The system was accepted by mid-Victorian society 
as it equated to Victorian capitalism generally of small family structure and the 
consumer preference for craft-produced artefacts, as previously described by Payne 
(1967). The Binningham gun trade produced utilitarian small arms, mainly for the 
military, whereas the London gun trade supplied more aesthetic small arms which were 
individually made for the sporting and field market. 
There is evidence to suggest that the Birmingham gun trade generally was 
affected by a small workshop mentality, restrictive practices and by the craft myth. 
These are themes which will be returned to later. One engineering witness in evidence 
to the Molesworth Committee asked: "Why are the manufacturers of Birmingham so 
much at the mercy of their men; if they have the quality of machinery that I think 
is acceptable to gun making they oUght to be quite independent of those men and not 
knuckling down to them as they are" (report from the Select Committee on the 
Manufacture of Small Arms, PP 1854. xviii. 12, cf. 1662; 8ehagg. 1998: 3). 
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Colonel Chalmer and Lt Col Tulloch in a statement to the Molesworth Commit-
tee reviewed the existing state of small arms manufacture in the UK. Both officers 
demonstrated the impossibility of exercising proper governmental control as to price 
and quality. Their report painted a picture almost from the contemporary Hard Times 
by Dickens. of underpaid men working with ill-equipped machinery in wretched 
garrets and dark cellars. under which conditions standards of workmanship and 
accuracy were bound to suffer. Both Chalmer and Tulloch argued for reform with 
an up to date government factory sufficiently large to cope with the quality and 
quantity of arms required. 
At the commencement of the Napoleonic War in 1802. the scarcity of arms 
was so great and the need for arms so urgent that the government had recourse to 
foreign markets and bought up all the weapons that could be obtained. These were 
poor in quality. heavy in pattern and cumbersome. Only a relatively few were 
obtained. 
During the immediate post-1815 period. the manufacture of small arms for the 
government ceased and many workers deployed at Enfield were laid off. Only a small 
nucleus remained at Enfield to manufacture small arms ammunition for a much 
reduced Army and Navy. 
By 1840 an attempt was made to produce weapons sufficient in quality and 
numbers to equip the Army. Great difficulties were experienced in obtaining the 
requisite skilled labour force. This state of affairs was still apparent at the outset of 
the Crimean War. 
So. on 12 May 1854, the Molesworth Committee recommended that the 
existing system of contracting for the supply of small arms should be discontinued. 
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It considered, however, that the Board of Ordnance should undertake the manufacture 
to a limited extent. This amounted to the production of small arms at a government 
factory to supply two thirds of the total demand. Such a factory would serve as an 
experimental plant whereby the advantages of government manufacture could be 
observed. The new factory would be a laboratory for all anns manufacture in Britain. 
Also, a government small arms factory would act as a check upon contractors' prices 
as well as a nucleus for any increase in times of national emergency. 
However, the Board of Ordnance were a little apprehensive of Molesworth's 
recommendations. In 1855, despite the ongoing war with Russia, there were delays 
in production of small anns from the private contractors. Strikes were common in 
the private annories, both in London and Binningham. There were also allegations 
of profiteering. The Board of Ordnance, in an attempt to circumvent industrial action 
in the private sector, took control of all small anns manufacture until the cessation 
of hostilities. The Enfield factory was expanded to meet the increased demand and 
the government of the day increased the factory's budget to £150,000 to cover the 
costs of additional resources. 
Prior to the Board of Ordnance Commission visit to the American federal and 
private annories, John Anderson, Captain Dixon (Royal Artillery) and Mr. James 
Gunner (Chief Inspector of Small Arms at Enfield) were granted permission to visit 
manufacturers at Manchester and Leeds to inspect machinery for the manufacture of 
bayonets and locks for muskets (WO 42/2752. no.861. 13 March 1855). 
On the advice of Mr. (later Sir) Joseph Whitworth. a mission consisting of Lt 
Col Bum, Major Tubeville and Captain Warlow. all of the Royal Artillery, Messrs. 
Anderson and Whitworth were sent to the United States to collect information about 
- 227 -
small anns manufacture, from the American federal and private annories. Captain 
Warlow was also empowered by the government to purchase machinery in America, 
in particular for instruments "for taking the specific gravity of metals and some hand 
tools for the manufacture of metal tubes" (WO 42/2752 p,455, 5 February 1855). 
Cooper comments that "the Blanchard's lathe was especially prized among the British 
for their new Annory at Enfield" (Cooper, 1991: 120). 
The National Annory at Springfield played a major role in the initiation and 
co-ordination of interchangeable parts. Springfield attempted to co-ordinate its 
operations with those at the National Annory at Harper's Ferry. However, the US 
Ordnance Department also contracted with private annories. Through this contracting 
system and by specifying interchangeability within the tenders of contract awarded to 
private annories, this gave access of technological knowledge as used in the national 
annories to the private anns manufacturers. In particular, the US Ordnance Depart-
ment contributed significantly to the growing sophistication of metalworking and 
woodworking in the United States by the 1850s (Hounshell. 1984: 62). 
The Board of Ordnance visit to the United States had gone to discover every-
thing about small anns production and the Commission were also authorised to 
purchase American anns making machinery. beginning with Warlow's remit, as 
already stated, but which increased as the fact-finding mission began to be more 
suitably impressed. 
Hounshell (1984: 62) argues, however, that Anderson in particular was not 
necessarily aware that unit costs at the Springfield Annory with interchangeable parts 
in small anns manufacture was larger than those small anns produced under more 
traditional methods. However, Anderson was probably aware that the US Ordnance 
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Department could produce annually only a relatively small number of Springfield 
rifles, manufactured with interchangeable parts. Perhaps Springfield and 
interchangeability leading to low unit costs came about during the American Civil 
War, with maximum output. a point discussed previously. 
Despite the apparently high costs and limited output. Anderson remained 
optimistic. Through his observations of the American annories, Anderson suggested 
that the process of interchangeability could be adopted almost universally within British 
metal and woodworking establishments. 
Hounshell states that "the idea of interchangeable fireanns captivated the British 
Board of Ordnance and many members of the select committee much in the same way 
it had the United States Ordnance Department in the 1800s" (1984: 62). Hounshell 
also stated that Anderson. in: 
"learning the whole of the American system at Springfield, was aware 
of the fundamental importance of 'hundreds of valuable instruments 
Gigs and fixtures)' and gauges that are employed in testing the work 
through all its stages. from the raw material to the finished gun." 
(Hounshell, 1984: 62) 
However, Anderson was aware that" American manufacturers would become exporters 
to England ... [This] came to pass in the second half of the nineteenth century" 
(Hounshell. 1984: 62). 
The concept of interchangeability involves a quite different production process 
from that apparent with British anns manufacturers. Indeed. the principal contract 
anns manufacturers for the Anny were mainly located in London and Binningham. 
Although there were significant variations between one contractor and another. the 
production process was undertaken in a workshop rather than a factory environment. 
with skilled craft labour. This traditional process was very decentra1ised and reflected 
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the use of agents as middle-men, sub-contracting and employed craft labour, with the 
attendant restrictive practices and demarcations. Cole suggested that: 
"In most branches of the British engineering and kindred industries, ... 
the position ... is essentially different. Piecework and other forms of 
payment by results have not been introduced into these industries. 
Moreover, there is not, in the great mass of British engineering oper-
ations, any standardisation at all approaching that which exists in the 
textile industries. The work done is still largely of a jobbing character, 
or, even if processes are repeated. for skilled men at least the 'runs' 
are, as a rule, comparatively short. Consequently, new piecework 
prices and basis times have constantly to be arranged for fresh oper-
ations, while the fact that the machinery also is by no means 
standardised means that the price for the job has not infrequently to be 
modified in accordance with the character and equipment of the 
machine-tool on which it is to be done." (Cole, 1922: 13) 
However. the craft orientated nature of British engineering and allied industries 
may only be reflecting local consumer demand. Payne, in a comparison between the 
emergence of the large-scale company in Great Britain between 1870 and 1914, 
suggested that the British preference for craft orientated products "of British consumers 
for articles exhibiting 'craftsmanship' and individual character" was one of the major 
causes of restrictions to diversify and enlarge (Payne, 1967: 524) but the contemporary 
American national market reflected an opposite character, where there was a "willing-
ness to accept a mass-produced standardised product" (Payne, 1967: 524). This is 
a major reason why interchangeability was an attractive method to be employed in 
America rather than Britain. Interchangeability as observed by the Board of Ordnance 
Commission to the American armories reflected a production system evolving into a 
factory system which reflects decrafting of labour and labour flexibility. The complete 
factory system occurred during the American Civil War six years later. 
The Board of Ordnance and in tum the Select Committee had obtained most 
of their information on the American arms manufacturing technology from Colt and 
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from Joseph Whitworth, a noted Manchester machine tool manufacturer. Whitworth 
had toured many American anns factories and the federal annories whilst serving as 
a commissioner to the New York Crystal Palace Exhibition. His 'Special Report' on 
American manufacturers proved to be of major interest to the British. Another 
commissioner, George Wallis, had also seen the Springfield Annory and had written 
a report on his US tour. He too served as an infonnant to the Board of Ordnance. 
Colt, Whitworth and Wallis were among the experts called to testify before the 
committee. Other witnesses included: 
• The machine tool maker James Naysmith. 
• A fonner superintendent at Colt's factory, Gage Stickney. 
• A noted English machine-builder, Richard Prosser. 
• The Board's own technical expert, John Anderson, who was inspector of 
machinery at the Royal Arsenal. 
Anderson was the author of the Board's proposal to establish a small arms plant. 
After a four-month study trip to the USA he was the most ardent advocate of Ameri-
can small anns production technology. Anderson was perhaps the most knowledgeable 
British engineer on the subject. The testimonies of all these men, however, suggest 
the ambiguities of the system adopted in the US annories to produce muskets. 
For the purpose of analysis, the committee's investigations can be classified 
into five categories of questioning: 
1. Whether small arms could be produced by machine. 
2. Whether mechanics and machine tool builders could produce a weapon. 
3. What effect mechanised production would have. 
4. Whether anns made by machine would contain interchangeable parts. A 
- 231 -
corollary question was what was meant by 'interchangeable'! 
5. Whether the Americans had indeed pioneered this approach to production. 
The Ordnance Factories however were a microcosm of the American system 
of manufacture. The process of a factory manufacturing system and interchangeability 
created management progression and reform to include costing, DEB and systems 
similar to scientific management. This was also influenced by the prevailing laissez-
faire economic doctrine of the day. Nevertheless, the Ordnance Factories had to 
compete with the corresponding private sector. In the production of small arms and 
of military and naval guns, the Ordnance Factories were supreme. 
The private sector In Britain and Its attitude to interchanleablIIn In production -
the Birmlnlham lun trade 
The Portsmouth system of manufacture (Cooper, 1984) did not spread in 
Britain despite its success, indeed the system was regarded merely as a novelty within 
British contemporary society. Cooper commented on the "propensity of the British 
working men to be suspicious rather than enthusiastic about labour-saving inventions 
compared to their American counterparts" (Cooper, 1984: 222). She also considered 
that the British class system was a factor: 
"by restricting workers' opportunities in job mobility, education and 
promotion, made them view themselves more often than did workers 
in the 'American system' as potential victims rather than participants 
in the process of mechanisation. The class system thereby acted 
through the social psychology of workers as a drag on attempts to 
rationalise manufacturing methods." (Cooper, 1984: 222) 
Writing in 1927, Allen gives a cursory account of the Board of Ordnance 
v isitation to the Springfield Armory in 1853 and of the decision by the War Office 
to build an establishment at Enfield "where guns might be made on the interchangeable 
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principle" (1927: 187). He suggests that there was not only opposition from the gun 
trade but also from the "active exponents of laissez1aire [who were) aroused by this 
proposal" (1927: 187). 
The civilian gun trade in Britain was a niche market "with a privileged clientele 
who expected a custom-made gun for the sport shooting" (Cooper, 1984: 223). 
Cooper suggested that the ordering of a sporting gun in Britain by the upper classes 
was more akin to ordering a tailor-made suit. The gun was tailor-made to fit the 
owner; the gunsmith as well as the tailor had careful measurement entries of their 
clients made in their books (Cooper, 1984: 223). 
Cooper argued, however, that the consumer preference in Britain for custom-
made and locally manufactured goods discouraged production-line methods of manu-
facture. This argument is also relevant when comparing the structure of business 
organisations in Britain compared to America during the nineteenth century (Payne, 
1967; Chandler, 1996). despite the success of the Portsmouth system from 1805. 
Cooper commented that: 
"A market that was biased towards the upper class militated against 
mass production of clothing even after the coming of the sewing 
machine in the 1850s made it possible. In a related endeavor, the ever-
inventive and ever-optimistic Brunei met disappointment after he went 
into business in 1812 to supply mass-produced footwear for the British 
Army. He had invented a series of machines for making shoes and 
boots, employed crippled war veterans to man the machines. and began 
producing 400 pairs daily. When the war ended sooner than expected 
in 1815, he was left with a large stock of unwanted shoes. That was 
one of the financial blows that eventually put him into a debtor's prison 
in 1821. .. The shift from hand to machine industry in the British shoe 
trade took place ninety years later. Similarly. there was insufficient 
demand for standardised carriages in a country that later produced 
customised Rolls Royces rather than Model T Fords." (Cooper, 1984: 
224) 
The reaction by the Birmingham gun makers was to form an association known 
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as the Birmingham Small Arms Trade. On its formation, the association consisted 
of sixteen firms, originally selected by the Board of Ordnance to supply small arms 
at the outbreak of the Crimean War. The Association agreed to fix the wages of their 
workers and to "determine selling prices" (Allen, 1927: 188). 
In 1861 the Association organised itself into a company and erected a factory 
at Small Heath, Birmingham. According to Allen, the factory was equipped with 
machinery capable of producing interchangeable arms comparable to those at Enfield. 
"Stocking machinery was purchased from Massachusetts and rifling and boring 
machinery from Leeds, and the famous Birmingham Small Arms Company Limited 
was set upon its long career" (Allen, 1927: 188). Allen stressed that "it cannot be 
too strongly emphasised that the Birmingham Small Arms Company was the first of 
the local factories to tum out highly finished complicated metal articles by mass 
production methods" (Allen, 1929: 191). 
The creation of the Birmingham Small Arms Company (BSA) was due to the 
establishment of the Royal Small Arms Factory at Enfield in 1857. Initially. in 1862, 
BSA received a large War Office contract when the Army adopted the Snider breech 
action rifle which could interchange with the standard Army issue Enfield rifle musket. 
BSA were contracted to convert 100.000 Enfield rifle muskets to the Snider breech 
mechanism. The Army decided to convert all its holdings of Enfield muskets to the 
Snider breech mechanism. Also BSA obtained a considerable amount of trade as a 
consequence of the American Civil War and also produced 50.000 Enfield rifle 
muskets for the Turkish Government. The War Office contract was the largest Army 
order BSA received until the second Anglo-Boer War in 1899. 
However, the experiences of the Birmingham Small Arms Company (BSA) 
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were unique to the Birmingham gun trade generally. Allen did not refer to the two 
Enfield satellite rifle factories located at Sparkbrook and Bagot Street, Birmingham 
in his work. 
Despite this, it may have been the influence of the Army Contracts Department 
which slowly began to encourage private arms manufacturers to reorganise their 
production methods on interchangeability methods, and form what was to become BSA 
in order to successfully tender for Army contracts. The Director of Army Contracts, 
Evan Nepean, stated in his annual report of 1882: 
"The Birmingham Small Arms Company is, or was, an amalgamation 
of the old firms that in former days made parts of muskets and rifles 
for us and for the East India Company. 
The company first turned out non-interchangeable arms and 
subsequently at the instigation of the [Army Contracts] Department, set 
up special machines for the production of the interchangeable rifle. 
Further alterations of machinery have been necessitated by the conver-
sion of muzzle-loaders to Sniders, the manufacture of new Sniders and 
two patterns of Martini-Henry rifles. 
Taking the period of duration of an interchangeable rifle at 20 years, 
the calculated annual want to replace wear and tear could not reach 
3,000 arms. 
In a report on this question written in 1878 I showed that the trade had 
no orders for small arms from us from 1817 to 1842. and only then 
because a fire at the Tower of London quickened the introduction of 
a new pattern. Brown Bess. 
The trade is only useful when a new pattern is to be made, at other 
times it is a source of expense to us and reaps no profit for itself." 
(Annual Report of the Director of Army Contracts for 1882. p.27. 
WO/395/t) 
There is evidence to suggest that despite the introduction of interchangeability 
at BSA. the company still subcontracted for component parts. Also. the company still 
had problems in getting craft workers to adjust to the new methods of production. 
A description of the operations in BSA in 1910 clearly suggests that at least some of 
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the firm' s workshops were dominated by the handicraft methods: " . .. workshops 
formerly occupied by benches and vices. are now almost exclusively filled with 
machinery" (Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers. 1919. parts 3-4. 
1324). 
In 1862 before the BSA had acquired its stocking machinery. it was observed 
that "at present the gunmakers of Birmingham had to pay a high price to have their 
gunstocks made by machinery in London. in order to secure greater accuracy and 
finish of workmanship than was obtained in handwork". Such machinery then existed 
at Enfield "and ... nearly a similar set at the London Armoury Company's works in 
London" (Thomas Greenwood. 'On machinery for the manufacture of gunstocks·). 
The firm eventually acquired a complete set of stocking machinery from the Ames 
Manufacturing Company (The Engineer. XVI. 25 December 1863. 375). 
More generally. the specialised American machine tools which were so closely 
associated with interchangeable manufacture achieved only a very gradual acceptance 
in Britain in the private sector generally. In 1867 Anderson deplored the failure of 
British industry to adopt the milling machine. which was not in fact widely adopted 
in England until the bicycle craze of the 1890s (Saul. 1969). The reason for this 
failure by British industry to utilise new technology was due to the ossification of 
British capital structure and the home market preference for craft-orientated goods. 
as explained by Payne (t 967). This was previously referred to in Chapter 1. 
The British experience with the turret lathe. which began to be widely used 
in the USA during the 18505 and 1860s. was also one of slow and grudging accept-
ance. Moreover. even where it was adopted. principles of machine design which were 
taken for granted in the USA were often stoutly resisted. The turret lathe does not 
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seem to have been exhibited at the London Exhibition in 1862. As late as 1902. an 
eminent British engineer found it necessary to reprimand British manufacturers for 
using turret lathes which did not incorporate interchangeability in their construction. 
a feature which was embodied in American turret lathes in the 1850s. 
However slow the introduction of the new techniques may have been. and 
whatever the reasons for the slowness, it is clear that their introduction into British 
industry was directly linked to the importation of American fireanns machinery into 
the Enfield Rifle Factory in 1855. Allen makes this point forcefully with respect to 
the Birmingham area and the experience of BSA and the process of interchangeability: 
"This meant that certain kinds of complex machinery began to appear 
for the first time in large quantities in a Binningham factory, while new 
methods came into existence for the production of standardised parts. 
For instance it now paid to sink dies and stamp out rifle parts which 
previously had been forged by the smith on an anvil. Thus the coming 
of interchangeability in rifle manufacture brought not only the machine 
shop and tool room in their modem fonns, but also the method of hot 
stamping. This process, previously confined to such products as keys 
and edge tools, now began to play a much more important part in 
Birmingham's manufacturing operations." (Allen, 1929: 191) 
There was also a reluctance for the old craft gunsmith to adapt to the new methods 
of production through interchangeable parts at BSA. 
"A number of Darlaston lock and spring filers were engaged by the 
Birmingham Small Anns Company, and a struggle immediately took 
place between them and their foreman, who tried with little success to 
induce them to give up old time methods and prejudices. These men 
still followed the practice of a hundred years previously ... they still 
resorted to fiddle-drilling (Le. bow and breast drilling) when, by going 
a few yards, they could use power machinery. They still used tallow-
dip candles (purchased by themselves) when tempering springs, though 
the company had offered to supply them with best Russian tallow free." 
(Allen, 1929: 189) 
In contrast, the American private small anns market began to manufacture 
under the process of interchangeability. Cooper argues that: 
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"The Whitney Armory, for example, which had started on a govern-
ment contract was able to advertise cheap and standardised guns in a 
brand new civilian market... But even after the Enfield Armory began 
to use the American system of manufactures for making military small 
arms, English manufacturers of lightweight sporting guns continued 
(and continued well into the twentieth century to use their old methods 
of production). " (Cooper, 1984: 227) 
The distinguishing features of the Birmingham gun trade, excluding BSA, were as 
follows. 
1. Smallness of scale. 
2. Dependence on skilled craftsmen. 
3. An extensive division of labour in the production of components and their 
eventual 'setting up'. 
4. Localisation - most of the Birmingham gun trade was located around the 
district around St. Mary's Church. 
These characteristics applied not only to guns but to a considerable extent to most of 
the trades producing finished goods in Birmingham, including the jewellery and other 
retail trades and to the engineering I metal industry in Britain at the time. Allen 
observes that: 
"There has been no 'industrial revolution' in Birmingham and District. 
Its great economic development was marked by a vast increase in the 
number of producing units rather than by a growth in the size of the 
existing few, and the factory still remained unrepresentative of the 
majority of the concerns producing finished goods." (Allen, 1929: 46) 
Of Birmingham itself, it was said in 1856 that nothing was on a large scale and that 
the manufacturing class had not raised itself to any large degree. The concentration 
of capital and the development of large-scale enterprises had not taken place there, 
as in the northern centres of industry, and most master manufacturers, it was declared, 
employed only five or six workers. This was equally true of the Black Country's 
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small metal industries (Allen. 1929: 113). 
At the time of the Crystal Palace Exhibition the gun trade was still the province 
of the skilled craftsman. Mechanical assistance was virtually non-existent except for 
a few instances such as the rolling. boring and grinding of barrels or the rolling. 
grinding and polishing of bayonets and rammers. 
A so-called master gunmaker typically possessed neither factory nor workshop. 
Often. he possessed a warehouse and arranged to acquire components from specialised 
craftsmen who may have worked from home or in more sizeable workshop establish-
ments. The co-ordination of these separate activities in a manner which assured 
continuity of operation was a formidable task and. as might be expected. led to 
interruptions whenever the supply of a particular component was disrupted. 
However. the War Office did assist the Birmingham gun trade, including BSA, 
in time of recession. During the 1880s the Birmingham gun trade was facing a 
depressed market. An extract from the Annual Report of the Director of Army 
Contracts for 1882 stated the following: 
"The military small arms company in Birmingham after a long struggle 
to keep alive in the absence of orders, are going into liquidation." 
(Annual Report, 1882: 27; WO/39111) 
The following year (1883) the Director of Army Contracts was directed to place orders 
for 3.900 rifles with the Birmingham 'trade' which would otherwise have gone to 
Enfield (Annual Report, 1883: 17; WO/39111). But the Director of Army Contracts. 
no doubt on the advice of his political masters, would divert orders from the Ordnance 
Factories and place them under contract when the private sector was facing recession. 
Most English manufacturers did not wish to adopt the American practice that 
Anderson, Colt, Naysmith and others had declared to be universally acceptable. But 
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neither did all manufacturers in the United States. Indeed, when Anderson toured 
Derringer's pistol factory in Philadelphia, he was "astonished" to find that traditional 
hand methods were still in use (Rosenberg (ed), 1969: 193; Hounshell, 1984: 64). 
However, this was also true of English pistol manufacturers. In his Annual Report 
for 1887, the Director of Army Contracts reported that: 
"There are but few pistol makers on the interchangeability principle in 
England. Mr. Kynoch MP owns Trantor's Factory Birmingham, but 
is unable to compete, being in Parliament, and Mr. Locke of Adams 
(London) Workshop does not tum out good work. Practically Webley 
of Birmingham has all the first class private trade." (Annual Report, 
1887: IS, WO/395/1)2 
The last decade of the nineteenth century witnessed acrimonious labour disputes 
in the private engineering industry, particularly on the issue of the eight-hour day. 
With the formation of the Engineering Employers' Federation, the disputes became 
even more gridlocked as the Federation and the Amalgamated Society of Engineers 
were loggerheaded into a strike and lockout for seven months in 1898. Much of this 
dispute was more than the argument for an eight-hour day, it was more to do with the 
Employers' Federation's attempt to introduce interchangeability and dec raft workshop 
skills, ritual and demarcation through piece working. Previously, in 1894 an eight-
hour day had been introduced into the Ordnance Factories. This topic is explored later 
in Chapter 7. 
2 George Kynoch 1834-1891 (DBB) vols 2-3 pp.630-2. Described as an ammunition 
manufacturer. No reference is given in DBB that Kynoch produced small arms. The 
Times obituary notice describes Kynoch as a gun manufacturer (2 March 1891). 
Conservative Unionist MP for Aston, Birmingham. Owned the Whitton ammunition 
factory in Birmingham, the second largest of its day, employing some 800 people with 
the capacity to produce 400,000 cartridges. Kynoch was no supporter of the divorce 
of ownership from control being dismissed after the flotation of his organisation. 
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, Armory practice': the dissemination of mass production into the private sector· 
the American and British experience 
The transition of the Springfield Armory into a factory system probably 
occurred during the American Civil War (1861-64). However, the Board of Ordnance 
Commission to America was influential in the establishment of the Enfield Rifle 
Factory on a factory system and production under the process of interchangeability. 
The fundamental difference between the American experience and the British experi-
ence can be seen in the transition of interchangeability into the private sector. This 
developed into the manufacture of a variety of civilian artefacts ranging from sewing 
machines, McCormick reapers, bicycles and eventually automobiles. A commentator 
writing in 1890 noted that: "Intelligence of what was transpiring at the [Springfield] 
Armory is widely diffused... The news reached and enchanted the sewing machine 
men ... " ('The American System of Manufacture', American Machinist, 1890, quoted 
by Hounshell, 1984: 67). Indeed, the onset of interchangeability later in the American 
automobile industry was known as armory practice. 
The transition of interchangeability and factory production in the engineering 
I metal industry in America resulted in the subsequent developments particularly in 
costing and scientific management practices. In America up to 1914 there were major 
developments of cost accounting. The contemporary British economic situation was 
not so developed. The majority of the privatised engineering industry reflected a craft-
orientated workshop mentality. The apostles of scientific management from America 
"had long claimed that modem engineering production could dispense with craftsman-
ship: 'their essential principle was that the machine man should not exercise any 
discretion at all'" (Hinton, 1973: 98, quoting from The Engineer, 1903). 
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By contrast, in America it was agreed "by competent observers in this country 
and in Europe that America's increasing prosperity and high standards of living are 
due chiefly to the rapidly increasing use of scientific mass production and distribution" 
(Edward A. Filene, quoted by Hounshell, 1984: 303). 
Yet these influences and the introduction of cost accounting and scientific 
management in the United States before 1914 only began to have a major and perma-
nent impact on British industry after 1945. By comparison, in the United States during 
the latter half of the nineteenth century there is evidence that cost accounting was 
being used on a large scale to promote business efficiency. For example, when 
Andrew Carnegie took over control of the Edgar Thomson Steelworks in Pittsburg, 
he appointed William Shinn from the Pennsylvania Railroad Company as his Chief 
Executive. Shinn implemented costing systems which acted as a decision-making tool 
for Carnegie. 
This trend continued in the United States. Pierre du Pont, a graduate in 
management studies from the MIT, was employed by the E.I. du Pont de Numours 
Powder Company. Pierre du Pont and his colleagues placed a definition on costs, 
which ended "the long separation between cost, capital and financial accounting" 
(Chandler, 1977: 445-7). This may have been true for the United States, however, 
but it was not until post-1945 that du Pont's definition had any relevance in British 
industrial management. 
After carefully defining costs, du Pont with his management team devised a 
more precise definition of profit together with a more specific criterion for evaluating 
performance. Indeed, du Pont and his team actually combined and consolidated the 
three basic but otherwise separate types of accounting and thereby laid the foundation 
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for modem asset accounting. This was achieved by 1910. 
However, there were many sceptics who felt that large organisations like du 
Pont would collapse through internal inefficiency or alternatively would pass on the 
costs of their bureaucracies to the consumer, thus resulting in bankruptcy through lack 
of competitiveness. But du Pont and his modem asset accounting structures actually 
lowered the cost of integrating each departmental activity. The system allowed for 
routine data of daily operating decisions and long-term information about the return 
of investments. The techniques pioneered by du Pont were quickly incorporated into 
American industrial management and developed by the largest entrepreneurial struc-
tures in the United States, principally by du Pont, General Electric and General 
Motors. 
The elements of cost accounting within the British economy in 1914 were not 
so sophisticated. A Board of Trade investigation, begun in 1916, reported: 
"Of course all efficient firms in this country have proper systems of 
costing. We think, however, that the essential value of a careful 
system of costing to ensure the maximum economy has not yet received 
from many houses the attention it deserves. Certain large works are 
known to have no system of costing at all. Other works are known to 
have a system of costing based upon conventional rates of wages in 
those works some years before. It may be assumed that most small 
works have only a costing system more or less reduced to a rule of 
thumb." (Board of Trade, The Position of the Engineering Trades after 
the War, Cd 9073, 1918: 11; Loft, 1986: 141) 
The differences between the American and British cost accounting experiences 
can also be seen from the following article written in 1923. 
"In America the cost accountant has come much more quickly into his 
own than with us, and for obvious reason. America is the home of 
mass production ... it takes naturally to mechanical records. It has 
been comparatively untrammelled by trade union regulation, money 
making is a clearer objective in itself than with us... In America, 
therefore, there is a ground not only favourable. but thirsting for cost 
accountants. There is a business public keenly alive to his use. He is 
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one of the luminaries of the economic world. (The Cost Accountant, 
23 March 1923: 332; Loft, 1986: 142) 
A Miles Taylor, a chartered accountant with working experience in America, 
who advertised himself as a Chartered Accountant and Efficiency Engineer, was 
censured by the ICAEW who considered that this was "discreditable to Chartered 
Accountancy" (The Accountant, 28 June 1919: 552; Loft, 1994: 119).3 
Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to explain the sources of interchangeability and its full-
scale emergence within the American Federal Armories. The concept of interchange-
ability requires the manufacture of a standardised product in long runs through a 
management / control process of scientific management, quality control and costings. 
Its successful introduction both in America and Britain within government arsenals 
also reflects the lower costs of production process together with quality in this form 
of mass production. The Treasury was content, as was the taxpayer both in America 
and Britain. 
3 The actual comment by Taylor appeared in The Accountant as a matter of humour 
rather than of a serious nature. Taylor stated that on his return from the United States 
in 1914 "with more enthusiasm than common sense", he had put up the plate describ-
ing himself both as a chartered accountant and efficiency engineer. Taylor, in 
reiterating the Institute's reaction, was met with laughter from the audience attending 
a conference on scientific costing where the main speaker was J.M. Fells FSAA (The 
Accountant, 28 June 1919: 552). Taylor was appointed to the Committee of the 
Institute along with Lieutenant Colonel J. Grimwood DSO and J.M. Fells. Taylor, 
a British accountant, had spent several years in the United States prior to 1919 where 
he had experienced scientific management principles. Later in 1919 he was critical 
of the lack of knowledge of costing techniques by British accountants employed within 
the Ministry of Munitions (see later in this thesis). In 1921 Taylor wrote a book 
called Business Organisation and Management, published by Pitman. The success 
of Taylor's book was limited, however and it was not a great success. By 1925, 
Taylor was the Principal of the British College of Accountancy, Coleman Street, 
London. The College taught traditional accountancy for the ICAEW and for the 
Scottish equivalent (The Balance, voU1, no.6, Spring 1925, 48A). 
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Small anns produced through interchangeability were more efficient in tenns 
of the job they were designed to perfonn and this was evident from the Union Anny 
in the American Civil War. Repairs and replacements could easily be undertaken 
without any major logistical backlog. 
The introduction of interchangeability and the establishment of the Royal Small 
Anns Factory and the Royal Gun Factory quickly changed the production process into 
one of a factory system which deployed the concepts of (a) costings and DEB and (b) 
scientific management within a short period of time. Such refonns did not make any 
great inroad into the British private engineering industry until well into the twentieth 
century. This is despite the initial euphoria within the post-1918 period. Wilson, 
reflecting on the post-1918 era, refers to the fact that: 
"Membership of the Works Management Association ... totalled around 
900 by 1929, but there were approximately 250,000 works managers 
in the country at that time. Similarly the Institute of Industrial Manage-
ment, fonned in 1920 as a key vehicle for spreading the gospel of 
Rationalisation, was by the end of the decade almost moribund." 
(1995: 156) 
However, the fact that the Ordnance Factories had achieved such changes 
before 1914 suggests that there was a knowledge concept within British management. 
This theme is further developed in the next chapter, which examines the management 
process, the functions and structures within the British Anny and the Ordnance 
Factories more fully. This will include pieceworking and the principles of scientific 
management. 
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CHAPTER 6 
The Model Employer: 
Management and Piece-working 
and the Beginnings of Scientific Management 
in the Government Manufacturing Departments 
1855-1914 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the management process. functions and 
structures within the Army and in the government manufacturing departments and 
especially the effect on labour relations. The structure of science. technology and 
management during the Victorian era may have been more advanced in the military 
than in the contemporary civilian world. 
This chapter also examines the management functions within the Ordnance 
Factories generally. and the critically assesses the decentralized structure of the 
factories themselves. Much of the evidence comes from statements given to the 
Morley Inquiry (C 5110: 1887) by Lewis W. Engelbach. principal clerk to the 
Director of Artillery and Stores at Woolwich. and James McGee. manager of the 
Royal Small Arms Factory. Enfield. The Director of Artillery and Stores was an 
involuntary last stop clearing house for the Ordnance Factories. because no centralized 
management structure existed. 
McGee's evidence was very much more at a micro-level, and his testimony 
explains the role nature and function of a manager within a Victorian factory, albeit 
an Ordnance Factory. Few details exist concerning the management or wage struc-
tures of private enterprise in the nineteenth century. This was a point succinctly made 
by Hobsbawm (t 979: 357). Yet evidence contained in the Morley Report provides 
a clear picture of both management and wage systems which existed in the contempor-
ary nineteenth century Ordnance Factories. This is why it is considered that the 
Morley Report is a very useful piece of primary source data for the business or 
management historian generally. 
Other primary source data used in the compilation of this and the next chapter 
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includes obituaries, of superintendents and managers of the various Ordnance Fac-
tories. In particular, obituaries tend to exist for those who were members of the 
Institution of Civil Engineers, as these appeared in the Proceedings for the Institution. 
The obituaries appearing in the Proceedings also contain good data when attempting 
to assess the management function and abilities of those in charge of the Ordnance 
Factories. 
The nature and structure of labour relations, including the piece-rate systems 
that were in existence at the time are all described in the Morley Report. These are 
referred to in this chapter, and where possible comparisons are made with the contem-
porary private sector. 
Compared to the private sector, little has been written or researched into 
Victorian management of the public sector. The evidence contained in the Morley 
Report (C 5116: 1887), particularly from the military superintendents of the govern-
ment manufacturing departments, the civilian managers and other civil servants, 
portray a small window into the hidden realms of Victorian management generally. 
The size of the government manufacturing departments were comparable to any 
contemporary private engineering company or railway engineering company. When 
assessing the management of the government manufacturing departments, the majority 
of the military superintendents were senior officers in the Royal Artillery or Royal 
Engineers, as were their military subordinates and this has been described previously 
in Chapter 2. 
Civil servants who gave evidence to the Morley Inquiry had joined the service 
at the juxtaposition of the old and the new after the Northcote-Trevelyan Report. 
Lewis Engelbach who gave evidence to Morley, had originally been appointed as 
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junior clerk in the office of Secretary at War in 1854. Again there were numerous 
engineers employed at the government manufacturing departments who were of 
Scottish origin, and had attended Scottish institutions. These included the two 
Andersons, and Fraser. The cultural differences between the Scottish and English 
Universities was very pronounced. The Scottish culture was more sympathetic to 
science and technology. Also, Engelbach had received part of his education in 
Darmstadt Gymnasium and William Anderson, the first civilian Director General of 
the Ordnance Factories, had been educated at the Commercial School in St. Peters-
burg, Russia. 
The principal personalities in the Ordnance Factories 
Part of the purpose of this section is to suggest that not all Victorian manage-
ment was based on the concept of the practical man. Although engineers such as John 
(later Sir) Anderson (1814-1886) were trained on the 'Practical Man' concept (Barnett, 
1989), others did receive formal training. Though Anderson was born in Aberdeen 
(Scottish universities being more favourable to mathematics and science in the mid-
nineteenth century than their English counterparts) he was apprenticed as an engineer 
to a local cotton mill. On the completion of his apprenticeship Anderson went to 
Manchester where he was employed first at Messrs. Fairbairn. Messrs. Sharp Roberts 
and Co. and then Mr. D. Napier of London, who had a contract to build a steam 
engine at the Royal Brass Foundry, at the Royal Arsenal. The Inspector of Artillery, 
General Dundas was impressed with Anderson and engaged him as an engineer. 
Anderson worked at the Royal Arsenal for nearly forty years. In a biography 
of Anderson, Jeremy stated that: 
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"Apart from numerous technological contributions, Anderson was 
responsible for a thorough reorganisation of government munitions 
factories. He rearranged the sequence of the work process, introduced 
a system of wage differentials and brought in incentive payment 
schemes." (Jeremy, 1984, DBB, vol.1 (A to C): 58) 
During the Crimean War, Anderson together with Robert Frazer (later changed 
to Fraser) designed the floating factory Chasseur, which became an extension of the 
Royal Arsenal being moored off Balaclava (WO 33/2A 41922). The experience of 
the Chasseur operating in the Crimean war zone exemplifies the concept of a growing 
military strategic philosophy of manufacturing and repair of ordnance and munitions 
within close proximity of the forward edge of battle area (FEBA). The concept of 
production and repair of military small arms by interchangeable processes whereby 
small arms could be repaired within the FEBA by semi- or unskilled military personnel 
was also part of this military strategic philosophy, which was initially realised in 
practice during the Crimean War (1854-6) and in the American Civil War (1861-5) 
(see Fernie's description of the Enfield Rifle Factory in 1862, Institution of Civil 
Engineers Minutes of Proceedings, vol.22, 1862-3; Cowan, 1997: 80). 
HM Floating Factory Chasseur was managed by Robert Fraser. The Chasseur 
was a vessel of 500 tons, and was fitted with a 70 hp fixed engine, together with a 
10 hp engine capable of being erected on shore. Chasseur housed a brass furnace and 
cast iron foundry and two saw mills. In its factory role, Chasseur made rails for the 
military railway at Balaclava, axles for rolling stock, and wagons used by the Land 
Transport Corps, repaired guns for the Artillery and Navy, both for the British and 
French Armies. The Chasseur was originally a collier, being steam and propeller 
powered. She had belonged to Messrs. T. and W. Smith of Newcastle-upon-Tyne. 
Fraser too was of Scottish descent and at the age of fourteen was apprenticed 
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to William Clark of Sunderland. He supervised the construction of the Chasseur from 
collier to a factory ship and appointed the artificers of smiths, carpenters, engineers, 
iron-founders, brickmakers, brass-finishers and saddlers. For his services in the 
Crimea, Fraser was appointed first to the machinery department of the Royal Arsenal, 
then as manager of the Royal Gun factory (Proceedings of the Institution of Civil 
Engineers, vol. 78, Part 4, 1883-84; see also Chapters 3 and 4). 
Many notable members of the Royal Arsenal were involved in community and 
local issues, such as school board politics from 1870. Anderson became a juror at 
numerous International exhibitions and served first as a lecturer and then examiner 
for RMA Woolwich, the Royal School of Naval Architecture and the Arts and Science 
Department (Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers, 1886: 346-3531). 
Anderson had been knighted in 1878. 
The first civilian Director General of Ordnance was Sir William Anderson. 
Anderson's managerial education possibly occurred in Russia. He was born in St 
Petersburg, and lived there until his late teens and attended the Commercial High 
School at St Petersburg. In 1849, Anderson was enrolled as a student in the Applied 
Sciences Department at King's College, London, passing with distinction. Anderson 
began his business life in 1855 when he joined Courtney, Stevens and Co. of the 
Blackhall Place Ironworks in Dublin, where he was engaged in engineering and 
signalling work. Anderson was appointed as Director General in 1890. He also 
lectured on hydraulic machinery at the School of Military Engineering Chatham, and 
was an examiner at the Royal Indian Engineering College, Cooper's Hill. Anderson 
was an elected member of Woolwich council, and for Erith School Board. He was 
fluent in French and Russian and translated and abstracted for the Institution of Civil 
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Engineering's proceedings, original papers from the Russian, including Chernoff's 
researches in steel (Minutes of Proceedings Inst. CE vol.iv p.I48, vol.ix p.220, 
vol.ixxxiv p.151). Davenport-Hines stated that "it fell to Anderson to implement the 
post-Morley refonns but it was his misfortune to take office just as the Navy Defence 
Act 1889 started an upsurge in annament orders and distracted attention from refonn 
(DBB, 1984, vol.1 (A to C), biography by R.P.L. Davenport-Hines: 61). 
The first chief mechanical engineer to the Ordnance Factories was Sir Hay 
Frederick Donaldson KCB (1850-1916). Donaldson was the second son of the first 
premier of New South Wales. Unlike the previous examples, Donaldson had been 
educated at Eton and Trinity College Cambridge, where he obtained an Arts degree. 
Donaldson then graduated from Edinburgh University in mechanical engineering. 
After which he was apprenticed to the London and North Western Railway Works at 
Crewe. He later attended Zurich Technical School, and returned to Cambridge for 
further technical training. His later career included rail and canal construction at 
Gore. On his return to Britain, Anderson was involved in the construction of Number 
1 section of the Manchester Ship Canal. He then became Engineer-in-chief to the 
London and India Docks Joint Committee. Donaldson appeared to have encompassed 
the 'arts' and sciences in his academic career, which may have been due to his Scottish 
origins. 
Mangement and the lovernment manufacturinl departments - the evidence of 
James McGee and Lewis W. Enaelbach to the Morley Committee. 1886-1887 
The management chain in the government manufacturing departments before 
the Morley Recommendations of 1887 were not well structured or cohesive. There 
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was no overall executive command. This role was loosely covered by the Director 
of Artillery and Stores based at Woolwich. 
Surveyor General of Ordnance - political/politician 
(an office formed as part of the Cardwell Reforms under the War Office Act 1870) 
Director of Artillery and Stores (Woolwich) 
Colonel RA (supervisory role only) 
Principal Clerk - civil servant 
Superintendent government manufacturing department 
Lieutenant colonel RA 
Assistant superintendent - civilian appointment 
Manager - civilian appointment 
Estimates branch 
Chief mechanical writers - civil servants 
Writers - civil servants 
In 1886, the Secretary of State for War set up a Committee of Inquiry into the 
workings and structure of the government manufacturing departments. The Committee 
was chaired by Earl Morley, who reported in 1887 (C 5116). The superintendents 
of the Ordnance Factories, principal clerks and one factory manager gave evidence 
to the Morley Inquiry. 
James McGee was manager at the Royal Small Arms Factory, Enfield, where 
he started as a fitter and gaugemaker in 1856. McGee's experience at the Springfield 
Armory was referred to in Chapter 3. 
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McGee's experience of the Springfield Armory included labour relations. sub-
contracting of labour, and the status of intellectual property in the form of patents 
awarded to personnel employed at Springfield. McGee commented upon the number 
of skilled English labour employed at the Springfield Armory, notably blacksmiths 
and metal workers. However McGee confirmed that he had never visited any contem-
porary European arsenals.. But he did suggest that Enfield had the best machinery 
of "any manufacturing in Europe" (Morley, C 5116: 381, question 7889). 
As manager, McGee could 'hire and fire' labour on the recommendation of 
the subordinate foreman. The military superintendent of an Ordnance Factory 
normally relied on the discretion of his civilian manager over such matters. There 
were, however, appeal procedures to the superintendent against any decision in the 
matter of labour hiring or firing made by the manager (Morley. 1887: 381. questions 
7896-7898). McGee stated that as manager he would first hear what the man had to 
say before discharging or recommending discharge. though the disciplined worker had 
a right of appeal to the superintendent. 
The time of the manager was divided equally between the factory and clerical 
work. McGee suggested that the clerical work was not heavy. and he had two writers 
subordinate to him to prepare, analyse and summarise the major burdens of administra-
tion. The most important aspect of the clerical work was the detailed accounts which 
were required annually by Parliament. To do this McGee also had four War Office 
clerks on the establishment to assist his in this task. 
The Chief Clerk at Enfield was primarily concerned with accounts and wages. 
He was assisted by a subordinate cashier and stores accounts clerk. The foremen were 
the subordinate line staff under the manager. and McGee acknowledges that the role 
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of foreman as crucial to him conducting his duties properly as a manager. It was the 
foremen who calculated the piece rates through timekeepers, and was the link with 
the Inspection Branch. The foremen worked closely with the Chief Inspector. who 
employed viewers. The viewers inspected the work done. If properly made, and 
passed by the viewer, the artefact was counted, booked. and passed into the store. 
The men were only paid on work passed by the viewer. 
The manager at each government factory was required to be in direct communi-
cation with the assistant manager, the foreman and with his line superior, the assistant 
superintendent. The responsibilities of the manager also revolved around the state of 
the engines and machinery within the Department. The manager could recommend 
the purchase of any machinery. The superintendent acting on his manager's recom-
~endations would indent for the requisite machine. Any special machine for a specific 
purpose was made at Enfield. Bulk orders for machinery were generally placed on 
contract to a private manufacturer. 
A shop was situated at Enfield for manufacturing special machinery. McGee 
did not think it economical if all the machinery for all Ordnance Factories were 
produced at Enfield (Morley, C 5116: 381. questions 7940-7946). Nor did McGee 
think it prudent for the Enfield Factory to manufacture its own steel as suggested by 
Morley. Expensive plant would be necessary particularly as rifle manufacture required 
mild steel based on the Siemens-Martin process (Morley. C 5116: 1887: 383. question 
7939). 
The manager was responsible for the numbers of workmen to be assigned to 
each foreman. and that the work was fairly apportioned. Any requests or recommen-
dations for transfer, or any reduction or increase in labour had to be submitted from 
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the foreman in the first instance, via the manager, to the superintendent. The manager 
was also responsible for the submission of any proposed alteration in the piece-work 
rates, to the superintendent, who was the sole authority for any alteration. McGee 
had twenty-four foremen subordinate to him in respect of rifle manufacture, and a 
further five foremen responsible for the inspection and administration of the stores. 
In comparing and contrasting the US Springfield Federal Armory and the Royal 
Small Arms Factory, Enfield, in McGee's opinion both factories "were working very 
much on the same lines" and "their machinery is nearly the same as that at Enfield" 
(Morley, 1887, C 5116, question 7846: 380). 
A weakness in the pre 1887 structure of the government manufacturing 
departments was described by the Director of Artillery and Stores at Woolwich, Major 
General H.J. Alderson RA, CB. He revealed that there tended to be a want of 
connection and cooperation between each individual government factory. Indeed, each 
factory enjoyed almost total independence over its contemporaries, despite the inter-
dependence of ordnance manufacturing generally. This lack of uniformity was 
manifest in the fact that disunity of action or even common strategic plan for the 
Ordnance Factories generally existed. 
There were variations of current regulations affecting remuneration and other 
conditions of service for civilians employees. Each individual superintendent was 
responsible for the financial and administrative management of his factory. However 
this may have been due to the varying types of piece-work schemes undertaken at the 
Royal Small Arms Factories. compared to the Royal Gun Factory. The Royal 
Gunpowder Factory at Waltham Abbey and parts of the Royal Laboratory only worked 
on hourly rates. and never piece-work rates due to the volatile nature of the explosives 
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either in manufacture or testing. 
The weak link of these almost independent five government factories was in 
the Director of Artillery and Stores who acted as a clearing house between the 
individual superintendents and their respective factories. The apparent weak link in 
the military chain of command, as is evident from the Director of Artillery and Stores, 
may be due to a number of factors. However, the most likely cause is that the role 
of the Director failed to evolve with the evolution of the Ordnance Factories after 
1855. The original Director prior to 1855 fulfilled a similar though better-managed 
role over what were no more than workshops. Alderson informed the Morley Inquiry 
that: 
"The superintendents are almost independent in their different depart-
ments, but each one refers to me every detail required. They come up 
to see me personally, or write to me, and very often if they want 
information from another department they make use of me, if I may 
use the expression 'as a post office'. They write to me and I have to 
write to the other superintendents, and backwards and forwards, and 
there is no way at present of putting the various departments in touch 
with one another excepting through my office." (Morley, C 5116: 
1887: 413; also Hogg, 1963: 843). 
The proposed solution to this was left to Engelbach. 
Lewis W Engelbach CB,l Principal Clerk of the Director of Artillery and 
Stores in evidence to the Morley Committee, argued that a supreme director general 
should oversee all the government manufacturing departments. Their quasi-indepen-
dent status was due to each department being fonned at different times in history. 
Until the time of the Morley Inquiry, the Director of Artillery, based at Woolwich, 
was subordinate to the Surveyor-General of Ordnance though he had some 'anns 
Engelbach's eldest son Charles Engelbach OBE (1876-1943). Coventry Ordnance 
Works 1915-19, director Austin Motors Limited (see DBB, 1984: 288-90 and Chapter 
8). 
- 256-
length' control over the superintendents of the various manufacturing departments. 
Engelbach emphasised despite the Director of Artillery's overall control of the 
superintendents, each superintendent had control of the internal workings and econ-
omies of their particular departments. There was a certain amount of dissimilarity 
between departments due to the varying areas of munitions produced, a point previous-
Iy noted. In fact the Director of Artillery had only a general supervisory role over 
the superintendents. 
The problem was that the Director of Artillery performed a multi-purpose role, 
in which he was, "jack of all trades and master of none". In Engelbach's opinion the 
duties of Director of Artillery and Stores had increased enormously in successive years 
(C 5110: 1887: 251. question 4292). 
Engelbach put forward his proposal for a new overall post of "Inspector of 
Manufacturing Departments, or of a Superintendent of the Royal Arsenal." This 
officer should be a military officer based at Woolwich where the general administra-
tion of the five government factories would come under one head. The proposed 
supreme head of government factories should, in Engelbach's opinion, be subordinate 
to the Director of Artillery and Stores (question 4293). The Inspector of Manufac-
turing Departments, 
"or whatever he may be called, would be a means of relieving the 
Director of Artillery and Stores of an enormous mass of detail which 
comes up to this office, and would at the same time save an immense 
deal of time and promote the unity of administration which would be 
an immense advantage to the public service." (C 5116: 1887: 251. 
question 4293) 
In attempting to clarify what he thought the role of a proposed head of the 
government factories or of the Arsenal should be, Engelbach commented that a similar 
scheme had been twice previously attempted, unsuccessfully. 
- 257 -
The first scheme had been planned some thirty years previously by John 
Anderson, chief mechanical engineer and Assistant Superintendent of the Royal Gun 
Factory. Anderson had originally proposed the appointment of a chief mechanical 
engineer post under an overall Director of the Royal Arsenal. This proposal had been 
submitted at the same time Anderson had recommended the location of the new Small 
Arms Factory on the Royal Arsenal site. Both proposals were rejected at the time 
by the then Secretary of State for War. Though in Engelbach's opinion both attempts 
had previously failed: 
"owing to the opposition of the superintendents themselves the orders 
of the Secretary of State have not been carried out as intended: and 
therefore I have come to the conclusion that unless you give the new 
head of the Arsenal or the Superintendent of the Manufacturing depart-
ments, not only the power of controlling the superintendents, but also 
the knowledge of the departments themselves, it would be quite imposs-
ible for him to act successfully as the deputy or subordinate of the 
Director of Artillery and Stores without the difficulties arising which 
previously arose on the part of the superintendents in the fact that the 
superintendents knew more than it was possible for the head of the 
Arsenal to know, or to learn. and that therefore the head of the Arsenal 
as then intended was merely a buffer as it were between the superin-
tendents and the Chief Director of Artillery and Stores; therefore I say 
that I think the head of the Arsenal must in fact be the superintendent 
of the factory so far as his military position is concerned ... practically 
speaking I should abolish the present superintendents to carry out my 
idea." (C 5116: 1887: 251-252, question 4299). 
Engelbach felt that the proposed office should be held by a military officer. 
due to the military nature of the administration of the government factories, and the 
fact they produced munitions for the Army and Navy, as well as research and develop-
ment of artillery and ammunition and explosives. Such an officer would need to 
instruct military and naval subordinates. In his assessment. Engelbach argued that 
the military superintendents of individual government factories would be abolished. 
Their role concerning policy being incorporated with the new head. The day-to-day 
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control of individual factories as currently undertaken by the superintendents and 
assistant superintendents being delegated to the existing civilian managers, who 
Engelbach considered should be elevated in status and remuneration. Indeed, Engel-
bach considered such a scheme would be popular with the 12000 men employed at 
the Royal Arsenal alone, who could appeal to the head directly. By suggesting this, 
there may have been some resistance by the civilian workforce to appeal to the 
military superintendent, via the proper channels, ie through the foreman, manager, 
assistant superintendent. Engelbach may have assumed that with a civilian manager 
cum superintendent, this line of command could either be formally shortened, or 
informally • short-circuited' . 
Engelbach considered that the proposed head of manufacturing departments 
need not possess any great technical knowledge. This was required for the existing 
military superintendents. The qualities of a proposed supreme Director General were 
sound judgement and leadership. In essence, Engelbach was proposing a function of 
executive management that was generalist rather than specialist. This became the 
model of the Higher Civil Service from 1855. It seems that Engelbach envisaged a 
civilian administrator as Director General, recruited and promoted from the Higher 
Civil Service. 
However to balance the technical expertise at executive level, Engelbach 
considered that a deputy to the supreme Director General be appointed as chief 
mechanical engineer should be considered. According to Engelbach, the appointment 
should be made from civil mechanical engineers, rather than from the military. 
Engelbach's opinion here appears to be in the form of an upgraded position for the 
existing inspector of machinery. 
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There were existing examples of Engelbach' s chief mechanical engineer both 
in the contemporary railway industry, and within the India Office and Admiralty. In 
Engelbach's opinion, the proposed chief mechanical engineer should attract a salary 
of between £1,500 and £2,000 per annum, together with a house. Morley reminded 
Engelbach that Sir William Armstrong had previously been appointed as "engineer 
of Rifled Ordnance at a salary of £2,000 per annum" (as superintendent of the Royal 
Gun Factory 1858-1862). Similarly Mr. George Rendel was appointed as civil 
member to the Admiralty. The whole of their time was required to be at the disposal 
of the Government. In reply Engelbach referred to Armstrong and his dual interest 
as director of the Elswick Ordnance Company. But Morley retorted that Elswick total 
output 0858-1862} was for the government only and not for any other client. 
The idea of an office of Supreme Mechanical Engineer was probably influenced 
from the structure of contemporary railway companies who had chief mechanical 
engineers. Indeed when questioned about the salary proposed Engelbach acknowl-
edged the remuneration of £5,000 per annum in the Public Service was of "an ex-
tremely limited character." But it had been brought to his attention that railway 
companies did pay that sum for mechanical engineers. Nevertheless Engelbach, whilst 
acknowledging that large salaries are paid in commercial life, conceded that in his 
scheme the honour which the post carried would be reward enough (Morley (C 5116. 
1887. questions 4561-4564: 265). 
With regard to the control of labour in the government manufacturing depart-
ments, Engelbach argued that civilian officers should be empowered to take on and 
discharge labour. In Engelbach's plan. the elevated managers would be the techno-
crats, along with the chief mechanical engineer. and a Chief Civilian Controller, with 
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civilian controllers in each factory would be responsible for the personnel function, 
the chief civilian controller being on the staff "of the Chief of the Arsenal" (Morley 
(C 5116, 1887: 29; summary of evidence, p.252; question 4304). 
Piece-workina and labour relations in the lovernment manuracturinl departments 
Hobsbawm stated that, "We know so little about systems of management and 
wage-payment that it is dangerous to generalize about them" (1979: 357). Neverthe-
less they are central to the theme of this study. The evidence presented in this chapter 
has been obtained mainly from Parliamentary Select Committee Reports on Ordnance 
of 1862 and 1863, together with evidence given to the Morley Committee (C 5116: 
1887). 
Evidence suggests that piece-working was introduced into the Royal Carriage 
Department in November 1855 (WO 47/2755, p.1535). The concept of piece-working 
is crucial to this thesis, as the system is closely allied to costing interchangeability and 
scientific management. The introduction of piece-working into the Royal Carriage 
Department appears to occurred independently of the Board of Ordnance Commission 
visitation to the American armories. However it seems to be synonymous with the 
introduction of machinery into the Royal Carriage Department. Steam engines were 
introduced into the Royal Carriage Department in 1855. De Fonblanque states there 
were twenty-three steam engines, "equal to 720 power, ... computed to be equal to 
the manual labour of 1200 men" (1858: 202). 
Indeed, de Fonblanque commented that with the introduction of steam power 
into the Royal Carriage Department in 1855, 10,000 pairs of wheels were turned out 
in that year. Previously, in 1814, the Department by a great effort managed to tum 
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out 2400 pairs of wheels. De Fonblanque commented that. "the expenses of the staff 
of the establishment are less now (in 1858). than when it was comparatively in its 
infancy" (1858: 20t). 
Hobsbawm observed that until the 1830s economists treated wage-payment 
systems only incidently. From the 1830' however. economists began to pay more 
attention to wage-payment systems (1979: 357). In particular piece-rate systems began 
to be taken seriously along with other systems of Payment by Results (PBR). Both 
economists (such as McCulloch and Michael Chevalier) and employers "in several 
countries showed a marked tendency to extend payment by results. i.e. incentive 
payments - initially mostly in combination with sub-contracting and piece-mastering." 
(Hobsbawm. 1979: 357). 
Again Hobsbawm suggested that due to lack of reliable statistics. the successes 
or otherwise. of these efforts cannot be accurately predicted. Hobsbawm also com-
ments that "sometimes they failed among British engineers and builders" (1979: 357). 
Such schemes succeeded. including at Krupps where piece-work was introduced after 
1850 along with mass production techniques. Other successes included in the new 
coal fields in South Wales. Hobsbawm suggests that the nucleus of acceleration of 
piece-working was the massive construction of the railway network in Britain and 
Europe (1979: 357). Surprisingly Hobsbawm does not include the experience of the 
American system of manufacture. 
What is evident from Hobsbawm's research is that there may have been more 
than one source of influence. Krupp's were in a similar line of production to the 
British government manufacturing departments. and again. the government factories 
were closely allied to the railways. Therefore the introduction of piece-working into 
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the Royal Carriage Department may have come from sources other than America. 
The early failure of the British engineering industry to introduce piece-working may 
have been crucial to later attempts to reintroduce it during the 1890s. 
The Molesworth Committee of 1855 also recommended the introduction of 
interchangeability and piece-working into the Royal Small Arms Factories at Enfield 
and Birmingham, giving two broad reasons for this recommendation. These were as 
follows:-
• It was considered in any manufacturing system to be advantageous to all parties 
where payment was made by the piece. However it introduced a system 
whereby labour was strictly controlled and monitored. Labour would be paid 
by the piece, and it would be an incentive in the interests of the employees to 
tum out as many standardised parts in quality as possible subject to passing 
a quality audit. The deployment of labour saving machinery which would 
promote the increase in productivity without compromise on quality was 
approved. 
• The new system appeared to work with minimum supervision. The logic of 
this was that performance and productivity equalled with quality determined 
through inspection resulted in higher wages for the worker. Molesworth 
considered with this in mind, that workmen will not waste their time, through 
any reduction in output or decrease in the quality of output as this would 
reduce his wages, without loss to the employer. 
Molesworth considered that where workers are paid by the piece this empowers 
them to be financially responsible for their own work and audit of such work. Any 
spoilt work caused would make the worker financially responsible. This method did 
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not work where payment was made by the hour. or day. This particular point is 
important when considering that the standardised parts made for the musket or 
bayonet were required to be identical. in order to enhance interchangeability. 
The Molesworth Committee in consideration of these recommendations was 
impressed by the Board of Ordnance Commission's tour of the American Federal and 
private armories. where they had observed in both the. "Government and private 
manufactories ... piece-work. where it is applicable is universally preferred to day-
work. as this yields the greatest amount of work at the least cost to the employer. at 
the same time paying him the best wages .... " (Rosenburg. 1969: 196). 
The Commission were equally impressed with the cleanliness of the work-
stations within the American armories both Federal and private. There were facilities 
for employees to wash and change clothing. and also canteen facilities were present. 
The workforce displayed regular attendance and sobriety. 
The scope of the Commission' s observations reflected on the industrial relations 
attitude within both the US Federal and private armories. particularly Remington and 
Colt. The notion of a payment through a process of piece-work is synonymous with 
the concept of costing. Perhaps an example of this can be seen later in American 
history and the first Henry Ford. Lord Leverhulme. in an address in 1922 at Man-
chester. suggested: 
"Those of us who have an opportunity of comparing statistics in differ-
ent works. find that the hard driver is not the organiser who can pro-
duce at low costs. There is a type of man. as foreman or manager or 
as head of a company who can bring the best out of a man - the biggest 
production at the lowest costs without any driving at aiL.. Ford. last 
year [1921] is reported to have made ... 75 million dollars. We know 
that he paid in the process of making that money considerably more 
than the trade union rate of wages. in some cases double; but in every 
case over the trade union rate of wages; that they worked less than the 
recognised hours of most firms in the United States. and that the price 
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of his car is such that neither in this country, where our wages are less 
than half, nor in any other country in the world, can a car be produced 
of equal quality at anything like the price that Ford sells his cars. And 
having done all that - paid higher wages, worked shorter hours, sold 
his car for less money, he comes out with a profit which is said to 
place him as the man with the biggest income of any in the world." 
(The Cost Accountant, 3-9 December 1922: 213-4) 
However, Leverhulme conveniently overlooked the fact that Ford's high wages were 
predicted on a maximum human effort (see Hounshell, 1984: 259). 
The Board of Ordnance Commission visitation to America found in both 
government and private manufactories that payment through piece-work was the more 
preferred system for day-to-day work. It was considered that piece-work yielded the 
least cost to the employer, whilst at the same time paying the best wages to the 
employees. 
On the recommendation of the Molesworth Report, the government of the day 
voted the sum of £40.000 for the. "immediate erection of the necessary buildings and 
machinery at Enfield" (de Fonblanque. 1858: 207). 
However, in his description of the Enfield Rifle Factory. de Fonblanque writing 
in 1858 noted a "striking feature" of which. 
"is the employment of machinery for the manufacture of the musket in 
all its intricate parts which has been most successfully adopted in the 
United States of America. but has not hitherto been attempted in this 
country ... some idea may be formed of the minuteness and nicety of 
the operations carried on ... from the fact that the musket is made up 
of between fifty and sixty pieces each of which requires special 
machines for its production; the bayonet alone undergoes sixty- seven 
distinct operations from the first to the last, and that the gunstock 
passes through seventeen different machines ... while only in the last 
stage. that of • polishing' • is manual labour resorted. II (1858: 207). 
Evidence suggests that interchangeability as practised in America and in Britain 
required 'filing down' in order for the interchangeable parts to fit. There is evidence 
to suggest that even the Colt revolver was not 100% interchangeable. even though Colt 
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himself claimed that they were (Institution of Civil Engineers proceedings 11 (1851-2): 
30-68). 
Hounshell (1984) argues that: 
"Annory workmen filed and fitted machine-made parts while soft. 
When assembled, major components were stamped with serial numbers, 
the anns taken apart and the parts hardened. After hardening, the parts 
with same numbers were refitted by hand into a complete revolver. 
When considering the establishment of a small anns factory, the British 
Select Committee on Small Anns heard the testimony of a number of 
gunmakers and mechanics who had purchased Colt's pistols to see if 
they were constructed with interchangeable parts. None found them 
so constructed. The testimony of Colt's fonner superintendent, Gage 
Stickney, also damned the idea of interchangeability - 'I have heard of 
it, but I defy a man to show me a case'. All the British experts argued 
correctly that the process of hardening would throw off the fit between 
parts and that these hardened parts would have to be refitted with a 
file." (Hounshell, 1984: 49) 
However, the solution to perfect interchangeability may have been one of the 
successes of the Royal Small Anns Factory, Enfield. John Fernie, in a paper 
delivered to the Institution of Civil Engineers on 19 May 1863 related that: 
"In the year 1855 the old establishment at Enfield was broken up, and 
a new one was fonned for the purpose of making rifles of the 1853 
pattern, on the system established in America. The accounts for the 
year 1859-60 show that the number of rifled muskets which had been 
delivered into store was 87,405 on which there had been expended a 
total sum of £178,588.10s. 7d, being the rate of £2.1s.8 I,1zd per arm; 
whilst the contractor's price for the same, at £3.3s.8d per arm, would 
have been £272,509.5s; thus a saving had been effected to 
£93,920. 14s. A proper allowance for depreciation on tools and build-
ings was made, and no money value is claimed by the Enfield author-
ities on account of the anns being duplicates of one another. It is only 
necessary to see a rifle put together at Enfield thoroughly to appreciate 
the mechanical advantages of the duplicate system. Thus, the separate 
pieces which form the lock are picked up indifferently from heaps of 
such pieces, everyone fitting into its place most perfectly; and a rifle, 
the parts of which have never been together before, is formed in a few 
seconds from a lot of fittings promiscuously thrown together, as any 
lock will fit any stock, any stock will fit any barrel, and each part, 
however, minute, will fit any rifle. If any part be broken or requires 
replacing, there is a new one which will exactly fit it, so that wherever 
troops are armed with the Enfield rifle, there is not any fear of a 
- 266 -
mischance through a bayonet not fitting, and the armourer's duty is 
confined to the exchange of a few duplicate cocks or springs; and, as 
it is only a system of exchange, a skilled armourer may be dispensed 
with. Whether serving in Canada, India or China, the various pans of 
that delicate instrument can be sent from home, with the cenainty that 
they will fit the places for which they are intended, and thus there is 
a great saving of time and money, and the soldier is inspired with 
confidence in his rifle by the knowledge that it can be quickly made as 
good as new." (John Fernie, 'On the manufacture of duplicate 
machines and engines', Institution of Civil Engineers, vol.22, 1862-3: 
604-5) 
The reflections made by Fernie are similar to those of the American War Department 
some fony years previously. The small arms could be repaired on the battlefield and 
a skilled armourer would not be required to perform these repairs. 
Rosenberg claims that Fernie's paper was a "plea for standardisation and 
'duplication' of machinery parts in locomotives" (1969: 63, note 2). Fernie stated 
that it was not his intention to "describe the machines employed at Enfield" but 
suggested that "these examples are only intended to show that the system of duplicates 
both cheapens and improves the manufacture of all articles to which it can be applied" 
(Fernie, 1862-3: 605). However, Fernie did comment that: 
"Until lately, little or nothing has been done in the application of this 
system to the manufacturing of machines, or engines on a large scale. 
It is true that the principle had been acknowledged and various writers 
had argued the desirableness of its introduction into the railway system; 
but with such large component parts special machines were out of the 
question, and the only other possible mode was working to a correct 
standard." (Fernie, 1862-3: 605) 
The remainder of Fernie's paper explores the possibility of interchangeability being 
introduced into locomotive manufacture. 
Fernie was locomotive superintendent at the Derby works of the Midland 
Railway. His obituary notice of 1904 states that he "introduced methods of fine 
measurement of work and established a system of duplicating engines whereby parts 
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were made readily interchangeable" (Institution of Civil Engineers. Minutes of 
Proceedings. 1904: 389). The same obituary also stated that Fernie was awarded a 
Watt Medal and Manby premium for his 1863 paper. 2 
Over twenty years later. McGee told the Morley Inquiry that inspection failures 
at the Enfield Rifle Factory were low. The inspection department at Enfield was 
outside McGee's jurisdiction but came under the direct control of the superintendent 
of the factory (Morley. C5116. 1887. questions 8060-8). At this time the standard 
rifle being manufactured at the Royal Small Arms Factory was the modified Martini-
Enfield produced on interchangeable parts. This was a direct improvement on the 
previous Mark 1 Enfield Rifle Musket in 1855. as mentioned earlier in this chapter. 
The introduction and promotion of piece-working schemes into most of the 
government manufacturing departments was quite remarkable. First there appears to 
be very little evidence that contemporary private engineering or Ordnance Factories 
could equal the systems operating in a public sector institution. Secondly. later writers 
on piece-working have ignored the role of the government manufacturing departments 
in pioneering this method of production and payment (Bienfeld. 1972: Cole. 1923: 
Hunt, 1951). 
2 
Hunt argues that: 
"Only if management is efficient can labour earn the maximum bonus. 
and only if labour earns the maximum bonus (compatible with the 
maintenance of standards and the avoidance of undue fatigue) can 
management earn the maximum profits. Thus the interests of the two 
sides are made to coincide, and there is therefore a much better chance 
of success being achieved." (1951: 27) 
John Fernie 1824-1904. Member of the Institution of Civil Engineers. 1869. Born 
Cupar. Fife and served an apprenticeship to his father. In 1849 Fernie was appointed 
to the North Staffordshire Railway and in 1852 was appointed as manager of the 
Britannia Foundry in Derby. moving to the Midland Railway in 1855. 
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Fernie's application of interchangeability into the locomotive works of the 
Midland Railway Company from 1862 onwards spread to other locomotive works. 
The success or otherwise of interchangeability and pieceworking on the shop floor of 
a locomotive factory is difficult to assess. However, Williams, writing in 1914, slaled 
that: 
"Many of the methods employed, both in manufacture and administra-
tion, are extremely old-fashioned and antiquated ... Small private firms 
are usually a long way ahead of railway companies in the matter of 
methods and processes, and they pay better wages into the bargain." 
(Williams, 1915; reprinted 1984: 45) 
In terms of pieceworking, Williams observed that: 
"Piece-rated men seldom or never work at a perfectly uniform speed; 
there are dull and intensely active periods depending sometimes upon 
the physical condition of the workmen and sometimes upon the quality 
known as luck in operation." (Williams, 1915: reprinted 1984: 237) 
Williams also commented that the same speed and feed is required whatever the 
weather, especially affecting those who work over furnaces. 
However, Williams comments that the process of pieceworking may have 
arrived much later at the GWR Locomotive Factory, Swindon: 
"That great changes have taken place in regard to everything connected 
to the factory of late years is not to be disputed ... New machinery has 
revolutionised many branches of the labour and it usually happens that 
where an appliance that saves 50 per cent to the firm is adopted the 
men are hustled into double activity; the great delight of the managers 
is to boast of the large amount of work produced by a machine. and 
to add that 'one man does it all'... The officials declare openly that 
piecework balance is merely given to the men when they earn it without 
strenuous efforts; they will not admit the reasonableness of working 
without any degree of sanity and comfort." (Williams. 1915; reprinted 
1984: 376) 
The introduction of piece-rate working into the private engineering industry, 
together with payment by results. reflects a trend towards a factory-orientated produc-
tion process and a standardised product (Cole. 1922: 12-13). But its introduction into 
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the private engineering sector was a slow process due to union (ASE) militancy and 
the demarcation within workshop practice and management at the time. This is 
reflected in Williams' description (as above) in the GWR Locomotive Factory in the 
twenty years prior to 1914. 
Cole, writing in 1922, commented that: 
"The work done is still largely of a jobbing character, or even if 
processes are repeated, for skilled men at least the 'runs' are, as a rule, 
comparatively short. Consequently, new piece-work prices and basic 
times have constantly to be arranged for fresh operations, whilst the 
fact that machinery also is by no means standardised, that the price for 
the job has not infrequently to be modified in accordance with the 
character and equipment of the machine-tool on which it is to be done." 
(Cole, 1922: 13) 
The Royal Small Anns Factory, Enfield evolved into a factory-orientated establishment 
from 1858. This culture also quickly developed into the Royal Gun Factory, Wool-
wich, particularly under the influence of Robert Fraser, the manager of the gun 
factory. The Ordnance Factories generally were extremely successful in their piece-
rate systems. Labour relations were excellent because the two operations of both the 
interests of management (the government and taxpayer) and of labour were comple-
mentary. 
The expansion of rifle manufacture at Enfield through the process of 
interchangeability was from 1858 by a factory production system rather than by a 
workshop orientated process. A factory system implies that machinery for the main 
part is crucial to the production process. Labour tends to be deskilled rather than 
craft-orientated, thus concepts of the aristocracy of labour, labour control of the 
production process is greatly reduced if not eliminated. The labour process is con-
trolled through supervision and inspection of the produced component, rather than the 
finished product. Other forms of control include accounting systems, clocking on and 
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off systems and a system of punishments (fines) and rewards. The pieceworking 
system, though not universal to a factory orientated production process, does adapt 
very well in this environment. 
There is evidence to show that production of rifles at the Enfield Factory 
increased threefold within three years. "Up to 31 March 1858, 26,739 rifles were 
produced; between 1 April 1858 and 31 March 1859, 57,256 rifles; between 1 April 
1859 and 31 March 1860, 87,405 rifles; and between 1 April 1860 and 31 March 
1861, 99,083 rifles." (Rosenberg, 1962: 63 - quoted from Parliamentary Papers 37 
(1857-8) : 139; Parliamentary Papers 15 (1859): 217; Parliamentary Papers 41 
(1860): 457; Parliamentary Papers 36 (1864): 607). 
Unlike the Birmingham gun trade, the Royal Small Arms Factory, Enfield was 
manufacturing, under a system of mass production, the Enfield rifle musket Mark 1 
for use by the British, Indian and Colonial armed services. The demand was perpetual 
and the constant production through interchangeability was at a price lower than 
through contract. The process continued throughout the nineteenth century with the 
Martini-Hemy stop-breach load rifle introduced in 1869. the Lee Metford and event-
ually the short muzzle Lee Enfield rifle (SMLE) as used in both world wars. All the 
parts of these weapons were interchangeable. thus the stock. barrel. bolts. magazines 
and magazine springs of an SMLE could easily interchange with another SMLE. 
The Birmingham gun trade produced to a small niche market. mainly based 
on sporting guns. These were made to order. on an individual basis. and were 
manufactured in a workshop I craft-orientated environment. The component parts 
were often manufactured through subcontracting arrangements. 
The development of a factory system within the Ordnance Factories. first at 
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the newly reconstituted Royal Small Arms Factory, Enfield with the manufacture of 
rifles with interchangeable parts, quickly developed in other Ordnance Factories. The 
major architect of the new Ordnance Factories was James Alexander Cameron Hay, 
who served his apprenticeship under John Anderson at the Royal Arsenal. Woolwich 
(1847 -54) where he became principal draftsman in the machinery department. Hay. 
under Anderson's direction, designed the Enfield Factory, the new Shell Factory (The 
Royal Laboratory) and the Gun Factory, both on the Woolwich site. Hay succeeded 
Anderson as Inspector of Machinery in 1874. He was elected as an Associate Member 
of the Institution of Civil Engineers on 2 March 1875, Anderson being his proposer. 
By 1894 Hay was Superintending Engineer and Constructor of Shipping at Woolwich, 
being also a Member of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers and a Fellow of the 
Royal Historical Society (candidate circular submission to the author by kind per-
mission of the Archivist, the Institution of Civil Engineers, The War Office Staff List, 
1894: 227). 
The creation of a factory system at the Ordnance Factories which evolved into 
a structure of line and staff functions together with the introduction of attendant costing 
and accounting systems suggests that principles of scientific management could have 
developed there. The three principles assumed by Taylor - (i) the ownership of 
knowledge given to the managers from the workers, (ii) intellectual knowledge being 
centred in a planning or laying-out shop, and (iii) the task idea (Braverman, 1998: 77, 
82) - appear to have been developed from 1858 onwards. 
The system of scientific management also increased the clerical functions within 
the growing structure of the Ordnance Factories. The governance of the Ordnance 
Factories appeared to be centred within the clerical function. This growth of clerical 
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workers is needed within a system of scientific management which relies on data 
processing in order to keep records on the measurement of a worker's output, 
timekeeping, absence from the workbench and so forth, and to be able to convert this 
into monetary terms. Indeed, a scientific management technique could also be applied 
in the same way to a routine clerical function (Braverman, 1998: 221). Such tech-
niques are crucial to the smooth operation of pieceworking and scientific management. 
Cole's description reflects the British engineering industry immediately during 
the post-1918 era. The culture of the industry reflected a 'workshop' mentality, 
whereas the Royal Arsenal at Woolwich and the Royal Small Arms Factory, Enfield 
had previously in the nineteenth century changed to factory production both structural-
ly and culturally. 
The British engineering industry was still controlled by the mysticism of 'craft' 
through the ASE representing the aristocracy of labour. In such industries reflecting 
small-scale economies and objectives, it was also extremely difficult for scientific 
management principles, costings and labour utilisation through flexibility to be applied. 
This is a major cause for the concept of costing to be deficient in British management. 
This also persistently affected the recognition or status of cost accounts by the pro-
fessional accounting bodies in the post-1918 era. 
This can be seen in the struggle of the Institute of Cost and Works Accountants 
formed on 8th March 1919. Although supported by numerous industrialists, the 
ICWA was ostracised by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales 
and by the Incorporate Society of Accountants who saw the fledgling body as a 
provider for traders and not for business. The ICAEW successfully opposed the idea 
of the ICWA of receiving a royal charter (The Accountant, 5 May 1923: 683; Loft, 
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1994: 129), or of a qualified chartered accountant advertising himself as an efficiency 
engineer (The Accountant, 28 June 1919: 552; Loft, 1994: 119; see also Chapter 5 
and the experiences of Miles Taylor ACA). 
It is evident that overall supervision under a payment by results system at the 
government manufacturing departments was not as strict as under a time-rate system, 
nor as oppressive as some PBR schemes became under Fordist practices of the earlier 
twentieth century. In fact under the PBR system of the nineteenth century government 
factories, there was a great sense of freedom experienced by many workers than under 
the previous piece-rate system. Equally PBR schemes attempted at the Elswick 
Company during the 1880s led to a number of strikes and lockouts. 
Indeed Hunt suggested that the bitter resistance of the trade unions to piece-
work was not reduced until after the First World War. During the 1920s attempts 
were made to introduce piece-working into collective bargaining (t 951: 42). Having 
said this Hunt does point out that it was only during the Second World War that 
opposition to piece-work in the civilian industries was largely eliminated (t 951: 43). 
Evidence presented to the Morley Committee (C 5116: 1887) gives a wide 
perception of the operations of the government manufacturing departments from 1855 
to 1886. A later Treasury Committee Report of 1907 (Murray, Cd 3626) continues 
with this, and reflects the systems of piece-working in the Ordnance Factories up to 
1915. Though no actual statistics or wage calculation documentation exist, the 
evidence given to both Morley and Murray presents a more accurate picture than the 
contemporary private sector. 
The evidence given to Morley reflected that of piece-working in the Ordnance 
Factories had existed there for the preceding thirty years. Much of this evidence came 
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from the superintendent of the Royal Laboratory, Colonel Barlow, and James McGee, 
manager of the Enfield Rifle Factory. Barlow identified two forms of piece-working 
at the Ordnance Factories:-
• Individual piece-work, and 
• Fellowship piece-work (Morley (C 5116) 1887, p.l84, questions 3129,3130, 
3131; see also summary of evidence, p.21) (in 1907 this was referred to as 
collective piece-work [Murray, Cd 3626]). 
Collective piece-work was not unique or original to the government manufac-
turing departments. The practice probably evolved from farming and the growing use 
of gang-labour during the nineteenth century. Work was sub-contracted, or given to 
a piece-master who received remuneration for the work undertaken. From this lump 
sum remuneration, the sub-contractor, or his agent paid the members of the gang, for 
the total output of the gang, and not for the output of any individual. 
In the railway manufacturing industry, fellowship pieceworking corresponded 
to piecemastering. Williams commented that this, or a similar scheme to piecemaster-
ing, was very unpopular in the Swindon locomotive factory: 
"A few privileges attach to the post of chargeman, especially if there 
is a big gang; his wages are higher and he draws a sum called percen-
tage equal to 10 per cent of his own weekly wages, deducted out of the 
'balance' earned by the gang... The system of paying percentage is 
very unpopular with the rank and file of the workmen; whether the 
chargeman's behaviour is good or bad he is heartily hated by most of 
the men in consequence of it." (Williams. 1915; reprinted 1984: 254) 
Group piece-work cannot be assessed in every aspect of output. either in mass 
production. or in job or batch production. The deficiencies of pieceworking included 
setting the correct rate. An incorrectly set rate could cause inflationary reaction. 
ensuing loss of competition. Cole commented that: 
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"The system theoretically in operation for fixing of the piecework 
prices was that of 'mutuality'. or individual bargaining between the 
workman who was to do the job and the foreman or rate fixer." (1922: 
57) 
Unfortunately. the increase in premium bonus systems became somewhat ambiguous. 
Cole again suggests that: 
"In some cases at least. the employers took the view that the granting 
of the bonus was a purely gratuitous or ex gratia action on their part. 
and that either collective or individual bargaining about the amount of 
the bonus, or the basis on which it is calculated, would be out of 
place." (t 922: 57-58) 
Within shipbuilding group piece-work was applicable to riveting. or as Barlow pointed 
out to Morley it was common in the Shell Factory though not in the Cartridge Factory 
which undertook individual piece-working. At the Shell Factory. Barlow described 
that ten or more men would act as a team for fellowship piece-working. If part of 
the team was absent. then that worker would be fined, and the rate not paid to the 
absentee would be divided amongst the remainder of the fellowship (Morley, C 5116; 
questions 3130 and 3131: 185). 
Barlow stated to Major General Goodenough.3 a committee member. that one 
man did not make a complete artefact but only a component part. Barlow described 
the individual piece-work system in cartridge manufacture:-
3 
" ... it would be divided up into several parts; one man will be working 
at the discs, and the costs go on the completed article; but supposing 
that a man turned out 500 discs he would be paid for those 500, and 
another man would tum out 560 and he would be paid for them, pro 
rata, according to the component parts of a cartridge." (Morley, C 
5116: 185, question 3135) 
It is apparent from Barlow's evidence that the average costing for piece-
Major-General Sir William Goodenough KCB. Inspector-General of Artillery 1885-
86. previously Assistant Adjutant General. Woolwich Garrison. 
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working was a day and a third in one day. If the rate increased beyond a time and 
a third, then steps were taken to reduce the piece-rate. There was no set time allowed 
for this. Barlow commented that when discovered that the piece-rate was beyond a 
time and a third, then the shop manager's attention was drawn to it. Barlow suggested 
that reductions are made gradually (C 5116, questions 3150-3155, p.185). 
Barlow in answer to a question by Mr. Carbutt, stated that both he and the 
managers of the government factories were all satisfied with the piece-work system 
now carried out. 
Barlow in response to the Earl of Morley's request brought in books and other 
documents to the Committee to show how labour, piece-working and the workings 
of machinery were costed. These were consolidated in Appendix XIII and Appendix 
XIV of the Report. 
The superintendent was directly responsible for the control of the budget 
allowed for Parliament, and was also responsible for promotions and appointments 
of subordinate staff, and in determining the rates of pay. 
The Assistant Superintendent was responsible for order and discipline within 
the Department and acted as first auditor of piece-work earnings. In this respect, the 
Assistant Superintendent was assisted by a chief examiner and 36 subordinate exam-
iners. 
The Principal Clerk was responsible for the accuracy of the accounts, and 
payment of wages. Subordinate to the Principal Clerk was the Works Accounts Clerk, 
a senior clerk, who was in charge of the works account as follows:-
"He is responsible for the care of all extracts received form the Com-
missioning General, for the issue of the necessary orders to the man-
ager for carrying out the services demanded ... for keeping a correct 
account of all the charges incurred on them ... . 
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He has charge of the work-taking branch and half wrought material 
stores and is responsible for the custody and correct account of all 
semi-manufactured articles sent into store, and that all work is properly 
taken up by the work-takers, and that the piece-work prices paid are 
in accordance with the approved rates. 
He is responsible for the preparation of the 'C' forms of the wages 
accounts in time for the weekly payment of wages, and the value of the 
work performed during each week as per authorised rates corresponds 
with the total paid on the check books. 
He keeps the principal accounts of the Department by the system of 
double-entry ... 
He prepares the annual balance sheet for Parliament , and is responsible 
that all documents in support thereof are properly verified." (Appendix 
XIII to Morley, C 5116: p.556, 'Division of Duties') 
The actual wages, hours of work and other books relating to the operation of 
piece-work at the government manufacturing departments have not survived. How-
ever, the payment and wage records concerning time-rates at the Royal Gunpowder 
Factory for the years from 1892 to 1898 have survived. These records are water-
stained which suggests that the others were destroyed during the blitz during the 
Second World War (Supp.5/431). 
Under the principal clerk was the clerk responsible for stores and cash. The 
stores and cash clerk was responsible for the contract ledger and that all stores 
received by way of contract were inspected and passed as to quality and correctness 
in quantity. The stores and cash clerk verified all bills prior to payment, and verified 
the cost price of all materials on behalf of the works account branch. The stores and 
cash account clerk was responsible for the correctness of the nominal roll within the 
check book, and that entries to rates of wages, and proper medical reports to fitness 
were correct. 
The check books contained a record of every worker's time, 
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"with his rate of pay, periods of sickness, and absences from all causes, 
and a weekly computation is made as regards day work of the wages 
due to each man. The hours for working being 54 hours are made. 
At the end of each week a return of extra time worked is furnished by 
the several branches for posting in these check books. No extra time 
is paid for until 54 th hours are made up. Extra time counts as time 
and a half for payment, excepting in the case of men who are only 
allowed common time for extra hours." (Morley, C 5116: 1887, 
Appendix XVI: 568) 
With regard to piece-working, 
"The amount of wages due to each man on piece-work is furnished 
through the foreman, through the manager, and these amounts must 
agree with the amounts arrived at by the Works Account Branch on the 
amount of work taken up by work-takers or sent into half-wrought 
stores." (Morley, C 5116: 1887, Appendix XVI: 568) 
The cash account clerk was also to ensure that the 'ticket-check' was under-
taken according to the established system. These pay tickets 
"bear the same number as the metal tickets, the amount due to the man 
as per the check book for the week to which they relate, and are 
delivered up to the cashier at the pay table as receipt for the payments." 
(Morley, C 5116: 1887, Appendix XVI: 568) 
McGee confirmed that the work at Enfield was chiefly piece-work, though it 
differed from that in the Royal laboratory described by Colonel Barlow. 
Indeed McGee suggested that the character of piece-work at Enfield rendered 
it more easy to fix the "proper piece-work prices than at Woolwich" (Morley, C 5116: 
1887: 50), though usually it is not easy to fix the correct rate at all. McGee suggested 
that the Enfield prices only required a revisory process when improvements within 
the manufacturing process were made. He commented on the piece-work prices of 
the Martini-Henry rifle had considerably changed due to recent improvements in the 
tooling up and machinery improvements. McGee suggested that improvements within 
a manufacturing context were ongoing at Enfield. 
However, McGee stated that men at Enfield under the existing system of piece-
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rate earn 35 shillings a week, whilst others doing the same work only earn 25 shillings 
a week. He suggested that the established time and a third rule contributed to this 
anomaly at Enfield, but conceded that less supervision was now required; " ... men 
had reached the limit they would not try to do more" (Morley. C 5116: 1887: 50). 
But under this system more work was derived from machinery, McGee also stated that 
the price of piece-work is "only reduced when improvements in machinery is intro-
duced" (Morley, C 5116: 1887: 50). 
At Enfield in 1886, the men also worked a fifty four hour week, similar to 
their colleagues at the Royal Arsenal, Woolwich. The recent introduction of new 
machinery at the Enfield Rifle Factory allowed the working day to be reduced from 
ten hours to nine hours. McGee also commented that the 
"reduced cost of manufacture of rifles is chiefly owing to improvements 
in machinery. The new machine for boring rifle barrels was a Belgian 
idea, perfected by Greenwood and Batley and at Enfield. The manager 
was encouraged to improve designs to contract machinery for use in 
the factory." (Morley. C 5116: 1887: 50) 
McGee stated that the craft labour at Enfield. particularly tool-makers. fitters 
and blacksmiths, did belong to trade unions (Morley, C 5116: 1887, question 7728). 
McGee reiterated that trade union membership was passive. He knew of no foremen 
who were trade unionists. In McGee's opinion workmen who were members of trades 
union were not prejudiced in any way (Morley. C 5116: 1887: 378, question 7738). 
The only resistance to change had been quite mild. McGee reiterated the background 
to this. when "some time ago it was decided to have one man to look after two 
machines simultaneously" (used for planing Gatling machine guns). There was some 
initial resistance on the part of the men. who were trade unionists, "but they finally 
consented to do the work as required. No further difficulty had been encountered with 
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the men" (Morley, C 5116: 1887: 51). 
There is no evidence that there was any industrial action within the government 
manufacturing departments. No evidence to support this is to be found in any primary 
source evidence, including the Times newspaper. By contrast the growing industrial 
unrest at the Elswick Company during the 1880s and 1890s was regularly reported 
in the Times. Therefore McGee's observation that trade union membership in the 
government manufacturing departments was passive, is probably correct. 
The systems of piece-work at the Enfield Rifle Factory tended to be individual-
istic rather than collective. However McGee was challenged whether pressure is 
brought upon an individual to reduce their output. McGee felt that the incentive of 
bonuses suggested that each man is trying to get all he can" (Morley, C 5116: 1887: 
377, question 7717). 
But McGee did suggest that in other Departments there may have been an 
understanding "among the men that they shall not go above a certain rate". Neverthe-
less, McGee reiterated that this did not occur at Enfield for "the men are working for 
themselves and not for any union" (Morley, C 5116: 1887: 377, question 7718). In 
responding to this, McGee gave an inclination of the origins of the workforce at 
Enfield. 
"Some of them perhaps would be shoemakers, and some of them 
bricklayers, and some of them bricklayers' labourers, or some of them 
working in the fields before we get them, so that they came in with the 
intention of getting what they can." (Morley, C 5116: 1887: 377, 
question 7718) 
Adult male labour employed at the Royal Laboratory, about five sixths were 
paid on piece-work rates, single or collective. The Murray Committee recognised that 
the" 'Rowan' system of premium piece-work was used to a certain extent" (Murray, 
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Cd 3626: 1907, para. 6) . The Murray Report also commented that the Royal Carriage 
Department employed by skilled and unskilled labour on piece-work rates, either on 
individual or collective schemes (Murray, Cd 3626, para. 12) . These rates were settled 
by a special rate-fixing branch of the Carriage Department. Evidence presented to 
the Murray Committee suggested that these rates worked out at about 30 per cent more 
than the time rate fixed for each man. 
Hinton stated that: 
"An alternative method of containing wage inflation was the Premium 
Bonus system, whose acknowledged objective was 'to obviate the 
necessity of rate cutting by so arranging the piece-rates that the work-
men could never earn excessive wages'." (1973: 89; see also MUN 
5/82, Payment by Results, 1919) 
Instead of a piece being fixed for each job, a standard or basic time was fixed. Hinton 
argues that the most widespread system was the Rowan premium bonus system, which 
was devised in order that earnings could never reach double time. Also the increase 
in earnings slowed down as the worker increased his speed. Again Hinton argues that 
the Rowan system was extended particularly on the Clyde. However, Hinton confuses 
the Rowan system with the earlier Hasley system by suggesting that it was the Rowan 
system that "had originated as an American import in the late 1890s and at the Vickers 
works in Barrow". The Rowan system was initiated on the Clyde, it was not imported 
from America. Cole (1922) confirms this, suggesting that "before the war [1914], 
a few shops had introduced the premium bonus system, usually the modified Rowan 
system originally devised upon the Clyde" (1922: 64). 
Again, Hogg (1963: 906) suggests that the experimental premium bonus system 
used at the Royal Laboratory was discontinued due to its dislike by the workers and 
trade unions. This is not supported by the original evidence. however. Murray (Cd 
- 282-
3626, 1907) confinns the use of the Rowan system at the Royal Laboratory. 
The origins of the Rowan system began in 1898. being a premium bonus 
system begun in the Glasgow marine engineering finn of David Rowan and Co .. the 
actual inventor being James Rowan. The Rowan system was designed to eliminate 
arbitrary rate cutting. To achieve this, a price was fixed for each job and a standard 
or basic time was fixed. For each hour the worker saved in the operational perfonn-
ance of the job or task undertaken, he was paid some proportion over his hourly rate 
(Hinton, 1973: 89). The Rowan premium bonus system was designed in order that 
earnings could never reach double time. Also the increase in earnings slowed down 
as the worker increased his speed (Hinton, 1973: 89). This reduces the possibility 
of deliberate restriction of output, whilst encouraging the employer to increase the 
efficiency of his plant or factory (Hunt, 1951: 81). It must be noted that the Rowan 
system was only adopted in certain British shipyards at the very end of the nineteenth 
century, some three decades after similar systems had been introduced in the Ordnance 
Factories. 
There is no evidence that any deliberate restriction of output occurred at the 
government manufacturing departments. This had been stated in the Morley Commit-
tee by McGee as has been previously stated. 
However, there is some evidence that the system of piece-working as described 
by McGee to Morley tends to reflect a similar premium system as devised by Hasley. 
The Hasley premium bonus system was introduced by F.A. Hasley, an American 
engineer, who was superintendent of the Royal Drill Company of Sherbrook. Canada 
(Hunt, 1951: 79). Hunt suggests that Hasley's method was first introduced into British 
industry by Messrs. G. and J. Weir of Cathcart (1951: 79). Yet McGee's evidence 
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suggests that a similar system was universally being used at the Enfield Rifle Factory 
some years before 1890. 
At the Royal Gun Factory, the majority of the labour force reflected highly 
skilled labour who were paid mainly single piece-work rates. However for some 
operations the collective piece-work system was often adopted. Murray in 1907 
concurred with the Morley findings some twenty years previously that "the practical 
result of the system of piece-work rates is that workmen earn one-third as much again 
as they would on time rates" (Murray, Cd 3626: 1907, para. 8). 
Originally the industrial workers at the government manufacturing departments 
did not have the status of civil servants, and as such did not originally belong to any 
government superannuation scheme. Managers, foremen and writers were only 
admitted to the superannuation scheme from 1906 and all industrial workers had to 
wait until 1911 for entitlement under the National Insurance Act. 
But the workers also enjoyed benefits which were not universally in the 
contemporary private sector. Sick pay was allowed. for which the employees paid 
one penny in contribution into a sick fund (Morley. C 5116: 1887, questions 7704. 
7706). 
The following rates applied, 
"If injured, full pay for a period not exceeding three months is allowed 
on the certificate of the principal medical officer, the foreman also 
certifying that the accident was not the result of carelessness. 
If sick, the men are entitled to pay as follows:- half-pay after three 
years service, with the exception of foremen. who are allowed full pay. 
to be issued for no longer continuous period of one month. and not for 
more than two months in one year. except under special circumstances 
when the superintendent has authority to grant up to two months to men 
over 10 years service. and up to three months continuous to men over 
15 years service." (Morley, C 5116: 1887, Appendix XVI: 568). 
The origins of sick pay in the government manufacturing departments had 
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originally been approved on 9 March 1855, the War Office authorised sick pay to 
artificers and labourers in the original departments of the Inspector of Artillery and 
in the Brass Foundries (WO 47/2752, p.853). 
This was long before the Employer's Liability Act of 1894. The Financial 
Secretary to the War Office, W. Woodall in answer to a Parliamentary question in 
1894 stated that, 
"there is no intention of altering the present arrangements for injury 
pay to which all workmen of the Ordnance Factories are entitled 
although the Employer's Liability Bill now before Parliament is made 
to apply to any such workmen as if the employer was a private person." 
(The Times, 4 May 1894). 
There is some suggestion that Woodall described the injury pay scheme at the Ord-
nance Factories was the model for the Employer's Liability Bill. He commented 
further that, "There will be no objection to lay upon the table the rules of the Ord-
nance Factories under which injury pay is granted" (The Times, 4 May, 1894). 
The labour at the government manufacturing departments was not casual. 
Lewis Engelbach informed the Morley Committee that he had never known a case of 
labour being discharged from the various departments towards the close of the final 
year, due to a lack of funds to keep them in employment (C 5116: 1887, summary: 
28, and question 4147-4148: 244). 
From the evidence given to the Morley Committee, it is apparent that the 
Ordnance Factories were highly organised and bureaucratic institutions. The supervi-
sion within the government factories was not severe, whereas discipline in a workshop 
environment often was. To illustrate this, Hobsbawm quotes one of F.W. Taylor's 
disciples, "We used to drive workers but - especially if they are skilled - they do not 
have to stand it" (Hobsbawm, 1979: 358, quoting C.B. Thompson, Scientific Manage-
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ment 1914: 684). The concept of scientific management evolved from the process of 
interchangeability and the factory system. Therefore it is probable that this is why 
Ordnance Factories innocently adopted scientific management before Taylor. 
One can reflect on the comments made by Professor J. G. Smith in his introduc-
tion to Roll's pioneering study on the Boulton and Watt Foundry: "Neither Taylor, 
Ford nor other modem experts devised anything in the way of plan that cannot be 
discovered at Soho [The Birmingham factory of Boulton and Watt] before 1805 ... " 
(quoted by Urwick and Brech, 1953, vol.2: 24). Urwick and Brech clarify Smith's 
observation by suggesting: 
"What Taylor did was not to invent something quite new, but to 
synthesise and present as a reasonably coherent whole ideas which had 
been germinating and gathering force in Great Britain and the United 
States throughout the nineteenth century." (1953, vol. 1: 17) 
Indeed, Urwick and Brech suggested that: 
"A study of the methods of control practised in the Boulton and Watt 
Foundry in 1805 or described in Slater Lewis's book in 1896. suggests 
that Taylor was not so much a pioneer in a completely new field, as 
one who made a new synthesis out of old practices. He isolated and 
defined the fundamental principles underlying good management in 
industry, principles which had been applied for many decades but had 
not been fully recognised." (1953, vol. II, pp.8-9) 
One historian of scientific management suggested that there "now had to be 'a substi-
tute for the effective supervision characteristic' of the small shop" (Person, 1929, 
Scientific Management in American Industry (NY) 7, quoted by Hobsbawm, 1979: 
358). 
Thus, Hobsbawm stated that "'Scientific Management' was the result" (1979: 
358). Again Hobsbawm considers that scientific management in its: 
"initial phases ... consisted of three elements 
a) a careful analysis of the production process, its break-up into 
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simple segments and establishment of labour norms for each: 
b) a system of costing which enabled the firm to discover the 
labour cost of each operation and to keep it under constant 
observation; 
c) the elaboration of systems of incentives or supervision capable 
of making workers labour at maximum intensity. For practical 
purposes, this then meant payment by results." (Hobsbawm, 
1979: 358). 
A fourth element in the success of scientific management was by the long production 
runs of output specified to a standard design. 
This relates well to the internal economy of the Ordnance Factories as follows:-
• The use of work marks, and all expense direct and indirect were charged to 
the appropriate work mark. The team work mark could equate to what is a 
cost centre in the late twentieth century. 
• The continual use of piece-working. The control, recording and monitoring 
of the workers, suggest that there was a measured output per worker. The use 
of team working which can either contribute towards team effort and encour-
agement, or, alternatively suggest that a worker's fellow peers may be his 
police and monitoring agent. 
• The clear lines within the division of labour suggest that there was a degree 
of scientific management within the government factories. In this respect, the 
government factories tended to put more emphasis on the role of Department 
manager, than the contemporary private sector and that accounts and the 
transmission of regular financial and numerical infonnation was crucial to the 
decision making role of the Superintendent, the Assistant Superintendent and 
the Manager. The employment of mechanical writers is also suggestive that 
their role also may have included costing calculations. 
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There is also the evidence of McGee, which suggests that a number of skilled 
craft workers at Enfield by 1886, were now allowed to be members of trades unions. 
This is a reversal from the policies of thirty years previously. In particular were the 
recommendations of both the Molesworth (t 854-55) and the Monsell Committees of 
1862 and 1863 which were categorically opposed to trade union membership. The 
issue of trade union recognition is covered in the next chapter. The establishment of 
Fair Wages Resolutions from 1891 also affected government employees, particularly 
unskilled workers in the War Office or the Admiralty. 
There were differentials in piece rates and wages generally between the Royal 
Small Arms Factory at Enfield and the Royal Arsenal at Woolwich. The matter grew 
into a grievance procedure which was investigated between 1906 and 1911. In 
particular, the unskilled workers at Enfield, represented by the Small Arms Workers 
Union, complained that the differentials in payment between workers at Enfield and 
at Waltham compared to those at Woolwich and Pimlico contravened the Fair Wages 
Resolution. 
A conference in respect of the minimum wage levels for War Office and 
Admiralty employees was held on 14 February 1911 which concluded that: 
"I. The minimum rate at Enfield and Waltham should be 23/- as 
now, the report of the Admiralty Committee not justifying any 
increase. 
2. The minimum rate at Woolwich and Pimlico should be raised 
to 24/-. This would necessitate a similar rise at Deptford and 
the West India Docks. 
3. These minimum rates are to apply in future to quite unskilled 
labour only (such as fetching and carrying or sweeping and 
cleaning); all men, the nature of whose work requires them to 
display any special skill or to bear any special responsibility are 
to get more." (WO 32/9275) 
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Under the Fair Wages Resolutions, the transfer of contract or sub-letting also required 
the payment of the minimum wages as set, and the contractor was responsible for the 
observance of the Fair Wages Resolutions by the sub-contractor. There are numerous 
examples contained in the Annual Reports of the Director for Army Contracts between 
1891 and 1913, of contractors being removed from the Army Contracts Department 
list for non-compliance with the Fair Wages Resolutions. The differences in the levels 
of the minimum wage rates between Waltham and Enfield, compared to Woolwich 
and Pimlico were given as the differentials in the cost of living as calculated from the 
Board of Trade statistics. 
The general philosophy behind the government manufacturing departments 
suggests that they reflected model business ethos, rather than the contemporary private 
sector. It is worth reflecting, when considering this, the findings of the Board of 
Trade Report in Changes in Rates of Wages Hours of Labour in the UK. For the 
Industry of Engineering and Machinery Works. District XIII for Kent and Surrey 
(Extra Metropolitan). Berkshire and Hampshire. sub paragraph b) stated that. "A few 
Returns giving piece-rates were received and from these. the piece-rates appeared to 
be nearly 30 per cent higher than the time rates" (BPP. 1894. LXXXIII. Pt.2. p.56). 
It would appear from this that the piece rates were being set by the trade unions. 
notably the ASE. and not by the management. This is a complete contrast to the 
systems at Enfield and Woolwich. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the management structures and the growth of 
pieceworking within the Ordnance Factories from 1855. The scope of this chapter 
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has focused more so at the macro level of management structures and bureaucracies 
because this is where the majority of the primary source evidence lies. Little has been 
recorded which has survived the passage of time which can give an in-depth study of 
the micro factors of management within the government manufacturing departments. 
Having said this, one should not under-estimate the data which exists in 
Parliamentary select committee and other reports of the time, notably Monsell (1862, 
1863), Morley (1887) and Murray (1907), which give a clear picture of the macro 
structures of the Victorian Ordnance Factories and of the personalities behind them. 
This is equally important. Names and experiences of managers such as James McGee 
would be unknown to the future historian, save for the recorded evidence and experi-
ences to the Parliamentary Reports for 1862, 1863, 1887 and 1907. 
The following chapter explores the recommendations of the Morley Inquiry, 
and subsequent inquiries particularly during the period from the post-Anglo-Boer War 
period to 1915. Parts of the Morley recommendations were not fully implemented. 
After 1902, the effects of the Esher Reforms restructured the high command of the 
Army to reflect a twentieth-century organisation. However, at a micro-level the Esher 
Reforms reintroduced layers of bureaucracy in the system of munitions procurement 
which had previously been abandoned in 1855. The Esher Reforms together with the 
Treasury sponsored Murray Report of 1907 reflected the retrenched politics of a post-
war economy ultimately lending to the shell scandal of 1915. This concept is dis-
cussed more fully in the next chapter. 
Yet the earlier internal reforms of the Ordnance Factories. as they were to be 
known during the post-Morley era), promoted the 48 hour week (average 8 hour day) 
within the majority of government departments from 1894. In the case of the Ord-
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nance Factories the introduction of a 48 hour week was the full recognition of rational 
labour utilisation through scientific management. 
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CHAPTER 7 
'The First Flight of Employers' 
Centralisation and Industrial Relations 
in the Ordnance Factories 1887-1914 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to follow on from Chapter 6 and analyse the indus-
trial relations dimension of the Ordnance Factories. To start with. we continue with 
evidence from the 1887 Morley Committee Report. 
From the recommendations of Morley, the management structure of the 
Ordnance Factories was developed. This process took the form of centralisation of 
the management structure and the identification of an overall head of a centralised 
Ordnance Factory structure. These reforms relieved the Director of Artillery and 
Stores of overseeing the informal stopgap clearinghouse functions of the Ordnance 
Factories. 
The introduction of the 48-hour week in all but one of the Ordnance Factories 
settled both sides of an enigmatic equation. First, on one side, the management of 
labour utilisation and the need for increased productivity. on the other side was the 
consolidation and reinforcement of the trust culture, with all its prevailing attendants. 
The contemporary private sector were not so fortunate. The private engineering 
industry was becoming embroiled in a growing and acrimonious industrial relations 
conflict. Though masked in a cloak requesting for an eight-hour day, the eventual 
strike and lock out in the engineering industry dispute of 1897 was more to do with 
the machine question, the use of semi-skilled operatives. and the employer's right to 
manage. These were issues which had been resolved long before in the Ordnance 
Factories. 
The Committee of Inquiry into the Government Manufacturing Departments 
(the Morley Committee. C 5116) reported in July 1887. The final report was divided 
into three parts. 
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• The first part gives an outline of the system in operation in 1886. 
• The second part reports on the weakness in the existing system. 
• The third part of the Morley Report puts forward recommendations for 
redressing the apparent exposed weaknesses. 
The weakness of the existina system as it existed to I ~ 
• Decentralisation 
The weakness of the existing system up to 1886 has already been stated 
through the evidence of Major General Anderson, Director of Artillery and Stores, 
and his Principal Clerk, Lewis W. Engelbach. 
Again further weaknesses were exposed in the system that prevailed until 1886 
by Evan Nepean, Director of Army Contracts. Nepean in evidence to the Morley 
Inquiry reflected on the earlier Cardwell reforms when: 
"In 1868 [he] began those investigations which ultimately led to the 
formation of the present Surveyor-General's Office [Surveyor-General 
of Ordnance]. In the year 1869 I became responsible under Sir Henry 
Starks and General Balfour for the work connected with the establish-
ments of the manufacturing departments, as there had never been an 
inquiry [before] ... Sir Henry Starks was very anxious to know some-
thing about their interior economy, and he ordered a letter to be 
addressed to all heads of department, in which [he wanted to know 
about] what they did about wages, . .. what rates they paid, and 
whether their piece-working rates were much above their day rates, 
and generally speaking what their system was. That was met by the 
heads of manufacturing departments at the time with some opposition. 
They said, 'You have no business to interfere with our internal 
economy and management, and we submit that we should not be 
required to furnish any' ... 
A committee was then appointed to go thoroughly into the details. 
That committee consisted of Sir George Balfour and myself [Nepean]. 
and Mr. O'Neil, a principal clerk in the Accountant General's 
Department, who left the Service some 15 years ago. We went into 
all the manufacturing departments ... we received ... every assistance 
from the superintendents of the manufacturing departments and we 
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found that there was really nothing to conceal ... no report was ever 
made of our proceedings, but I can assure the Committee that a report 
was drafted which would have been satisfactory and favourable to the 
departments in every respect if it had been presented." (Morley, C 
5116: 1887: ch.3606-3607, 205). 
No action was ever taken on this earlier report. 
The co-ordinating level was by a very narrow level of senior management, 
through the Director of Artillery and Stores. However his parameters of 
responsibility and authority were by no means clear. The structure was sound if the 
prevailing environment was stable. Problems arose when conditions became more 
unstable, for instance producing in a war time economy or international crisis. 
The problem as stated by Nepean over the previous Balfour Report. saw the 
individual manufacturing departments becoming threatened if there was any threat of 
change, or perhaps flexibility intruding into the stability of an inflexible status quo, 
for example in a war setting. Handy (1993: 186) suggests that: 
"Organisations used to be operating in a sellers' market until the mid 
1950s, or with the state as their only customer. were quite properly 
operating as a role culture since there was a high premium on product 
reliability. and few penalties for cost or lack of product innovation." 
Handy's thesis is evident from the nineteenth century pre-Morley refonns. 
Nepean in his evidence summarised the role of the Director of Contracts concerning 
the specifications for orders which was the responsibility of the superintendents 
concerned, after approval with the Ordnance Board. The contractor could not alter. 
or restructure the order. This was in response to Messrs. Annstrong. who attempted 
to alter the specifications of a contract for gun carriages after the order had been 
placed by the Anny Contracts Department. Indeed Nepean suggested that if the 
contractors were allowed to alter specifications after contracts had been placed, this 
could be at the sacrifice of interchangeability (Morley, C 5116: 1887: questions 
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3701-3734. pp.213-214). This comment suggests that interchangeability was not 
universally practised in the contemporary private sector. 
Nepean explained to the Committee that his duty with regards to contracts 
ceases when the contract is completed. With important contracts, the Director has 
to report showing how the contract has been completed. and whether the delivering 
contractor should be recommended again for future tenders (Morley. C 5116: 1887: 
question 3740, p.214). In response to a question from a member of the Committee 
(Hon. Guy Dawney). Nepean stated that it was the head of the receiving department 
responsible for the quality of any article delivered, and that the Director of Army 
Contracts has no further responsibility in this matter. 
• The quinquennial changes of superintendents 
As the superintendents of Army manufacturing departments were staff appoint-
ments in the Army. they only held office for five years. It was considered that five 
years was not long enough for a military superintendent to acquire the knowledge of 
factory organisation and manufacturing processes. 
All superintendents however had to have passed the Advanced Class. and have 
served in the Army Manufacturing Department within a subordinate position. These 
posts were connected with inspection or instructor duties rather than administrative 
office. 
The assistant superintendents acted as deputies to the superintendents of the 
Ordnance Factories. They were civilian managers rather than military officers as 
were the superintendents. The civilian assistant superintendents had more of a 
permanent position than the superintendents and tended to be better acquainted in the 
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administrative procedures governing the Ordnance Factories. 
The five year succession of superintendents therefore meant that equally there 
was a succession of breaks. When one superintendent had been guided through the 
learning curve under the guidance of a more permanent civilian assistant superintend-
ent, then he was replaced, and the whole process had to begin again. 
Indeed the five year cycle through the learning curve was unproductive. 
First year 
Second year 
Third year 
Fourth year 
induction - mentored by Assistant Superintendent 
supervised control 
perhaps the most productive year 
complacency - the following year would be a return to 
regimental duty. 
There were advantages to the limited tenure of commissioned officers as 
superintendents of Ordnance Factories. For example, most were officers of the Royal 
Artillery and had more than a working knowledge of ordnance, artillery and the 
sciences appertaining to these speciaiisms. Many superintendents had also spent a 
large part of their military service within the Ordnance Factories both in England and 
India. 
If, however, the post of superintendents of Ordnance Factories was 
civilianised. then officers would be deprived of an incentive to enter the Advanced 
Class. Thus any scientific attainments either previously or contemporaneously gained 
by officers would generally deteriorate. Alternatively officers of the Royal Artillery 
and Royal Engineers who were some of the most highly trained officers in the Army 
would be lost if they decided to seek an alternative career in civilian life in order to 
pursue their planned career aspirations. This was a point made in Chapter 2 
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concerning fonner military officers who, through the frustration of career prospects 
in the Anny and Navy, had left the services to become railway managers. 
According to the Committee, therefore. that the government factories existed 
for supplying the Anny and Navy with warlike stores in the most efficient and 
economic manner. They were not constituted to provide well paid positions for Artil-
lery officers. The Committee also believed that if limitation were to be removed 
from certain posts connected with manufacture. there would. under new proposals. 
be a sufficient number of technical appointments which would induce Artillery 
officers to pursue their scientific studies. 
Artillery officers reflected the 'users point of view' of warlike stores. and it 
was argued that this was essential qualification for a manufacturer of such stores. 
However this may not have been technically true, a point realised by the Committee. 
The Morley Committee noted that military experience was undoubtedly of value in 
indicating broad lines of designs and in inspecting finished products. However. 
military experience tended to be of little value in manufacturing warlike stores to a 
specific design which had to undergo rigorous research and development. The skills 
and characteristics for this specialised process was more generally acquired in civil 
than in the military world. Captain Noble, who was in favour of retaining military 
superintendents, did admit in his evidence that, 
"in actual manufacture military knowledge is not of great importance 
and that the government ought to be able to command the very best 
mechanical engineering ability that is to be had. but doubts whether 
that is always the case." (Hogg, 1963: 845) 
The rationale behind Noble's argument is that the majority of the government 
manufacturing departments were staffed by civilians. However. Noble was referring 
to a similar point put forward by Engelbach, that is the appointment of a Chief 
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Mechanical Engineer. His doubts, perhaps, refer to the experiences of Engelbach in 
relation to salaries paid to the chief mechanical engineers of contemporary railway 
companies. Noble's argument possibly reflected the prevailing viewpoint within the 
War Office and supports the notion that the concept of the soldier-technologist was 
not a major influence in the broader structure of British management, unlike the 
American experience. 
• Inspection 
The Committee argued that the manufacture of munitions should be inspected 
twice: once whilst being manufactured to test quality control, the second inspection 
should occur after the munitions had left the place of manufacture. This second 
inspection was to proof and test the munitions on receipt into the Ordnance Stores of 
the Army and Navy. These inspections were required to ensure that the contract for 
manufacture met the specifications and that the public were getting value for money. 
The first inspection could be made without intruding upon the responsibility of the 
manufacturer. The reasons given by Morley included:-
a) Both the government factories and private manufacturer would test the 
material he received, as well as the manufactured commodity in oreler to 
satisfy himself as to their quality and conformity both during and after 
manufacture. Certification to the Secretary of State, to the effect that the 
finished manufactured goods conformed to requisite tests and conformed to 
contract. The first inspection should take place at the place of manufacture. 
b) All procurements produced under contract by private ordnance companies 
were transported to the Royal Arsenal for its first inspection and proofing. 
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The cost of conveyance was borne by the contractor. Despite this. initial 
inspections at the place of manufacture were undertaken by government 
inspectors {called viewers}. This procedure was enacted on the recommenda-
tion of the second Monsell Report of 1863. This procedure. however. did not 
relieve the contractor from responsibility. 
Private contractors were in a different situation to that of superintendents in 
charge of government factories. Lord Herbert. some thirty years previously had 
argued that the aim of the contractor was profit motivation. Thus it was incumbent 
on him to produce his warlike stores as cheaply as possible compatible with their 
passing inspection. 
If the contractors' products failed on service. the remedy via the Director of 
Army Contracts was to remove his name from the list of approved contractors. Thus. 
the private contractor could not afford to take undue risks. The profit motive kept 
him on the straight and narrow path. 
The government manufacturing departments did not have this inducement to 
produce cheap work. They operated in a protected market. free from competition. 
The employment of those in the government factories was long-term. and could not 
be suddenly terminated. 
Despite this apparent criticism. the superintendents of the manufacturing 
departments were subject to forms of competition in that they competed through the 
Army Contracts Department with the private sector. Indeed. the Army Contracts 
Department did form special relationships with certain private manufacturers. 
Trebilcock notes the relationship with the cordite companies (Trebilcock. 1969). 
Superintendents of Ordnance Factories were subject to presenting a proper set of 
- 299-
accounts, thoroughly audited and submitted to Parliament. Also they were under 
pressure to show that output of the Ordnance Factories compared favourably with the 
private sector. If an inspection disclosed serious defects, the Secretary of State for 
War could dismiss any official responsible for any defective article, just as he could 
remove a contractor from the recommended list of contractors held by the Army 
Contracts Department (Hogg, 1963: 848). 
The post Morley era 
The reasons for the centralisation of the Ordnance Factories from 1887 
onwards were partly to do with the increasing bureaucratisation of the command line 
and staff structure, which had first commenced after 1856 (see Chapter 3). This 
system of centralisation is also attributable to the earlier Cardwell reforms of the 
Army in general (1868-71) where the structure of command and staff level was 
centralised and the terms and engagement of Army service became more professional. 
Also the influence of the centralisation of the contemporary railway companies 
between the 1850s and 1870s may have been a contributory factor. As mentioned in 
Chapter 2, Captain Mark Huish as general manager of what was to become the 
London and North Western Railway, united three separate railway companies into one 
centralised railway company. The scale and scope of production of the Ordnance 
Companies had increased since the Crimean War. The contemporary management 
ethos by the mid-1880s favoured centralisation of large organisations, particularly as 
evident from the railway industry. 
These reforms continued during the early 1880s under Childers; also, the 
scope of weapons technology had developed and increased. Such developments were 
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hindered by a decentralised system as had existed since 1855. Almost all weapons 
components were either manufactured or tested in at least one of the Ordnance 
Factories. The manufacturing structures had to be cohesive and in communication 
in order to achieve this goal. In the contemporary private sector the structure of 
British industry was still mainly centred on the family firm or partnership. Certain 
railway companies were developing along similar lines and staff functions together 
with delegation, salaried management and the introduction of the modem costing and 
accounting concepts (Gourvish, 1980: 10) (see Chapter 1). Centralisation was not 
universal in British business structures at this point in history. 
The main thrust of the Morley recommendations was to centralise the 
organisational structure of the Ordnance Factories by creating an overall Director 
General of Ordnance Factories. The Director General would be able to co-ordinate 
the policies and operations of all government factories simultaneously. This had the 
following advantages of utilising the concepts already begun in the individual 
Ordnance Factories, notably scientific management, costing and accounting. 
particularly stores inventory accounting. Also the experience of management skills 
and knowledge was more efficiently utilised. 
The recommendations of the Morley Report of 1887 included the centralisation 
of Design, Manufacture and Accounting Clerical and Stores branches into one 
organisation based at Woolwich. 
The centralisation of the Ordnance Factories under a Director-General tended 
to reflect an earlier model of a group of companies under a holding organisation. 
Hogg suggested that the restructuring of the Ordnance Factories followed the 
Morley recommendations: 
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"On studying the Morley Report one cannot fail to be struck by the 
far-seeing nature of the reforms advocated. Although to modem ears 
the recommendations sound normal enough, they were in their day 
revolutionary . . . They drove the first wedge into the bastion of 
military control which had dominated the factories from time 
immemorial." (1963: 859). 
Actually Hogg is mistaken in his assessment. Military superintendents only 
began to be appointed into the government manufacturing departments from 18SS. 
Despite the recommendations of Morley. and the optimism of Hogg. the Ordnance 
Factories remained under direct military control until May 191 S. Initially Morley 
made no recommendation on Engelbach' s recommendation for a Chief Mechanical 
Engineer. 
The reforms when enacted during the post-Morley era did not appear so 
revolutionary as indicated by Hogg (1963: 859). Davenport-Hines also tends to be 
critical of the post-Morley reforms, particularly in those who were not implemented. 
Davenport-Hines suggests that Anderson was appointed from the private sector to 
implement the post-Morley reforms but was frustrated in these attempts due to the 
upsurge in the naval armaments programme. However, Anderson's obituary is more 
complementary : 
"he made many improvements in the details of management of the 
Arsenal, thereby removing numerous sources of waste of money, 
which his experienced eye quickly detected, and there is no doubt that 
at the time of his death the factories were working far more economi-
cally than when he took up the post." (Proceedings o/the Institution 
0/ Civil Engineers, vol.CXXXV, 1899: 323) 
However, Davenport-Hines suggests that the first DGOF Major-General E. Maintland 
CB RA, appointed in 1887, was inefficient (DBB, 1984, vol.1 (A-C: 61). He was, 
however, an experienced superintendent of Ordnance Factories. The removal of the 
CSOF Sir Frederick Hay Donaldson for apparently similar reasons of inefficiency is 
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also suggested by Davenport-Hines. However. Donaldson was a civilian and his 
removal was for political reasons rather than for inefficiency. This is further pursued 
in the next chapter. Maintland. as a senior military officer. had originally been 
commissioned in December 1851 and served with distinction in the Indian Mutiny. 
and then as military attache Constantinople. In terms of experience within Ordnance 
Factories. Maintland had previously served in the Royal Gun Factories first as an 
Inspector. then as Assistant Superintendent of the Royal Gun Factory 1872-1877. 
becoming Superintendent there from 1880 to 1887. 
was: 
Regarding the duties of Director General of Ordnance Factories. Maintland 
"charged with the administration and works as far as possible on a 
commercial basis of the Ordnance Factories at Woolwich. Enfield. 
Waltham and Birmingham. He submits estimates of the expenses 
necessary to carry out orders he may receive for Army. Navy. India 
and Colonial Services. and prepares accounts of expenditure incurred 
by the factories for audit in the Finance Division and submission to 
Parliament. He makes an Annual Report to the Secretary of State 
through the Finance Secretary to the War Office." (War Office Staff 
List, 1888: 37, PRO Library). 
There is no evidence to suggest that Maintland was not up to the job and he 
took normal retirement in 1890. Davenport-Hines also claims that military appointed 
DGOFs were cheaper to employ. He compares Maintland's annual salary of £1.800 
against Anderson's salary of £2,500. In his argument, Davenport-Hines suggests that 
the appointment of military DGOFs was more popular with the Treasury as they were 
cheap, but the reverse is true and Davenport-Hines had not considered that the 
military superintendents, DGOFs and other military staff employed in the Ordnance 
Factories in fact received two salaries: they received their full entitlement to a 
military salary. together with superannuation rights. However, their civilian salaries 
- 303 -
for duties with the Ordnance Factories did not have superannuation rights. thus their 
dual salaries would make them more expensive to employ than their civilian 
counterparts. Davenport-Hines suggests that the apparent cheapness of military 
superintendents. DGOFs resulted in a military CSOF superseding Anderson (DBB. 
1984, vol. 1 (A-C): 6). However, Colonel Sir Edmund Bainbridge CBI was a retired 
Royal Artillery officer and was in effect a civilian appointee. I 
In 1890 the office of Surveyor General of Ordnance was abolished, and the 
duties taken over by the Financial Secretary to the War Office, a political office. 
Also in 1899, a Chief Mechanical Engineer was appointed for the first time. 
some eleven years after it was recommended by Engelbach in evidence given to the 
Morley Inquiry. The first Chief Mechanical Engineer was Hay Frederick Donaldson. 
The role of the chief mechanical engineer had evolved from the original Deputy 
Director of Ordnance Factories. Donaldson had also previously been Superintendent 
of the Royal Small Arms Factory. 
The duties of the Chief Mechanical Engineer were to: 
"give[s] such advice and assistance as he may deem necessary, or may 
be asked for by the Chief Superintendent, or by the Superintendent of 
Factories, on all matters relating to the introduction, extension, 
improvement and maintenance of all machinery and appliances in the 
Ordnance Factories. He has free access to the Ordnance Factories 
workshops and other buildings and reports to the Chief Superintendent 
on the general character and output of work with special reference to 
speed and feed, piece-work rates, wages, quality and cost of labour, 
and advises generally as to the most economical methods by which the 
work can be carried out. He reports direct to the Chief Superintendent 
who, if the recommendations involve the saving or expenditure of 
money transmits them to the Financial Secretary through the Chief 
Colonel Edmund Bainbridge CB, appointed CSOF 18 February 1899. Bainbridge 
was a retired officer of the Royal Artillery whose previous military service had 
included extensive periods with Ordnance Factories including Inspector of Warlike 
Stores at Portsmouth and on the staff of the Royal Laboratory including as 
superintendent from 1892 to 1899. 
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Superintendent and the Director General of Ordnance." (War Office 
Staff List 1899: 39). 
Most superintendents of Ordnance Factories from the time of the Morley Report in 
1887 to 1900, remained mainly military officers. However, after the Murray 
Committee Report (Cd 3626: 1907), the post of Chief Mechanical Engineer and Chief 
Superintendent were merged. Also the number of posts of superintendents were 
halved as follows:-
The Royal Gun and Carriage Factories 
Superintendent, Colonel C.P. Martel RA 
The Royal Gunpowder and Small Arms Factories 
Enfield and Birmingham 
Superintendent, Lieutenant Colonel F.T. Fisher RA 
This rationalisation is characteristic of the philosophy behind the Treasury 
sponsored Murray Committee Report. The rationality reflects cost cutting rather than 
cost efficiencies. For example there were closer links behind the Royal Laboratory 
and the Royal Gunpowder Factory than with the Small Arms factories. 
Morley made no recommendation as to the piece-rate working, or the hours 
worked. However the major change in the post-Morley era was the reduction of the 
daily time of working in the Ordnance Factories except the Royal Gunpowder Factory 
from a 54 hour week to one of 48 hours a week in 1894, when it was sanctioned by 
the Secretary of State for War, Campbell-Bannerman. 
In assessing the nineteenth-century reforms of the Ordnance Factories. the 
Morley Committee Report is an important landmark within these reforms generally. 
The decentralised system of the Ordnance Factories. as advocated by the earlier 
Monsell Reforms of 1862 and 1863. had some 25 years later become anachronistic 
in structure. Morley's recommendations for a centralised system and the removal of 
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the Ordnance Factory vote from the general Army vote in Parliamentary accounts was 
agreed. 
However, not all of Morley's recommendations were put into effect. The 
superintendents of the individual Ordnance Factories were not civilianised and the 
political office of the Surveyor-General of Ordnance (which Morley recommended 
should become "the supreme controller of supply and inspection") was abolished in 
1890 (Hogg, 1963: 870). 
Nevertheless, the implemented reforms as advocated by Morley brought the 
structure and management of the Ordnance Factories together in what was then a 
modem production factory. The increase in artillery and ballistic science as well as 
weapons technology were better served by the restructured Ordnance Factories, to the 
benefit of the public. However, the recommendations of the Morley Report also 
acted as a catalyst for the industrial relations reforms of the Ordnance Factories which 
reflected the War Office as being in the first flight of employers. 
'The First Flilht of Employers' • the War Office as the model employer 
In an amendment to a motion in the House of Commons on 6th March 1893 
Sir John Gorst expressed the 
"opinion of this House [thad no person should in Her Majesty's Naval 
establishments be engaged at wages insufficient for a proper mainten-
ance, and that conditions of labour as regards hours [etc.] ... should 
be as such as to afford an example to private employers throughout the 
country. " (WO 32/9275) 
The Secretary of State for War, Henry Campbell-Bannerman, responded by 
stating that "the Government should show themselves to be amongst the best 
employers of the country ... [that is] in the first flight of employers" (WO 32/9275). 
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However, relatively unskilled labour, notably gas stokers and dockers, had 
been successful in attaining an eight-hour working day during the 1880s after some 
protracted strike action (Hobsbawm, 1979: 367). Previously, in 1872 attempts had 
been made to unionise gas stokers which resulted in widespread strikes. but the South 
Metropolitan Gas Company was the only company unaffected. The managing 
director, Sir George Thomas LivesyZ had introduced a weekly Is.6d good time 
money bonus and had abolished Sunday working during the same year (DBB. vol.3 
(H to L): 813). 
In March 1889 under the growth of 'new unionism', Will Thome had founded 
the Gas Workers' Union, with the major objective of pursuing an eight-hour day for 
gas stokers, who were working a twelve-hour day. Livesy, on behalf of the South 
Metropolitan, agreed to the terms of the eight-hour day but only reluctantly 
acquiesced to double time for Sunday working. Although in respect of the South 
Metropolitan the terms for Sunday working were academic only, as this had been 
abolished seventeen years previously, though Sunday working was commonplace in 
the contemporary gas industry generally (DBB, vol.3 (H to L): 814). 
In assessing the introduction of the eight-hour day in the Ordnance Factories 
in particular, and in the public sector generally, was not achieved through any threat 
of industrial action. Rather, it was achieved through a benevolent Liberal 
Government, together with the support of the management of the Ordnance Factories. 
The model for this may have been due to the paternalistic practices of certain 
Victorian entrepreneurs such as Sir George Livesy. There were economic advantages 
Z Sir George Livesey (1834-1908) - see DBB, vol.3 (H to L), bibliography by Francis 
Goodall, pp.813-17. 
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for an eight-hour working day. both in the public and the private sectors. Gas 
companies who agreed to the terms of the Gas Workers Union were persuaded to 
adopt a system of three eight-hour shifts in a twenty-four hour period rather than the 
two twelve-hour shifts then worked (Hobsbawm. 1979: 355). 
But there was considerable opposition to the eight-hour working day in both 
the public and private sectors. In politics. the major criticisms came mainly from the 
Conservative benches and those who were entrenched in the prevailing classical 
liberal philosophy which argued that greater labour efficiency would result in higher 
wages earned for shorter hours worked. Therefore. the critics assumed that the cost 
of labour would be higher than the market could afford. thus it was assumed that in 
the long term this would result in redundancy and unemployment. Neither did the 
entrepreneur in the gas industry. nor the Victorian politician. who was guardian of 
the contemporary taxpayer. want to raise his costs unless he was confident of 
recovering them. 
Therefore. much of the Parliamentary opposition to the 48-hour week for 
government employees also came from the Conservative benches. who moved that it 
would be detrimental to the public purse. It was assumed that. as in the argument 
against reforms in the gas industry. either more labour would have to be employed 
to achieve the same level of output obtained through a 54-hour week. or alternatively 
production would fall. 
However. the overall effect of attempts to introduce an eight-hour day in the 
private engineering industry was less successful. The great engineering strike and 
lockout of 1897 was probably encouraged by the TUC and ASE due to the success 
of the unskilled New Unionism representing dockers and stokers. and the Liberal 
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Government's policy of introducing an eight-hour day into the public sector. 
The critics were proved wrong: the overall results showed that: 
"the aggregate changes achieved were in fact small, and indeed 
negligible when compared with the major periods of adjustment. 
Hence the Board of Trade reported in 1901, that 'the total effect of all 
the changes during the eight years (1893-1900), if spread over the 
whole working population, is quite insignificant, amounting to less 
than ten minutes per head per week' . " (Board of Trade. Reports on 
Changes in Rates of Wages and Hours of Labour', BPP, 1900, 
vol. LXXII; Bienefeld, 1972: 150-151) 
The introduction of a 48 hour week into the Ordnance Factories in 1894 was 
at the latter part of the Great Depression. Hobsbawm considers the era of the Great 
Depression, and the changes in the pattern of work and working hours as "the 
beginning of the substitution of rational for empirical 'intensive' utilisation, or of 
scientific management" (1979: 356). 
However, Campbell-Bannennan was also quick to establish that although the 
Government wished to reflect the principle of a model employer which could be 
emulated in the private sector, in his opinion "we do not take it to mean they [the 
Government] should embark in new experiments far ahead of general practice" (WO 
32/9275). 
Campbell-Bannennan's statement laid the foundation for a 48-hour working 
week in most central and local government departments. This included most of the 
Ordnance Factories where a 48-hour working week was introduced during the early 
part of 1894. The exception was the Royal Gunpowder Factory. which. "owing to 
the dangerous nature of the operations or in the care required. it is undesirable to 
increase the hourly output" (SUPP 5/126 2836; BPP. 1896. vol.LXXX, Pt.l. p.ixx). 
The introduction of the 48 hour week into the Ordnance Factories is 
contemporaneous with the ASE argument for an eight-hour day in the private 
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engineering industry. Indeed. reflecting in 1999 on the transition within the working 
structures in the Ordnance Factories from 1894. and the deteriorating labour relations 
in the private engineering industry. one is struck by the similarities which span one 
hundred years. In April 1998 it was announced that proposals will commence to 
transpose into U.K. law. the European Union working time directive. to come into 
force by October 1998. Part of this Directive states that workers need not work more 
than a 48 hour week averaged over four to twelve months (The Financial Times. 9 
April 1998). 
However. the earlier transition of the Ordnance Factories from 1858. including 
management control of labour utilisation. was promoted by the restrictions placed 
upon them. particularly through Treasury control. Yet it is worth reiterating the 
argument that the Ordnance Factories did not trade in a free capitalist market. They 
could only operate in a restricted market. But this market was not protected. as 
ordnance procurement was contracted under the two-thirds rule. Again the Treasury 
consideration towards the Victorian Army and Navy expenditure were not generous. 
neither would the Treasury be over-generous in application of extra public funding 
to either the Admiralty or the War Office. 
Therefore the Ordnance Factories operated under a fairly harsh environment 
with limiting and finite resources. In order to achieve their objectives. given the 
restrictions as outlined. the criteria of management and efficiency developed more 
rapidly than it did in the private sector. 
The eiaht-hour day in the private enaineerina industry 
The growing demands for an eight-hour day in the private engineering industry 
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were symptomatic of deeper causes. notably the machine question. Many engineering 
industries and workshops during the 1890s reflected a craft orientated system 
governed and controlled by skilled craftsmen. inflexible to change. 
Originally the role of a millwright practically encompassed the function of an 
engineer. in all its parameters. However by the mid-nineteenth century other skilled 
labour had been accepted into a closer bond by the traditional millwrights. who 
allowed the 'lesser fellows' to join their union. the ASE. 
Such skills included fitters (or as they were contemporarily known by. filers). 
Other skilled workers who emerged from the mid-nineteenth century onwards. 
included turners and blacksmiths. From 1850 onwards. Britain began to lose its pre-
eminence as. 'the Workshop of the World'. and during the following decades 
witnessed recurrent unemployment in the engineering industry as a whole. The years 
between 1860 and 1870 were particularly severe when the margin of unemployment 
in the engineering industry was 16 per cent. From 1880 to 1890. this margin had 
increased to 26 per cent (Burnham and Hoskins. 1943; Clarke. 1957). 
By the 1890s. the management and employers of the private engineering indus-
try were concerned about labour utilisation. Interchangeability was being introduced 
into many companies for the first time. and the Hasley system of premium bonus 
systems was being introduced by numerous engineering companies in Britain (Hunt. 
1951: 79). The growing crisis in industrial relations in the private engineering 
industry reflected more about "the principle of freedom of employers in the 
management of works" than the symptom of an eight-hour day. as argued by the ASE 
(Clarke, 1957: 130). 
A number of engineering employers had formed the Federation of Engineering 
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Association, later changed to the Engineering and Allied Employers' National 
Federation (Clarke, 1957: 130). This Employers' Federation was part of a: 
"sense of industrial concentration which helped to teach labour that the 
'industry' rather than the 'master', singly or in small or local groups 
was the force which confronted it in industrial warfare." (Hobsbawm, 
1979: 220) 
Again the Employers' Association grew in the era of the Great Depression, as did the 
concept for the right of employers to manage. Other employers' associations fonned 
in this period included the Shipping Federation. 
The engineering employers were becoming more and more frustrated over the 
hostility shown by ASE members, in allowing piece-working to be introduced. Many 
local ASE district branches placed limitations on such schemes, and would fine 
members who worked above a locally ASE set rate. Within the private engineering 
industry piece-rate fixing was complicated due to differing local rates reflecting 
regional patterns. The transition of the industry itself had altered the character of the 
traditional divisions of labour. Employers were engaging unskilled hands, who could 
be trained as productive machine operatives in a matter of weeks. This was often 
achieved very effectively and cheaply through the 'sit by Nellie' system. There is 
evidence to suggest that many 'unskilled' machine operatives produced output of 
better quality and quantity than a skilled (craft orientated) operative. The ASE 
insisted that only skilled craftsmen, at craftsmen rates, should be employed as 
operatives despite the 'deskilling' process (Clarke, 1957: 131). 
However, despite the ASE protestations, the Engineers "followed the machine" 
(Hinton, 1973: 61). Hinton points out that by 1914: 
"a substantial proportion of the work perfonned by craftsmen at the 
craft rate required little of their skill", a measure of how far the 
engineers had succeeded in 'following the machine'... The ASE 
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defence of the standard rate rested increasingly on bluff." (Hinton, 
1973: 61) 
The reason in part for craft engineers 'following the machine' in the view of Cole 
was the spread of piecework. Craftsmen were attracted to less skilled work through 
the incentive of earning what, in many cases, was well above the ASE district set rate 
for piecework for repetition production (Cole, 1923: 165-6). This was probably more 
inflationary than an incorrectly set piece rate. 
Rate-fixing was nonnally arrived at between the management and the 
individual engineering worker. Clarke suggests that rate-fixing at this time (during 
the 1890s) was in its infancy, and suggests that the piece-working system was often 
abused (1957: 132). Whilst not disputing this, both rate-fixing and piece-working 
were at an advanced stage as experienced in the Ordnance Factories. No system of 
abuse was admitted to the Morley Committee of Inquiry of 1887 (C 5116), 
particularly in relation to the evidence given by James McGee, manager of the 
Enfield Rifle Factory, as stated in the previous chapter. 
Cole, writing in the post-1918 era, stated that: 
"In most branches of the British engineering and kindred industries, 
and particularly in those in which the skilled workers are mainly 
engaged, the position was before the war, and still to a very great 
extent remains, essentially different. Piece-work and other fonns of 
payment have not been introduced into these industries under national 
agreements between the big trade unions and employers' associations ... 
Where they have been introduced. it has been shop by shop. and often 
job by job. and without any collective trade union regulation beyond 
the insistence that the district standard time-rate of wages shall be paid 
to every skilled worker engaged under a system of • payment by 
results', irrespective of his output." (1922: 12-13) 
Indeed, Cole admits that: 
"The introduction of payment by results. in any or all of its fonns, has 
been made, as a rule. in the face of more or less definite opposition 
from the engineering trade unions. It was one of the principal issues 
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in the great national engineering lock -out of 1897." (1922: 13) 
Equally, the era of the Great Depression "produced a national and interna-
tional socialist movement, which inevitably provided many of the most intelligent and 
dynamic leaders of the new unions" (Hobsbawm. 1979: 221). 
Though not a new union, the ASE replaced its otherwise conciliatory general 
secretary in 1896, with George Barnes, a militant. in the mould of Tom Mann and 
John Bums, who were also associates of Barnes. The attitude of Barnes and the ASE 
was to preserve the status quo of craft skills and labour demarcation. This was 
despite the growing competition from Germany and America. 
The eventual conflict in the private engineering industry came in 1897, in the 
disguise of a claim from the London Branch of the ASE for an eight-hour day, or 48 
hour week to replace the existing nine hour day or 54 hour week. The engineering 
dispute was neither popular with the press or public, and a plethora of correspondence 
was published in The Times between 1897 and 1898. This correspondence was 
generally critical or hostile to the ASE and its leadership, which would be expected 
in The Times. 
One letter, the author of which describes himself as "an Old Trade Unionist 
of Many Years", refers to what may have been the crucial grievance of the ASE, by 
suggesting that there was a curtain containing the eight-hour argument concealing the 
major question in the dispute, that being the 'machine question'. He suggested a 
compromise. The engineering employers agreeing to an eight-hour day or 48 hour 
week, and the ASE in agreeing the withdrawal of their restrictions on the use of 
machinery (The Times, 7 September 1897). This was the model of the working 
arrangements at most of the Ordnance Factories, and the anonymous writer to The 
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Times may have gained the idea for his argument from the practice conducted at the 
Royal Arsenal, Woolwich. 
The focus of correspondence to The Times commented on the use of machinery 
in America where 
"the introduction of labour saving machinery [facilitates] its 
economical working and ... so far from the use of such machinery 
decreasing the demand for labour and lowering the rate of wages. the 
contrary effect." (The Times, 7 September 1897) 
Little mention was made of the Ordnance Factories, in the contemporary 
press. Also subsequent historians of the dispute have made no significant comparison 
between the private sector engineering industry and the public sector Ordnance 
Factories. Cole only gives the briefest mention of the Royal Arsenal at Woolwich 
(Cole, 1922: 18 and 84). Clarke again only referred to the Ordnance Factories and 
the eight-hour day briefly in his paper, suggesting that only "a handful of finns had 
adopted the 8-hour day, and in 1893 it was introduced in certain Government work-
shops" (1957: 132). 
However, the General Secretary of the ASE, George Barnes in a letter to The 
Times compared and contrasted "the Speed and Feed" men at the Elswick Company 
with Woolwich Arsenal, as follows: 
"What we protest against is the wretched espionage which degrades 
both the worker and the watcher and while by doing so defeats its 
object. At Woolwich Arsenal better work and more of it is turned out 
with speed and feed men, and everywhere output is increased rather 
than diminished in proportion as men are treated with consideration. 
The fact is that the Elswick Company have started a system, and are 
seeking to extend its application, which is based on the notion that 
workmen are rogues and cheats, and we believe that such a system is 
bound to fail in the long run ... " (The Times, 9 September 1897) 
Barnes may have been incorrect in his assessment of the Royal Arsenal, Woolwich 
and the absence of speed and feed. On the appointment of a chief mechanical 
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engineer in 1898, one of his duties was to oversee the Ordnance Factories "with 
special reference to speed and feed, piece-work rates, wages, quality and cost of 
labour" (War Office Staff List, 1898: 37). 
The comparison made by Barnes is important in that it reflects the manage-
ment styles at the Elswick Company and at the Royal Arsenal. Woolwich. Indeed. 
it tends to equate with McGregor's concept of Theory X and Theory Y. The idea 
that concepts of Theory X and Theory Y existed in industry before McGregor is 
apparent. McGregor may have only isolated an existing management practice which 
had existed for decades. This is similar to the principles of the development of 
scientific management, referred to in the previous chapter, which Urwick and Brech 
(1953, vol.2: 8-9) and Hobsbawm (1979: 355-362) had argued existed long before 
Taylor. 
The Ordnance Factories and the forty-eilht-hour week 
The introduction of a 48 hour week at the Ordnance Factories was a reflection 
of patterns of rational intensive utilisation through elements of scientific management 
which had previously been conducted at the Ordnance Factories. 
The implementation of the 48 hour week was phased into the Ordnance 
Factories from early 1894. The Accountant General, W.H. White in a hand-written 
memorandum implemented the scheme where "the Secretary of State has approved 
the adoption of a nonnal working week of forty-eight hours. in the Ordnance 
Factories where it is found practicable to adopt it" (SUPP 5/126). 
Where there were reductions in hours, nonnally to an eight-hour day during 
the 1890s, it was enforced through government intervention, rather than by either 
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industry or the trades unions. Bienefeld states that: 
"large number of reductions agreed to by the authorities determining 
the hours of various groups of government employees, including 
43,000 who were granted an eight-hour day in 1894." (1972: 152) 
The Board of Trade Report for 1896 identifies these employees as follows: 
"Of the total of 43,895 Government employees whose hours were 
shortened, 43,039 had their hours reduced to 48 hours per week: 
Occupation Number of Number of persons Corresponding 
reductions whose hours of number for 1893 
labour were reduced 
Government 14 43,895 134 
employees 
Police 3 117 602 
Employees of 27 2,301 910 
local authorities 
Totals 27 46,313 1,646 
(BPP, 1896: vol.LXXX, Pt.l, p.ixv) 
The Government Employee figure was broken down as follows:-
"The following table classifies the 43,895 workpeople in government 
employment whose hours of labour were reduced among the various 
Government Departments. 
Department Number of workpeople whose Average number of 
hours of labour were reduced hours reduced per week 
Admiralty 24,263 2.49 
War Office 18.977 5.79 
Post Office 518 9.50 
Other departments 137 4.81 
Total and averages 43.895 4.00 
(BPP, 1896. vol. LXXX. Pt.l. p.ixv) 
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Other workers were also given the eight-hour day. through statutory 
legislation, notably textile workers under the Textile Act 1902. 
Most of the Ordnance Factories in the last decade in the nineteenth century 
were located in the greater London area. The introduction of an average eight-hour 
day into the Ordnance Factories in 1894, when compared with the contemporary 
private engineering industry within the London area reflects marked contrasts. The 
Board of Trade Report comments on this:-
"Engineering and Machinery Works, District XII. London: 
... the hours of labour were generally 54 per week, but in a few works 
the hours were more. Stationary engineers, warehouse hands, store-
keepers, timekeepers, watchmen and carters usually worked longer 
hours than other employees. II (BPP, 1893, LXXXIII) 
Campbell-Bannerman's decision to introduce an average eight-hour day or 48 
hour week was only part of an overall policy of government to introduce a shorter 
working day into numerous government departments. 
The reasons for the 48-hour week at the Ordnance Factories were due to a 
number of factors. In assessing these reforms, one must be aware of the 
contemporary reforms in the public sector generally. The overall reforms may have 
been as a response to the prevailing labour problems faced in the private sector and 
with the growth of the rise of New Unionism. However. Campbell-Bannerman was 
also aware of the emerging crisis within the engineering industry and the growing 
militancy of the ASE. 
A large percentage of the Ordnance Factories workforce were skilled workers 
to varying degrees and many belonged to the ASE. Union membership by 1894 was 
tacitly accepted by the War Office (see McGee's evidence to Morley, 1887 (C 5116), 
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question 7738: 378). By allowing a 48-hour week in the Ordnance Factories, 
Campbell-Bannennan split the ASE in the London area. This was similar to Livesy's 
policy by restructuring the working day into system of three eight-hour shifts at the 
South Metropolitan Gas Company. The company was not directly affected by the gas 
strikes elsewhere in London. 
Other engineering companies also allowed an eight-hour day, profit sharing 
schemes and bonus systems equal to those experienced in the Ordnance Factories. 
Jeremy states that "between 1865 and 1912 a total of 199 profit-sharing schemes were 
started" (Jeremy, 1998: 449). Certain railway companies along with food, 
confectionery and beverage manufacturers based their employment systems on a 
paternalistic structure. This tended to be the case if the company founders / directors 
belonged to certain religious groups such as the Quakers, and the experiences of the 
Fry and Cadbury companies are an example of this: alternatively, where the industry 
dominated a town, as for example railway engineering and towns such as Crewe and 
Swindon. 
In tenns of Swindon and the Great Western Railway (GWR), the town had 
been selected in 1841 by BruneI junior as the site for the company's central repair 
depot. The GWR built a model village, a church, chapel, shopping centre, gardens 
and a cricket ground for its employees. Again. mindful of improving the technical 
expertise of present and future employees. the company built a hall and library for 
the Mechanics Institute, where educational. literary, musical and other social pursuits 
were held. The GWR was influential in the politics of Swindon, including the School 
Board. Water Board and technical education. Two chief mechanical engineers of the 
GWR, Dean and Churchward, were very influential in the development of technical 
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education in Swindon. 
Both Swindon and Woolwich are examples of one-industry towns. The Royal 
Arsenal had the same effect on the politics of Woolwich, together with the Mechanics 
Institute, church and, until 1904, the Royal Arsenal had its own elementary school 
for the children of its workers. A town's reliance on one industry survived or 
declined according to the industry's fortunes. Ashworth (1969) noted this with a 
naval dockyard town such as Portsmouth, and Williams (reprinted 1984) with 
Swindon. In 1907 there were provisional plans to remove the Royal Arsenal to the 
Midlands. The people and politicians of Woolwich led a campaign to prevent this. 
A committee was established, chaired by Arthur Henderson, to assess the effects such 
a move would have on the economics of the Woolwich area and the plans were 
eventually abandoned. 
Other benefits including sick pay existed in numerous industries during the 
1880s. Sick pay was administered through sick clubs, through which employers and 
workers contributed (Jeremy, 1998: 452). Similar schemes also existed in the 
Ordnance Factories at an earlier period (in the 1850s). McGee explained to the 
Morley Inquiry that a sick pay scheme existed at the Enfield Rifle Factory whereby 
the workers contributed a penny a week to a sick fund (Morley, 1887 (C 5116), 
questions 7704 and 7706: 377). 
. Also seasonal variations played a crucial part in the transition from a 54 hour to 
a 48 hour week. 
There is a signed collective document from the Forgers Branch at the Royal 
Carriage Department addressed to the Superintendent who in their application: 
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" ... of the undersigned of the Forgers Branch RCD respectfully beg 
that you will take the following into your kind consideration in respect 
to the working of 48 hours per week. Ordnance Factories. Viz: That 
we should be allowed to commence work at 6am during that period of 
the year in which no artificial light would be required; and that during 
the remaining period work should commence at 8am. We would urge 
in respect to the commencing of at 6am. that we should be able to be 
working at a time when the heat of the sun would not be so oppress-
ive. and to men who have to contend against the heat of large fires. 
and furnaces, as well as that of the sun, this would indeed be a great 
boon. We would also respectfully ask, that the dinner hour should in 
no case be altered from the present system. Trusting that you will 
take the above into favourable consideration. we beg Sir. to remain 
Your Obedient Servants." (SUPP 5/126) 
This petition is undated, but is signed by one hundred forgers at the RCD. in 
five columns of twenty names each. No one person identifies themselves as a spokes-
person, and the names are not in alphabetical order. 
This petition obviously did not instigate the 48 hour week. but it probably 
accelerated policy already under consideration. The later start meant the first shifts 
began work in light and work stopped just before twilight. British summer time did 
not exist in 1894, but was temporarily introduced as a war-time policy during the 
First World War. The major reason for these radical changes were concerned with 
efficiency and economic performance, and this is a major example of the 'intensive 
utilisation' policy designed at co-ordinating greater output. In terms of labour 
relations, the overall policy of the 48 hour week is also concerned with costings, and 
the two elements combined relate very much to scientific management. 
The change to a 48 hour working week also established a more efficient 
method of labour utilisation and quality of production. This was more noticeable at 
the Royal Arsenal at Woolwich. Prior to the changeover to an eight-hour day the 
majority of piece-working at the Ordnance Factories was on a premium piece-rate 
method, similar to the Hasley system. This was because there was a breakfast break 
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of one hour, some two hours after the start of the working day. 
The hours of work under the original system of 54 hours a week was as 
follows: 
Old hours Monday to Friday Saturday Total per 
Thursday week 
Morning 6 to 8 6 to 8 6 to 8 
54 hours 
9 to 1 9 to 1 9 to 1 
Afternoon 2 to 5.30 2 to 6 --
Total hours 9 th 10 6 
per day 
(BPP, 1896, LXXX, Pt.I, p.ixx) 
The breakfast break of one hour, allowed two hours after the commencement 
of the working day was not efficient in terms of labour utilisation. energy. machine 
working. fuel and lubrication. Also local custom at the Royal Arsenal saw many 
workers frequent public houses during the breakfast hour. Campbell-Bannerman 
defended the introduction of the eight-hour day which in the short-term would reflect 
on increase of expenditure in wages, but in the longer term would accrue savings, 
particularly in fuel, light, lubricants and general wear and tear through "the increased 
energy of the workmen, and lastly by the prevention of lost time owing to the 
suppression of the breakfast hour (hear, hear)" (The Times. 4 May 1894). 
There is no direct evidence to suggest that a drink problem existed at the 
Royal Arsenal before 1894 although the potential for a problem may have been 
apparent. Campbell-Bannerman probably repressed this potential problem, which 
could have affected production and efficient output, very successfully through the 
introduction of an eight-hour day. Also, the restructured 48-hour week reduced the 
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stress and fatigue of the labour force. The elimination of an idle hour and less 
fatigue resulted in fewer rejections at the inspection stage in the factories by the 
viewers. 
The work of analysing and tabulating the rates of wages paid to workers in the 
Ordnance Factories was begun in 1892. By May 1893, this research was at a well-
advanced stage. The Financial Secretary, in answer to a Parliamentary question, 
confirmed that no specific minimum wage rate had ever been accepted by the 
Government (The Times, 25 April 1893). The Financial Secretary was Mr. W. 
Woodall who, in 1887, had been Deputy Chair of the Morley Committee. 
There were numerous objections made in Parliament to the introduction of a 
48 hour week at the Ordnance Factories, particularly from the Conservative benches. 
They held similar views previously aired by the management of the contemporary 
British gas industry as outlined previously. By May 1894. Woodall confirmed to 
Parliament that the 48 hour week had been satisfactorily introduced at the Royal Gun 
Factories, and the Royal Laboratory. The forty-eight-hour week had included all but 
three hundred men at the Royal Arsenal, Woolwich. These three hundred men were 
employed on continuous operations. But these three hundred men only represented 
just over two per cent at Woolwich (The Times, 4 May 1894). 
Woodall also confirmed that the new 48 hour week had been introduced with 
the full cooperation of all concerned, despite considerable operational upheaval of the 
individual departments concerned. However Woodall expresses his disappointment 
that overall, the War Office did "not at present see its way to apply the eight-hour 
schedule to departments which worked under continuous operations of a twelve hour 
schedule" (The Times, 4 May 1894). 
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The imposition of an average eight-hour day was made on workers paid 
through piece-work, nor had the price of piece-work been reduced "since the hours 
of labours had been reduced" (The Times. 4 May 1894). This statement made by 
Woodall was an attempt to allay Conservative fears that the eight-hour day would 
reduce productivity whilst simultaneously increasing workers wages. The protagon-
ists argued that for the same output more would have to be employed. The reforms 
of the working hours at the Ordnance Factories actually increased the quality of 
output whilst stabilising the wages bill. 
Defending his junior minister, Campbell-Bannerman reiterated that he did not 
anticipate that "any additional workmen will be required as a result of reducing the 
working hours to forty-eight hours a week" (The Times. 4 May 1894). 
The new hours at Woolwich came into force on 26th February 1894. These 
were as follows and reflected 11,790 workers. 
New hours Monday to Friday Saturday Total hours 
Thursday per week 
Morning 8 to 1 8 to 1 8 to 12.40 
Afternoon 2 to 5.40 2 to 5.40 
Total hours per day 8% 8% 4% 48 Hours 
(BPP, 1896, voI.LXXX, Pt.l, p.ixx; supp. 5/12642863) 
The 48 hour week was also extended to the Inspection Department at the 
Royal Arsenal, Woolwich, which affected 701 employees. Here the new opentional 
hours were phased in from 26 February 1894 for the majority of the employees, and 
completed for the whole Department by 12 March 1894. 
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Old hours Monday to Friday Saturday Total hours 
Thursday per week 
Morning 6 to 8 6 to 8 6 to 8 
9 to 1 9 to 1 9 to 1 
Afternoon 2 to 5.30 2 to 6 
Total hours per day 91h 10 6 54 Hours 
New hours Monday to Friday Saturday Total hours 
Thursday per week 
Morning 8 to 1 8 to 1 8 to 12.40 
Afternoon 2 to 5.40 2 to 5.40 
Total hours per pay 8% 8% 4% 48 hours 
(BPP, 1896, voI.LXXX, Pt.t, p.ixx) 
There were certain categories of employees who were not included in the 48 
hour a week scheme, at the Royal Arsenal, Woolwich: 
"To these hours, the necessary exceptions will be made in some cases 
such as stokers where their duty has always hitherto required a more 
prolonged attendance than the 54 hours, and also in such Factories 
where the hours of work are governed by the seasons (in particular the 
Royal Laboratory), and are not absolutely the same all the year round, 
or in which owing to the dangerous nature of the operations, or in the 
care required, it is undesirable to increase the hourly output" (this 
refers mainly to the Royal Gunpowder Factory). (SUPP 5/12642836; 
BPP (1896) voI.LXXX, Pt. 1 , p.ixx) 
The evidence of stokers employed at the Royal Arsenal from the 48-hour week 
seems somewhat unusual, given that the crucible of the 48-hour week was the gas 
stokers strike and the earlier changes in working conditions by Livesy at the South 
Metropolitan Gas Company. The eight-hour day had been introduced by operating 
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a system of three eight-hour shifts. There is no explanation as to why a similar 
system could not have been introduced into the Royal Arsenal, particularly the Royal 
Laboratory . 
However, J.A.C. Hay, who had designed the Royal Small Arms Factory at 
Enfield and the Royal Gun Factory, also designed and constructed two gas works. one 
which supplied the Royal Arsenal, the Royal Artillery Barracks and the Military 
Hospital at Woolwich, and the second which supplied the Royal Military College at 
Sandhurst. Part of his duties as Inspector of Machinery at the Royal Arsenal was also 
superintendent of the gas works at Woolwich Arsenal. In evidence to the Morley 
Committee, Hay admitted that the South Metropolitan Gas Company, which supplied 
the Borough of Woolwich, made gas at Is.llhd per 1,000 cubic feet, compared to 
Is.9d at the Arsenal gas works. Hay stated that although the South Metropolitan Gas 
Company manufactured ten times as much gas, he considered that the Arsenal gas 
works did not compare unfavourably with it. Part of the Arsenal's problem was the 
length of the mains laid to supply the Royal Herbert Military Hospital on Shooter's 
Hill Road. This was two miles from the Arsenal site and up an incline. According 
to Hay, this was a major factor in the higher price differential between the Arsenal 
gas works prices and that supplied by the South Metropolitan Gas Company. Hay 
refuted that the quality of gas as supplied in the Arsenal's gas works was equal to that 
supplied by the South Metropolitan, despite earlier evidence to the contrary given by 
General Close. 
Hay, in evidence to Morley, commented that up to two years previously the 
coal supplied was of inferior quality and insufficient sizes of the gas mains both 
having caused low gas pressure. By 1887. however. Hay admitted that the inferior 
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coal supply had been rectified and he was personally responsible for the quality 
control of the coal supplied for the manufacture of gas. The gas mains were still a 
problem, however. Applications had been made to enlarge the gas mains but, at the 
time of the Morley Inquiry, Parliamentary approval was still awaited (Morley. 1887 
(C 5116), questions 4007 to 4146, summary of evidence: 27-28). 
In terms of efficiency and in the interests of the public, the War Office via the 
Morley Report could have considered privatising the supply of gas to Woolwich 
Garrison to the South Metropolitan Gas Company, thus making considerable saving 
to the public. No such recommendation was made, however. 
At Enfield, the number of employees affected was 1,800 and the new hours 
came into operation on 26 February 1894. The change of hours at the Sparkbrook 
Rifle Factory, Birmingham, including the Inspection Department at Bagot Street, 
Birmingham, were identical to the new hours at the Royal Arsenal. Woolwich. rather 
than at Enfield. However. on representation from the Superintendent of the 
Birmingham Rifle Factory, the hours were immediately changed to equate with 
Enfield. The Times reported that. "in deference to the strong representation of the 
Superintendent of the Sparkbrook Factory", the Financial Secretary "altered the hours 
of work at Birmingham to agree with those of Enfield instead of Woolwich" (The 
Times, 8 March 1894). 
The new changes did not affect the Royal Gunpowder Factory at Waltham 
Abbey. This complex included the cannon, cartridge and rocket factories. The 54-
hour week remained. due to the dangerous of the production process and the care 
required in successfully operating an explosives factory. Indeed. the 54-hour week 
included both day and night shifts, the shell forges, and the shell and brass foundries. 
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and in most of the smithery (SUPP 5/126 'Reasons for Excepting the Royal Gun-
powder Factory from the Eight-Hour Day'). 
Despite this the Manager of the Cordite Factory at Waltham Abbey, James M. 
Thompson, submitted a paper to the Superintendent arguing for a two shift system at 
the Cordite Factory rather than the three shift system. This would. in effect. reduce 
the working week for the Cordite Factory only. from a 54 hour week to a 49 hour 
week. 
Thompson argued that the advantages of a two shift system would have the 
accompanying advantages:-
" 1. No electric light required after 11 pm 
2. A saving of steam power 
3. Saving in wear and tear of shafting and machinery and in oil 
for some 
4. When No.2 Guncotton stove is ready. the no. of men taken on 
will be reduced by about 10. 
I would propose that all on shifts work Monday. Tuesday. Wednesday. 
Thursday and Friday from 6am to 3pm and 2pm to llpm. and on 
Saturday 6am to lOam and 9am to 1 pm = 49 hours per week." 
(Supp. 5.431) 
This scheme was approved by the Accountant General on 5 October 1893. and 
came into force some weeks prior to the 48 hour week in the remaining Ordnance 
Factories. This memorandum by the manager of the Cordite Factory shows the 
professionalism of the factory managers, as previously demonstrated in the Morley 
Report. 
Hourly-paid workers and clerical staff 
However in all cases where the men were paid on daily or hourly rates. it was 
policy after the introduction of the eight-hour day. that no worker would receive a 
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lesser amount of money for working 48 hours than he did for working 54 hours. 
Therefore for this type of worker. the introduction of a 48 hour working week meant 
in effect that he received a pay increase of one eighth of the "present hourly ratings 
at which the men are entered on the books" (SUPP 5/126 42836). The daywork 
rating used in the calculation of holiday pay. sick and injury pay. superannuation. and 
non-effective allowance of persons employed on piece-work was similarly raised. "so 
as to give the same rate of pay for a 48 hour week as would hitherto have been issued 
for a week of 54 hours" (SUPP 5/12642836). 
There appeared to have been a change since Monsell 1863, and Morley of 
1887 which confirmed that industrial workers in the Ordnance Factories were not 
superannuated, as they received the full market price for their labour. However in 
relation to piece-work prices. no increase was made in these as a consequence of the 
reduced hours of working. 
Regarding the hours for clerical writers who were paid from the Wages Vote. 
they were now paid for 42 hours a week, instead of the original 45 hours, made up 
as follows:-
Monday to Friday 
Saturday 
9am to 1 pm and 2pm to S.3Opm 
9am to Ipm 
Any overtime attendance given by these writers did not count for extra time 
payment until the normal Factory hours had been worked. 
The pay for workers and writers was also allowed if any of the Ordnance 
Factories were closed for any period. The time lost no longer had to be worked-up. 
Pay was issued as for free holidays. This condition did not apply to writers, assistant 
foremen, foremen and those of higher rank. 
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Overtime 
Overtime for each of the first two hours in anyone day was calculated as an 
hour and a quarter. Every additional hour work thereafter was calculated as an hour 
and a half. However extra time was not counted until the total weekly number of 
ordinary hours had been made up (SUPP 5/126). these conditions and the eight-hour 
day were officially introduced in February 1894. 
The concept of Theory Y management is also apparent from the first call time 
check of the men coming to work. They had to deposit their metal ticket into the 
appropriate box placed close to where they worked. From 1894. a second call was 
made two hours after the first call. "so that men late for the first call would have a 
second chance" (Supp. 5/126 42836). This applied to mornings only. No second 
check was allowed in the afternoon. 
Some workers at the Royal Arsenal worked in outlying shops. They were 
taken to and from their work by the military railway from near Plumstead Gate. 
Their check tickets were collected as they entered the train. when their paid day 
began. During the return journey from work the trains began before the end of work 
and the men deposited their tickets at Plumstead Gate on the termination of their 
journey (SUPP 5/126). 
The introduction of the 48 hour week at the Ordnance Factories and the 
standardisation of overtime procedure. resolved the previous concerns expressed by 
Hurst to the Morley Committee some eight years previously. 
The transition of a 48 hour week from an original 54 hour week also included 
the Royal Army Clothing Department. which affected 535 men and 84 women 
workers, and the Ordnance Stores Department at Woolwich. This affected 696 men 
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and 27 women workers. 
The 48-hour week was successfully operated in the Ordnance Factories for 
twenty years. However. the onset of the First World War in August 1914 obviously 
radically transformed the working structure there. 
Industrial relations at the Royal Arsenal Woolwich· the leJacy or the nineteenth 
century 
Women were employed from time to time within the Royal Arsenal and the 
Ordnance Stores Depot since 1855. They were mainly employed in the paper factory 
making cartridges or employed in shell filling within the Royal Laboratory. The 
nature of this work was the major role of women workers employed at the Royal 
Arsenal during the First World War. Although women workers were not a 
pennanent feature of the regular workforce at the Ordnance Factories before 1914. 
women workers were regularly employed at the Ordnance Stores Depot on the 
Arsenal site at Woolwich and its sub-depot at Woolwich Dockyard. Evidence from 
the 1907 Murray Committee (Cd 3626) suggests that a few women were also 
employed at the Royal Laboratory. However, Murray did not quantify the number 
of women employed. This is despite the suggestion in the official history of the 
Ministry of Munitions, that "the use of female labour at the Arsenal had been stopped 
... many years before" (History of Ministry of Munitions. 1922. Part 1. p.14). 
Although the Murray Committee did not attempt to quantify the actual 
numbers of women employed at the Royal Laboratory. nor describe the work they 
undertook. it is assumed that they were employed in shell filling "with a considerable 
number of boys" (Murray, Cd 3626. 1907. para.6). 
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It is not the purpose of this thesis to examine in depth industrial relations at 
the Royal Arsenal Woolwich during the period of the First World War. two broad 
points have been identified by Hinton (t 973) concerning industrial relations at the 
Royal Arsenal between 1915 and 1918. These are: 
• Women and 'dilution' were successfully deployed into the labour force at 
Woolwich from 1915; and 
• The lack of industrial militancy with the Woolwich trade unions. particularly 
the ASE from 1914 to 1918, compared with the contemporary private sector. 
Hinton has not recognised two prevailing characteristics about the nineteenth-century 
legacy of industrial relations at the Royal Arsenal. This legacy was the reason for 
the easy transition of women workers and the rather less militancy displayed by the 
ASE at Woolwich during the First World War period. 
By May 1917 one third of the total workforce at the Royal Arsenal were 
women (this represented between 25,000 to 26,000 women workers out of a total 
workforce of 74,467). Most of the dilution took place in the Royal Laboratory. This 
was the traditional area of women workers. The work itself involved shell filling and 
cartridge manufacture. The History of the Ministry of Munitions suggests that fewer 
women were employed at the Gun and Carriage Departments as "being less suited to 
women" (History of the Ministry of Munitions, vol. VIII, Pan II, Ch.l. p.16). In 
1917 about 1,150 women were employed in the Gun Factory, representing 30% of 
the total workforce. However, according to Hinton only 0.4% of the workers in the 
Carriage Department were women (1973: 179). 
The official history of the Ministry of Munitions suggests that the smoothness 
of the dilution of labour at the Royal Arsenal Woolwich was because of the excellent 
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relationships in labour relations at the Arsenal. Hinton has suggested that this was 
due to the acceptance of the shop stewards' committee at Woolwich. 
"The smoothness with which dilution was introduced probably reflects 
the fact that already, before the war, the skilled workers had built up 
a shop stewards' committee and gained recognition for it." (Hinton, 
1973: 180) 
This, however, may not be the principal reason for the smoothness of the 
dilution process at Woolwich. The Royal Arsenal had a culture of accepting women 
workers since the nineteenth century. It probably was this factor which affected the 
Woolwich Shop Stewards' Committee and allowed the smooth transition of women 
workers into the Royal Arsenal in 1915. 
The second point concerns the concept of interchangeability. Interchangeabil-
ity, craft dilution and the principles of scientific management were also part of the 
culture of the Ordnance Factories having been introduced and developed since the 
mid-nineteenth century, whereas in 1914 the contemporary private engineering indus-
try was still coming to terms with them. Hinton explained that the "apostles of 
scientific management had long claimed that modem engineering production could 
dispense with them" (1973: 97-98). 
This had already been achieved in the Ordnance Factories, particularly at 
Enfield and Woolwich where the craft skills had been reduced. In the private sector 
Hinton explained that "new jigs attached to lathes. and other machines. turned skilled 
work into almost foolproof machine minding ... speed and feed tables replaced the 
experienced judgement of craftsmen" (Hinton. 1973: 98). 
The transition of Enfield and Woolwich into factory-orientated engineering 
units also had an effect on the development. acceptance and recognition of trade union 
membership and attitude. Earlier, evidence given by James McGee to the acceptance 
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of trade union members at Enfield without recognition rights was stated. At the time 
McGee was giving evidence to the Morley Inquiry of 1886-87. McGee's testimony 
suggested that the War Office tacit acceptance of trade union members without con-
ceding to bargaining or recognition rights had moved considerably since the mid 
nineteenth century. Both the Molesworth Committee (1855) and the first Monsell 
Committee (1862) tended to reflect some hostility to trade union membership. 
By the time of the Morley Inquiry, trade union membership was accepted by 
the War Office although trade unions were not recognised for bargaining purposes. 
As stated earlier in this chapter, McGee had stated to the Morley Committee that no 
worker was prejudiced in respect of trade union membership (Morley, 1887 (C 5116), 
question 7738: 378). 
Acceptance did not necessarily mean recognition for bargaining purposes. 
However, in March 1906 H.F. Donaldson (the Chief Superintendent of Ordnance 
Factories) wrote to the Secretary of State for War in order to clarify points raised at 
a previous meeting. Haldane's reply clarified two principles which were previously 
agreed: 
"(1) that men or trade union officials on their behalf should be able 
to come and discuss matters affecting a class with me, or with 
an informal advisory committee here, and 
(2) that on these matters and on individual cases men or trade 
union officials should have access to you or to the 
Superintendents as is most convenient, whether the officials of 
the unions are actually employed in the factories or not, and 
whether or not the men concerned are actual members of the 
unions." 
It was also confirmed by Haldane that "we could not accept the claim that when once 
a union had taken up a case there was to be no further communication between the 
managers and men" (WO 3217051 - letter by Haldane, 9 March 1906, to H.F. 
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Donaldson CSOF). 
In matters of recognition. dialogue and acceptance of trade unions. the Ord-
nance Factories did reflect a model employer ethos whilst accepting the current 
market rate for labour on a regional basis. Many private sector organisations paid 
well below what was deemed to be the current market rate for labour and did not 
allow trade union representation nor an eight-hour working day. These factors tended 
to be the cause of the industrial unrest of 1911112 in the private sector. 
The almost tacit recognition of trade unions within the Ordnance Factories 
eventually led to the creation of the first Shop Stewards' Committee at the Royal 
Arsenal, which was recognised by the Army Council at the War Office in November 
1912. Cole stated that: 
"Probably the most powerful pre-war (1914) works organisation of 
trade unions and the most fully recognised in practice by the trade 
unions to which the members belonged. was the Royal Arsenal Shop 
Stewards Committee at Woolwich... This. however. was recognised 
as an exceptional case, and had little influence on the position else-
where." (1922: 18) 
The founder of the Royal Arsenal Shop Stewards' Committee was Tom Rees. a fitter. 
By 1914 Rees had been elected as full-time London District Secretary of the ASE. 
Rees was influential in developing the shop steward system under District Committee 
control throughout London District. This Committee was representative of the skilled 
engineers within the Arsenal site (Hinton. 1973: 180). Five years later. in July 1917, 
there were between 110 and 130 shop stewards from the various departments on the 
Royal Arsenal site, which regularly met together monthly. The Committee elected 
an Executive of seven members "which conducted all negotiations with the manage-
ment" (MUN 5/53; Hinton, 1973: 180). 
The development of the Shop Stewards' Committee at the Royal Arsenal cut 
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through the layers of bureaucracy that existed between the War Office and its various 
departments. "The gained direct access to the highest levels of management" 
(Hinton. 1973: 180). "There was no beating about the bush with managers. shop 
managers or foremen: they went directly to the Supervisor (sic) or Chief Supervisor 
as required" (Woolwich Pioneer. 19 November 1915: Hinton. 1973: 180). 
However. Hinton does not give any reason for this recognition or success of 
the collective agreements between the recognition of the Shop Stewards' Committee 
and the War Office. This tacit acceptance of trade union followed by full 
recognition. was due to the reforms of the Ordnance Factories in the nineteenth 
century. This included the introduction and application of machine tools. piece-
working which also included longevity of employment. sickness benefits and eight-
hour working day since 1894 and. more latterly. superannuation. The results of these 
tend to reflect reskilling through old craft boundaries (Cooper. 1984: 223). rather 
than deskilling as postulated by Braverman (1998). who suggested that such schemes 
led to short-term employment contracts, lay-offs and long-term unemployment. This 
was not the case at the Ordnance Factories. These benefits. representing the concepts 
of a philanthropic state employer. had hardly been touched upon within the 
contemporary private engineering industry. which still fought battles with the ASE 
over craft tradition and control of the workshop. 
These two areas of conciliatory acceptance of dilution and the less militant 
structure of the ASE at the Royal Arsenal is a complete reversal of what occurred 
elsewhere in the engineering industry. As Hinton aptly describes: 
"The fact that wartime dilution threatened not only the economic 
security of craftsmen but also the spiritual values that lay at the heart 
of their world outlook goes some way to explaining the ferocity of 
their militancy and their readiness at least to tolerate a leadership 
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which publicly attached revolutionary goals to this militancy." (1973: 
98) 
However, there was some militancy at the Royal Arsenal and indeed there was 
an episode of industrial action early in 1914 when a fitter called Entwhistle refused 
to work a job with non-union (ASE) labour. Another underlying factor for the lack 
of militancy within the Royal Arsenal Shop Stewards Committee was the elevation 
of a militant shop steward, Tom Rees, to the appointment of London District 
Secretary to the ASE, which was outside the remit of the Royal Arsenal, Woolwich. 
During the First World War, the general Workers Union (WU), recruiting 
unskilled labour at Woolwich, was formed. Despite initial support between the ASE 
and WU in 1916, later issues soured this relationship, resulting in both unions 
reflected sectionalism which is a marked characteristic of British trade unionism. 
However, the Royal Arsenal branch of the ASE did participate in the strikes of May 
1917, supporting colleagues in the private sector over the withdrawal of trade cards 
and the increased use of dilution. Despite this, Hinton pointed out that "subsequently 
... the Woolwich engineers caused no serious trouble for the government" (1973: 
185). 
The Royal Arsenal Shop Stewards' Committee did not even provide a platform 
from which the more militant London Works Committee could be launched. This 
was because of "the unique position that the Woolwich engineers occupied outside 
normal collective bargaining procedures" (Hinton, 1973: 185). This too was due to 
the legacy of the nineteenth century reforms of the Ordnance Factories and the 
established collective bargaining structures with the Army Council. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the period from the publication of the Morley 
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Report in 1887 to 1914. In this period the structure and management of the Ordnance 
Factories were centralised, which enabled the individual reforms of each government 
factory to be co-ordinated into the whole system. This was more evident with the 
stores inventory system. Again an overall DGOF was akin to the managing director 
of a company. The Director General had close communication with the Secretary of 
State for War and with Parliament, who were analogous to the shareholder body of 
a similar company in the private sector. 
The period from 1890 onwards also witnessed some remarkable labour 
relations innovations within the Ordnance Factories, including the eight-hour day and 
flexible labour. The issue of women workers had much bearing on these reforms as, 
particularly with the Royal Arsenal at Woolwich, its success with 'dilution' 
production and restraint from militancy during the First World War, had much to do 
with the legacy of the reforms of the nineteenth century. 
The next chapter examines the nineteenth-century legacy of the Ordnance 
Factories compared to the almost temporary experiences of the wartime Ministry of 
Munitions, particularly in relation to costing and DEB. Recent research into account-
ing and the First World War, particularly in relation to the Ministry of Munitions 
(Loft, 1986, 1988, 1994; Marriner, 1994) have left gaps as to the origins of these 
reforms. The next chapter addresses these, arguing that the origins of costing and 
DEB in the Ministry were part of the legacy of the nineteenth-century reforms of the 
Ordnance Factories. 
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CHAPTERS 
Re-inventing the wheel? 
The Legacy of the Ordnance Factory Reforms 
compared to the Temporary Experiences 
of the Ministry of Munitions 
in relation to Costing and DEB 
Introduction 
In May 1915, the Ministry of Munitions of War was created as a temporary 
wartime measure. The role of the new Ministry was to control, manage and adminis-
ter the supply of all procurement for the armed services deemed to be munitions. The 
first Minister of Munitions was David Lloyd George, who had previously been 
Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
The objective of this chapter is to argue that the previous reforms within the 
Ordnance Factories initially were not practised by the Ministry of Munitions. but were 
either ignored or forgotten. Evidence put forward in the Chapter 4 suggested that 
costings and DEB had been introduced into the Royal Arsenal, Woolwich from 1862 
onwards by J.C. Hurst and H. W.S. Whiffin, the Assistant Accountant General. There 
is no evidence to suggest that these reforms had been removed by 1915. 
Yet the official, though unpublished History of the Ministry of Munitions 
indicates that DEB was only introduced into the Ministry in March 1917, and costings 
later in 1917 (voI.3, pt.I, ch.3, p.80). No reason is given for the apparent demise 
of the Ordnance Factory reforms prior to 1914. The reason why the official History 
of the Ministry of Munitions ignored either intentionally or through ignorance the pre-
1914 reforms may have been due to the retrenched Treasury policies towards the 
Ordnance Factories between 1904 and 1914. These policies have been either misun-
derstood or ignored by later writers of the period. including Lloyd George (1938), 
Adams (1978), Loft (1988, 1994) and Trebilcock (t 975). 
This chapter includes the evidence of the retrenched policies which by 1914 
had reduced the reserve production capacity of the Royal Arsenal Woolwich to almost 
zero effect. The Ministry of Munitions was operating in a wartime corporatist 
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economy, a point which is sometimes not totally stressed either by Marriner (1994) 
or Loft (1994, 1998). When considering the merits or otherwise of the Ministry, one 
should take note of the wartime environment in which it operated. The aim of all 
major departments of state was to win the war. For example, Wolfe stated that: 
"The sole preoccupation of the Ministry of Munitions. the Shipyard 
Labour Department of the Admiralty. the Contracts Department of the 
War Office and even of the Coal Controller's Department ... was with 
the war." (1923: 297) 
Indeed, Harris had earlier said of war that it was most unbusinesslike (1911: 60). a 
point noted in Chapter 3. However, the pre-1915 Ordnance Factories existed in a 
liberal-orthodox iaissez1aire economy, which acted as a catalyst for them to achieve 
the maximum levels of efficiency through internal reforms. The results of these 
reforms were hampered through the external Treasury-driven committees between 1904 
and 1914, who were preoccupied with achieving short-term economies. 
There is evidence to suggest that the formation of the Ministry of Munitions 
in 1915 did inherit the original reforms of the Ordnance Factories. Loft (1994), in 
her paper on accountancy and the First World War, leaves gaps as to where certain 
skills in costing may have originated. This chapter presents the argument that the 
reforms did permeate from the pre-1914 Ordnance Factories. This argument is 
supported, where possible, by primary source data. Although this data is not substan-
tive, the corollary of all the evidence suggests that Ordnance Factories were the source 
of the subsequent reforms of the Ministry of Munitions, as identified by Loft (1994). 
Also, Sir Charles Harris, in evidence to an immediate post-1918 internal committee 
on the performance of the Ordnance Factories, hinted that the pre-1914 reforms were 
not continued in the Ordnance Factories when under the administrative control of the 
Ministry of Munitions from 1915 to 1919 (MUN 4/6375). 
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There are limitations in the scope of evidence relating to this chapter. In 
particular there is insufficient documentary evidence to produce any collective biogra-
phy of military superintendents of the Ordnance Factories during the nineteenth 
century up to 1914. Part of this deficiency has contributed to the sometimes negative 
regard to the Ordnance Factories in relation to the contemporary private sector. This 
was mentioned in the previous chapter, and in particular the biography of Sir William 
Anderson by Davenport-Hines (DBB, 1984, vol.3 (A-C): 61-63). Few military 
superintendents qualified for a Times obituary notice. Major-General E. Maintland 
CB, RA, the first DGO of the Ordnance Factories, retired into obscurity in 1890 and 
died at Cheltenham in 1911. Unlike his successor, Sir William Anderson, Maintland 
was never afforded the privilege of a Times obituary. 
However, one of the few military superintendents who was so honoured was 
General Edward Mourrier Boxer, FRS. Boxer spent most of his career in the Royal 
Laboratory (being superintendent there from 1860 to 1879) where he invented a 
number of improvements to ballistic science including the Boxer fuse cartridge. for 
which "he was the recipient of a special grant from Parliament" (The Times. 11th 
January 1898). But this contrasts with the bibliographical details in the Dictionary 
of Business Biography of George Kynoch, the ammunition manufacturer, who is 
accredited with a similar invention (DBB. vol.3 (H-L): 630-2; see also Chapter 5). 
Boxer gave evidence to the two Monsell Committees (1862 and 1863) and to the 
Morley Committee in 1886. 
Most military superintendents of the Ordnance Factories. both in Britain and 
India, belonged to the Royal Artillery or the Royal Engineers. The common denomi-
nator in respect of initial military education of both gunner and sapper officers was 
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the RMA Woolwich. as previously described in this thesis. The major source of 
biographical infonnation for both the senior military and civilian staff of the Ordnance 
Factories are the War Office Staff Lists held in the PRO Library. The biographical 
infonnation within them only relates to their military or War Office career. Infonna-
tion of early history. where educated or family connections. is rarely given. but many 
military and civilian officials of the nineteenth century Ordnance Factories were just 
as innovative as Boxer. or as their contemporaries in the private sector. A number 
of senior military superintendents were Fellows of the Royal Society. as was Boxer. 
Others. particularly senior civilian officers. belonged to the Institution of Civil 
Engineers or the Institute of Mechanical Engineers. No official was a qualified 
accountant and it was very rare to find one in the War Office Staff Lists until the late 
1950s (see Judge. 1981). 
In order to amplify the comments made in the previous paragraph. it is worth 
looking at three civilian managers in the Ordnance Factories during the second half 
of the nineteenth century. The source for this information is the War Office Staff 
Lists held at the PRO Library. Henry Joseph Butter was appointed as manager within 
the Royal Carriage Department from 1873 and held this post until he retired in 1890. 
Butter had originally been appointed as schoolmaster to the Royal Arsenal School in 
March 1856. He became a draughtsman in the Royal Carriage Department in April 
1862 and Constructor in June 1868 (War Office Staff List. 1891: 182). 
Harry Travers (War Office Staff List. 1894: 227). a contemporary of Hay. was 
in 1898 superintending engineer and constructor of shipping at the Royal Arsenal. 
Travers began his career as an apprentice in the Royal Carriage Department. becoming 
a draftsman there in 1877. Travers was elected to the Institute of Mechanical Engin-
- 342-
eers in 1888 (War Office Staff List, 1898: 326). 
John Allen had entered the Royal Carriage Department as an artificer in June 
1839, becoming master artificer at Malta in July 1852. Allen served in Malta through 
out the Crimean War. He was transferred to the Royal Dockyard, Devonport in 
March 1861. In May 1866 Allen returned to the Royal Carriage Department as 
Second Constructor in May 1866, becoming manager in June 1868. Allen was the 
inventor of a self-acting brake for artillery (which is still used today by King's Troop, 
the Royal Horse Artillery). He retired in April 1873 (War Office Staff List, 1873: 
124). 
The 'servile state' • the beainninp of a corporatist state 
The argument of this thesis has concentrated on the efficiency of the Ordnance 
Factories in relation to the evolution of professional management developments which 
mainly came from civil servants and civilian engineers cum managers. By the time 
of the second Anglo-Boer War the Ordnance Factories were more efficient in the 
production of munitions and annaments than the contemporary engineering I metal 
industry. The Ordnance Factories themselves existed within the political liberal 
doctrine of laissez-faire and the management refonns were both externally and 
internally linked. What must be borne in mind, particularly when assessing the post-
1904 events described later in this chapter, is that the military superintendents and the 
civilian managers did not have total autonomy in the decision-making process of the 
Ordnance Factories. They were also governed by their political masters. 
No war is ever efficient in tenns of cost and production. nor are wars accurate-
ly predicted in tenns of their duration. This is despite the evidence of historical 
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precedent. notably the Crimean War and the American Civil War. Neither are the 
costs of war correctly budgeted. This was as true in 1899 as it was in 1914. In 
relation to the second Anglo-Boer War. the Treasury in 1899 "calculated that the cost 
of the war would not exceed £10m and expected to recoup most of this from a swift 
annexation of the Transvaal gold mines" (Trebilcock. 1975: 147). By January 1900 
the Royal Arsenal Woolwich "had to work a seven-day week and a three-shift day ... 
and it had to add £lh million worth of equipment to its capital stock" (Trebilcock. 
1975: 147). Yet the Royal Arsenal fared far better than the private sector between 
1899 and 1900. The political remit of the Ordnance Factories in time of war was " ... 
only required to provide a rapid initial increase in output - by 50 per cent within the 
first four to six weeks of hostilities" (Trebilcock. 1975: 147). However, the Royal 
Arsenal continued the increased 50 per cent production rate throughout 1900 despite 
the political objective, requiring it only "to carry the burden of munitions demand only 
at the commencement of the war" (Trebilcock, 1975: 147). 
The political rationale was to allow time (up to six weeks) for the private sector 
to ratchet up its production capability to meet the munitions demand for the Anny in 
the field. This did not happen either in 1900 nor in 1915. The private engineering 
I metal industry in Britain in 1899 was not logistically capable of meeting this demand. 
The craft workshop mentality generally prevailed. Engineering managers were 
constantly concerned with the monitoring and control of labour in order to diffuse what 
was still an acrimonious industrial relations arena. 
The Ordnance Factories had resolved these problems some forty years earlier. 
However, the outcome of the second Anglo-Boer War was not totally satisfactory to 
the Ordnance Factories which, despite their 50 per cent increase in munitions output, 
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also failed to meet the procurement demands for the Anny in South Africa. In fact 
the Ordnance Factories were politically penalised for their relative success compared 
to the private munitions factories who were rewarded for their relative failure. In spite 
of the retrenchment which followed from 1904 to 1914. the Ordnance Factories were 
still very efficient in tenns of management. The initiatives put in place from 1862 
remained in place and were there when the Ordnance Factories were transferred from 
War Office control to the Ministry of Munitions in 1915. The creation of the Ministry 
of Munitions was as a direct response to the failure of the ratchet policy. which had 
failed both in 1899 and again in 1915. By 1915. however, the era of laissez-faire was 
being quickly superseded by the corporatist state. 
The decade from 1904 to 1914 witnessed a massive rise in public expenditure 
due to the cost of the South African war and to the emerging servile state. The 
meaning of the tenn 'servile state' suggests that there was a growing encroachment 
by the state into the affairs of the private sector. From the last decades of the 
nineteenth century the state became involved in the labour market. bringing in the 
eight-hour day under the Fair Wages Resolution. as described in the previous chapter. 
By the first decades of the twentieth century to 1914, the state was becoming increas-
ingly involved in trade union legislation (1906), social security (1909). labour 
exchanges (1909) and National Insurance (1911). Also. from 1905 the largest element 
for the defence budget was naval expenditure, in order to finance a major naval 
reannaments programme. In tenns of small anns manufacture. the War Office began 
to place more orders out to contract. The private annaments industry which had fared 
so badly in procurement supply during the second Anglo-Boer War were encouraged 
to expand. 
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Until the second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) only the Royal Small Arms 
Factory at Enfield and its two satellites at Birmingham supplied the Army and Navy 
with small arms on a regular basis. with the weapons made on the process of inter-
changeability. 
It was just prior to 1899 that the BSA factory received large orders for the 
production of the magazine-fed Lee Metford rifle and. with the development of the 
machine gun. new firms such as the Gatling Gun Company were formed. able to 
produce machine guns through mass production. For BSA this was the first large 
Army contract they had received since the Snider conversion some thirty years 
previously. 
From 1904 a number of other private arms manufacturers were established 
including the Naval armaments factory called the Coventry Ordnance Works in 1904. 
Warren states that: 
"The origins of the Coventry Ordnance Works are to be found in the 
engineering economy of the West Midlands in the 1880s and 1890s 
when traditional trades were being replaced by new lines connected first 
with the booming cycle business and later with the early motor indus-
try." (Warren. 1998: 140) 
Part of the reason for the establishment of the Coventry Ordnance Works was due to 
changes "in Admiralty procurement policies" who were "encouraging an ability to 
provide a comprehensive heavy armaments package" (Warren. 1998: 141). 
The Coventry Ordnance Works were associated with the shipbuilders John 
Browns and Cammell Laird, who wished to secure more comprehensive orders for 
naval capital ships in the face of competition from Vickers. However. the Coventry 
Ordnance Works were not a total success and the company nearly went into liquidation 
in 1912. The first two pre-1914 managing directors, Herbert Mullinger and Captain 
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Reginald Bacon, RN were not successful in either obtaining naval contracts nor in 
managing the Coventry Ordnance Works. 
Captain Bacon had been on the staff of the designs committee. which had 
drawn up plans for the Dreadnought class of battleship. He became the first captain 
of HMS Dreadnought. From 1907 to 1909 Bacon became director of naval ordnance 
and torpedoes, succeeding Jellicoe and was described by Fisher as "the cleverest 
officer in the Navy" (Warren, 1998: 148). He was not so clever. however. as 
managing director of the Coventry Ordnance Works and lacked "the conception of true 
business-like management" (quoted by Warren. 1998: 152). However. the First World 
War intervened and Bacon was recalled to the Royal Navy. duly tendering his resigna-
tion as managing director of the Coventry Ordnance Works in January 1915 (Warren. 
1998: 155).1 
The Coventry Ordnance Works was saved from liquidation by Charles R.F. 
Engelbach. who was the son of Lewis W. Engelbach CB. formerly Principal Clerk 
to the Director of Artillery, Woolwich and Assistant Accountant General at the War 
Office. Engelbach junior had become a premium apprentice at Armstrong Whitworth 
at their Elswick factory where he specialised in the manufacture of naval gun turrets 
and the development of reinforced steel. In 1906 Engelbach was commissioned into 
the newly formed Royal Navy Voluntary Reserve (RNVR) with the Tyneside Division 
as an engineering officer. 
In August 1914 Engelbach was RNVR Inspector of Marine Engines at Grimsby 
and then posted ashore primarily to manage the 4.7 Howitzer Division of the Coventry 
Bacon became Second Commandant of the Royal Marine Artillery and commanded 
a heavy howitzer brigade of the Royal Marine Artillery with a Naval Brigade (BEA 
France, 1914-15. Later, Bacon commanded the Dover Patrols. 1915-18 and was 
promoted to Vice Admiral and knighted (Who Was Who. 1919: 88). 
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Ordnance Works. Engelbach quickly rose to managing director of the now state-
owned Coventry Ordnance Works and turned the company around from near-disaster 
to a successful munitions producer. For these services Engelbach was awarded an 
OBE (Civil) in March 1920. 
In the 1920s Engelbach became perhaps one of the most successful and 
innovative production engineers of his generation. Engelbach was instrumental in 
saving the Austin Motor Company Ltd from the hands of the Receiver (DBB, 1984: 
288-90; PRO ADM 337/117). The success of Charles Engelbach as an engineer and 
manager may have been due to his father's experiences at Woolwich in the latter part 
of the nineteenth century and the close proximity of the Royal Gun Factory. The Gun 
Factory at this time also produced naval ordnance and Engelbach junior may have had 
access to the factory. 
In addition, the establishment of the Territorial Force in 1908 increased the 
demand for small anns, as the new Territorial Army was equipped to the same 
standard as their Regular Army counterparts, unlike previously with the volunteer 
movement. 
Hinton argues that the origins of the corporate state began after the second 
Anglo-Boer War, with the origins of the servile state (1973: 30). In particular was 
the establishment of the Labour Exchange system. Hinton states that: 
"Here it was not the integration with business that was most striking, 
but the continuity with the institutions of labour control erected by pre-
war Liberal governments." (Hinton, 1973: 30) 
According to Wolfe, writing in the immediate post-1918 era, the statutory establish-
ment of the Labour Exchanges Act (1909) and the National Insurance Act of 1911 
were examples of the servile state. Both Acts had anticipated an imminent war. Both 
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acted as a foundation for marshalling and distributing workers during the First World 
War, particularly in the engineering. shipbuilding and munitions industries (Wolfe. 
1923: 68-69). 
From 1904 to 1914 the private armament manufacturers began to polarise into 
three or four large companies and there was a general decline in the small-scale gun 
trade in the Birmingham district. These companies may have modelled their produc-
tion criteria on the model of the Ordnance Factories. producing on a factory system 
using mass production methods similar to those used at the Enfield Rifle Factory from 
1858, and the Birmingham-based BSA from 1863. Allen demonstrates this through 
census figures: 
"which show a fall in the numbers of persons concerned in the industry 
from 5,500 in 1881 to 4.100 in 1911. Birmingham itself had less than 
3,000 gunsmiths. as compared with about 6,500 fifty years previously. " 
(1929: 191) 
The major emphasis of government policy from 1904 appeared to prepare the 
private sector for any major expansion in time of war, where they could ratchet up 
production in a short space of time. This also appears to be the view of Trebilcock 
(t 975). The opinion of Esher and other committees of inquiry into the outcome of 
the second Anglo-Boer War blamed the general inefficiency of the Army for the long 
delay in achieving any success in the field during the course of the War. When war 
came in 1914 the laissez-faire attitude of the private sector being able to ratchet-up 
very quickly to meet the munitions demand of the Army also proved futile. 
By 1915 the economy of Britain began to move rapidly towards a corporatist 
state. The experiences and economic position of the Ministry of Munitions existed 
totally within a corporatist state but the earlier reforms of the Ordnance Factories, 
including costing and accounting, evolved from a laissez-faire political doctrine from 
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1855. The nineteenth-century Ordnance Factories had reformed themselves in order 
to survive within a prevailing philosophy of laissez-faire. particularly at its most 
dominant points: 1855 to 1870 and 1904 to 1914. 
Part of the problem faced in any historical assessment of the Ordnance Fac-
tories is that much of what has been written tends to be subjective. This may be due 
to the belief that the private sector was inherently more efficient due to the profit 
motive and competitive element. Recent writers also tend to support the premise that 
compared to private armament companies the state-owned Ordnance Factories were 
not efficient. Davenport-Hines (1984). in his biography of Sir William Anderson. 
quotes from evidence given by Sir Charles Harris to the 1919 Committee of Inquiry 
into the performance of the Royal Ordnance Factories during the First World War. 
Harris describes that the management of the Ordnance Factories was: 
" . .. largely in the hands of military officers who in matters of pure 
industrial administration were themselves in the hands of managers and 
assistant managers ... who were not men with engineering degrees ... 
but men grown up from the bench. The general disposition was to 
regard accounts as an unfortunate necessity about which the less said 
the better... When offered to take any information out of the accounts 
which the superintendents and managers might find useful . .. they 
asked for nothing and when put that information before them which 
thought they ought to be in a position to refuse. they made no use of 
it. " (Davenport-Hines. DBB. 1984. vol.l (A-C): 61. quoting from 
PRO MUN 4/6375) 
The document MUN 4/6375 relates to the Committee of Inquiry into the Royal 
Ordnance Factories and in particular the evidence given by Harris as Assistant 
Financial Secretary to the War Office. The actual evidence was given to the Sixth 
Meeting of the Costs Sub-Committee. on 27th January 1919. The piece quoted by 
Davenport-Hines does not relate to the whole theme of evidence given by Harris. 
Although Harris admitted the accounts of the Ordnance Factories "had served a very 
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valuable purpose ... he [Harris[ was entirely in sympathy with the view that sufficient 
use had not been made for them for internal administration". Indeed. Harris con-
sidered that the "foundations of the accounts were absolutely sound and solid. and he 
hoped that in any changes made it would not be necessary to interfere much with 
primary records". Harris praised "the main feature of the Woolwich system of 
accounts" which was "the independent record by the work-taker. and he imagined that 
that stood unchallenged as a primary record" (MUN 4/6375. evidence of Sir Charles 
Harris. Sixth Meeting of the Costs Committee, 27th January 1919). 
The earlier statement quoted by Davenport-Hines was later qualified by Harris 
as a problem faced during "the past four years [When] the ROFs [Royal Ordnance 
Factories] had been separate from the War Office" (MUN 4/6375). 
During the First World War. particularly when the Ordnance Factories were 
controlled by the Ministry of Munitions (1915-19), there was a problem in the 
valuation of work in progress. Harris referred to the work in progress as semi-
manufacturers. There was a difficulty in their valuation, however this had not been 
a problem before 1915. It would seem that the difficulty occurred in the collation of 
appropriate information from the record system, which was an overall problem faced 
by the Ministry of Munitions generally. 
Harris thought that: 
"a great deal could probably be done by abstracting the primary records 
in various ways useful for internal control and for furnishing informa-
tion at the very earliest and most frequent dates at which the managers 
and superintendents could make use of it for the current control of the 
work in the shops." (MUN 4/6375) 
The Chairman of the Sub-Committee referred to the earlier audit of the 
Woolwich accounts system by Morland in 1902, by stating that: 
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"The cost account system at Woolwich was fully inquired into in 1902 
by Mr. Morley of Messrs. Price Waterhouse ... who examined the 
systems obtained at certain private engineering establishments and, 
speaking generally of his enquiry, he stated that: 'The system of cost 
accounting at Woolwich appears as well adapted to obtain the results 
required as that of any works visited. These results differ in character 
from those of commercial houses, owing to the absence of profit 
considerations and to the requirements of Parliamentary Returns' ... 
In 1902, however, the modem commercial system of costing was 
hardly known, since then the developments in engineering costings and 
the recognition of the importance of up to date accounts capable of 
affording short-period results and comparative statistics for managerial 
purposes ... have enormously advanced." (MUN 4/6375) 
Harris identified the time lag as a major factor in accounting within the Royal 
Ordnance Factories between 1915 and 1918. He argued that the delay was caused by 
translating the primary records into a consolidated account in order to process the 
annual Parliamentary Returns. An article on 'Army Accounts past and present', 
published in 1923, stated: 
"It has probably been a very great surprise to many people to read that 
the Army, until a few years ago, had nothing worthy to be called by 
the name of accounts. One can imagine the taxpayer exclaiming, 'What 
no accounts and spending fifty millions a year'. The old method 
completed but one account - a cash statement of sums received and paid 
on Army services - and this was the only account presented to Parlia-
ment. Estimates of expenditure for Parliamentary sanction on the same 
basis. The only control Parliament possessed was in regard to the total 
amount, for the method adopted was to show expenditure under its 
various classes only, without relation to objects." (The Balance, vol. 1. 
no.3, summer 1924: 100) 
At the time of giving his evidence. Harris as Assistant Financial Secretary to 
the War Office, was engaged in the nucleus of a cost accounting experiment within 
the War Office. Accounts 6 Department had been formed at the War Office in 1917. 
Later, in November 1919, the Cost Accounting experiment was introduced into the 
British Army generally, but its experimental status meant that the original cash system 
remained in tandem with the new cost accounting system. The cost accounting 
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experiment in the British Army was terminated in 1925. In 1995, the Treasury 
introduced RAB into all government departments, which included commercial concepts 
of accounting including DEB, accrual accounting, and depreciation provisions. These 
were accounting concepts introduced into the Ordnance Factories by Whiffin and Hurst 
from 1862 onwards. Harris introduced these concepts into the cost accounting 
experiment in 1919 but the traditional cash-based system returned in 1925 and 
remained the major accounting system for Parliamentary accounts until 1995 (Cm 
2929, July 1995). 
However, the assumed inefficiency of the pre-1914 Ordnance Factories has 
been highlighted by the few historians who have researched the British armaments 
industries, or the Ministry of Munitions, and by Lloyd-George himself who became 
the first Minister of Munitions. 
The politics of retrenchment. 1904·1914 
Lloyd George, in his War Memoirs, relates that when he became Minister of 
Munitions in May 1915. he inherited an inflexible system of Army procurement in 
the form of 'the Extract': 
"'The Extract' is a term with an historical origin ... it was an extract 
from the proceedings of the Board of Ordnance which met at the 
Tower ... The Extract was passed from official to official of equal rank 
who were not in a position to give orders to each other. An Extract 
... is merely an order to do certain work. The Extract was backed up 
by [the] MGO. DDOS. 50S. DEOS. IRES and CSOF." (Lloyd 
George. 1938: 351) 
Lloyd George refers to this system as being historical. However. the actual layers 
of alphabetical letters were relatively new. Trebilcock considers that the shell scandal 
of 1915 was due to the retrenchment of Treasury politics from 1904. He considers 
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in particular that the cause of the shell scandal was due to the recommendations of 
the committee investigating government factories and workshops (Cmd 3626, 1907, 
the Murray Committee). The Murray Committee was a Treasury appointed committee 
which investigated government factories and workshops. Its policy was to find ways 
of reducing the size and expenditure of the Ordnance Factories. The overall aim of 
the Murray Committee was to transfer "the expansion and contraction in armaments 
supply on the private armories" (Trebilcock, 1975: 152). 
Trebilcock argues that "historians have not so far seized upon the point, but 
many of the difficulties of the Kitchener Armies in 1914 and 1915 began with this 
Committee" (1975: 152). The Murray Committee had two objectives in mind regard-
ing the problem of armaments output. Murray examined these objectives as follows: 
• "The economy of production in time of peace" 
• "The power of expansion in time of war." (Trebilcock, 1975: 152). 
The overriding economic aim of the Murray Report masked any lessons learnt from 
the second Anglo-Boer War and in particular the shell scandal of 1899, which was 
to be repeated again in 1914, though on a much larger scale. 
However, whilst agreeing in principle with Trebilcock's argument, the Murray 
Committee was not the only cause of the shell scandal of 1915. There were other 
Treasury committees which will be explored shortly. The problem faced by Lloyd 
George first as Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1914-15 and then as the first Minister 
of Munitions, was not historically linked but was due to the Esher Report of 1904. 
Indeed, the Esher Committee examining War Office reconstitution in 1904 is equally 
to blame for the ensuing layers of bureaucracy which confronted Lloyd George in 
1915. 
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The Esher recommendations were far-reaching and indeed did bring the 
governance and administration of the Army up to date. Esher ended the authority of 
the anachronistic Commander-in-Chief. This office was replaced by an Army Council 
of senior military and civilian personnel. together with fifteen subordinate Army 
directorates. 
However. the down side of the Esher reforms reflected the immediate post-Boer 
War retrenched policies in terms of military expenditure versus military efficiency. 
This level of politics occurs after every war and is often Treasury influenced. Under 
the Esher recommendations the military APD and the civilian Army Contracts Depart-
ment were abolished. albeit only temporarily. The mistake of Esher in the abolition 
of the APD and the Army Contracts Department was quickly realised. and the Army 
Contracts Department was resurrected in 1907 and the APD two years later. in 1909. 
due to the persistence of the Assistant Financial Secretary (Sir) Charles Harris. 
The Esher Report also recommended the revival of the office of Master General 
of the Ordnance (MGO). The original office had been abolished during the Crimean 
War in 1855 together with the Board of Ordnance. From 1855 to 1904 Army procure-
ment was the direct responsibility of the Secretary of State for War through his junior 
minister, the Finance Secretary (formerly the Surveyor General of Ordnance). and the 
Director of Army Contracts who was advised by the Ordnance Council. Designs. 
inventions, patents and new lines of production were submitted to the Ordnance 
Council prior to any decision being made, ultimately by the Secretary of State for 
War. Once approved, the Director of Contracts then invited tenders either through 
the Ordnance Factories or from the private sector. The system was flexible and ran 
efficiently and smoothly, given that until the second Anglo-Boer War the role of the 
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British Anny was that of imperial and colonial policing rather than operating in the 
field as a large offensive anny. 
The re-emergence of the office of MGO added an inflexible layer over the 
existing system. Esher's recommendations generally aimed at the restructuring of the 
Anny and its chain of command to compete with the annies of the central powers. 
Much of the philosophy behind the Esher refonns were learnt from the Admiralty 
refonns under Lord Fisher, but Esher suggested that the system of ordnance procure-
ment as laid down in 1855 had outlived its purpose. It was considered that an 
executive officer with technical expertise was required, who could devote all his 
energies to the problem of munitions supply. 
The Conservative Government under Balfour accepted this and the office of 
MGO, together with a new Ordnance Board, was made up of Anny and Navy muni-
tions experts to advise the MOO. There was nothing new in this structure. A similar 
structure had existed until 1855, the then MOO being Lord Raglan. The original 
office of MGO had been abolished in 1855 and was replaced by an Anny Contracts 
Department headed by a Director of Contracts. The post-l904 MGO did not enjoy 
ministerial rank, as did the pre-1855 incumbent, yet there was an understanding that 
both the Anny Council and Secretary of State for War were "to delegate to him full 
charge of munitions supply authority" (Adams, 1978: 10). This was of course without 
ministerial rank, authority or power. 
The resurrected office of the MGO in 1904 replaced the disbanded Army 
Contracts Department. Esher had decentralised the contracting function to each of 
the newly fonned fifteen Army directorates. The 1904 report's rationale behind this 
decision was to have an officer (the MOO) of "executive ability and technical expertise 
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to devote his full attention to munitions supply" (Adams. 1978: 10). However. the 
newly established Army Council and the Secretary of State for War could now 
delegate to the MGO the total role of munitions supply authority for the Army and 
disseminate the contract through the respective Army directorates. 
Esher's plan to decentralise the contract function in the Army by abolishing 
the Army Contracts Department. along with its director. was not practicable. The 
system became confused and there was duplication and inefficiency as fifteen separate 
Army directorates contracted for similar procurement. The Army Contracts Depart-
ment was revived three years later in 1907 as previously stated. but the office of MGO 
remained. This added a layer of bureaucracy to the procurement system which also 
led to inefficiencies, particularly from 1914 when procurement contracts were required 
on an unprecedented scale. The return in 1907 of the Army Contracts Department 
also went some way to explain the intransigence of the MOO in 1914. His authority. 
limited as it was in 1904, was further limited from 1907 onwards. Although the 
Director of Army Contracts was subordinate to the MGO. the process of procurement 
supply was further restricted due to an increased layer of bureaucracy. The Director 
of Army Contracts had less authority from 1907 onwards than he had before 1904 as 
his decisions had to be authorised by the MOO. This ultimately led to the decision 
to take munitions procurement from the War Office and transfer such responsibility 
to the new temporary and monolithic Ministry of Munitions. 
Both Kitchener and the MGO, Major General von Donop, along with the senior 
military and naval munitions officers at the Ordnance Board, "never surrendered the 
view that only professional soldiers were qualified to express an opinion so technical 
as the supply of munitions to the Army" (Adams, 1978: 13). In other words, it could 
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be argued that both Kitchener and von Donop were taking the idea of the soldier-
technologist to excess. Indeed, Adams also observed that "the problem of the Ord-
nance Department in its ability to overcome the munitions shortage began with its 
outlook" (1978: 13). Had the pre-1904 system existed in 1915, the shell scandal may 
have been less serious and the system more flexible to cope with the demands of the 
Great War, particularly the 1914-15 period. 
When Lloyd George as first Minister of Munitions attempted to remove the 
Ordnance Board from War Office control and to infiltrate it with civilian experts. he 
was met by strong protests from the War Office. Indeed. the success of the transfer 
of the Ordnance Board from the retrenched grasp of War Office control was only 
achieved when Lord Kitchener was out of the country on a fact-finding tour in the 
Mediterranean theatre. 
In considering the day-to-day management of the Ordnance Factories from 1899 
to 1915. the prevailing culture and ethos was perhaps more paternalistic than the 
corresponding private sector. particularly the engineering industry. Overall at govern-
mental policy level, the Ordnance Factories suffered from retrenchment policies of 
both Conservative and Liberal governments in the name of economy. 
One of the first steps taken by Lloyd George when appointed as Minister of 
Munitions was to remove the CSOF. Sir Frederick Donaldson. Lloyd George refers 
to Donaldson in his Memoirs as "head of the Arsenal" (1938: 351). In fact Donaldson 
was head of all the Ordnance Factories, not just those on the Arsenal site. Lloyd 
George recognised his talent and appointed Donaldson to a new post of technical 
adviser to the new Ministry. but Lloyd George commented that: 
"Years of routine in tranquil days when time did not count, when shells 
were manufactured to fire at safe targets ... and, above all, ensure that 
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the last penny provided by the estimates should be judiciously expended 
within the financial year, disqualified him for an emergency where 
hours were precious to the safety of the State." (1938: 351) 
In his place Lloyd George appointed Vincent Raven from the London and 
North Eastern Railway, who had no experience of the armaments industry. Adams, 
in his appreciation of both Donaldson and Raven, considered that the Arsenal was a 
"poorly run system [which] could stifle a competent man until he was no use to a well-
run one". He saw Donaldson as a case in point (I 978: 137: note 9: 208). Again the 
contrast between Donaldson and Raven is somewhat misleading. Donaldson was 
CSOF of Ordnance Factories in a peacetime economy. He had to work according to 
the retrenched politics imposed through both Conservative and Liberal policies and 
rigidly enforced Treasury conditions, which will be shortly explained. 
Raven worked in a wartime economy where, by the end of 1915. the Ministry 
of Munitions had adopted an almost 'black-hole' concept of production without 
adequate financial scrutiny or audit as the major objective of the Ministry was to win 
the war, rather than to be prudent with public money. 
Une Vieille Boue 
When assessing the reasons behind the politics of retrenchment within the War 
Office Ordnance Factories. the notable contrast was naval expenditure, a point briefly 
mentioned earlier. 
Ashworth commented that 1905: 
"saw the launching of the Dreadnought which. by rendering obsolete 
every existing battleship. inaugurated a new era in which the world's 
navies restarted competition from scratch and it was the year in which 
reform equipped the Admiralty administratively to cope with a new era 
more efficiently than ever before. " (Ashworth, 1969: 504) 
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The reorganisation and reannament of the Navy under the Fisher refonns were at the 
expense of the Anny. Thus most of the defence expenditure was channelled to the 
Admiralty vote. 
Expenditure on the Anny and Ordnance compared with the Navy from 1898 
to 1914 was as follows: 
" 1 ,000,000 sterling 
Anny and Ordnance 
1898 
1899 
1900 
1901 
1902 
1903 
1904 
1905 
19.3 
20.0 
43.6 
91.5 
92.3 
64.9 
36.7 
29.2 
(Mitchell and Deane, 1962: 397) 
Navy 
20.9 
24.1 
26.0 
29.5 
31.0 
31.2 
35.5 
36.8" 
The upsurge in expenditure on the Anny and Ordnance was due to the second Anglo-
Boer War which was fought mainly on land and not at sea. However. from 1905 the 
Navy attracted more expenditure than the Anny and Ordnance. a trend which con-
tinued to 1914: 
"1906 
1910 
1911 
1912 
1913 
1914 
28.9 
27.2 
27.4 
27.6 
28.1 
28.3 
(Mitchell and Deane, 1962: 397) 
33.3 
35.8 
40.4 
42.9 
44.4 
48.8" 
The logistical rationale behind this policy assumed that any fonhcoming land 
war in Europe would be short and swift. This was modelled on the earlier Bismarck 
wars of the 1860s and the later Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1. The victor of such 
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a European war would be the one with moral advantage and supremacy at sea! 
Unfortunately the order of battle did not proceed to plan and the land war was not 
resolved in a few weeks. The lessons of the Crimean War and the American Civil 
War were not considered in the assessment of any future European war. 
However, as this was the prevailing logistical philosophy from 1904 to 1914, 
it was the Ordnance Factories which bore the brunt. Equally, having an MGO as a 
military officer of non-ministerial rank made him subservient to his political masters, 
more notably the Treasury. Commentators writing on the inadequacies of industrial 
mobilisation and the shell scandal of 1915 have been quick to blame the Ordnance 
Factories and their management for this (Lloyd George. 1938; Adams. 1978; Loft. 
1994; Trebilcock. 1975). The major reason was. however. the trade-off of defence 
expenditure in favour of the Navy. Also. there were growing demands for the 
financing of an emerging servile state as already described. 
According to Lloyd George' s Memoires, there was an atmosphere of low 
morale and inertia within the Ordnance Factories (Lloyd George. 1938: 99-104). 
Little in the way of capital investment had been spent since 1904 to upgrade their 
production processes. The most illogical part of this policy was that in the name of 
efficiencies the Royal Arsenal reserve production capacity had been removed by 
August 1914. The removal of the reserve production capacity from the Royal Arsenal 
may have been identified as a soft target by the Treasury in an attempt to redirect 
expenditure to a growing naval armaments programme and an emerging welfare state. 
No doubt this was achieved with Cabinet connivance. Two officers held the office 
of MGO from 1904 to 1914. Neither registered any protest about the run-down or 
removal of the reserve production capacity of the Royal Arsenal. 
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This is the Royal Arsenal witnessed by the French Munitions Minister, M. 
Albert Thomas, early in 1915. He described Woolwich as "une vieille boite". In his 
War Memoirs, Lloyd George assumed that the system encountered by M. Thomas was 
historical (1938: 100-4, 160-1) whereas in fact it was not, it was only ten years old. 
The adjective description of the Royal Arsenal as "an old shop" only occurred 
from 1904 onwards and was due to the retrenched fiscal policies of the Cabinet and 
Treasury towards the Ordnance Factories. These had been manifest in a number of 
interdepartmental committees sponsored by the Treasury in the wake of the Esher 
Report of 1904 on the reconstitution of the War Office. The interdepartmental 
committees included the Mowatt Committee (1904), the Henderson Comm ittee (1907) 
and the Murray Committee (1906-7). Indeed, the Murray Committee spawned the 
internal Hadden Committee which sat from 1907 to 1910, it was chaired by the then 
MGO, Major-General Sir Frederick Hadden. It was the recommendation of the 
Hadden Committee which resulted in the removal and scrapping of the reserve 
production capacity of the Royal Arsenal, just in time for August 1914 (WO 32/8984)! 
In reality it was the recommendation by the Hadden Committee which relegated 
Woolwich to "an old box", in terms that for the first time the Royal Arsenal had no 
reserve production capacity. 
The creation of the Ministry of Munitions from the summer of 1915 tended 
to obliterate the pre-1915 reforms of the Ordnance Factories. Apparently these 
reforms, particularly in the case of costing and DEB, were 'reinvented' by the 
Ministry. 
The traditional interpretation of the perceived inefficiency of the Ordnance 
Factories probably originated through the War Memoirs of Lloyd George. Here, Lloyd 
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George casts a jaundiced eye on the 1914 Ordnance Factories. The first edition of 
his Memoirs was published in 1936, however recent historians have begun to reassess 
and be more critical of Lloyd George and his Memoirs. Historians are now consider-
ing that Lloyd George, when writing his memoirs in the mid 1930s began to distance 
himself from the events of 1914-18 in relation to the conduct of the war, particularly 
in relation to his position as Chancellor of the Exchequer, Minister of Munitions, 
Secretary of State for War and latterly as Prime Minister (see BBC documentary 
Time watch , September 1998). 
The Ordnance Factories were still in effect very efficient organisations in 1914 
despite a ten-year reign of political retrenchment. In political tenns, the Ordnance 
Factories could still supply munitions to the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) (mainly 
the Regular Anny) in the field for the predicted short European land war. Had its 
reserve production capability remained intact it is possible that the shell scandal of 
1915 would not have been so severe, nor as embarrassing. The increase in private 
finns from 1904 to 1914 also did little to stem the shortage of munitions during 1914-
15. The major obstacle was the layers of logistical bureaucracy that had been created 
since 1904 and the removal of the reserve production capacity. 
In order to appreciate the major refonns in terms of a professional managerial 
ethos which generated within the War Office controlled Ordnance Factories from 1855 
onwards, the remainder of this chapter concentrates on the origins of costing. cost 
accounting and DEB at the Ministry of Munitions. The argument put forward suggests 
that these reforms originated long before 1914 in the Ordnance Factories. 
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The ori&ins of costine and cost accountin& at the Ministry of Munitions 
Referring to an amendment to wartime emergency legislation, A.J. P. Taylor 
suggested that: 
'''the House of Commons did not realise [what it] was doing' when in 
early 1916 it added a clause to the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA) 
concerning the price which the war ministries would pay manufacturers 
for war supplies which it purchased from them. That price was to be 
the cost of making the items in question, plus an allowance for profit. 
This allowance for profit was to be based on the profit usually earned 
by the factory or workshop before the War." (Taylor, 1970: 66: Loft, 
1994: 116; see also Lloyd, 1924: 58-60) 
In assessing this, Loft does not totally consider the difference between the War 
ministries within a corporatist economy, and the pre-1914 economy of laissez-faire 
which the Ordnance Factories originally operated in. Much attention has been given 
to Lloyd George's deputy at the Ministry of Munitions who in August 1915 stated that 
"the astounding thing is that nobody seems to be able to tell us what things cost to 
make" (Addison, 1934: 116). 
One week later, Addison recorded that: 
"I am very relieved to have made proper arrangements for cost account-
ing for the control of the cost of new munitions factories. for revising 
our present tenders and so forth, and I have arranged with Black that 
Lever should be in full charge. I shall be very disappointed if he does 
not save hundreds of thousands of public money." (1934: 119) 
From these statements there is an inference that the pre 1914 system of costing 
for contract was inefficient. In fact it was not. Addison was probably asking the 
wrong people for this information. Time may also have been a factor here as his 
autobiography was written in 1934, some nineteen years after the event. The system 
operated along the theme of efficiency and economy, through the laws of demand and 
supply. This can be seen from the statement by the Surveyor General of Ordnance 
(Lord Eustace Cecil) in his Annual Report to Parliament on the Army Contracts 
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Department, in 1878. 
"Competition is resorted to as much as possible. This is the point at 
which we are most at variance with the proceedings of the commercial 
world. When a manufacturer or merchant finds a producer whose 
goods are excellent in quality, reasonable in price and exactly suited 
to his requirements, he will give that man his orders untillhe condition 
changes. Our system is rather this, that when a man has, by fulfilling 
all our wants, created a monopoly, we try to stir it. This is called 
'buying on the cheapest market', it is the only system which those 
dealing with public money can pursue." (WO/395/1: 3) 
The problem with the laissez-faire system in the first two months of the First 
World War was that it could not compete with the increased demand. The anned 
forces, particularly the Anny, expanded to over 2 million in a short space of time. 
This included Kitchener's New Army which for the first few months of their existence 
were quasi-private organisations. The War Office did not take over many of the New 
Army battalions until well into 1915. The raising of such battalions was only sanc-
tioned on the understanding that their administration, training and accommodation were 
initially the responsibility of their founders and sponsors. In many cases this was a 
local authority organisation. 
From August to December 1914 the original method of supplying the Anny 
through the Army Contracts Department, became an unregulated yet speculative 
market. Prior to August 1914, the Army Contracts Department had a list of approved 
(or ringed) contractors. After August 1914. this system had completely collapsed. 
Many of the New Army battalions were purchasing their equipment and accoutrements 
direct from the supplier and not through tendering via the Army Contracts Department. 
The speculative market was being encouraged due to unlimited demand. but limited 
supplies. Even competitive tendering became speculative tendering. 
It was not necessary for a speculator to possess the goods. All that was 
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required was an option. The banks were more than willing to advance credit on a 
contract that would eventually be settled by an agency of the War Office. An example 
of this practice was made by Lloyd. 
"A consignment of jerseys was bought by a firm of merchants at 
3s.11d. each [19p] and offered to the War Office at 4s.5d. each [23p]. " 
(Lloyd, 1924: 19) 
The Army Contracts Department refused this offer as it did not deal with wholesalers. 
retailers or middlemen but only with manufacturers. The policy of the Director of 
Army Contracts only tendering to manufacturers had originated in 1880. Lloyd gives 
the reason that the price offered was too high. 
"The merchant then sold ... the jerseys to a provincial draper at 4s.11d. 
[24p] each. The draper then sold a considerable quantity of these 
jerseys to various local commands at 5s.1Od. [26p] each and the bal-
ance went to firm of recognised Army contractors who resold them to 
a Territorial force association for 6s.6d. [33p] each." (Lloyd. 1924: 
19) 
Thus, by the latter part of 1914. the Department still sought to maintain their 
traditional principle but this was not easy, for wholesalers could offer stock immediate-
ly whereas manufacturers had to set up production lines and thus a time lag constraint 
existed. Wholesalers could anticipate the Army's requirements and place orders with 
manufacturers before a War Office contract could be negotiated. 
The solution to this problem was to suspend the laws of supply and demand. 
This idea was suggested by Lord Rhondda, later Controller of the Coal Commission. 
Initially no form of nationalisation was agreed upon, but small firms with no experi-
ence of contracting for army contracts were encouraged to do so. They were also 
encouraged to form associations to tender for larger orders. Existing associations, 
as for example the Wholesale Clothiers Association, were encouraged to take the lead 
here. At its 1914 conference, the executive recommended co-operation with the Army 
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Contracts Department in the submission of tenders form their members at reasonable 
prices. The Department, in agreement with the Association for the supply of uni-
forms, at an all-round flat rate, for jackets, trousers and greatcoats. The War Office 
would supply the cloth at fixed issue prices. This method was encouraged by the 
Department so that by the end of 1914 the Association induced its members by 
voluntary arrangement to prioritise army contracts. In place of a continuous piecemeal 
demands and individual tenders, the Wholesale Clothiers Association arranged for the 
fragmentation of the total War Office tenders to all their members so that all got a 
share of the army contracts. This arrangement was planned ahead for several months 
in order to avoid time lags or for production to be switched to private wholesalers, 
who were eventually eliminated. 
From this example, the Army Contracts Department created the nucleus of the 
first stage of national organisation and control of the factors of production, both by 
the War Office and later by the Ministry of Munitions from May 1915. Four prin-
ciples emerged which became the major characteristics of this national organisation. 
• The abandonment of the system of limited competitive tendering. 
• Reorganisation by the War Office of trade associations and their co-operation. 
• The introduction of effective agreements covering the whole of a particular 
trade. 
• The substitution of a general uniform fixed price over a period of time for a 
multiplicity of individual contracts at different prices. 
The origins of the system of cost plus pricing may. therefore. have been 
initiated by the Army Contracts Department, under the reforming zeal of a Board of 
Trade official U.F. Wintour, who was appointed as Director of Army Contracts in 
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November 1914. Wintour had been Exhibitions Manager at the Board of Trade and 
was appointed as Director of Army Contracts in November 1914, an appointment 
approved by Kitchener. 
The embryo of the new Ministry of Munitions was formed in May 1915, and 
the first Assistant Financial Secretary and Accounting Officer to the new Ministry until 
November 1915 was Sir Charles Harris, who fulfilled this post with the equivalent 
post at the War Office. The War Office was responsible for the financial administra-
tion of the Ministry of Munitions until November 1915 (MUN 5/102/400/17). 
Harris was succeeded by Samuel Hardman Lever. who was brought back from 
America to fulfil this role. Lever was a chartered accountant and one of Lloyd 
George's men of "push and go" (MUN 5/103/400/18; Adams. 1978: 40). Marriner 
described Lever as a practising accountant "with extensive experience of cost account-
ing" (1994: 454). 
It was the policy of Lloyd George that the new Ministry should be staffed by 
'men of push and go', insisting that, 
"in the present case the interests of the economy and the safety of 
public funds will be best served by Mr. Lever's appointment in this 
capacity. He alone of the persons who may be regarded as available 
and suitable will have an intimate knowledge of the financial aspects 
of the enormous contracts which have to be made." (MUN 
5/102/400/6 - H. Llewellyn Smith quoting Lloyd George to the Secre-
tary of HM Treasury, 24 November 1915) 
The point being made here is that Lever, though a chartered accountant. may 
have had a considerable knowledge of costings due to his American experience. This 
knowledge was not universally the experience of British professional accountants 
generally. as has been previously stated. However, consideration must be given to 
civil servants both within the Board of Trade and the Army and Navy Contracts 
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Departments who also had knowledge of costings, and indeed cost-plus pricing may 
have been a tool used in the Navy Contracts Department before 1915 (see Ashworth, 
1953: 66-7). The Director of the Navy Contracts Department, Sir Frederick Black. 
was appointed as Director of Munitions Supply within the Ministry of Munitions in 
1915. This was the Black Addison referred to previously. Sir Frederick Black and 
his colleague U. V. Wintour, Director of Army Contracts. were career civil servants. 
It has been recognised by accounting historians that costing was not the remit 
of public and professional accountants, of which Sir John Mann (Lever's successor) 
was one. Loft correctly states that Urwick and Brech acknowledged the limited source 
of texts on cost accounting. This includes Factory Accounts by Fells and Garcke 
which, by 1914, had gone into six editions. Brech (1994) follows an earlier theme 
(Urwick and Brech, 1953, vol. II: 23) suggesting that Factory Administration and 
Accounts, first published in 1914, had a considerable bearing on the introduction of 
costing within the Ministry of Munitions and its agencies. Mann apparently sold 
10,000 copies of Elbourne's book to munitions contractors. 
Elbourne was not an accountant but an engineer working variously for Maxim, 
BSA, Vickers and Thorneycroft. Brech (1994) explains that Elbourne may have 
learned costing techniques whilst in America from 1900 to 1902 although he admits 
that there is no corollary evidence to support this. Equally, Elbourne may have 
learned these techniques whilst at Thorneycroft where he was employed in 1914. 
Thorneycroft was closely allied to the Admiralty and the Navy Contracts Branch (see 
also E.F.L. Brech's unpublished thesis, 1994: 12). There is some suggestion that the 
Admiralty, particularly the Navy Contracts Department, and the Directorate of Naval 
Construction may have used costings in their decisions to place orders either in-house 
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or to contract. Ashworth stated that: 
"the Admiralty had always sought from its appropriate technical 
branches a certificate stating that the price tendered and to be accepted 
was fair and reasonable... In giving these certificates the technical 
branches based their judgement mainly on comparisons between previ-
ous prices obtained by competition and with the costs of similar vessels 
built in the Royal Dockyards." (Ashworth. 1953: 107) 
During the period of the First World War. Elboume was employed as Assistant 
General Manager at Ponders End Shell Works. Middlesex. 
The History of the Ministry of Munitions and later writers of the First World 
War and of the Ministry of Munitions appear to suggest that a system of costing 
existed in the Ordnance Factories before 1915 but without either admitting as such 
nor identifying the origins. For example. Loft relates that: 
"A sophisticated system of costing was developed for the National Shell 
Factories 'which should yield for each process of shell manufacture 
statement of output, its cost in material. wages and establishment of 
charges and the extent to which each of these items was affected by 
faulty workmanship'." (Loft. 1994: 134, Note 8: History of the Minis-
try of Munitions (nd). vol.3, part 2. ch.l: 12-13) 
The official History of the Ministry of Munitions itself does not describe the 
system as being sophisticated. It does suggest that: 
"The new National Shell Factories provided, at least for the smaller 
nature of shell, both material for the ascertainment of costs and a field 
for the application of the results as an index for efficiency ... The 
average cost of each process through which the shell passed was ascer-
tained and the addition of these costs gave the total cost of the shell. 
The costs so obtained are known as the 'Process costs' , as distinguished 
from 'Unit costs'. This method permitted the closest comparison of 
the costs of each operation, not only for each factory week by week, 
but also between one Factory and another. The results thus indicated 
the relative efficiency of the management, and within each factory 
provided the managers with a clue to any leakage or extravagance." 
(History of the Ministry of Munitions (nd), vol.3, pt.2, ch.l: 13) 
There are a number of important points to consider when assessing the origins 
of the costing reforms within the Ministry of Munitions. Firstly is: 
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• That the wartime economy itself allowed for such systems to be developed. 
The powers conferred upon the Government during the course of the War 
through emergency legislation and the quasi-nationalisation of private engineer-
ing cum armament firms, gave government agencies the right to assess the 
contractor's actual costs of production through the examination of his books. 
The History of the Ministry of Munitions acknowledges this point as follows: 
"It is obvious that these Accountancy costs provide a much 
more powerful weapon in bargains. The contractor could always 
argue that the technical estimate did not in fact allow for the 
peculiar conditions under which he worked: and so long as he 
could conceal his actual costs, or (as was frequently the case), 
did not know himself what they were, the dispute could not be 
settled. But from the evidence of his own books there could be 
no appeal." (History of the Ministry of Munitions (nd), vol.3, 
part 2, ch.l: 13) 
• It must be remembered that this intrusion into a contractor's accounts and 
records was not allowed by the Government before 1915 nor after 1918. The 
concept of commercial confidentiality prevailed in peace-time. 
• The war-time measures were only temporary. 
• Evidence from primary source data acknowledges that the Ministry of Muni-
tions inherited a costing system but does not identify the source. The His/ory 
of the Ministry of Munitions suggests that: 
"The Ministry of Munitions from the earliest months of its 
existence practised all the possible methods of arriving at the 
costs of production. The first is technical costing, that is to 
say, the estimate of costs by engineering experts resulting from 
the analysis of the process of manufacture into its elements, and 
the calculation of what the cost of each of these factors ought 
to be in the light of all known conditions. Apart from the use, 
for purposes of comparison, of the Government Factory costs, 
this is the only method which could have been used by a De-
partment before the War." (}Iis/ory of the Ministry of Munitions 
(nd) vol.3, part 2, vh.l: 10-11) 
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• Loft argues that: 
"Another means by which techniques of costing spread was 
through the Ministry of Munitions inspectors and through their 
work with cost accounting." (1994: 124) 
She continues that: 
"In the case of the production of shells. government experts 
developed a sophisticated system of cost accounting for the 
National Shell Factories based on 'special costing fonns·." 
(1994: 124) 
Loft does not identify the origins of what she describes as the "sophisticated 
system of costing" (1994: Note 8: 134). Neither does Loft identify the actual govern-
ment experts. Primary source evidence concerning the Ministry of Munitions acknow-
ledges the existence of costings within the Ministry but provides no clue to its origins 
(MUN 5/107/450/2; MUN 5/107/450/3). 
The origins of the "sophisticated system of costing on special costing fonns" 
may have evolved from a system originally used. although in a simpler fonnat at the 
Royal Laboratory. It is very difficult to substantiate this as primary source data. for 
the existence of such fonns or other documentation are missing. Files relating in 
particular to a Memorandum on the System of Cost Accounting in the National Shell 
and Projectile Factories, and on the System of Accounting at the National Filling 
Factories (MUN 5/107/450/8 and MUN 6/107/450/10 respectively) are found to be 
wanting at the PRO Kew. 
The arguments presented in this chapter are not being based on silence. 
However, taking together evidence that exists and as presented in Chapter 4 and in 
this chapter. the probabilities on circumstantial evidence does suggest that the origins 
of a costing system and DEB at the Ministry of Munitions originated from the pre-
1915 Ordnance Factories. The PRO file, MUN 3, refers to original files relating to 
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National Shell Factories in Britain during the period 1915-19, under the control of the 
Ministry of Munitions. Apart from a specimen. the Rochdale National Shell Factory 
Accounts, the remainder have been destroyed. There is little in this file to suggest 
that the National Shell Factory accounts were any better or more sophisticated than 
the Ordnance Factory accounts. 
However, although both Marriner (t 994) and Loft (t 994) have shown that the 
First World War elevated the status of both chartered and incorporated accountants, 
they acknowledge correctly that costings was not part of a professional accountant's 
remit. But Loft does show that they did in fact learn costing techniques whilst at the 
Ministry of Munitions. But there is little evidence or opinion suggested as to where 
the costing knowledge came from in the first place. 
What appears to be a more reliable influence may have come from practises 
already in use in the Ordnance Factories and the use of the "special costing" forms. 
According to the official history of the Ministry, many private shell manufacturers 
accepted the offer to use these forms at their plants. This made the administration 
of accurate cost records more accurate and efficient (Loft. 1994: 124; History of the 
Ministry of Munitions (nd), vol.3, pt.2, ch.l: 12-13; Loft. 1994: 124). 
However, Loft does not give any indication as to where the "government 
experts" came from, nor how they "developed a sophisticated system of cost account-
ing". Nor does she disclose the origins of the "special forms" (Loft. 1994: 124). 
Also, neither does the Ministry's official history identify these origins. It is argued 
that the origins of the sophisticated system of cost accounting, and the government 
experts. together with the special forms. originated in the nineteenth century Ordnance 
Factories. Evidence of this is to be found in the Morley Inquiry some 40 years 
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previously (particularly Appendix IX, Royal Gun Factory, examples of accounts and 
forms in use in the Department (C 5116) 1887: 535-552). Inspection, sophisticated 
cost accounting systems and accurate costing records all support the concept of 
scientific management and pieceworking. These had been developed within the 
Ordnance Factories from the mid-nineteenth century, as previously related in this 
thesis. The foundations of the costing systems in the Ordnance Factories had been 
laid down by Hurst and Whiffin some 60 years previously. 
Despite a considerable search amongst the PRO documents relating to the 
Ministry of Munitions, it was not possible to trace 'a special form'. Again, if the 
official history of the Ministry made no reference to the origins of the costing systems, 
then the same history also did not relate to the origins of DEB in 1864, which is easier 
to substantiate as it is well documented by Hurst's evidence to the Morley Committee 
of 1887. Instead, the official history stated that DEB had been introduced in March 
1917. 
The document MUN 5/107/450/2 refers to a Report on the Conditions and 
Difficulties of the Ministry Accounts Department, Based on an Inquiry in MFI and 
MF Materials. The Report lists the objectives of the Ministry's Accounts as follows: 
"1. A complete account for each contract made by the Ministry both for 
cash and material. 
2. Store accounts in quantities for all stores held on behalf of the Ministry. 
3. Cost accounts for all factories operated by the Ministry. 
4. A statement of cash payments and receipts by vote heads." 
This Report is dated February 1917 and it outlines the system as operated. 
This included: 
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"a) A system of receipts and payments as distinguished from income and expendi-
ture. This took no account of accrual or expenditure incurred. until a cash 
transaction took place. 
b) The system was accounted for on a single transaction entry basis only with all 
that system implies. 
c) The whole fiscal and operating systems were based. not on open accounts with 
manufacturers, but on contracts. Any transaction which cannot be traced. is 
not covered to a definite contract, or where traced. is not covered by the 
contract is susceptible of record. 
d) All goods are moved on instructions from the operating departments. made out 
on an Issue Warrant, and the evidence of movement is an Advice Note. made 
out in sexduplicate and distributed to the interested parties. 
e) No movement of goods is recorded at the time of its movement but only when 
the cash transaction. resulting therefrom. is made. 
Such is the general theory of the accounts ". 
The second reference MUN 5/107/450/3 in November 1917 relates to "Effi-
ciency in Production". The memorandum by George Duckworth to Lloyd George 
relates to cost accounting. In it Duckworth relates that: 
"this branch of work seems to me to be one of the outstanding 
realisations of the Ministry of Munitions. The system was not. of 
course, actually discovered here, but never before. in this country has 
it been put to such extended use. II 
The Controller of Cost Accounts at the Ministry of Munitions. M. Webster 
Jenkinson. stated in a letter to George Duckworth of 28 October 1917 that: 
"Cost Accounting can scarcely be termed a 'discovery of the Ministry 
of Munitions'. All that has been done is to apply modern costing 
methods to Government Factories; and. by the adoption of price-fixing 
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based on costs, to stimulate proper costing by outside contractors ... " 
(MUN 5/107/450/3) 
One year later in a lecture delivered at the LSE on 9 October 1918. Webster 
Jenkinson stated that: 
"There appears to be a prevalent idea that the Ministry of Munitions 
has either evolved or imported from America a new system of Factory 
Costing, which, through the aid of some mysterious mechanical office 
appliances, enables cost results to be obtained with greater facility and 
more accuracy than hitherto has been possible. 
It may, therefore, be disappointing to admit at the outset. that the 50-
called 'Ministry System of Costing' must be classed in the same cat-
egory as the 'Russians who passed through England in 1914' and 'The 
Angel of Mons' no such special system existed except in the minds of 
certain contributors to the accountancy papers ... 
The distinguishing feature about the costs obtained by the Ministry of 
Munitions is, however, that the results have been obtained month I y. and 
may have been used, and very effectively used, by the management for 
administrative purposes and by the (Anny) Contracts Department in 
fixing prices paid to outstanding contractors ... the Ministry of Muni-
tions has appreciated what so many British manufacturers fail to do, 
viz that efficiency management is only possible if reliable records of 
progress, production costs, and other statistical data are available." 
(MUN 5/107/450/9) 
There are also errors in Webster Jenkinson's account of the American origins 
of cost accounting. There is little doubt that Lever brought into the Ministry of 
Munitions his experience of cost accounting gained in the United States. The ethos 
of Webster Jenkinson's lecture was subjective in an attempt to portray the Ministry 
of Munitions as an innovator and contributor to the war effort. The fact that the war 
was still being fought suggests that an element of propaganda is also tainted in his 
lecture. The warts of the Ministry have been omitted. in order to achieve a public 
relations exercise, which is not uncommon in wartime governments. 
Whilst rejecting the American origins of cost accounting at the Ministry of 
Munitions, he is not totally explicit either as to its origins. However. as Webster 
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Jenkinson was a chartered accountant there is the assumption that he was also promot-
ing the professionalism of both chartered and incorporated accountants as being the 
instigators of cost accounting into the Ministry. 
However, there is ample evidence to refute this. Both Marriner (1994) and 
Loft (1994) have referred to the lack of interest taken by the British accounting bodies 
in cost accounting. Contemporary evidence suggests this too. Again. Miles Taylor 
ACA, in a letter to The Accountant on scientific costing, suggested that in his opinion: 
"Chartered accountants are only now beginning to see the possibilities 
of cost-finding as a vital branch of the profession. How many men at 
the Admiralty, War Office, Ministry of Munitions - or the Coal Con-
trollers - knew the first thing about it? Anyway, we should all be wiser 
for the experience gained during the war. Many of our leading manu-
facturers and distributors are keenly interested, and are looking for 
expert accountants for guidance." (The Accountant, 5th April 1919: 
277 - letter dated 28th March 1919; Loft, 1994: 134, note 11) 
Until 1917 and possibly beyond, the financial administration of the Ministry 
of Munitions was chaotic. DEB was only introduced in March 1917. some three 
months after Lever had vacated the Ministry of Munitions to take up the political 
appointment of Chief Secretary to the Treasury. 
The origins of both cost accounting and DEB at the Ministry of Munitions 
originated from the pre-1915 Ordnance Factories. Webster Jenkinson hinted at this 
in his LSE lecture through acknowledging the contribution made by the Army Con-
tracts Department. One week after his lecture, Lieutenant Colonel James Grimwood. 
special adviser to Harris and head of the experimental Accounts 6 Department at the 
War Office, also delivered a lecture at the LSE on 'Costing in Britain to Government 
Control, Efficiency and Economy'. Unfortunately Grimwood's lecture was not 
promoted or preserved as was that of Webster Jenkinson. However. the Incorporated 
Accountant did publish extracts of Grimwood's lecture during March. April and May 
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1919. The earlier reforms of the Ordnance Factories apparently did not become 
recognised in the Ministry of Munitions but their successor was the cost accounting 
experiment in the Army from 1917 to 1925, pioneered by Harris and Grimwood. 
The introduction of DEB into the Ministry of Munitions = a reinvention of the 
Wheel? 
Evidence related to the inefficiencies in the accounting system within the 
Ministry of Munitions which failed to meet set objectives. This was due to cash only 
based accounting methods, single-entry book-keeping and the maintenance of only 
contractor records (MUN 5/107/450/2). This was occurring in the second year of the 
Ministry's existence at a time when about three hundred and forty professional 
chartered and incorporated accountants had been deployed to the Ministry as temporary 
civil servants (The Incorporated Accountants' Journal. July 1918: 187). 
The official history quotes J. Guy, the Director of Munition Accounts who 
stated that: 
"The accounts were kept by single-entry. upon a system of receipts and 
payments (as distinguished from income and expenditure). This meant 
that the accounts took no cognisance from income accruing, or expendi-
ture incurred. until some cash transaction resulted." (}Iistory of the 
Ministry of Munitions (nd). vol.III. part 1 viii: 80) 
Guy sat on an advisory committee which in 1917 found the following ineffic-
iencies within the Ministry of Munitions. 
Guy commented that: 
"While the whole fiscal system is based on contracts. we find:-
1. That many contracts have been made without record in the Accounting 
Department. 
2. That we cannot trace the present location of many of these contracts 
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with the accompanying letters, nor is there a complete file anywhere. 
3. The modifications are made without report to us. 
4. The prices of sale are made without authority from the Contracts 
Department. 
5. That many transactions occur without contract. 
6. That contracts are made without the purchase price being fixed. 
7. That all the transactions under contracts are not covered in terms. 
especially the all important matter of material supplied by the Minis-
try. " (MUN 5/107/450/2) 
The Advisory Committee recommended the following refonns: 
"The appointment of a proper authority to coordinate finance and 
operating departments, and to see that plans adopted are adhered to:-
a) As to the fonn and distribution of Issue Warrants and Advice Notes. 
b) As to notification in advance of new enterprises 
c) As to fixing of prices on direct sales 
d) As to securing supervision in the use of free issues of materials 
e) To see that all stores are brought under the jurisdiction of a Central 
Stores Authority." (MUN 5/1071450/2) 
Guy concluded: 
"The installation of a double-entry system of accounting capable of 
sectional balancing appears to us to be imperative. Such a system has 
been carefully considered and approved by the Financial Heads of the 
Ministry, but the requirements set out above are conditions precedent 
to satisfactory operation of my system ... " (MUN 5/107/450/2) 
The official history of the Ministry of Munitions records that double-entry was 
recommended by the Advisory Committee in their Report of 9 March 1917 as follows: 
"that the book-keeping system of the Finance department and its 
branches throughout the Ministry be changed to the best commercial 
practice as from 31 March 1917. n (JIistory of the Ministry of Munitions 
(nd), vol.III. part 1. ch.III: 80) 
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Nowhere either in the Ministry's official twelve volume history. nor in the 
surviving records of the Ministry of Munitions is there an acknowledgement of the 
earlier reforms of the management and accounting systems of the Ordnance Factories. 
Indeed the Ministry's treatment of depreciation was similar to that experienced in the 
private sector, a point noted by the Comptroller and Auditor General. who stated in 
his Report for 1917-18 that: 
"the accounts (for the Ministry of Munitions) include for the first time 
depreciation charges which have been calculated from the commence-
ment of operations at each factory; reserves have been created and the 
production accounts have been duly charged. The rates fixed by the 
Ministry vary with the class of the asset. and are stated to be in excess 
of those generally adopted in commercial practice under normal condi-
tions. At certain of the explosive factories depreciation has not been 
charged on plant for periods during which it has been 'idle' ... " 
(Ministry of Munitions Appropriation Accounts, CAG Report 1917-18, 
para.61, MUN 5/106/400/6) 
The oriKins of the cost accountinK experiment and the formation of Accounts 6 
Branch at the War Office 
This thesis has argued that the origins of the cost accounting experiment in the 
British Army came from the nineteenth-century reforms of the Ordnance Factories and 
not from the Ministry of Munitions. The link between the pre-1914 Ordnance 
Factories and the cost accounting experiment was Sir Charles Harris, the Assistant 
Financial Secretary. 
Harris had persuaded Parliament to establish a sub-committee of the PAC to 
inquire into the form of public accounts. He was critical of the traditional system of 
Parliamentary accounts, commenting: "but when you come away from that pure 
question of accountancy, and come to the control of expenditure. then I should propose 
to depart from the cash basis altogether" (BPP, 1918. vol.iv, pp.334: question 220). 
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The Treasury were not totally enthusiastic about change. Sir John Bradbury, 
the Joint Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, defended the status quo, arguing that: 
"In criticising the existing scheme of appropriations of Parliamentary 
grants, it must be borne in mind that the control of expenditure, in the 
sense of securing the various public services are efficiently administered 
at a reasonable cost, was as part of the object which the framers of the 
[new] system had in view." (Memorandum by Sir John Bradbury and 
quoted in the Seventh Report to the Public Accounts Committee, 1918) 
The green light for the cost accounting experiment was given in November 
1917. Accounts 6 Section was established at the War Office to pilot the scheme. An 
incorporated accountant and Army officer, Lieutenant Colonel J.M. Grimwood DSO 
FSAA SWB, was appointed to command Accounts 6 Section and to act as special 
adviser on cost accounting to Harris. Accounts 6 Section had two offices, one at the 
War Office, the other at Woolwich. 
The staff at Accounts 6 at the War Office included five professional accountants 
(including Grimwood) and three professional accountants loaned from the Ministry 
of Munitions, twelve civil servants and three military clerks. The function of 
Accounts 6 was to audit the factory accounts. including the cost accounts of the 
Ordnance Factories. This was a function which had been the responsibility of both 
Hurst and Harris in the nineteenth century and it is argued that the cost accounts were 
similar then as in 1917. 
The function of the sub-department located at Woolwich included the exam in-
ation of wage. store and the manufacturing accounts under the following vote heads: 
Vote 6 Supply Reserve Depot. Woolwich. 
Vote 7 Clothing stores and factories at Pimlico and Marylebone. 
Vote 8 The Army ordnance departments located at Woolwich (the Royal 
Arsenal and at Woolwich Dockyard). Purfleet. Park Royal and the 
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Stationery Store. 
Vote 9 Inspection of the engineer stores and factories at Soho, Kilburn, Crick-
lewood and Teddington. 
Inspection of the Ordnance College, Woolwich and the workshops and 
experimental establishments at Woolwich. 
The sub-department at Woolwich was headed by Harry Douglas Leather ACA, who 
was normally a partner in the Leeds firm of chartered accountants, Leather and Keale. 
The findings of initial research conducted by Accounts 6 Department were 
presented as the Seventh Report to the Select Committee on National Expenditure 
during the session for 1918. The report criticised the non-significant character of the 
then present form of estimates and accounts, suggesting that it contained little value 
for the purposes of control. 
However, the report contained evidence which supported the argument by 
Harris for a total reform of the accounts and the following statements were given to 
support Harris: 
"We cannot make much use of the Appropriation Accounts for adminis-
trative purposes; we rely on the Commercial Accounts ... " (Sir 
Charles King, Comptroller and Accountant-General of the Post Office) 
"If you wish to establish financial control it can be better effected by 
the objective rather than by the subjective scheme. I have always felt 
that the subjective classification, though very simple and convenient, 
did not lend itself to establishing a unit of cost by which you could 
control and compare the cost of one service with another." (Sir H.J. 
Gibson KBE, Comptroller and Auditor-General) 
"I do not think Estimates as furnished in the past to Parliament are 
worth the paper they are written on from the points of view of Parlia-
mentary control." (S. Dannreuther CB, Accounting Officer of the 
Ministry of Munitions) 
Harris concluded: 
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"You cannot get any real control of expenditure by cash issues or cash 
payment excluding such factors as liabilities, consumption of stores 
from stock and things of that sort. You cannot control administration 
by controlling expenses on subjects. If you want to control administra-
tion by appropriation you must appropriate to objects." (Sir Charles 
Harris KCB, Assistant Financial Secretary to the War Office) 
Other problems of the existing system were also highlighted: 
• Classes of accounts are not consistently on objective lines. 
• The total cost of the services for which they provide is not disclosed either in 
Estimates or Accounts. 
The situation was not much better in the contemporary private sector, either 
before 1914 or after 1918. Warren, referring to the Coventry Ordnance Works, as 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, describes how the transition from a wartime: 
" . .. to a more cost-conscious, competitive peacetime regime proved 
psychologically difficult. A.H. Sturdee, given the job of trying to 
make the Coventry Works commercially viable, later referred to his 
difficulties in getting 'the aspect changed from the more generous 
ordnance ideas to the strictly economic basis necessary for competitive 
electrical manufacture'." (Warren, 1998: 182) 
Warren admitted that the problem was a general one. Part of the Cammell Laird 
group was the Sheffield-based Cyclops Steel Works, whose accounting system was 
inspected by Price Waterhouse in February 1918. The objective of this had been to 
establish an accounting system "with a view to the introduction of modem methods" 
(Warren, 1998: 182). The report from Price Waterhouse found that at Cyclops: 
"There was no costing system. The Manufacturing Costs have never 
been properly balanced with the Financial Books... The Time and 
Material Records at Grimesthorpe are very unreliable, and the methods 
of charging Time, Material and Indirect Charges to work are also so 
irregular that the Cost Data hitherto produced must have in these 
considerations alone seriously misinterpreted the actual position... The 
Costs at Penistone are only Annual Costs and are therefore of little 
worth; furthennore, no distinction is made between different grades 
of various products, all being thrown into one set of costs. " (Price 
Waterhouse Report, quoted by Warren, 1998: 182) 
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It is worth comparing this observation of 1918 with the earlier report in 1902 by 
Morland, of Price Waterhouse, into the accounts of Woolwich, as stated earlier in this 
chapter. As with other reforms initiated into industry during the First World War, 
they only proved to be temporary. The management of the Cyclops Steel Works, in 
thanking Price Waterhouse for their report, stated that: 
"After careful consideration we have decided that, owing to the ever 
increasing pressure of war work, it is not possible for us to proceed 
rapidly with any scheme of reorganisation and that the steps taken must 
necessarily be conditioned by the greater urgency of war requirements. " 
(Warren, 1998: 182) 
According to Warren: 
"This perfectly reasonable response meant the company carried over 
a ramshackle system into the next few years, in which a worsening 
operating environment provided a keener test of its efficiency. The 
hopefulness of the early post-war period then passed over into contrac-
tion, to stagnation and eventually to blank despair." (Warren, 1998: 
182) 
Conclusion 
The transformation of the Ministry's management and accounting system, some 
two years after its formation, may only reflect a re-invention of the wheel! In essence, 
the reforms of March 1917, re-discovered the original system within the government 
manufacturing departments that existed from 1862, the original architects being 
H.W.S. Whiffin, J.C. Hurst, and John Anderson. Much of Guy's Advisory Commit-
tee into the internal operations of the Ministry of Munitions only re-invented pro-
cedures recommended for the Ordnance Factories by Monsell (1862, 1863) and by 
Morley (1887). 
A minute written by Mann of 5 March 1917 stated that measures had been 
implemented to carry out the recommendations of the Advisory Committee. This 
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included, to substitute: 
"the contractor for the contract as the book-keeping unit. At present 
each contract was dealt with separately; in future, there was to be an 
account for each contractor, summarising his contracts." (History of 
the Ministry of Munitions (nd), vol. III, part 1 viii: 81) 
These changes have influenced later historians in believing that it was the 
professional accountants, industrialists and entrepreneurs who were deployed as 
temporary higher division civil servants in major government departments, which 
influenced public sector management and accounting during the First World War, and 
in the post-I918 period. Most of these temporary civil servants were employed in the 
War Office, the Admiralty, the Ministry of Munitions and the Coal Commission 
(Marriner, 1994; Loft. 1986, 1988, 1994). These 'reforms' included the revised 
system of management and accounting with the Ministry of Munitions from March 
1917, and the cost accounting experiment in the British Army from 1917 to 1925 
(Wright, 1954). 
that: 
For example. the Controller of Munitions Accounts, Sir Gilbert Garnsey, stated 
"The result was that, as at 31 March this year (1917), the whole of the 
accounts of the various sections of the Ministry were put upon a 
double-entry basis, so that any payment that is made day-to-day does 
not automatically, as it used [to] in the old days, get written off and 
disappear, but it is charged up to the section which as to account for 
it. That is really the sum and substance of the whole difference 
between the accounts on the single-entry basis and on the double-entry 
basis." (History of the Ministry of Munitions (nd). vol. 3. part 1, ch. 3: 
80) 
The official history of the Ministry suggests that the failure of the financial and 
accounting systems was not the fault of Lever, but rather to the enormous increase 
in the Ministry's business. However, Lever had overall responsibility and despite the 
influx of the men of 'push and go' , the structure of the Ministry of Munitions reflected 
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an inflexibility where delegation was found to be wanting (History of the Ministry of 
Munitions (nd), vol.3, part 1: pp.26-27). 
The major points relating to the financial administration of the Ministry of 
Munitions are again reiterated for reference: 
• Until March 1917 there was no proper accounting system beyond a cash based 
single-entry method of recording. 
• The movement of stores and supplies was not centralised, nor were the issue 
of Advisory Notes and Issue Warrants satisfactorily controlled. 
• Records were kept loosely on a contract basis. This led to many errors of 
commission and omission which could not be traced under the existing account-
ing system of single-entry. 
• The existing system was heavily overstaffed, under utilised, causing a duplica-
tion of effort and inefficiencies. This is despite that by July 1918 there were 
about 340 chartered and incorporated accountants acting as temporary civil 
servants in the finance, contracts, accounts and audit departments of the 
Ministry of Munitions (The Incorporated Accounts Journal, July 1918: 187-88; 
Loft, 1994: 125).2 
• The introduction of costing into the Ministry of Munitions was not due to the 
influence of the professional accountants employed there from 1915 to 1919. 
Despite the apparent reforms, there were still problems with the monolithic 
Ministry of Munitions. In a memorandum of 3 October 1917, the chief accountant 
2 In answer to a Parliamentary question in dealing with illegal maladministration at the 
Ministry of Munitions, 'Flapper Finance', it was pointed out that "In the finance, 
contracts accounts and audit departments of the Ministry there are unfortunately less 
than 1 per cent of permanent civil servants, but we have secured the services of many 
businessmen and about 340 Chartered and Incorporated Accountants" (Jncorporated 
Accountants Journal, July 1918: 187). 
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at the Ordnance Factory, Chilwell, Notts (a shell filling factory), reported that the 
invoices received from the Ministry of Munitions were: 
"full of errors and they propose to have a particularly bad one framed 
as a permanent example of the difficulties the Factory have experienced 
in connection with the Ministry's financial invoicing." (MUN 
5/108.450/32 - Papers on Costing in FiJling Factories). 
The Ministry of Munitions only produced its first balance sheet in April 1918, 
some three years after its formation. The use of costing within the Ministry and its 
use in private armament companies was to satisfy wartime measures only in an attempt 
to reduce profiteering. The structure of the Ministry into departmental components 
allowed for cost accounts to be established, albeit by a slow process. There is little 
doubt that Lever's enthusiasm for costing was due to his American experience rather 
than from any involvement with the ICAEW or with British accountancy generally. 
However, the transition into a peacetime government department did not affect 
the Ministry of Munitions but the War Office, and it is argued that the rationale behind 
the cost accounting experiment in the British Army was influenced by the pre-1914 
reforms of the Ordnance Factories and in particular by Sir Charles Harris, Assistant 
Financial Secretary to the War Office. Harris had originally been Hurst's successor 
as auditor of factory accounts in 1894. 
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CHAPTER 9 
Contribution of this Thesis 
Contribution 
Much of the 'bad press' of the Ordnance Factories has been generated because 
little in-depth analytical historical research has previously been attempted. Compara-
tive recent research into munitions manufacture generally (Trebilcock. 1966, 1969, 
1973) or of the Ministry of Munitions in particular (Adams, 1978) tend to rely too 
much on bibliography written by the political masters of munitions production during 
the First World War (Addison, 1934; Lloyd-George, 1938). They assumed that the 
apparent inefficiency of the Ordnance Factories in a period from 1914 onwards, when 
a quick-fix solution of a three-month short war, quickly degenerated into a war of 
attrition which few had foreseen. The previous planning for a European war set 
objectives for munitions production for a war of three months' duration only. The 
events after October 1914, the First Battle of Ypres and the entrenchment of the 
belligerent armies on the Western Front by Christmas 1914 not only made the pre-
1914 Order of Battle plan obsolete but it had failed to identify the sort of war which 
would emerge. Yet there were signs which suggested that a protracted European war 
could be possible. Evidence that this was possible came from warfare fought in the 
nineteenth century including the Crimean War and the American Civil War. Both 
these wars had experienced trench and siege warfare. where prolonged heavy artillery 
bombardment was the norm. Again. both these wars had involved civilian targets and 
casualties. Not least for the British imperial armies was the more recent experience 
of the second Anglo-Boer War. a war which was predicted to last for three months 
and in fact lasted for almost three years. This war also experienced similar tactics 
and weaponry later used on a greater scale during the First World War. The second 
Anglo-Boer War is also remembered for its high losses of both civilians and combatants. 
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Other historians, notably Marriner (1994) and Loft (1986. 1990, 1994) tend 
to be biased towards accountants and change in the wartime Ministry of Munitions. 
The only comprehensive account written about the Ordnance Factories was Hogg's 
History of the Royal Arsenal (volumes 1 and 2), published in 1963. Unfortunately 
Hogg's history is lacking in comparative historical analysis and concerns itself with 
the Royal Arsenal only and not the Royal Enfield Rifle Factory nor the Royal Gun-
powder Factory. Hogg wrote in the style of a chronological regimented history and 
this style is also evident in the official twelve-volume History of the Ministry of 
Munitions. Yet Hogg's history remains the fulcrum of any historical stance including 
the Ordnance Factories because nothing as yet has replaced it. 
Little interest has also been shown by business historians into the state-owned 
Ordnance Factories. It has been assumed that the Ordnance Factories were second-rate 
as compared to the private sector. This interpretation is apparent in Davenport-Hines' 
biography of Sir William Anderson (DBB, 1984: 61-4), as described previously in 
an earlier chapter. Davenport-Hines is quick to quote from the evidence by Harris 
in 1919 which tends to support his premise without taking the whole context of the 
evidence given by Harris, which is very positive about the accounting procedures at 
the Royal Ordnance Factories, a point ignored by Davenport-Hines. Indeed, Harris, 
in his evidence, implied that the problems which did occur during the First World War 
were when the Ordnance Factories were under the political administration of the 
Ministry of Munitions, along with its 340 qualified accountants, recruited as temporary 
civil servants (MUN 4/6375). Scott (t 962) was biased in his history of Vickers, 
particularly in relation to the role of the Elswick Ordnance Works and the abandon-
ment by the War Office of the contract for Armstrong guns. Scott also suggests that 
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Armstrong was sacrificed by the War Office in order to uphold its decision to termin-
ate the Elswick contract. However, no such evidence appears in primary sources to 
support this premise, nor does Armstrong's own testimony to Scott's premise. 
Ashworth's paper (1969) on naval administration in the late Victorian era stands in 
a league of its own in relation to the historical importance of a state-owned institution. 
The Admiralty dockyards were among the largest employers in eighteenth and nine-
teenth-century Britain. Despite this, their role has generally been ignored in any study 
of Britain's economic past. 
There are also too few detailed biographical records in relation to the personal-
ities behind the reforms of the Ordnance Factories. Few made the obituary notices 
of the Times newspaper. The biographical notices in the War Office Staff Lists tend 
only to give their War Office careers. No details are given of education and socio-
economic background. Thus it was not possible to produce a detailed biography of 
ten leading reformers of the Ordnance Factories compared to, say, the contemporary 
railway industry as achieved by Gourvish (1973). 
The overall aim of this thesis has therefore been to present an alternative 
argument to the prevailing one, which is supportive of the private sector. It is argued 
that the development of professional management in Britain was probably more 
advanced in the state-owned Ordnance Factories from 1855 onwards. The Ordnance 
Factories evolved from the post-Crimean War era as relatively modem factory 
production units, supplying a long-run production demand. By comparison, it has 
been shown that the contemporary engineering / metal industry in the private sector 
remained a small-scale craft workshop structure, dominated by the myth of a craft 
mentality. Together also with the small-sized structure of family capitalism in 
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contemporary Britain, modem production methods were not introduced into British 
industrial life until well into the twentieth century. The example of Brunei senior and 
the Portsmouth production line, and his mass production system for boot manufacture 
in 1812. are examples of this delay (Cooper. 1984: 222). 
The management reforms were allowed to flourish in the Ordnance Factories 
as the managerial skills included production innovation, managing labour flexibility 
and research and development. Therefore the flourishing of integrated management 
techniques in the Ordnance Factories included: 
• Costing and accounting systems including DEB from 1864. 
• The production process within a factory system including interchangeability. 
• Scientific management labour relations and flexibility including pieceworking. 
The reforms themselves were in the main accounting-driven. 
The Ordnance Factories themselves expanded during the period from 1855 to 
1914 as weapons technology emerged and developed. In particular, the establishment 
of the pre-1854 Royal Brass Foundry (a workshop) into the Royal Gun Factory from 
1858. was associated with the development of the Armstrong rifled multi-calibre gun 
(ranging from the 6 pounder in 1858 to the naval 64 and 100 pounder in 1864). The 
experiences of the Crimean War and the American Civil War, together with the 
tensions in Europe from 1859 to 1914 exemplified the increase in weapons technology. 
Also, the Ordnance Factories flourished in the doctrine of laissez-Iaire. Public 
funds are not directly attracted to defence expenditure in times of peace. therefore 
there were incentives for internal economies and reforms within the Ordnance Fac-
tories. 
The First World War period reflected short-term change for the British 
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economy. In certain respects the management reforms that are often credited to the 
experiences of the monolithic yet temporary Ministry of Munitions mask the reforms 
that took place in the pre-I91S Ordnance Factories. The assumed innovation and 
reforms of the Ministry of Munitions were only as temporary as the Ministry itself. 
The pre-1914 attitudes of British business and management returned in the post-1918 
era. Indeed, the modern management reforms did not begin to be a permanent feature 
within British economic life until after the post-194S era. 
Part of the interpretation as to why the Ministry of Munitions has been per-
ceived as an innovator of these reforms, together with an assumed inefficient system 
of Ordnance Factories, is due to the retrenched policies as described. Unfortunately, 
this interpretation has been incorporated into the historiography of British history gen-
erally, either through the ignorance of the pre-1914 establishment or through misinter-
pretation. Historians generally, when assessing the shell scandal of 1915, forget that 
the whole strategy involved in the planning of the order of battle (ORBAT) of a 
European war from the beginning of the twentieth century assumed that it would last 
for only three months, a point made earlier in this chapter. 
Regarding management in terms of public policy, concern with productivity 
has historically arisen in three contexts: 
II First, from a focus of unemployment and the argument that real wage 
growth was outstripping productivity increases and so reducing the 
demand for labour. 
Secondly, productivity has come into focus when output has been 
supply-constrained. The First World War, by calling on British indus-
try as a key resource, focused attention on industrial efficiency. 
Thirdly, concerns arising from the perception of a supply-constrained 
economy have led to international comparisons which in turn slide into 
a concern with international competitiveness. II (Tomlinson, 1994: 169) 
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The first concept relates to the laissez-faire economic liberalism which was the 
prevailing doctrine under various shades until 1914, whereas the second concept is 
very much the ethos of the First W orId War. The third concept can be identified with 
the post-1918 era. 
However, other factors must be taken into consideration when assessing the 
inability for the management reforms of the First World War to continue during the 
post-1918 era. First, the concept of family capitalism prevailed until well into the 
twentieth century in Britain (Payne, 1967; Chandler, 1996). Secondly, as part of the 
settlement with capital and labour for the passing of the Munitions of War Act 1915, 
legislation was quickly enacted in August 1919 to return capital and labour practices 
to the status quo as existed in 1914. This was achieved by the Restoration of Pre-War 
Practices Act 1919 which returned certain trade practices including demarcation and 
the closed shop. This Act was also responsible for the removal of women from 
industry in favour of the returning men from the War. Also the 1919 Act statutorily 
imposed differing rates of pay for women, reflecting the assumption that their contri-
bution at work was of lesser value (Howe, 1999: 415). This Act has often been 
ignored by historians attempting to explain the reduction of management reforms after 
1918. The 1919 Act was probably the catalyst for the demise of such post-war 
reforming organisations as the Works Management Association and the Institute of 
Industrial Management and indeed the whole of the rationalisation movement in Britain 
as identified by Wilson (1995: 156). 
The thesis has explored management concepts in decision-making such as 
costing, financial management and accounting (including DEB), this leading into 
production process management, scientific management and industrial relations 
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generally. It is argued that this thesis has incorporated a new insight into government 
accounting. This is an important concept as Anderson has stated that very few 
scholars have "dedicated themselves" to government accounting (Anderson, 1994: 67). 
This point has also been made by Carnegie and Napier (1996). The reason for this 
academic neglect may be due to the assumed simplification of such accounting as 
reflecting a cash input I output only. However, accounting historians have tended to 
ignore generally how accounting reforms interfaced with other managerial components 
such as production control and labour relations. 
The focus of the development on the War Office administered Ordnance 
Factories, especially with regard to their reformed accounting dimensions, drove other 
managerial reforms relating to production process control and industrial relations 
reforms. The catalyst for these reforms probably lay more in the increasing pro-
fessionalism of the civil service from 1853, as was evident from the senior manage-
ment of the Ordnance Factories, rather than from the soldier-technologist which was 
much more apparent in the American federal armories and railroads. 
Great pressure for efficiency was placed upon the War Office in general and 
the management of the Ordnance Factories in particular. An examination of the 
evidence has led to the suggestion that a professional management ethos did emerge 
within the Ordnance Factories from the mid-nineteenth century. From an interpreta-
tion of the evidence, it is also argued that much of the alleged reforms of the Ministry 
of Munitions during the First World War had been introduced in the pre-1914 Ord-
nance Factories. This thesis argues that there is evidence to show that the Ordnance 
Factories from 1855 to 1914 reflected a professional management ethos superior to 
the contemporary private sector, particularly in the engineering / metal industries. 
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In the foreword of the Consultation (Green) Paper on RAB (Cm 2626. July 
1994: iii). the then Chancellor of the Exchequer stated that: 
"Resource accounting will enable managers in departments to evaluate 
the cost of using capital and current resources on an equivalent basis. 
It will strengthen cash management in departments. Crucially. it will 
also provide a much better means that we have ever had for setting 
departmental objectives and outputs in terms of resources used. II 
This statement has been made in the ignorance of history for. as this thesis has 
sought to demonstrate. the principles of RAB were being used quite extensively by 
the managers in the pre-1914 Ordnance Factories. What is unfortunate about central 
government departments in Britain is the neglect shown by economic and business 
historians as to their origins and development prior to the twentieth century. Little 
has been done to analytically research the pre-1914 Ordnance Factories. The two-
volume history compiled by Hogg in 1963 is neither analytical nor in depth. yet to 
date it is the only history that has been compiled. 
The introduction of RAB (or Project CAPITAL as it is called in the MoD) is 
part of a wider programme of both civil service and military reforms. The overall 
civil service reforms began during the 1980s and in particular the Next Steps initiatives 
from 1988. The Next Steps initiatives began to revolutionise the control management 
and finance of the civil service in Britain. In particular the initiatives began to 
introduce a business enterprise ethos with the civil service and central government 
departments. 
The Next Steps initiatives include the restructuring of civil service departments 
into agency status executives. which are managed on a day-to-day basis by a chief 
executive. An example of this from the MoD is the devolvement of the original MoD 
(Procurement Executive (PE) formed in 1971) into the Defence Procurement Agency 
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(DPA) in 1993. Since 1997 the DPA has encroached on the philosophy of smart 
procurement, which includes Integrated Project Teams or IPTs. Each IPT comprises 
civil service and military members and members from industry representing innovator 
supplier and final customer in the development of each particular project. The DPA's 
relationship with other MoD agency users such as the MoD Ships Support Agency 
(SSA) is one of customer or client. 
Other reforms include the devolvement of management strategies including 
devolved budget holders down to intermediary management levels, under the New 
Management Strategies (NMS) which were introduced into the civil service in 1991. 
One year later, in 1992, came the introduction of a revolutionary scheme of public 
sector finance under the public / private initiatives known as the Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI). Schemes involving PFI funding in the MoD include long-term 
contracts to private companies to train military helicopter pilots, maintain MoD 
housing stocks and providing the lecturing and teaching staff at the new joint service 
staff college at Watchfield, Oxfordshire. The introduction of RAB or Project CAPI-
TAL from 1995 onwards is an integrated part of these reforms which will focus more 
on subject rather than object accounting, using conventions recognised by the pro-
fessional accounting bodies. 
Related to these reforms within the civil service are the external international 
events which include the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. 
This has radically altered the role and order of battle (ORBAT) of the British armed 
services. The era of the Cold War tended to stabilise the role deployment and training 
needs for the armed services. Now, however, the armed services need to be very 
much more flexible and to be sensitive to rapid deployment or change at short notice. 
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Equally, the British armed services have been downsized and much more of its role 
has been delegated to the voluntary reserve forces such as the Territorial Army. In 
this context the armed services are now deployed within a similar scenario as existed 
prior to 1914 and from 1919 to 1938. The micro-reforms of the War Office controlled 
Ordnance Factories during the latter half of the nineteenth century which cumulated 
in the Cost Accounting Experiment in the British Army 0917-25) reflected similarities 
with the present-day reforms. However, the demise of the Cost Accounting Experi-
ment in the British Army, as piloted by Sir Charles Harris, failed because schemes 
such as PFI, NMS and executive agency status were a bridge too far from any 
government of the time and subsequently. This is evident from the philosophy behind 
the 1950 Crick Report (Cmnd 7969). 
Historians writing about the Ministry of Munitions (Marriner, 1994; Loft, 
1988, 1990, 1994) tend to highlight the apparent efficiency and success of the Ministry 
on the inclusion of professional accountants into the Ministry as temporary civil 
servants. There tends to be a bias towards the role of accountants and the apparent 
reforms of the Ministry of Munitions, no doubt because both Marriner and Loft came 
from the accounting profession. Indeed, accounting history, in assessing the pro-
fessional accountant, is largely the history of the financial accountant. Management 
accountants have not had the same success historically and, of the financial account-
ants, the glory has always gone to the oldest and "traditionally the most elevated body" 
(Quail, 1999: 122). Again, two points which are often ignored by British accounting 
historians are, first, the fact that "UK business was extremely poor at recruiting for 
management until well after World War Two" (Quail, 1999: 122). Secondly, the rise 
of the British accountancy profession from 1880 onwards is contemporary with the 
- 397 -
economic decline of Britain. 
The failures from 1914 in munitions production have been blamed on the 
apparent and hypothetical long-term inefficiencies of the Ordnance Factories. This 
myth has been allowed to become part of the historiography of British history in any 
appreciation of the First W orId War. The reason why this has happened is because 
so little research has been conducted into the pre-1914 Ordnance Factories. 
The overall aim of this thesis has been to present an alternative argument to 
the prevailing one, which supports the private sector. It is argued that the develop-
ment of professional management in Britain was probably more advanced in the state-
owned Ordnance Factories from 1855 onwards. The Ordnance Factories evolved from 
the post-Crimean War era as relatively modem factory production units, supplying 
a long-run production demand. By comparison, it has been shown that the contempor-
ary engineering I metal industry in the private sector remained a small-scale craft 
workshop structure dominated by the myth of a craft mentality. Together also with 
the small-sized structure of family capitalism in contemporary Britain. modem 
production methods were not introduced into British industrial life until well into the 
twentieth century. The example of Brunei senior and the Portsmouth production line. 
and his mass production system for boot manufacture in 1812. are examples of this 
delay (Cooper. 1984: 222). 
However, there are areas of government in the nineteenth century which could 
also enlighten our knowledge of public sector management and accounting procedures 
generally. More in-depth research needs to be undertaken into naval administration 
from 1834. In many respects, the reforms of the Royal Dockyards and naval 
victualling yards was the model for the reforms of the Ordnance Factories. 
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Indeed, other government trading departments such as the General Post Office 
appear also to be a neglected topic. The Victorian Post Office was possibly the largest 
department in the home Civil Service during the nineteenth century. yet very little 
research has been undertaken in this area. 
Also there is scope for further research to be conducted into the management 
of the Ordnance Factories under Ministry of Munitions supervision during the First 
World War, compared with their performance under Ministry of Supply control during 
the Second World War. 
Ashton (1953), in his volume • Contracts and Finance'. demonstrates that 
munitions procurement during the Second World War was not contracted by a tempor-
ary monolithic ministry but was split between three permanent ministries. The 
Ministry of Supply had been formed by Chamberlain just prior to the commencement 
of the Second World War. Aviation procurement was under the auspices of the 
Ministry of Aircraft Production and the Board of the Admiralty. though notably its 
subordinate, the Directorate of Naval Construction, was responsible for matters of 
procurement of ships and associated matters. Linking these three major ministries 
were Treasury Inter-Service Committees (TISC). The Royal Ordnance Factories 
(ROF) came under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Supply during the Second World 
War. Unlike the Ministry of Munitions during the First World War, each of the 
ministries during the Second World War were given full authority to sanction their 
own expenditure (Ashton, 1953: 16). 
Lessons had been learnt from the First World War from the rather inflexible 
and cumbersome Ministry of Munitions. Prior to and during the First World War, 
both the Directors of Army and Navy Contracts had carried out their respective duties 
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quite independently of each other. However, from December 1920 a Contractors Co-
ordinating Committee was established as 
" ... a result of a Cabinet decision which stated that the object was 'to 
secure economy and eliminate the forcing up of prices by competition' 
among the three Service Departments. Membership was originally 
limited to the Directors of Contracts of the Service Departments, who 
took the Chair in rotation, but in 1927. at the suggestion of the Esti-
mates Committee ... it was extended to representatives of the Treasury , 
the Post Office and the Office of Works. II (Ashton, 1953: 25) 
It is unfortunate, however, that no reference has been made by previous historians of 
the First and Second World Wars, including Ashton, relating to armament and 
munitions manufacture of the pre-1914 Ordnance Factories. Most references to the 
pre-1914 Ordnance Factories are directed at Hogg (1963). Sadly, Hogg's work is very 
regimented and lacks analytical discourse. This promotes the concept that the Ord-
nance Factories were therefore inefficient. The major objective of this thesis has been 
to address this shortcoming. 
Again, the focus of this thesis has been to address the experiences of the state-
owned Ordnance Factories in relation to their organisational business and management 
roles and experience. Comparisons with contemporary private sector organisations 
can be useful to future researchers in business history generally rather than the military 
historian. Other comparative studies of the Ordnance Factories of the second half of 
the nineteenth century compared with the contemporary Naval Dockyards could 
exemplify research not only into allied private sector institutions but also in our current 
understanding of the First World War period. 
This research has proved that the aspect of management of a public sector 
institution such as the War Office controlled Ordnance Factories in the nineteenth 
century is far from simple. Again, the survival of the Ordnance Factories and the 
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Royal Dockyards in an era of economic liberalism was due mainly to internally 
sponsored reforms which were implemented mainly by civil servants supported by 
soldier-technologist superintendents, in order to satisfy the best practice of private 
enterprise. By this strategy both the Ordnance Factories and naval dockyards survived 
in the era of laissez /aire. 
This thesis has explored the transition of munitions production in the War 
Office controlled Ordnance Factories from workshop to factory production from the 
mid-nineteenth century onwards. The transition was established in a very short time 
span, spurred on by the failures learnt during the Crimean War (1854-56) and the 
increased development in weapons technology, notably the multi-calibre rifled Arm-
strong and Fraser guns, and the introduction of interchangeability production processes 
first at the Royal Small Arms Factory, Enfield and the Royal Laboratory, then at the 
Royal Gun Factory. Such transitions in institutional and production processes were 
conducted in a post-Crimean War period and in a harsh political climate of economic 
liberalism which prevailed throughout the nineteenth century. This was a positive 
attribute towards the mainly internal refonns of the Ordnance Factories from 1855 
onwards. 
These refonns were similar to those experienced in America though of course 
these were on a much larger scale, encompassing more types of industry. The 
Ordnance Factories themselves as public sector institutions were totally divorced from 
the smaller scale family capitalism ethos of the private sector in Britain. This thesis 
will have made a useful contribution if it has shown that public sector industrial 
activities are not ipso facto less efficient than those in the private sector. 
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